Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations by Brocades Zaalberg,Thijs W.
www.ssoar.info
Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or
Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace
Operations
Brocades Zaalberg,Thijs W.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Monographie / monograph
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
OAPEN (Open Access Publishing in European Networks)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
, (2005). Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations..
Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univ. Press. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-272295
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Soldiers and 
Civil Power
Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities 
in Modern Peace Operations
Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg
amsterdam university press
Since the end of the Cold War, peace operations have become the core focus of 
many Western armed forces. During these operations, the division between civil and 
military responsibilities often rapidly blurs.
Within military circles and among policy makers there is a continuing debate 
regarding the scope of the military in stabilizing war-torn societies. Should the 
military, who train primarily for combat, pursue a policy of strict segregation 
between the ‘military sphere’ and the ‘civilian sphere’, or should it become involved 
in ‘nation-building’? Should soldiers be allowed to venture into the murky arena of 
public security, civil administration, humanitarian relief, and political reconstruction?
In Soldiers and Civil Power, Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg uses military records and  
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primarily on the experiences of Dutch, Australian, and American forces, he reveals 
large gaps between the tactical level of operations, strategic decision-making and 
military doctrine. By comparing peace operations to examples of counterinsurgency 
operations in the colonial era and military governance in World War II, he exposes 
the controversial, but inescapable role of the Western military in supporting and 
even substituting for civil authorities during military interventions. 
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Introduction
The adage that any military plan is only as good as the assumptions that underlie
it is a central theme in this book. During international interventions in civil wars in
the 1990s in Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, the reaction of warring par-
ties and the local population to initial military success – or failure – often proved
unpredictable. Intervening forces tended to fall victim to the law of unintended con-
sequences which, during times of chaos, operates at exponential levels. This study
examines how the unintended consequences of the presence of a new source of
power in a war-torn society placed high demands on the flexibility of military com-
manders on the ground. In each of these peace operations, the mission they had set
out to perform steadily shifted beyond its original parameters. 
In conventional war, waged by military adversaries with similar weapons and
methods, the destruction of the main forces of the enemy has always been the ulti-
mate and seemingly straightforward military goal. In this type of military operation,
for which soldiers spend most of their time preparing, adaptability to unexpected
tactical moves by opposing forces on the battlefield has always been one of a field
commander’s most valued skills. In the sort of military operations most Western sol-
diers found themselves in during the 1990s, the ‘next move’ of what could be con-
sidered the ‘enemies of the peace’ (or anyone opposing the goals of the foreign pres-
ence) was most often made in the civilian sphere. Moving into this murky arena has
often been discarded as ‘mission creep’: the real or perceived progression of the mil-
itary role beyond its original military parameters. However, in all its different man-
ifestations throughout the 1990s, ‘mission creep’ came to be a requirement to reach
any level of success rather than the doomsday scenario it was often made out to be
by those favoring a strict separation of the military and the civilian spheres.
On 30 November 1942, while leading the Allied military forces in battle against the
Axis in North Africa, General Dwight D. Eisenhower lamented in a letter to Gener-
al George C. Marshall: ‘The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are out-
side the military scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes think I live ten years each
week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.’1 The
responsibility for administrating conquered territory in North Africa had been dele-
gated to a variety of American civilian governmental institutions that, troubled by
bureaucratic infighting and unable to oversee and control the recalcitrant Vichy French
colonial administration, had frustrated Eisenhower’s war effort. Consequently he was
11
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consumed by civilian matters that he sought to avoid. The Supreme Allied Comman-
der’s complaints about the civilian responsibilities he wanted to discard, but which
he nonetheless had to manage, were instrumental in convincing Franklin D. Roose-
velt to invest in the military commander full governmental responsibility over liber-
ated and occupied territory for the remainder of the war. 
The US President had until then been hesitant to allow soldiers to assume these
civil powers, something he considered as conflicting with America’s democratic stan-
dards, which prescribed keeping the military subservient to civilian rule. For the
remainder of the war Eisenhower was enabled to delegate all civil authority to a spe-
cialized ‘civil affairs’ organization. The establishment of this separate military organ-
ization of many thousands of mainly American, British, and other Allied civil affairs
personnel under Eisenhower’s full command allowed him to control conquered ter-
ritory. Officers and men with specific civil affairs training helped establish public
order, managed the flow of refugees, prevented disease and exploited the host nation’s
logistical and infrastructural resources in support of the war effort. This enabled the
commander and his combat units in Italy and northwestern Europe to focus exclu-
sively on the tasks that lay ahead of them and that were considered inside the mil-
itary scope – fighting and defeating the enemy. 
More than fifty years later, Eisenhower’s complaints to Marshall resurfaced with-
in NATO’s military community. At the time, the military alliance was participating
in a peace operation for the first time since the Cold War’s end. In Bosnia, an impres-
sive peacekeeping force of close to 60,000 heavily armed troops helped put an end
to the war that had been raging in previous years in Bosnia by interposing them-
selves between the warring parties. Confronted with this new operational environ-
ment, the Atlantic Alliance started to seriously consider creating an operational capac-
ity for civil affairs, or civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), as the related concept was
known during the years when NATO planned and trained exclusively for its own ter-
ritorial defense against a possible Soviet invasion. While the American military had
retained a civil affairs organization of approximately 5,000 personnel since the Sec-
ond World War, consisting mainly of Army reserves, European armies had no des-
ignated military capacity for CIMIC or civil affairs while they were preparing for con-
ventional battle on the West German plains. The potential civil problems likely to
arise from maneuvering with large armed formations were arranged through a series
of formal agreements with the sovereign states of northwestern Europe and with
local governments, particularly in Germany. No military occupation by NATO forces
was anticipated. CIMIC was expected to present a primarily logistical challenge and
its practical handling was delegated to military personnel that temporarily filled these
posts and did not specialize for this, as their American colleagues did. 
Traditional NATO CIMIC was thus geared strictly towards facilitating convention-
al military operations by clearing civilian ‘obstacles’ such as refugees and by exploit-
ing civilian resources for military purposes. The effort was supported by a number
of dedicated logistical capabilities such as the European Central Pipeline System that
provided for the modern armies’ insatiable need for fuel. All this was possible because
Europe’s armies were not preparing to conquer and occupy foreign territory. The
12 soldiers and civil power
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American civil affairs branch was also largely occupied by preparations for these
CIMIC-type tasks in support of conventional warfare in the defense of Europe and,
while keeping its civil affairs organizational structure in place, disregarded much of
its ability to perform military governance in occupied or liberated territory. 
Interaction between soldiers and civilians was of course not limited to military
operations as planned on the Cold War battlefield in Europe. In the course of the
twentieth century, however, most Western democracies and their military forces came
to regard military support to, or substitution of, civilian authorities as not just an
abnormality, but also highly undesirable. While military forces were never enthusi-
astic about their involvement in public security and mostly tried to stay away from
duties supporting or substituting for the police and civil administrations in estab-
lishing internal order, modern armies became almost completely dissociated from
what can generically be called ‘internal security operations.’ This process took place
at a far quicker pace in most armies’ home countries, where police rapidly profes-
sionalized, than during military operations in colonies and other overseas interven-
tions. Here, the European colonial powers and their military forces had all suffered
the frustrating experience of wars of decolonization in a highly unpredictable envi-
ronment, often with no clear dividing line between soldiering and policing or civil-
ians and combatants. The only European power that reached a certain level of long-
term success in fighting insurgencies in their former colonies was the United King-
dom. The British, with a long history in these ‘counterinsurgency’ operations, had
grown well aware that any level of success in these operations depended on close
civil-military cooperation, since military goals could not be isolated from those of the
colonial administration and police. The US military had had its own traumatizing
experience in Vietnam that would continue to structurally influence its conduct of
operations in the decades that followed. 
The operational environment was well known to soldiers when they prepared for
defending their own or allied land in a NATO role. Armies such as that of the Nether-
lands had trained to operate on a particular patch of German soil for decades, and
the professional officers knew every road and tree they would encounter. Most of
their professional careers were spent in barracks and on military practice grounds
where no civilians would interfere. A soldier’s life within most Western military
establishments in the 1970s and 1980s was relatively predictable, and most of the
armed forces were very comfortable with this situation.
All this changed drastically at the Cold War’s end. The armed forces within NATO
were suddenly confronted with rapidly rising demands to engage in expeditionary
operations, now in a new role as peacekeepers. While the end to superpower rival-
ry facilitated solutions to some long-lasting civil wars, or ‘intra-state wars,’ in coun-
tries such as Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador and Cambodia, it had also unleashed
other powers, mainly ethnic nationalism, that would create new internal wars in the
Balkans and elsewhere. In this new role, which was often accepted grudgingly, sol-
diers once again found themselves in unpredictable territory. All of the countries in
which they operated suffered from the devastating effects of war and were often
devoid of properly functioning civil institutions and civil infrastructure. The civilian
introduction 13
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population of the areas involved also proved unpredictable in their attitudes towards
the foreign soldiers, in spite of the foreigners’ predominantly helpful intentions. 
When the call was made to revive CIMIC from its dormant state in the Cold War
years and create a specialized operational capability, those proposing the need for a
dedicated capability selected Eisenhower’s words with a clear purpose in mind. When
proposing to have the civil-military interface managed by military professionals, ‘get-
ting rid of questions outside the military scope’ was presented to underline CIMIC’s
direct support of military operations, both in combat operations and now in peace
operations.2 The quote started to have a life of its own in military circles, because it
suited the purposes of those enthusiastic about the creation of a CIMIC capacity. In
the previous decades, Eisenhower’s emphasis on the operational value of civil affairs
had often been repeated by civil affairs officers in the United States for exactly this
same reason. The Americans now transferred to their European partners their knowl-
edge of how to make a case within a combat-oriented organization that tended to
look at this hybrid civil-military organization with a certain degree of suspicion. 
In the Balkans, only the US Army was capable of deploying the hundreds of civil
affairs personnel believed to be required for smoothing out relations between the
local population and local and international civilian institutions in order to permit
the military force to focus on separating the warring parties. As this proved a seri-
ous drain on their Army reserves, the Americans were the primary driving force
behind the creation of a European CIMIC capacity within NATO. By and large, NATO
member states went along with the view that there was a need for a specialized
CIMIC capacity.3 The question was: What form would it take? 
After peace agreements had been signed by the various warring factions in coun-
tries such as Cambodia and Bosnia, the responsibilities for overseeing governing
structures, economic reconstruction, monitoring or reforming the local police and
holding elections was delegated to international civilian agencies, often within the
framework of the United Nations. Meanwhile, a share of the humanitarian aid and
reconstruction would be taken by non-governmental organizations, although their
contribution to the grand total of aid provided has often been overestimated.4 The
military mission in these ‘complex peace operations’ was commonly planned to be
limited to keeping the warring parties in check by separating and possibly disarm-
ing and demobilizing them, thereby creating a safe environment in which the civil-
ian organizations could perform their work.
In peace operations aimed at ending internal wars, the overall intent was to keep
the mission ‘purely military,’ just as they had been in more traditional peacekeep-
ing operations. Traditional UN peacekeeping during the Cold War years had mostly
been limited to solving conventional ‘inter-state wars,’ by separating the armies of
two sovereign nations along a status quo line. However, the agencies designated to
assume the civilian part of the mission in the new ‘second-generation peacekeeping’
operations were often unable to deploy rapidly and in sufficient numbers.5 Where-
as the military had rapidly deployable units, international civilian organizations had
to draw personnel from all corners of the world and build up on the spot. In coun-
tries affected by grueling civil wars, local government agencies responsible for admin-
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istration and public services were in ruins, had fled or were simply dysfunctional,
repressive and corrupt. The absence or malfunctioning of the public security triad
of police, judicial and penal organization was often a problem that particularly affect-
ed the work of the international soldiers on the ground. The absence, slow deploy-
ment, or insufficient capabilities of an international police force caused a ‘public
security gap’ to emerge, and frequently resulted in calls made on the military pres-
ence to support them, or even to step into the void by conducting law-and-order oper-
ations. Eight months after NATO’s military force had arrived in December 1995 in
Bosnia, the unarmed UN civil police monitoring force was finally fully deployed. It
faced a highly politicized police force that had swelled to three times its pre-war size
by the war-hardened former combatants, clad in fatigues and armed with Kalash-
nikovs. Four years earlier in Cambodia many thousands of former combatants, often
in possession of their weapons, simply blended in with the local population and were
even harder to control while they resorted to thievery and extortion to provide for
their needs. In Somalia and Kosovo there was almost total anarchy with no police
and no government institutions at all when the international military forces arrived.
As the division between civil and military responsibilities rapidly blurred in peace
operations, a debate erupted within military circles and among policymakers about
what was, and what was not, outside the scope of the military. Were soldiers, who
had focused on defending the Alliance’s territory and had – like their governments
– perceived their job as proceeding in a purely military domain, to become involved
in what was often called ‘nation building’? Would this entail the provision of the
means of civil reconstruction and development, regardless of the needs of the mili-
tary commander while performing his military mission? Should the envisaged seg-
regation between the ‘military sphere’ and the ‘civilian sphere’ be lifted, and would
soldiers be allowed to venture into the murky domain of public security? In the case
of the American-led intervention in Bosnia, the answer to these questions was clear-
ly negative. 
After earlier debacles in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, the early successes of
NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia had a profound influence on the
perception throughout the military ranks and in policymaking circles about the future
of peace operations. By taking the political and military lead in the Balkans, and by
deploying with overwhelming force to successfully separate the warring parties, the
Americans helped restore the thoroughly battered confidence of the Europeans in
peacekeeping. Within the US military, the operation played an important role in over-
coming the trauma it suffered as a result of their own intervention in Somalia. It
was no coincidence that the protagonists of a CIMIC capacity referred to the words
of the American IFOR Force Commander, Admiral Leighton Smith, to underline
that, like Eisenhower, contemporary force commanders saw the need for this organ-
ization. Smith admitted when addressing personnel of the specialized CIMIC Task
Force in Bosnia in April 1996 that, in the previous November, ‘we had never heard
of CIMIC, we had no idea what you did.’ He proceeded by emphasizing that ‘now
we can’t live without you.’6
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Despite the Force Commander’s enthusiasm for civil-military cooperation as a
specialized function, cooperation between the military and the main international
civilian branches in Bosnia has nonetheless been considered the weakest link in the
combined effort to bring a lasting peace in the ethnically divided Balkan state. The
problematic civil-military relationship contributed substantially to the early stagna-
tion of the peace process. Three years later in Kosovo, the Atlantic Alliance found
itself yet again deploying an impressive military force with the intent of solving anoth-
er ethnic conflict. This time, British Lieutenant General Sir Mike Jackson was at the
helm of the military component of a combined civil-military effort to control and
stabilize this province where the challenges looming in the civilian power vacuum
far exceeded those in Bosnia. Yet, whereas NATO had started to develop new CIMIC
doctrine and a capacity in the preceding years, the British commander did not opt
for the establishment of a designated CIMIC Task Force to manage the problems
that were likely to arise in the civilian sphere. Civil-military cooperation has never-
theless been regarded as far more successful in Kosovo than in Bosnia. During the
United Nations mission in Cambodia earlier in the decade, there had been no ‘CIMIC,’
but gradually soldiers and civilians reached levels of cooperation that exceeded that
of most other operations during the 1990s. Without a special civil affairs capability,
some military contingents came close to governing part of Somalia in 1993. Differ-
ent attitudes towards civil-military interaction in military operations far exceeded the
influence of formal arrangements on the approaches taken by soldiers. 
This historical study, although initiated as research into civil-military cooperation,
is therefore not primarily concerned with the concepts of CIMIC and civil affairs.7
Instead, this book is about missions and the changing roles of military forces in the
early phase of operations. Particularly in this phase, the methods and objectives of
an intervention tend to be ill-defined as a result of political and military leaders’ incli-
nation in the 1990s to treat the military and civilian spheres in peace operations as
distinct and separate, while in reality, they overlapped and merged. The desire to
segregate ‘military security,’ the separation of warring parties, from ‘public security,’
the protection of the population from aggression other than direct military violence,
often resulted in a large gap between the originally assigned mission and the actu-
al challenges faced by tactical units on the ground. This gap, and the predominant-
ly improvised process of bridging it, is analyzed in detail in three case studies into
the endeavors of individual battalions on the ground in Cambodia, Somalia and Koso-
vo. The book explores the choices and responses of battalion commanders and the
seven to nine hundred soldiers under their command.8 It also looks at the interac-
tion between the tactical commander and the force commander at the operational
levels of command. Larger questions of strategy and policy are discussed when they
affect operations in the field. 
From these three cases at the tactical level, a series of questions arise: What drove
local commanders to assume ever more responsibilities on the borders, or maybe
even beyond the parameters of the original mission? What caused this expansion of
the mission to be feared by political and military leaders, and often discarded as
‘mission creep,’ while the tactical commanders who flexibly interpreted their mis-
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sion were often very successful? Why did different commanders interpret the same
mission differently? In each of the operations, military tasks moved beyond cooper-
ation and even past support to civilian actors, often to a point where soldiers were
substituting for civilian authorities or organizations. Did soldiers assume the role of
policemen? To what extent did soldiers become governors by default in Somalia and
Kosovo? 
From an analysis of a fourth case, NATO’s operation in Bosnia, which focuses on
the operational level, the question emerges as to why an attempt was made to delib-
erately segregate the civilian and military spheres in peace operations. How did the
American military paradigms and traditions influence the overall military approach
to the civil-military interface on both sides of the Atlantic? What was the primary
cause of the incongruity between the professionalism of the civil affairs branch with-
in American military and the actual handling by the US military forces of civil-mil-
itary operations once deployed in overseas operations? Was there a fundamentally dif-
ferent British approach to civil-military interaction in peace operations and can its
sources be traced to different military traditions? Analyzed chronologically, these four
military operations allow us to discern some key aspects of the rapid development of
peace operations as a practice in the course of the 1990s. The overarching question
that emerges from the cases examined is why the military roles that had been planned
as separate support functions in the margins of military operations came to assume
a central and pivotal position during the execution of these missions. 
The reason for the scrutiny of such recent military history stems from the prevail-
ing perceptions of this problem in policy, military and academic circles. The practi-
cal problems emerging on the threshold of the military and civilian spheres during
peace operations in the 1990s appeared new and alien to the Dutch, as well as to
most other Western military establishments. This study originates in the require-
ment to place the subject, which had grown to some prominence when it began in
the year 2000, in a broader historical context in order to grasp its significance. 
Perceptions of CIMIC as a concept and capability in the Netherlands and other
NATO countries tended to be rather ambivalent. For instance, on the one hand, the
Dutch armed forces had taken a leading role in creating an elaborate CIMIC frame-
work within NATO with hundreds of specialist functions that was modeled to a large
extent on the American civil affairs organization. As in conventional warfare, its pur-
pose was presented within the military by emphasizing the traditional operational
use to the field commander while performing his military mission.9 On the other
hand, the way in which CIMIC has been portrayed by policymakers as well as
researchers in the Netherlands has been to emphasize the role soldiers played in
supporting or directly performing humanitarian work and reconstruction in coun-
tries affected by war. Doing small-scale reconstruction projects became the focal point
in the representation of CIMIC as it was the most tangible, and as I will argue, most
welcome image for most politicians and generals. A third and important argument
embraced by both policymakers and the military leaders was the value of such aid
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projects to ‘force protection,’ by creating favorable attitudes towards the force from
the local population. I argue that each of these three points of departure, that of
CIMIC clearing civilian obstacles for the commander, that of the soldiers as human-
itarians or ‘nation builders’, and the argument related to force protection, have con-
tributed to a marginalizing of a subject that had much broader implications for sol-
diers while performing internal security operations. 
The interaction of soldiers and their civilian environment during peace opera-
tions has attracted substantial attention in academic circles, mainly from political sci-
entists and other social scientists. Also here, the focus has to a large extent been on
military involvement in the humanitarian sphere, with a particular emphasis on the
troubled relationship between the military and NGOs in peace operations. Rhetoric
such as ‘strange bedfellows,’ ‘a marriage of reason,’ ‘worlds apart’ and ‘living apart
together,’ has been used in titles of books and articles to emphasize the cultural
divide between the two parties that are compelled to cooperate. The theme of ‘the
soldier as humanitarian,’ captured by photos of husky soldiers in a war zone with
small local children on their arms, has often provided cover photos for relevant books.
This relationship between the military and the humanitarian community has been
analyzed in many important scholarly publications.10 However, this humanitarian
focus has distracted attention from the even more thorny issue of soldiers assum-
ing various degrees of civil authority, most often by default, as an integral part of
their overall security operation. 
The more general argument that civil and military goals in modern peace oper-
ations and other forms of outside intervention have become entangled is, of course,
not virgin territory. Several valuable studies have addressed this subject, often with
the specific aim of providing a framework or guidelines for policy decisions and
future military operations.11 For the specific American military vantage point on civil-
military operations, US Army Lieutenant Colonel John T. Fishel wrote an important
book in 1997 about the American interventions in Panama, Iraq, Somalia and Haiti,
and the cooperation between soldiers and particularly American civilian agencies. In
an early phase of my research I was influenced by his statement that ‘the purely
military does not exist,’ but that the notion that political rather than military objec-
tives dominate had ‘only been accepted grudgingly, if at all, by the American mili-
tary.’12 Fishel, however, focuses on the inseparability of America’s strategic-political
goals and military objectives on the operational level, and emphasizes the specific
value of civil affairs for the longer-term reconstruction and stability of these coun-
tries. Much scholarly interest is also focused on the merits and dangers of the use
of military force for the sake of democracy.13 A recent study by the RAND Corpora-
tion called ‘Nation Building: The Inevitable Role of the World’s Only Superpower’
has made an important attempt to convince American policymakers that if the polit-
ical decision is made to intervene militarily, politicians had better contemplate the
long-term consequences: a lot of military manpower, many resources, and patience
are required to stabilize and reconstruct what has been upset.14 Most of the existing
academic research, however, takes the strategic and operational levels as a starting
point and tends to distill the examples from the technical level, that of the soldiers
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on the ground, to underline the value or dangers of the choices made. This histor-
ical narrative, in contrast, seeks to reconstruct three operations in Cambodia, Soma-
lia and Kosovo primarily at the battalion level. There is little empirical research into
this tactical level of operations and few studies have combined different missions in
order to draw generalizable conclusions on changes and continuity in the nature of
soldiering as a result of the converging civil and military spheres. 
The book’s structure relies on four sections. Part one analyzes how during and imme-
diately after the Second World War, and during counterinsurgency campaigns, mil-
itary forces addressed the interaction of their civilian environment in relation to their
military operations. Its purpose is to provide a frame of reference for the analysis of
peace operations in the 1990s and to underline continuity in the challenges military
forces found in supporting and substituting civil authorities. Chapter one traces civil
affairs and military government as practiced by the Western Allies in the European
theater of war during the Second World War. It highlights the practical choices made
concerning the employment of civil affairs units and traces the shift from a prima-
rily supportive function, to a more central position for military government once the
Allied forces became essentially an internal security force. Chapter two analyzes how,
in the colonial context, military forces adapted to insurgencies, and focuses on the
emergence of a distinct British approach to counterinsurgency, in which civil-mili-
tary cooperation assumed a pivotal position down to the lowest levels of command.
It further examines how, for various reasons, American forces were employed dif-
ferently in Vietnam and proceeds to explain how after these wars, while preparing
for conventional battle in Europe, the Western military came to perceive their role
as taking place in an exclusively military sphere during the remainder of the Cold
War era. 
Part two concerns the United Nations operation in Cambodia in 1992-1993 and
investigates the early development of complex peacekeeping, which combined mili-
tary and civil components. It reviews how the realities on the ground forced the mil-
itary and civilian branches to ever further integrate their activities, even though they
had been planned as operating along largely separate lines. The three chapters on
Cambodia analyze in detail how a battalion of Dutch Marines, caught between four
parties in a conflict that had not yet come to an end, adapted their operations to the
unexpected and how they were confronted with early examples of the thorny prob-
lems involved in providing some level of public security, partly in cooperation with
local authorities. Part two concludes with an investigation into the steady expansion
of the military role in facilitating the embattled elections in Cambodia.
Part three focuses on the profound impact on both sides of the Atlantic of the
leading American role in military operations in Somalia and Bosnia. The two chap-
ters dealing with Somalia review how the multinational military force, without a par-
allel civilian organization, struggled to establish some degree of security in a coun-
try with no government or functioning institutions. By analyzing in detail how the
Australian battalion in Somalia approached this challenge, it portrays how – seem-
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ingly unhampered by some of the restraints placed on the American military – the
Australians conducted their operation successfully by displaying a high degree of
flexibility and originality in the methods applied. The chapter on Bosnia describes
the troubled civil-military relationship and how the military’s initial refusal to assume
a substantial role in bridging the ‘public security gap’ seriously contributed to the
stagnation of the peace process. It also traces the early developments of NATO CIMIC. 
Part four analyzes NATO’s mission in Kosovo, a mission that, as in Somalia, took
place in a power vacuum. The absence of a functioning local government placed
extremely high demands on the ingenuity of the soldiers involved. It establishes how
NATO came woefully unprepared, reached uneven levels of success in filling the vac-
uum, but established an overall successful working relationship with the parallel civil-
ian UN mission. The five chapters on Kosovo center on the role played by a Dutch
artillery battalion, which came to perform de facto military governance during the
early months of the mission in order to establish the necessary security in a town
divided by ethnic hatred.
The motive for choosing these case studies is threefold. First, I selected the cases
because of their relevance to the main theme of this study. However, a substantial
number of other military operations during the 1990s would have qualified on this
basis. Supporting and substituting local authorities or international organizations
played a pivotal role in reaching any level of success in for instance Kurdish north-
ern Iraq in 1991, Haiti in 1994, Eastern Slavonia in 1996 and in East Timor in 1999.
A second criterion that helped to narrow down the wider selection of potential cases
was a mission’s exemplary function and overall impact on the stormy development
of peace operations as a concept and practice. A third deciding factor in the choice
of the cases was related to the availability of source material that enabled me to
reconstruct these military operations on the tactical level and provide the reader with
insights into the forces driving commanders to assume ever more civilian responsi-
bilities. In doing so, I have attempted to present each case as an original historical
narrative on itself. 
For two out of the three tactical cases, Cambodia and Kosovo, I have had the priv-
ilege to do extensive research in Dutch military archives. Most of these are still closed
to researchers as they contain a substantial amount of classified material. I thank
Lieutenant General John M. Sanderson for allowing me to be the first to access his
personal archive from his period as the Force Commander of the UN operation in
Cambodia. For my research into tactical level operations in Somalia, I had access to
the excellent field history by Robert Breen that has long been out of print and appears
to be unknown outside Australia. In addition, I used various other sources such as
Michael J. Kelly’s important legal treatise on the Australian experience in Baidoa and
several ego documents from the Australian War Memorial Archive in Canberra. In
order to supplement archival research and the vast body of literature on peace oper-
ations, I conducted several interviews with key players, both military and civilian. 
As this study is primarily focused on the first phase of interventions, varying
from six months to a year, it avoids entering the debate about the merits or impos-
sibilities of ‘nation building,’ ‘peace building,’ or ‘state building.’ These terms have
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been used by commentators, often interchangeably, to describe the specific longer-
term efforts to establish a lasting peace and most often democracy. The term ‘nation
building’ is used specifically to point to the discussion on the role of the US mili-
tary during the Bill Clinton presidency. ‘Nation building’ is a distinctly American
term that, while, on the one hand, evokes proud memories of the post-war efforts
to rebuild Germany and Japan after their defeat in 1945, on the other hand became
laden with a negative connotation in the United States as a result of its association
with the war in Vietnam. To the mainstream of the US military and those opposed
to the Clinton’s foreign policy, ‘nation building’ came to represent everything they
were opposed to, because it diverged from what they had come to consider the prop-
er military role, or what Eisenhower had called ‘all problems other than purely mil-
itary.’15 Karin von Hippel has correctly argued that ‘state building’ is the more prop-
er term, since the efforts to reconstruct concern state structures rather than the cre-
ation of a nation, inhabited by peoples of the same collective identity.16 State build-
ing will be used in this book when necessary, although ‘institution building’ is the
more specific term preferred for the reconstruction and reform of organizations such
as police, the judiciary, and administrative structures. ‘Peace building’ is a generic
term used by the United Nations in similar activities and will be used in that con-
text. 
During the 1990s, the very definition of peacekeeping has been in a constant
state of transition. By the year 2000, the Brazilian international relations professor
Domício Proença Júnior concluded that, after some ten years of muddling through,
‘the original clarity of what Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs) are supposed to be no
longer exists,’ adding the crucial qualifier ‘if it ever did.’ He continued by stating
that ‘PKOs in their various denominations and qualified variants have become,
increasingly, whatever peace forces are called to do, in spite of various attempts by
UN Secretaries-General, officials and scholars to pin down what their various types
are supposed to be.’17 I have avoided becoming entangled in the discussion about
the legal and theoretical standing of peace operations and their categorization and
have generally used the comprehensive term ‘peace operations’ for a variety of mis-
sions that have been categorized by the United Nations as peacekeeping, peacemak-
ing, peace enforcing and (post-conflict) peace building. When conducting historical
research into contemporary military operations, the definitions provided by concep-
tual thinkers as well as the military tend to be obstacles rather than of much assis-
tance. This is not to say that they are of no use for other purposes. However, when
examining the tasks soldiers actually came to perform on the tactical level of mili-
tary operations, the definitions tend to be too rigid as they often take the desired
mission as a point of departure. This proved to be problematic throughout the 1990s
as tasks and objectives in missions often changed.
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PART I
The Civil-Military Interface
in Twentieth-Century Military Operations
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1Substituting the Civil Power:
Civil Affairs and Military Government 
in World War II
History is rife with examples of soldiers acting as governors. The military has exer-
cised what was in essence civil power from the days of the Roman proconsuls to
military commanders of the modern imperialist powers. The former combined mil-
itary and civil powers in one person while ruling the provinces of the Roman Empire.
The latter were often called upon in the nineteenth century to temporarily adminis-
ter the rapidly expanding colonies. The prevailing image, however, of a modern and
benevolent type of military rule over other people is the Allied occupation of con-
quered territories in Europe and Asia during and after the Second World War. While
introducing the first theme of this book, the substitution of civil authorities by mil-
itary forces, this chapter focuses on the Allied experience in the European theater of
war. As the Allied military advance between 1942 and 1945 progressed from North
Africa to Italy and from the beaches of Normandy toward Berlin, many of the cen-
tral dilemmas involved in military occupation in relation to the primary military mis-
sion emerged.1 First of all, there was the fundamental debate over civilian or mili-
tary rule in liberated and occupied territories. Continued and historic reluctance in
the United States about soldiers entering the civilian domain is one of the reasons
for highlighting the American experience in military government. With the emer-
gence of a specialized military branch for addressing governance came a second
choice, either to integrate this ‘civil affairs’ organization into the regular tactical chain
of command, or separate it from the combat units as they swept across Europe. Relat-
ed to the issue of integrated versus segregated civil affairs was the dilemma over
direct rule, with a high degree of interference by military personnel in the details of
administration of a foreign country, or indirect rule through the local officialdom in
the conquered territories. A third question – one that is central to this book – arose
after the defeat of Germany. Did soldiers exercise control over civilian populations
solely in support of their military mission, as was originally envisioned, or was mil-
itary governance to become a central aspect of the military mission? 
The Operational Primacy of Civil Affairs
‘Modern war,’ F.S.V. Donnison wrote in 1966 in the official British history of mili-
tary government in the Second World War, ‘consumes governments and administra-
tions in its path, leaving anarchy and chaos behind. If authority and the necessary
minimum order and administration are not at once re-established, disorder and sub-
version can all too quickly erode the victory that has been won in the field.’2 It was
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this realization that made the Western Allies accept responsibility and prepare for
the occupation of friendly and enemy territory. The legal obligation to do so, how-
ever, was also prominent in the minds of the responsible policymakers and military
leaders. The Law of Occupation as laid down in The Hague Convention of 1907
obliged occupying armies to restore law and order, and as far as possible provide
basic relief and restore vital services.3
Although the Allies fully accepted the responsibility for the temporary governing
of occupied territory for both practical and legal reasons, it remained undetermined
if its execution would fall to civilians or soldiers. The inevitability of a large military
role was viewed differently on the two sides of the Atlantic. The British, with their
vast colonial empire and recent experience in occupation duty in the Middle East
and the Horn of Africa, had no inhibitions about letting the military temporarily
exercise civil power. They delegated the responsibility for policy to the War Office
and made the Army the executive agency of military government. 
In the United States, however, there was a strong tradition against the military
exercising civil power. This foreshadowed the more general tendency in the other
Western democracies to regard temporary military substitution of civil governments,
and increasingly also military support to civil authorities, as an abnormality and even
as highly undesirable. In American history, every war that involved the temporary
seizure or conquest of territory had evoked bitter debate about the military role in
government. Like most military occupation regimes, the US Army’s record for impro-
vising was inconsistent, in for instance in Mexico 1847-1848, in Confederate territo-
ry during and after the Civil War, in the Philippines and Cuba following the Span-
ish-American War of 1898 and in the German Rhineland after the First World War.4
In the eyes of President Franklin D. Roosevelt especially, the war against Germany
and Japan, more than any armed conflict preceding it, was fought for ideals. It was
waged to fulfill the promises of self-determination as laid down in the Atlantic Char-
ter and the United Nations Declaration. Replacing totalitarian rule with Allied mili-
tary government was therefore by no means the obvious choice.5
While civil administration was regarded as a task unsuited for military forces in
political circles, soldiers themselves were not particularly eager to assume this role.6
Nevertheless, as early as 1942, the US Army started to select and train specialized
civil affairs personnel for deployment in liberated and occupied territory in Europe
and Asia. The initiator of this civil affairs training program in the United States was
a soldier, General George C. Marshall, the chairman of the American Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS). As a second lieutenant, Marshall had served in the Philippines in
1902 where he received no instructions or training whatsoever for the civilian tasks
he would face. Nevertheless, he was ‘practically governor in effect of a large territo-
ry, about half an island.’ By the end of the First World War, Marshall witnessed how
preparations for the US Army’s contribution to the Rhineland occupation had not
much improved.7 Nevertheless, American forces performed relatively well, partly
because they lacked the punitive motives displayed by their French, Belgian, and to
a lesser extent, British allies.
Much thought was expended after 1941 on the definitions of ‘civil affairs’ and
26 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:05  Pagina 26
‘military government.’ The former, sounding more friendly to civilian ears, was com-
monly used for what was in fact military government conducted on one’s own or
liberated territory. Civil affairs was considered too bland for use in enemy territory,
so military government was plainly used for the occupation of enemy territory.8 For
the recruitment of civil affairs personnel, the British could initially fall back on a
large body of colonial administrators in uniform, but the Americans had to start
from scratch to build up an organization. Civil affairs officers in both Britain and
the United States were either regular career officers, or civilians in uniform. Part of
the latter group was selected for their specific civilian skills in administration, pub-
lic safety, finance, health and civil infrastructure, and referred to as functional spe-
cialists as opposed to the generalist civil affairs officers.9
The idea of civil administration entirely in military hands continued to make the
Americans, civilian and military alike, somewhat uneasy. Although civilian inspec-
tors generally found the level of the course adequate, sceptics referred to the School
for Military Government in the Provost Marshall General’s School at the University
of Virginia, as the Army’s ‘School of Gauleiters.’10 In the United States, President
Roosevelt’s lingering opposition to the military role in administration caused a pletho-
ra of governmental institutions – the State Department, the Treasury, the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and many others – to engage in a turf battle with the War
Department. Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s chief of
staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, was convinced that ‘the American peo-
ple will never take kindly to the idea of government exercised by military officers.’
He was among many advocating the occupation of Germany under civilian control.11
Lingering doubts among military commanders about the crucial role of civil affairs
were settled in the North African campaign. In late November 1942, a few weeks
after the British and American landings in Morocco and Algeria, Eisenhower wrote
to Marshall that he was desperate to rid himself of ‘all problems other than purely
military.’ Absorbed in political and economic matters and unable to coordinate the
American civilian agencies or to control the headstrong French, it was at that point
that the theater commander wrote to General Marshall his momentous complaint
about his desire to ‘get rid of all these questions that are outside the military scope.’12
Eisenhower even told Marshall that he was having ‘as much trouble with civilian
forces behind aiding us as I am with the enemy in front of us.’ According to Mar-
shall, Eisenhower’s complaints finally persuaded the president to temporarily invest
the theater commander with civil power.13
As far as the execution of administrative power was concerned, the initial inter-
departmental struggle in 1942-1943 was won by the War Department at the expense
of the State Department and other departments. In March, the Civil Affairs Division
(CAD) was established at the Pentagon under Major General John Hilldring. It was
created to plan the execution of interim rule in the Mediterranean, northwestern
European and Pacific theaters. The division would eventually number approximate-
ly ten thousand civil affairs personnel who were trained at the University of Virginia
in Charlottesville and various other schools for lower ranks. Nonetheless, responsi-
bility for occupation policy continued to rest with the State Department.
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The main object of having specialized civil affairs units was to facilitate military
operations by preventing chaos and disease in conquered territory. Military com-
manders as well as policymakers were eager to emphasize this operational primacy
of civil affairs and the limited scope and duration of military rule: ‘The Army is not
a welfare organization,’ Hilldring wrote to Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson in
November 1943. ‘It is a military machine whose mission is to defeat the enemy in
battle. Its interest and activities in military government and civil affairs administra-
tion are incidental to the accomplishment of the mission. Nevertheless, these activ-
ities are of paramount importance, as any lack of a condition of social stability in
an occupied area would be prejudicial to the success of the military effort.’14 Four
weeks before the Allies hit the Normandy beaches, Hilldring described the two main
objectives of civil affairs to a US congressional committee. The first objective was
‘to secure the civilian populations to the maximum extent possible, which is an obli-
gation under international law.’ The primary task of civil affairs was therefore to
maintain law and order. The second objective was to prevent civilian populations
from interfering with military operations and ‘that they are so treated that they will
be able to assist the forward movement of our troops to the greatest extent possi-
ble.’ Hilldring continued by emphasizing: 
That is the beginning and the end of our involvement in this business. When nei-
ther of those two objectives any longer obtains, in other words, when the battle
has gotten far enough ahead so that we can lay down our obligations under inter-
national law and so that the populations can no longer interfere with the military
purposes of the operation, we intend to turn this work over to such civilian agen-
cies as are designed to take it.15
In practice, the handover of responsibility from soldiers to civilians turned out to be
a mixed success during and after the Second World War.
Integrating or Segregating Civil Affairs
Whenever possible, control over foreign populations was to be indirect. This meant
that a civil affairs officer’s relations were to be with the head of local administration
and not with the public. The ‘ideal type’ of civil affairs officer trained at the School
for Military Government was considered ‘one who integrated the local laws, institu-
tions, customs, psychology and economics of the occupied area and a superimposed
military control with a minimum of change in the former and a maximum of con-
trol by the latter.’16 The strong preference of indirect control over direct control over
the population was in line with the requirements of international law that prescribed
the minimum of change to indigenous government systems. 
Indirect rule worked reasonably well in liberated territory. In occupied territory,
however, indirect rule and operational primacy appeared to be in conflict with the
policy of rooting out fascism and Nazism, a policy to which the Allies had commit-
ted themselves. This goal was higher on President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s agenda
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than that of Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill, and the Americans leaned more
towards direct control, reaching into lower levels of a defeated government.17 The
British may have been driven by a general personnel shortage, but most of all they
had a long tradition of indirect rule in their colonies. This administrative system,
similar to that used by the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies, leaned heavily on
indigenous administrative elites. This colonial policy had allowed both the British
and the Dutch to control a vast empire with relatively little administrative and mil-
itary personnel.
The Allied military campaign in Italy became the testing ground for military gov-
ernment and civil affairs. The invasion was planned as an occupation of enemy ter-
ritory, but it felt like liberation to most Italians. It officially became a liberation after
the Italian surrender and declaration of war on Germany following the invasion of
Sicily in the summer of 1943. The occupation of Sicily brought home to the Amer-
ican public the earliest and most popular image of civil affairs and benevolent occu-
pation in the form of the just and humane Italian-American Major Victor Joppolo,
the lead character in John Hersey’s Pulitzer prize winning novel A Bell for Adano.
Written in 1944 and later adapted to film, the story depicted how in the wake of the
Allied invasion Joppolo, based on a true character, assumed the reins of government
in the town Adano. Hersey’s graphic descriptions of Joppolo’s first day in office are
exemplary for the clarity of the military government mandate and powers that went
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with it. Joppolo walked straight into the town hall of the town of Adano and posi-
tioned himself behind the desk of the former Fascist mayor. The former civil ser-
vant from the Bronx then took an American flag from his briefcase and hung it from
the flagpole on the balcony overlooking the town square. Assigned to exercise mili-
tary authority in occupied territory, he held absolute judicial, executive and legisla-
tive powers over the village and its surroundings. 
Hersey also portrayed the problems of preparing soldiers for this unpredictable
task in a foreign land in the wake of major warfare. Major Joppolo sat down and
looked at the immense pile of Allied Government in Occupied Territories (AMGOT)
instructions for the first day. After reading just a fraction of them he started tearing
up the pile in neat quarters and crumpled them up to throw them in the wastebas-
ket. 
He stirred and reached into his briefcase again and took out a small black loose
leaf notebook. The pages were filled with notes in Amgot school lectures: notes
on civilian supply, on public safety, on public health, on finance, on agriculture,
industry, utilities, transportation, and all the businesses of an invading authority.
But he passed all these pages by, and turned to the page marked: Notes to Jop-
polo from Joppolo. And he read: ‘Don’t make yourself cheap. Always be accessi-
ble to the public. Don’t play favorites. Speak Italian whenever possible. Don’t lose
your temper. When plans fall down, improvise…’ That was the one he wanted.
When plans fall down, improvise.’ Plans for the first day were in the wastebasket.
They were absurd. Enough was set forth in those plans to keep a regiment busy
for a week.18
Flexibility and improvisation were the key virtues of the civil affairs officer, arguably
more than regular combat personnel whose mission, however difficult, was relative-
ly straightforward – the defeat of the enemy. It is important to realize when read-
ing the following chapters that during the 1990s, when international troops entered
Somalia and Kosovo under a United Nations mandate, regular combat units were
faced with a similar civil administrative power vacuum, but mostly left to fill the gap
without specialized personnel, no instructions or specific training and worst of all,
hardly any or no mandate or orders describing the civil powers a military command-
er was allowed to exercise to create some rudimentary order amidst chaos. 
AMGOT headquarters was established under British Major General Lord Rennell
of Rodd, who remarked that ‘I am frank to think we shall get away with things here
more by luck than good management.’19 The majority of the population would greet
the Allies as liberators, but this had been far from certain. Moreover, AMGOT was
generally able to rely on local officials such as the Carabinieri and regular police for
most public security tasks. Although the large majority of higher-ranking Fascist offi-
cials fled and some were purged by the Allies, an estimated ninety-eight percent of
the local administration and services in Palermo continued to be manned by nomi-
nal Fascists.20 Nevertheless, both on Sicily and mainland Italy, civil affairs units ini-
tially had a tendency to engage in direct control, thereby overstretching the organi-
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zation. Mostly shorthanded, AMGOT in the end refrained from direct control as
much as possible, instead leaving the Italians to administer under Allied control
those parts liberated without a battle.21
Italy became the test ground for various methods of military government after
September 1943. From the protracted organizational chaos emerged two preferred
models of military governance: a separate civil affairs structure responsible only to
the Supreme Commander versus a civil affairs organization integrated into the tac-
tical chain of command. The main argument by those favoring a single civil affairs
organization segregated from the tactical commanders was that, as Allied forces
moved forward, civil affairs personnel would constantly have to be changed as a new
commanding officer took over an area. The plea for a single military government
organization to be established as soon as possible after combat operations ceased in
a particular area resulted in ‘an organism standing on its own feet and divorced from
military command except at the highest level.’ In the early planning phase for the
invasion of Western Europe this model prevailed and large combined Anglo-Amer-
ican ‘country houses,’ were set up in England to prepare for the administration of
France, the Low Countries and Norway. They tended to prepare for direct control of
indigenous administrations. It was often referred to as the AMGOT theory of civil
affairs or the ‘Mediterranean system.’22
The primary disadvantage of the separate chain of command for military gover-
nance was that it endangered ‘unity of command.’ After all, commanders below the
supreme headquarters could not control the civil affairs units that were roaming
through their area of operations. According to US Army historian Earl Ziemke,
AMGOT in Italy ‘rapidly began to look like a prize example for the fallacy of per-
mitting two independent commands in the same theater.’23 The second disadvantage
was that as a separate entity civil affairs had a hard time gaining access to essential
Army resources and had to beg ‘like a stranger’ for relief goods, transportation and
engineer support.24 Ziemke’s British counterpart, the historian Donnison, argued
that the disadvantages of the integrated model were largely offset by the fact that
civil affairs was not represented in tactical units below army corps level in the British
Army and below divisional level in the US Army. In early 1944, Eisenhower decid-
ed to integrate the Allied Civil Affairs Division as a general staff division into his
supreme headquarters, and as a staff section called ‘G-5’ in the tactical chain of com-
mand (on army group, army, corps level and with the Americans on divisional level).25
However, Donnison argued that the controversy over the two systems lingered
throughout the war: 
Especially during the advance into Germany, mostly in the American area of oper-
ations, there were constant complaints about [...] the changing CA staffs coming
in with new ideas and priorities and duplicating work. They argued that only through
a separate command, uniformity of administrative policy could be created. Amer-
icans emphasised the need to replace administrators to a relatively low level and
– partly based on the North-African experience talked of the need to supplying
administrative personnel, ‘not by the dozens, but by the thousands.’26
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Although the difference of opinion about the two models cannot be drawn strictly
along national lines, it is safe to say that the British leaned towards an integrated
model while the Americans favored a separate civil affairs organization in theater.
Of this period of controversy, a British general said that ‘there were plenty of affairs
but the difficulty was to keep them civil.’ This is not to say that civil affairs was more
easily accepted within the British Army’s hierarchy. It was often still treated ‘like a
quasi-civil poor relation’ and it was accepted as a full general staff function only after
the authoritative Major General Gerald Templer, a former combat commander, was
appointed director of military government for Germany in March 1945. 
In the end, the integrated model and the related emphasis on indirect rule pre-
vailed first and foremost because the alternative was not feasible. The Allied Euro-
pean governments in exile whose countries lived under Nazi occupation were not
particularly enthused by the idea of direct Anglo-American military control. On top
of this political motivation, to which the British were more sensitive than the Amer-
icans, there were more practical considerations related to the shortage of civil affairs
personnel. Finally, the American tendency toward a separate organization was over-
ruled at SHEAF and in the War Department by those favoring minimal interference
in local administrations in order to assure the most rapid transfer of responsibility.27
In liberated territory such as France, Belgium and the Netherlands, the rapid
transfer of overall responsibility for government proved attainable, albeit not as quick-
ly or smoothly as envisaged. Dutch historian Peter Romijn asked the question as to
whether Allied soldiers had truly become governors in the Netherlands in 1944-1946.
Focusing on the first major city to be liberated in the south, Maastricht, he conclud-
ed that this had been the case, but only shortly and in limited ways. Given the
immense gratitude of the Dutch population and the overall cooperativeness of the
Dutch authorities, the Netherlands was clearly not the most difficult place in which
civil affairs officers could work. They could delegate much of their local administra-
tive powers to their Dutch counterparts in the Netherlands Military Authority (NMA)
under SHEAF, who in turn oversaw the reconstruction of a local civilian adminis-
tration. As a rule, Allied civil affairs officers only supervised this process and refrained
from interfering as long as matters of public safety and order was guaranteed and
general Allied interests were not in danger.28 This hands-off policy proved somewhat
more difficult in for instance Belgium and France, where political strife and more
rebellious resistance movements posed a larger threat to overall stability and public
security. Despite some significant hurdles, military governmental control as exercised
in the Netherlands could be considered the model for the sort of short-lived and
skin-deep indirect military rule the Allied Civil Affairs Division had envisaged in
support of military operations.
Military Government Moves Center Stage
After having successfully maintained order in France and the Low Countries, the
true test for civil affairs came in Germany. The United States came to dominate pol-
icy in the western zones of Germany as its military might eclipsed that of the British
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by 1945 and since it was footing much of the bill for the occupation. What was later
often described as ‘nation building’ in post-war Germany has often been portrayed
as an example of political vision, clarity and American generosity – an image repeat-
ed by George W. Bush prior to and during the occupation of Iraq in 2003. Profes-
sional historians of this era know, however, that the years between 1943 and 1946
were awash with political ambiguity. There was confusion as to the punitive or lenient
character of the occupying regime, the distribution of responsibility for administer-
ing Germany between soldiers and civilians, and the duration of the occupation. By
the time the first Allied troops entered Germany in mid-September 1944, there was
no clear strategy on how the country would be governed apart from the overall goal
of preventing it from ever again embarking on another wave of conquest. When the
newly appointed German mayor of Aachen asked the Americans in early 1945 if the
occupation intended to bring democracy to Germany, civil affairs officers were unable
to give him a clear answer. Neither the policy nor the plans provided for an active
democratization program.
The Marshall Plan, that aimed to economically revive Western Europe, has clear-
ly come to prevail in the image of post-war American policy towards Germany. How-
ever, America’s initial policy towards occupied Germany was based on the Morgen-
thau Plan, singularly focused on deindustrializing and pastoralizing the country. Two
years separated the acceptance of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s pro-
posal in April 1945 from the launch of the Marshall Plan. Morgenthau’s plan was
diluted after Roosevelt, its most important proponent, died in April. By the time the
new president Harry S. Truman finally approved it less than a month prior to Ger-
many’s capitulation, the policy as formulated in Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067
(JCS 1067) was a vague compromise between harsh and more lenient views. It was
nevertheless still an austere document. Relief to the Germans was strictly limited to
a means of preventing disease and unrest and the population was to be kept at sub-
sistence level. The ‘let-them-stew-in-their-own-juices approach to economic affairs’
was also given in by Roosevelt’s determination to punish the Germans whom he
held collectively responsible for Nazi aggression.29 The policy further emphasized
the need to root out Nazism. An Army orientation pamphlet for soldiers entering
Germany after May stated: ‘You are going to be fighting with ideas instead of guns,
laws instead of tanks, control measures and policing instead of bombs. But the ulti-
mate goals are the same – the complete stamping out of Nazism and fascist ideas,
and the re-education of the Germans to the advantages of a decent, responsible self-
government.’30 After pictures of GIs socializing with locals, often of the opposite sex,
appeared in American newspapers in late 1944, US soldiers became subject to a
strict ‘non-fraternization’ regime prohibiting all social interaction with German offi-
cials and citizens. It proved rather foolish and unenforceable, but the restrictions
would only be gradually lifted in late 1945.
Especially when compared to Japan, where the Americans would be in complete
control of the occupation of Japan, tripartite and later quadripartite control over Ger-
many in separate zones as agreed upon at the Yalta Conference seriously complicat-
ed policy planning. However, much of the policy vacuum was the result of contin-
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The Allied division of Germany in four occupation zones at the end of World War II.
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ued interdepartmental and jurisdictional rivalries within the US government. The
delegation of responsibility between soldiers and civilians also was not settled.
Although the War Department and the Army consistently argued that post-surren-
der occupation was a job for the State Department they advocated a short, but exclu-
sive military period to US control. However, they were still meeting serious opposi-
tion in October 1944. As civil affairs once again became military government just
across the Belgian-German border in Monschau, calls in Washington for the appoint-
ment of a civilian high commissioner once again become stronger.31
The lack of political guidance was largely offset by two factors. In the course of
1944, interim directives were provided by the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of
Staff, giving Eisenhower responsibility as the military governor and therefore
‘supreme executive, legislative, and judicial authority’ in seized territories. Meanwhile
tactical regulations were spelled out in two pocket-sized handbooks on military gov-
ernment prior to and after the German surrender. Both were less harsh on the Ger-
man population than President Roosevelt had envisaged, calling for military govern-
ment to be ‘firm,’ but ‘at the same time just and humane with regard to the civil-
ian population as far as consistent with strict military requirements.’32 Moreover, the
civil affairs organization had gained a lot of experience from the occupation of Italy,
France, Belgium and the Netherlands. There was nevertheless a lack of detailed plan-
ning beyond the ‘purely military requirements’ such as establishing governance, pub-
lic order, relief, handling displaced persons, and basic services in the initial stages.
Lack of policy complicated planning for more thorny issues such as economic reform,
political reform and re-education. These matters were, however, briefly addressed in
the handbooks. Hence, despite a lack of policy, the instruments and tactics to avoid
anarchy in the direct aftermath of Germany’s capitulation were well developed. In a
plan called Operation Eclipse, every available unit was ordered to contribute to a rapid
takeover of every town and institution once Germany surrendered.33
At the local level, American, British and Canadian civil affairs detachments per-
formed almost all military government functions in the towns and villages of north-
western Europe between 1944 and 1946.34 These mobile teams, composed on aver-
age of four generalist civil affairs officers and six enlisted men in jeeps or small
trucks were the backbone of Allied military government. Upon entering a German
town or village in the wake of the Allied advance, these spearhead detachments would
first post proclamations and ordinances, telling the Germans what their obligations
to the Allied troops were, informing them about curfews and where they had to turn
in weapons. A detachment, mostly consisting of two generalist civil administrative
officers and two public safety officers, would appoint a new local German mayor and
select a police chief, often in cooperation with military police.35 Temporarily they held
absolute power to dismiss or arrest anyone. 
East of the Rhine and Osnabrück, the Germans withdrew almost all of their pub-
lic administrators and police officials and took all public records, which seriously
complicated the task ahead. One of the tasks of civil affairs was to salvage such
archives whenever possible. Once the Allies crossed the Rhine early 1945, most Ger-
man public officials were found at their post. As in liberated territory many would
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continue their work administrating the German population, but now under Allied
control and later supervision. Once again military government staffs and detach-
ments were faced with the kind of tasks they had executed during the rapid advance
across the Seine and into Belgium. However, it was now no longer possible to ‘thrust
a bundle of notices into the hands of the local Maire and wish him good luck.’ Some-
one had to stay and see that proclamations and orders were issued and obeyed.36
By late March 1945, 150 US detachments were deployed in Germany, almost two-
thirds of US capacity for local-level military government. As US forces occupied far
more territory in May than planned, stretching from the Ruhr to the Elbe and includ-
ing Leipzig, and reaching into western Czechoslovakia and Austria, the US Army
swiftly ran out of civil affairs detachments. In April it had started to organize provi-
sional detachments made up of artillery units and signallers.37 By the end of the war,
250 detachments and 200 provisional detachments had laid a carpet behind the mil-
itary advance in Germany.38 Larger detachments varying in size from 27 to 43 offi-
cers and enlisted personnel also entered Germany to govern at the regional and state
(Land) levels and in the major cities, as they had done in liberated territory. Such
civil affairs units included more specialists in areas such as economy, transport, pub-
lic health, welfare and legal matters. Tactical forces occupied most of Germany after
the surrender and Major General Lucius Clay, Eisenhower’s deputy for military gov-
ernment, remembered how these combat units did not want to give up, ‘because as
long as they were in charge they could commandeer houses, and whatever they want-
ed, and they liked that sense of power.’ The regular forces and detachments ‘had
picked somebody here or somebody there to be a local Bürgemeister, a local official,
without much screening and without much time to screen.’39 German police were
disarmed and operated under Allied control and 27 lower courts were reopened and
functioned parallel to US military courts in late May. 
Unlike in Japan, there was no national governing structure in Germany after
Hitler’s regime collapsed. Since the Western Allies and the Soviets failed to agree
on a central German authority, military government in Germany was exercised on
the state level and below. In contrast, General Douglas MacArthur ruled Japan pri-
marily through the existing central governmental institutions, while making little use
of the civil affairs apparatus at his disposal. He did not give his military government
officers the authority to command Japanese officials, leaving the understaffed local
military government teams to do little more than supervise and report on the progress
– or lack thereof – of the reforms decreed by his own headquarters and executed by
the wartime local administrators. Thus, while MacArthur ruled and adopted a ‘top
down’ approach, Germany became an exercise in ‘bottom up’ state building. This
was not, and could not have been, foreseen during the planning phase, but emerged
from a very different military and political situation at the time of capitulation brought
about by the atomic bomb instead of prolonged struggle and a final stand. Detach-
ments in Germany had more power and influence, but the primary driving force for
the military commanders – to get out of government as soon as possible – was sim-
ilar.40 Personnel reform through purges of civilian officials was initially attempted
with more vigor by Clay in Germany than by MacArthur in Japan, but the effort lost
out in both countries to the overall urge to create stability and efficient rule. 
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Other than in Japan, where American forces expected protracted guerrilla warfare,
the Allies had not anticipated large scale revolts in post-war Germany, only smaller
acts of terror by die-hard Nazis. None of this materialized in either country. Inter-
nal security operations in Germany were limited to preventing a breakdown of pub-
lic order. In the direct aftermath of battle, looting was a serious problem. However,
‘since US troops, German civilians and [displaced persons] all looted,’ the official
Army historian wrote, ‘there was soon debate over whose behavior was the most rep-
rehensible.’ Three quarters of the town center of Hanover was destroyed and there
was still fighting when the first military government detachment moved in. ‘There
was no electricity, water, sewers. Some half million people inhabited the ruins. It
was a town of looting, drunkenness, rape, and murder as forced labor broke out
from restraint. Shots whistled by from drunken ‘slaves’ or left-behind snipers. Ger-
man police were mobbed and their bodies strung from lamp posts. A new force was
improvised and stopped the worst looting. It could do nothing yet about murders
and rapes.’41
In this phase, the contribution of the public security officers especially was crit-
ical. They were mostly drawn from police forces back home and their experience,
training and common sense was invaluable in handling the public as well as other
administrative problems. The military government detachment entering Osnabrück
encountered civilians and displaced persons (DPs) involved in looting clothing and
food. ‘Being unable to obtain military assistance two officers of the Detachment tack-
led the crowd with their revolvers, and gained control after inflicting casualties. The
commander of the [Regierungsbezirk] Detachment then reinstituted 24 hour house
arrest for the entire population, and gained control which he has not again lost….’
Donnison observed how the primary role of the state – establishing and maintain-
ing law and order – re-emerged in times of chaos:
When seeking to revive social existence in such anarchy the essentials of civil
administration once more stand revealed. In easier times they disappear under the
proliferation of amenities which comes to be looked for as the proper function of
administration. But without order and the enforcement of law the provision of
other services is vain or impossible. It was the primary task of the Military Gov-
ernment detachments, as it must be for any administration, to re-establish these
prerequisites of all other administrative endeavour.42
After Germany’s capitulation, the overall docility and servility of the German popu-
lation and administrators was certainly enhanced by every available regular Allied
unit contributing to a speedy and synchronized takeover of every town and institu-
tion of Germany in a matter of days. The number of American, British and Cana-
dian troops in Germany was well over two million at the time. In backing up the
civil affairs detachments during the execution of Operation Eclipse, local conquering
officers held absolute powers to dismiss or arrest anyone and impose pre-established
proclamations and ordinances. They were initially not always aware of their powers,
but soon informed by trained military government officers that they were ‘Caesar’
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in their towns and also allowed to use deadly force to quash any resistance.43
After the short-lived anarchy in some cities and towns, the military government’s
major concerns in 1945 were the rapid rise of a massive black market, criminal
behavior of displaced persons and local teenage youth. Germany was hungry, but not
starving and although the rates of violent crime in 1945-1946 amongst Germans
were obviously higher than in pre-war Germany, ‘post-war Western Germany was
not by historical comparison a particularly violent place in which to live, contrary to
the impression usually given.’ The major law and order problem amongst Germans
was property crime.44 Marauding and looting DPs were responsible for a large pro-
portion of the violence and the prime reason for rapidly rearming the German police
after September 1945. Military police and regular Allied forces were often called upon
to restore order in DP camps. One million displaced persons, almost all from East-
ern Europe, were still in Germany in 1947.45
Like everywhere in the wake of the Allied advance, rapidly fielding a local police
force answerable to the occupation forces proved crucial to quickly stabilizing the
country. The German police proved surprisingly loyal to their new military masters,
‘stolidly obeying orders and arresting their previous bosses just as happily as they
had political victims a few days earlier.’ However, deprivation clearly added to their
unreliability when dealing with the black marketeers.46 As in Italy, German police
officers were suffering from material hardship and often could not resist the bribes
from the criminals that thrived on black market activity and that have best become
known in the figure of Harry Lime in the film The Third Man. Meanwhile, denazi-
fication clearly lowered the efficiency of the police force and added to the demoral-
ization of its personnel. Like the Americans, the British soon found out that there
would hardly be a police force left if this policy was to be carried to extremes. The
denazification of the legal profession completely failed and the German police force
was only ‘half denazified.’ Police efficiency increased by early 1946 through a com-
bination of increased rations and better cooperation with the occupation troops. By
1948, its overall reliability had been restored despite the fact that the black market
was still thriving.47 In Japan as well, the relatively efficient indigenous police forces
were maintained and proved to be the key to public security and order. 
Whereas the crime rate among Germans was relatively low considering the post-
war chaos, that of American troops was far higher than is commonly thought. ‘Most
of my trouble came from the American soldier,’ US Major General Ernest Harmon
wrote in his memoirs about the first post-war winter. ‘Almost none at all came from
the German population.’ John Willoughby, in his study of the American occupation
army entitled Remaking the Conquering Heroes, gives a distressing account of an undis-
ciplined and marauding mob that was eventually tamed in the early Cold War years.
Only then did it become the garrisoned and disciplined army so crucial to project-
ing US power across the globe. The number of ‘serious incidents’ such as murder,
rape, and armed robbery between 1945 and 1947 was beyond anything contempo-
rary armies would accept from their troops during foreign interventions. GIs were
heavily involved in black marketeering, the theft of American military assets as well
as uncontrolled ‘requisitioning’ or theft from the German population. Crime rates
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among troops actually went up as those who had never fought the Germans replaced
the war veterans.48 Although there are no comparable accounts of overall British
behavior, there is no reason to believe that their record was structurally better. How-
ever, it has to be remembered that military behavior in the American and British
zones was exemplary by most historical comparisons of military occupations, and
certainly when compared to the systematic rape and plunder that occurred in the
Soviet-occupied territories to the east.49
Lack of discipline amidst the general confusion of the demobilization period was,
however, one of the key motives for creating a specialized force for internal securi-
ty operations in the US zone. A new constabulary force composed of regular Army
personnel was conceived in October 1945 and became operational in July the next
year. It consisted of 38,000 personnel and augmented the military government organ-
ization while backed up in case of emergency by the regular occupation Army, which
by then had shrunk from 61 divisions to just five and had disintegrated as an effec-
tive combat organization.50 In order to uphold law and order, the Constabulary had
jurisdiction over all civilian and all Allied personnel in the US zone. Although they
were launched as a ‘super military police organization,’ the main difference was that,
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and displaced persons all looted in the wake of battle, there was soon debate over whose behavior
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while the Constabulary was primarily tasked with policing the German people, the
Military Police (MP) was chiefly concerned with policing the Army and only did pub-
lic security on the side.51 Constabulary squads, equipped with jeeps and light armored
vehicles, wore distinctive formal jackets and yellow-brimmed helmets. They conduct-
ed patrols, community support and spent much of their time performing checkpoint
operations to stem the tide of black-market goods and illegal immigrants through-
out their sector. 
The War Department had estimated that constabulary duty demanded the use of
a ‘higher type of individuals.’ Their mission asked more from their resourcefulness
since, other than regular combat units, they were required to operate in small groups
at extended distances from headquarters. In addition to being capable of perform-
ing the strictly military duties of a squad, crew or team, its personnel were trained
for enforcement of law and order. Tasks included riot duty, conducting searches and
raids and operating checkpoints. In order to perform them they had to learn ele-
mentary German words and phrases.52 However, the Constabulary was forced to
accept regular troops and reinforcements. The Constabulary’s commander, Major
General Ernest Harmon, put a strong emphasis on discipline, and eventually his
force played a substantial role in improving relations with the local population by
substituting an ‘army-type occupation’ for a ‘police-type occupation.’ The British left
internal security operations to tactical troops and military police. 
Truman had repeated in May 1945 that ‘the military should not have governmental
responsibilities beyond the requirements of military operations.’53 However, once Ger-
many was defeated and the mobile phase turned into the static phase of occupation,
military government was propelled onto center stage. Apart from German demobi-
lization, which was largely accomplished in three months, there was no real ‘pure-
ly military’ operational purpose for the army other than constabulary-type duty in
support of the government, which the Allied commanders had in fact become. Civil
affairs had thereby lost its operational primacy, and in effect, tactical troops were
used in support of the Allied military government. Eisenhower formally assumed
the dual function as military governor with Clay as his deputy in charge of the Office
of Military Government US (OMGUS), established on 1 October 1945. In the early
months of 1946, military government and the tactical American and British chain
of command were once again fully divorced. The army of occupation thus contin-
ued its support role enabling military government to carry out its objectives, but the
new relationship was now formalized – not always to the liking of the tactical com-
manders who had previously been in command.54
The Effects of Military Pragmatism 
Military government not only assumed the central position for which it had not been
envisioned. It also lasted much longer than anticipated and assumed an increasing
number of functions. Expectations of a military occupation phase lasting no more
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than a few months after the capitulation proved unrealistic in both Germany and
Japan. The State Department – originally attempting to maximize its role – had to
admit it simply could not field the organization capable of supplanting the Army
with its abundance of resources and in personnel. The administrative responsibility,
the number of refugees and the food crisis were too massive. The distribution of
food became increasingly problematic with the economy in ruins and Germany’s
breadbasket, the eastern part of the country, under Soviet control. Millions of Ger-
mans were being expelled from the eastern parts of Germany now under Polish,
Czech and Russian control in what would in late-twentieth-century jargon be called
a massive ‘ethnic cleansing’ campaign. At one point, displaced persons from France,
the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Russia and Yugoslavia in the western zones num-
bered over five million.55 The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administra-
tion (UNRRA) had been created to take care of displaced persons, but it lacked the
capabilities to assume this awesome task. Military forces continued to take the lead
in feeding, clothing, housing and supervising this ‘mass of confused human beings
cut adrift in a collapsing society.’56 Other than the Red Cross, that played an impor-
tant role alongside the military, there were no other international humanitarian organ-
izations. In the decades to come the family of United Nations aid organizations,
national governmental relief organizations, and non-governmental organizations
would become the key players in relief during war and crisis. 
While the Army accepted responsibility for public order and handling the refugee
crisis – its motives shifting from operational to humanitarian – it initially balked at
assuming politico-economic functions. Eisenhower recommended in October 1945
that all non-security-related aspects of German occupation be transferred to Ameri-
can civilian institutions. However, the influential Assistant Secretary of War, John
McCloy, insisted by June 1945 that the Army would have to move far beyond the
envisaged role of policing the Germans as an occupation force. Although the State
Department was supposedly left in charge of policy matters, by late July Truman for-
mally assigned to the War Department and the Army the political and economic
responsibility for Germany.57
Partly as a result of the prolonged and broadened military control over govern-
ment, the two central American occupation aims, denazification and economic retar-
dation, rapidly dissolved. Winston Churchill’s refusal to adopt the harsh American
occupation policy as laid down in JCS 1067 had already barred it from becoming
Allied policy. The British were as eager as the American military to keep the mili-
tary phase of the occupation as short as possible and viewed that economic recovery
and order went hand-in-hand. They had always been more pragmatic in their approach
to Germany, putting less emphasis on the punitive element of occupation and more
on the expected stand-off with the Soviets. British policy therefore did not undergo
the same shift in emphasis from moralism to geopolitical concerns. Geopolitics had
always been prominent in Churchill’s mind, but only recently started to take hold in
some circles in Washington. American civil affairs officer Harold Zink found that
on the ground the British ‘certainly had a more professional attitude gained from
their long experience with colonial peoples, but displayed less sentimental concern
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for German suffering.’58 Helped by the British position on German recovery, Gen-
eral Clay admitted in retrospect that he all but ignored the policy guidance as laid
down in JCS 1067. ‘We were creating a situation that was hopeless,’ he recalled. ‘We
were preventing, not helping, the recovery of a country we had defeated, but at the
same time paying for its deficits to keep it alive.’59 Clay illustrated that those who
administer a policy often have more impact than those who conceive it.
After hostilities ended, the military was eager to transfer governmental responsi-
bility and there was a broad consensus about the need for civilian takeover. On 21
June 1945, Clay told the Army commanders in Germany that the War Department
considered military government ‘not a job for soldiers’ and should be ‘turned over
to the political as soon as practicable.’60 He vigorously pursued a policy to reduce
his own staff and replace them with civilians from the State Department and other
departments. The other means of speeding up the transfer was promoting German
self-government on the local level. Clay told McCloy in September 1945 that the Army
could ‘hardly withdraw the local [military government] detachments until officials
appointed by us have been replaced by others elected by the Germans.’ Elections
were first held in German municipalities in January 1946 and followed later that
year by ballots in the counties (Landkreise) and cities (Stadkreise ).61 The high voter
turnout was reassuring to the Allies, but generally seen as evidence of German obe-
dience to the victors than as proof of newly found democratic zeal. 
Clay’s expressed hope in September 1945 that the transition from military to civil-
ian control would be completed by July the next year proved unrealistic. However,
civilians gradually took over. At the lower levels of government, the burden of actual
administration was rapidly shifting to German civilian officials under American and
British civilian supervision in 1946. Meanwhile, the number of American civilian staff
working under military control in Germany would grow from a negligible size at the
close of the war to 2,500 in September 1946. In that same period, the amount of US
personnel involved in military government dropped from twelve thousand to less than
three thousand and steadily shrank to 155 by the end of 1948. When full responsibil-
ity was handed to the State Department in 1949, Clay had only 26 soldiers on his
staff.62 By that time the Federal Republic of Germany had emerged from the joint
British-American Bizone created in 1947 and the smaller French zone. The Germans
had also agreed upon a new constitution and elected their first parliament.63
After 1945, the US Army ran Germany in name and in law, but not in fact in local
communities. In the first half of 1946, military government detachments were grad-
ually replaced by two-officer liaison and security teams observing the work of local
German officials and assuring the quickest possible transfer of responsibilities. By
late 1946 they had mostly left. Clay continued to have absolute judicial, executive
and legislative powers after 1945, but hardly exercised them as selected and elected
German officials were allowed to run most of their own institutions in 1946. The
Germans even ran much of the denazification program. However, this program
already seemed to grind to a halt in all zones while under Allied military control.
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Nevertheless, the Americans had up until then purged and detained in greater num-
bers than the other occupying powers.64
Indignation and public pressure in the United States over the failure to remove
Nazis from positions of power and influence caused a short wave of new purges in
the American zone in late 1945. However, the Army again resorted to its pragmatic
approach to reshaping post-war Germany in order to withdraw from administrative
jobs as soon as possible.65 It continued to grant priority to order and security and
therefore emphasized material reconstruction rather than political and social democ-
ratization.66 To serve this purpose, it mostly turned to the old business and admin-
istrative elite, ignoring more progressive forces in German society. After September
1946, the State Department, after some qualms over JCS 1067, placed its full weight
behind the War Department in prioritizing economic reconstruction. By that time,
occupation priorities fundamentally shifted to creating a bulwark against Commu-
nism and denazification finally went on the back burner.67 But as Rebecca Boehling
argued in her study on the effects of US military interregnum in Germany, the occu-
pier’s changed priorities preceded America’s Cold War preoccupations. On the one
hand, the Army’s emphasis on efficient rule during the first year of the occupation
hurt denazification and socioeconomic reforms by reinstating a large part of the old
bureaucratic and economic elite. On the other hand, most Germans longed for sta-
bility and efficient rule and in the end, economic recovery ensured the acceptance
of the new political system. The emphasis on economic reconstruction also helped
to instill German confidence in democracy by sharpening the contrast with the Sovi-
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et zone, where their countrymen were living under considerably direr conditions.
Like quite a few of his more progressive colleagues in civil affairs, Harold Zink was
seriously disappointed with America’s failure to create a clean break with the Nazi
past when he wrote his first book on American military government in Germany in
1947. In his second book on the subject, written ten years later, Zink was milder,
concluding that ‘despite the well-remembered SNAFUs of the occupation, the end
result was oddly not that bad.’68
Conclusion
Most of the choices made in civil affairs and military government were driven by
pragmatism rather than principle. This is the likely reason why there was no con-
troversy in the United Kingdom about the occupation as there was in United States
where, as a result, far more scholarly debate has raged over the blessings and fail-
ures of military government in Germany. Soldiers rather than civilians governed in
the wake of the Allied advance because this served the war effort best. Integrating
civil affairs into the military chain of command rather than segregating the admin-
istrative organization assured their primary allegiance was to the tactical command-
ers and not to the people over whom they ruled. This also prevented civil affairs and
military government from creeping towards direct rule, for which even the massive
Allied war machine lacked personnel and resources. The operational primacy of civil
affairs prevailed during the mobile phase, but once the German armed forces were
defeated and the occupation moved into its static phase, the role of military govern-
ment shifted from support to center as the occupation became the primary goal of
the Allied military presence. Military government became a purpose in its own right
and the role of the regular tactical army units shifted towards a supporting role. As
will be further explored in the next chapter, military support to the government was
more or less the normal situation once a military force becomes involved in inter-
nal security operations.  
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2Supporting the Civil Power:
Counterinsurgency and 
the Return to Conventional Warfare
After the post-war occupations in Europe and Asia came to an end, most of the spe-
cific knowledge of civil affairs evaporated. With the rapid reductions of the military
forces that had fought the Second World War the British, Canadians, and Australians
discarded their specialized capacity to perform military interim government activi-
ties, leaving only the US Army in possession of a dedicated civil affairs organiza-
tion. However, civil affairs survived in two different forms outside the United States.
The Second World War dramatically upset the existing world order and the two pre-
vailing politico-military developments to emerge in its wake were superpower rival-
ry and the sudden and rapid disintegration of Europe’s colonial empires. NATO,
founded in 1949 to counter the Soviet threat in Europe, created a special function
for civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). Unlike the Americans, however, the European
allies did not create a specialized organization to coordinate its defensive operations
on the German plains with the local government institutions and population. Out-
side Europe, civil affairs and civil-military cooperation re-emerged as a prominent
aspect of the fight against nationalist and communist insurgencies in the colonies,
although not specifically designated in those terms or as a concept at the time. This
type of unconventional warfare is crucial to understanding the second theme in this
work – military support to civil authorities during internal security operations. Fol-
lowing an introduction into irregular warfare and the problematic search for a mil-
itary answer, this chapter centers on the British approach in Malaya in the 1950s.
This has often been regarded a ‘model campaign’ and ‘textbook case in counterin-
surgency.’ The Malayan campaign stood out for a number of reasons, but most of
all for its adequate balance between civilian and military measures and eventually
the high degree of coordination and cooperation between soldiers, civil administra-
tors and police.
Imperial Policing 
A wide array of terminology has been created to name the fight against irregular
opponents in war. According to one scholar, this is reflective of ‘the profound dis-
comfort of conventional armed forces with unconventional war.’1 Soldiers often did
not see suppressing revolts as their job, instead considering it a task for the civil
administration and its police forces. Military support was to be offered as a last resort.
In practice, however, military forces would continuously be called upon and once
engaged, steadily increased their role in pacifying colonized territories. 
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‘Small wars’ was a term that emerged in the course of the nineteenth century in
both the British and Dutch colonies. It echoed the Spanish word guerrilla that became
internationally known during Lord Wellington’s campaign against Napoleon’s forces
on the Iberian Peninsula 1808-1813, where he cooperated extensively with local irreg-
ular fighters sabotaging and ambushing the French behind enemy lines. The term
guerrilla warfare has been commonly used for the tactics employed by irregulars in
support of a conventional war, while ‘insurgency’ was coined for an autonomous
struggle to overthrow the existing government. The similarity in tactics employed by
guerrillas and insurgents caused the terms to be used interchangeably. Both often
chose not to wear uniforms, melted away into the civilian population, and preferred
hit-and-run tactics instead of open battle. 
Prior to the Second World War, the British commonly used the term ‘imperial
policing’ to describe military operations against insurgents in their colonies. The
Dutch used ‘politico-police tasks’ in the Netherlands East Indies and continued to
use the term ‘police actions’ in 1947-1949 to emphasize the illegitimacy of the enemy
who, in their view, were nothing but rebels and bandits who challenged the sover-
eign power. The Americans kept using ‘small wars’ as the generic term to describe
policing their zone of influence in Central America and their colonial adventure in
the Philippine Islands in the early twentieth century.2 After the Second World War,
‘counterinsurgency’ and, from the 1960s, ‘counter-revolutionary warfare’ were added
to the list by the British to describe their answer to the insurgencies by nationalist
and Communist movements. During the Vietnam War the American Army, after tak-
ing over from the French in the South, came up with a host of new terms to dis-
tinguish between the different elements of unconventional military operations. The
central tenet was to remove ‘counter’ from the parlance and as a result ‘stabilization
operations’ became the term preferred by the US Army.3
In 1971 the British General Frank Kitson, who fought in Malaya and played a
major role in successfully suppressing an insurgency in Kenya in the 1950s, intro-
duced a new umbrella term in his book Low Intensity Operations to distinguish it
from ‘high-intensity’ conventional military operations as in for instance the Second
World War, and included peacekeeping in this category. Low-intensity operations
became the common term used in the 1980s until the US military establishment,
who increasingly displayed their unease with anything other than symmetric war-
fare, came up with ‘Military Operations Other Than War’ in the early 1990s. The
aim, it had been suggested, was to lump together anything the armed forces consid-
ered to be outside their primary scope. ‘Stabilization operations’ would re-emerge at
the turn of the century after operations in Bosnia and Kosovo slowly convinced US
military leaders they had an inescapable role to play in the murky area between all-
out war and peace. 
According to counterinsurgency expert Thomas Mockaitis, all of these terms were
used to describe essentially the same phenomenon. This is correct if peacekeeping
– with its emphasis on impartiality instead of the defeat of an enemy – is left out
as a category.4 What most of these types of operations have in common is their
attempt to defeat an enemy that refused to fight on the government’s terms. They
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usually do so when the government’s armed forces are clearly better equipped for
open battle. Driven by some ideology, mostly nationalism or Communism and often
a powerful mix of both, the insurgent group’s political aim was traditionally meant
to create a new order by overthrowing the established government. It should be noted
that insurgency is not by definition civil war, but may be one or escalate into one
by splitting a society along ethnic, ideological or geographic lines. 
The insurgents start from a position of weakness and traditionally combine sub-
version, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism, but could move toward more conventional
forms of warfare. The classic method of Communist seizure of power preached by
Mao Tse-Tung distinguished three distinct stages in the Communist struggle for
power: guerrilla warfare, mobile warfare and positional warfare. The stages were not
necessarily consecutive and had to be handled flexibly while adapting to the enemy,
but after the first stage of Mao’s classical rural insurgency, which was aimed at wear-
ing down the government and winning the population to the cause of the revolu-
tion, some of the elite small guerrilla units could merge into large formations to
attack the government forces at the time and place of their choosing. The third and
last phase was all-out conventional war to dislodge the government and its foreign
supporters from the country. Ho Chi Minh succeeded in driving the French from
Indo-China in 1954 after successfully executing what can be considered the second
stage in an open battle at Diem Bien Phu. Mao had progressed to the third stage
when he defeated the nationalist Chinese in 1949 and so did the Communist Viet-
namese when they delivered the final blow to the South Vietnamese government
with conventional armed forces in 1975 after the Americans had withdrawn the bulk
of their troops in the preceding years. For insurgents to win militarily, they usually
had to progress to the higher stages for which they often relied on foreign backing.
However, they often did not even have to win on the battlefield as much as wear
down the enemy to the point where lack of resources, but most often the lack of
will, did the job. In the colonies or during foreign intervention, the disparity of will
was often caused by the fact that insurgents posed no threat to the foreign power’s
survival. ‘The guerrilla wins if he does not lose,’ Henry Kissinger wrote in 1969.
‘The conventional army loses if it does not win.’5
The limited learning process in fighting insurgencies was probably the most domi-
nant feature of Western armies. In the course of protracted colonial wars, learning
was most often slow and, in between campaigns, hard-won knowledge invariably
withered away. As a result, Western governments and their armies had a poor record
in defeating insurgencies. The Dutch colonial army in the East Indies in the nine-
teenth century is a case in point. At the outset of every new campaign since 1830,
the army advanced in large columns of heavily armed forces, including cavalry and
artillery, in search of the elusive enemy and a decisive battle to win. 
In campaigns that often lasted more than a decade, lessons were, in the end,
learned by some visionary commanders who adapted their organization and tactics
to the enemy. The vicious war that started in 1873 in Atjeh in the northern part of
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Sumatra progressed disastrously for the Dutch until the end of the century. Only
then was the struggle slowly won by employing light and flexible constabulary-type
forces, called the Korps Marechaussee, and by prioritizing a steady but intensive paci-
fication campaign aimed at controlling territory rather than killing the enemy. The
tactics employed in the campaign included a strong emphasis on intelligence gath-
ering. After the final remnants of resistance were quashed in the Indies in 1910,
decades of relative peace followed in the Indies. Not until 1928 were the lessons –
the bulk of which was learned thirty years earlier – officially codified and translated
into official learning material for a new generation of officers. Although the hand-
book’s overall emphasis was on military tactics and techniques, it incorporated a
chapter on cooperation with civilian authorities and one on the soldier’s posture
towards the indigenous population. At times, the Dutch colonial army had been
obliged to exercise military government in unruly areas, but overall the lessons were
surprisingly enlightened. It strongly advised against collective punishment by burn-
ing homes and crops (‘scuttle and burn’), as had been common wisdom in the pre-
vious century.6
Other colonial armies fared little better in the nineteenth century. The British
Army had extreme difficulty adapting to the sophisticated guerrilla tactics employed
by the South African Boers in 1899-1901. What often saved colonial armies in the
days of traditional colonial policing was their ability to rely on their superior fire-
power, the indiscriminate use of force, summary justice and collective punishment
for the population in order to suppress insurgencies. In the course of the twentieth
century, with a more critical media, such methods were increasingly hard to apply,
but at the time the press was hyper-patriotic and mostly uncritical. Reporters were
totally dependent on the military for access to the battlefield, if they ever came close
at all. When reported in the European press, harsh repressive measures only seemed
to raise widespread indignation when applied to fellow white men – and women and
children – in South Africa. Only after the Second World War did colonial armies and
the Americans in Vietnam constantly have to answer to international and domestic
opinion, which heavily politicized insurgencies and the struggles to counter them.
One explanation for inadequate learning in military circles was the overall aver-
sion to a type of warfare that was not considered the army’s proper role. Even when
serving in the colonies, the officer corps oriented itself mainly to military develop-
ments in the homeland, where rapid technical advances were made. The profound
military conservatism of the day also manifested itself in Europe, where develop-
ments in tactics dramatically lagged behind advances in weaponry, which resulted in
trench warfare and stalemate during the First World War. Poor adaptation while fight-
ing irregular opponents can also be traced to the complexity of the necessary meth-
ods, which depended on a delicate balance between civil and military measures and
therefore cooperation with, and support of, the civilian ‘other.’ As we have seen when
looking at military governance, soldiers prefer to operate in what they hope or expect
to be an exclusively military domain. 
Presumably because soldiers do not consider the causes of unrest and the wider
political aspects of a military problem, these aspects and the question of how to deal
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with them were left out of the meager available learning material in the British and
Dutch colonial armies. Yet, whereas learning in the Dutch colonial Army all but stag-
nated in the interwar period after the introduction of formal doctrine, the British
steadily progressed. Free from serious internal uprisings, the Dutch focused on the
growing conventional threat from Japan in the 1930s. Unlike most other European
armed forces, the small professional British Army ‘was in many respects an impe-
rial police force for which conventional warfare was the interruption.’ Nevertheless,
the literature of the interwar period was meager for an army involved in two decades
of almost continuous insurgency. There was little formal learning and teaching at
military colleges. Paradoxically, despite the steady stream of experience in Ireland,
India, Burma, and Palestine, the British started to preserve the lessons of the more
complex aspects of internal security operations in doctrine and literature since 1960,
only after the great campaigns were over.7
In his analysis of British counterinsurgency between 1919 and 1960, Mockaitis
argues that British learning did not progress through formal channels, but by the
application of three broad principles: minimum force, civil-military cooperation and
tactical flexibility. Although these principles evolved unevenly during the consecutive
internal security operations, they were ‘passed on as traditional wisdom from one
generation of officers and civil servants to the next with almost no effort made to
formulate doctrine, and little attention paid to preserving past experience in an organ-
ized fashion.’8 What made officers responsive to unofficial learning was their accept-
ance of internal security operations as a regular task for the military.
First, in quoting the 1923 Army manual, Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, Mock-
aitis emphasized that British soldiers were constantly reminded that their mission
was ‘not the annihilation of an enemy but the suppression of a temporary disorder,
and therefore the degree of force to be employed must be directed to that which is
necessary to restore order and must never exceed it.’ Rod Thornton has argued that
the minimum force philosophy was produced by a mixture of ethical principles that
can be traced back to Victorian values, and pragmatic considerations.9 Clearly ethics
would have lost out if the British had not gradually become convinced that in order
to rule over their vast empire effectively, the colonial yoke had to be as light as pos-
sible. This is not to say that the British Army has not been guilty of excesses dur-
ing imperial policing and counterinsurgency in the twentieth century. Despite their
wide and continuous experience, the British clung to ‘certain bad habits with remark-
able tenacity.’10 Since the British Army persisted in dealing with each insurgency on
an ad hoc basis, they often fell back on measures such as collective punishment,
even though this proved largely ineffective. During the insurgency in Ireland, for
example, instead of winning the people to the government’s case by positive incen-
tives and protection, the British resorted to measures such as burning people’s hous-
es. After the First World War, the newly created Royal Air Force was a rather blunt
instrument used to subdue tribesmen in the Middle East and employed to police the
Empire’s borders in the most cost effective manner. The most infamous example of
indiscriminate force by the British in the colonies was the shooting of between 200
and 379 Sikh protesters at Amritsar in India. However, while performing this role,
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the deliberate or thoughtless destruction of life was clearly the exception rather than
the rule. Overall, there was clearly an upward learning curve as a result of informal-
ly transferred lessons within the British regiments.11
Second, Mockaitis argued that the emphasis after the First World War on the
British Army’s role in support of civil administration and civil police asked for a
high degree of civil-military cooperation. Cooperation certainly had its ups and downs
in this period as it always involved the thorny question of whether soldiers or civil-
ians were in control. Cooperation between the military, police and civil government
in Ireland was poor while fighting the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1919-1921.
The initial solution had been to call on the military once local insurgent cells became
active and a situation threatened to get out of control. Once the local military com-
mander deemed his intervention necessary, he would assume command, but cease
to coordinate his efforts with the local civilian authorities once he handed over respon-
sibility to the civilian police. During joint police-military actions or patrols, the usual
uncertainty over who was in command prevailed. In Ireland, poor cooperation between
the military and police had a stifling effect on successful intelligence gathering and
sharing, the key to finding and fighting the insurgents, for which the police – more
familiar with the local situation – were essential. 
When the situation threatened to become uncontrollable for local administration
and police, calls were usually heard for the introduction of martial law, which in
many ways resembled military government. The usual first step taken by the gov-
ernment, quite different from martial law, was calling a state of emergency where-
by the civil government continued to exercise control and military forces acted in
their support and under civilian direction at the highest level. The provisions of the
state of emergency, usually a set of emergency regulations for arrest and detention
in relation to arms possession and support to the insurgents, give legal backing to
actions by soldiers, police and civil government officials to control violence. Martial
law was a more drastic measure. It implied a full-scale takeover by the military com-
mander of central or local government institutions, soldiers running public servic-
es, officers giving orders to the police and criminals being tried by military courts.
Calls for unity of command under military leadership were frequent in the tur-
bulent corners of the British Empire. Mockaitis concluded that ‘[p]erhaps too much
has been made of the debate over unity of command in counterinsurgency. The
British experience suggests that co-operation between civil and military authorities
rather than rigid control by either is what is required.’ This system worked in the
provinces and districts as long as there were clear political directives on the overall
aim of the campaign from the top.12 When delegating total control to military offi-
cers, the solutions tended to become militarized with a single emphasis on securi-
ty, whereas successful counterinsurgency called for measures in the political, eco-
nomic and social sphere. It made officers less accountable to civilian politicians and
more likely to rely on the maximum use of force. Clear political directives, the prime
condition for successful civil-military cooperation, proved problematic in for instance
Ireland and Palestine, where no political solution was offered. Between 1919 and the
end of the colonial counterinsurgency campaigns in 1960, ad hoc civil-military coop-
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eration slowly evolved into a system with constant liaison, sometimes with soldiers
and police operating out of a joint headquarters, and eventually into the elaborate
‘committee system’ of civil administrators, police and military commanders on all
levels of government that proved so effective in Malaya.
Tactical flexibility was the third principle that according to Mockaitis became
ingrained in British military culture. In order to allow the Army to adapt to the con-
stantly changing types of conflict and to an enemy that failed to ‘play by the rules,’
much authority had to be delegated to local commanders. This meant that command
had to be decentralized and the army needed to operate in small units, with much
latitude for battalion, company and even platoon commanders. Rigid control at the
center had proved counterproductive. In Burma, India and Palestine, cooperation with
their civilian counterparts on the regional and district level in order to find local solu-
tions to specific problems was the best guarantee for adequate intelligence gathering.
However, by 1945, much of the traditional wisdom of the interwar period had been
temporarily abandoned on the battlefields of the Second World War, where the tacti-
cal emphasis of military operations was on army groups and divisions rather than
battalions and platoons. For the troops faced with the Jewish insurgency in Palestine
in the immediate post-war years, most of the available manuals and pamphlets from
the interwar period focused on the purely military aspects, and cadets in the 1940s
and early 1950s were no longer trained in duties in aid of the civil power.13
Malaya: Integrating the Civil and Military Spheres 
After seven months of British military government following the Japanese defeat,
the British inaugurated the Malayan Union in April 1946. Under the new constitu-
tion citizenship and equal rights were granted to the Malayan Chinese minority that
constituted thirty-eight percent of the population and Indians, comprising twelve per-
cent. However, the Malay majority that made up almost half of the population and
had been traditionally in administrative control under British supervision refused to
accept shared political control. The minorities consisted of former immigrant work-
ers who had been brought in during previous decades to work on Malaya’s wealthy
rubber plantations and tin mines. The enlightened measures were premature and,
after serious opposition from the Malay elite, the British returned to a federal sys-
tem in early 1948. Power was thus restored to the nine Malay sultans that had tra-
ditionally ruled the country’s nine states with British administrative advisors operat-
ing in a classic system of indirect rule. 
In the Malay-dominated Federation, less than twenty percent of the Malayan Chi-
nese qualified for citizenship. The Chinese laborers had traditionally been discrimi-
nated against and had endured much hardship as a result of their Communist-
inspired armed opposition against the Japanese. Meanwhile the Malays had passive-
ly collaborated. Over 400,000 of the Chinese minority were ‘squatters,’ subsistence
farmers living on illegally occupied land on the jungle fringes, where they had fled
during the Japanese occupation. By 1948, law and order had seriously deteriorated,
and early that year the predominantly Chinese Malayan Communist Party (MCP)
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called for open rebellion and guerrilla operations. The dormant wartime guerrilla
cells were reactivated. It was on the squatters that the jungle army depended for its
support, in the form of supplies of food and clothing, information and recruits. Thick
jungle and rugged mountains covered eighty percent of the Malayan peninsula and
provided the guerrillas with a perfect hideout from which to launch their campaign
to gain control over the rural villages and ultimately urban centers. The remainder
of the country was predominantly covered with rubber plantations.
The Malayan ‘Emergency’, the polite British euphemism for a protracted colonial
war, can be divided into three consecutive phases. The first ‘defensive phase’ lasted
from 1948 to 1951. The second ‘offensive phase’ started in 1952 and ended in 1955,
when the insurgency was effectively broken. The remainder of the campaign was
spent consolidating the gains previously made by preparing the Malayan government
for self-government. Independence was granted to Malaya in 1957, but mopping-up
operations continued until 1960. The insurgency seriously began in May and June
1948 when many lives were lost in a wave of terror. The MCP’s military wing, the
Communist Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) mostly used hit-and-run tactics
against isolated police stations, rubber plantations, tin mines and moving vehicles.
Initially the terror was quite indiscriminate and managed to alienate a large part of
the apathetic public, but violence after 1950 was concentrated against Europeans,
government officials and Chinese who refused to cooperate with the MCP. In order
to retain popular support, the British had to avoid the mistakes made in Ireland,
where their counter-terror operations alienated a large part of the initially neutral
public. They also had to steer clear of the problems in Palestine, where – as in Ire-
land – no political solution was offered that might have addressed the legitimate
grievances of the insurgents. 
As much of the rural areas were in chaos calls for drastic legislation and a state
of emergency became louder. The government initially restricted introducing these
measures that could have provoked indignation and unrest rather than ameliorating
the situation. The usual package of emergency laws quite rigorously infringed on
basic civil rights. By the end of 1948, nine hundred people had died at the hands of
the guerrillas. Emergency regulations were introduced, but prior to 1950, the gov-
ernment was by no means able to enforce them. The local police force of 9,000 con-
stables was far too small and, as a result, the available military forces were tied up
performing static guard duties protecting the villages instead of effectively hunting
down the insurgents. Nevertheless, in those first two years of the Emergency, British
troops had been able to harass the insurgents in their jungle hideouts. At least this
kept them on the move and off-balance and prevented them from coordinating their
operations into larger assault by bigger units. However, the Army proved incapable
of inflicting any serious number of casualties. Meanwhile, the ranks of the Commu-
nist guerrillas swelled with Mao’s victory in China in 1949 as an inspiring example. 
In the defensive phase, the major theme was security for the people. As long as
the regular police were still relatively weak, the Army grudgingly assumed many
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police duties. Their role in policing was crucial, however, since public safety was
essential in order not to lose the bulk of the politically apathetic rural Chinese, who
cared only about stability, but who would side with the party that was most likely to
win and eventually provide law and order. Considering the fact that Communism
seemed to be sweeping through China and Southeast Asia like a whirlwind, it was
far from certain that they would place their bets on the British. Food and other sup-
plies were reaching the guerrillas in sufficient quantities, partly from the approxi-
mately ten percent of the rural Chinese actively supporting them and also from the
eighty percent that was coerced and intimidated by the Communists. By spring 1950,
the British and Malay authorities were losing the battle as the Communists were
able to recruit much faster than the government could kill and capture. Military casu-
alties were relatively low, but the police posts were hard-pressed and losing more
men than the insurgents. More than one hundred civilians were still murdered every
month.14 If the police and civilian population lost confidence in the government, the
struggle would be lost.
In 1948, the British Army could field no more than ten infantry battalions with
an average strength of seven hundred. Five of these were Ghurkhas, three Malay and
two British. As in any modern army, a large number of these were drivers, cooks,
mechanics, signalers and quartermasters. Therefore, a battalion of seven hundred
was mostly unable to put more than four hundred riflemen in the field. This left no
more than 4,000 riflemen to fight approximately the same number of guerrillas in
the jungle, who relied on civilians in the Communist Party organization and its sup-
porters in the villages. The number of Army battalions rose to twenty by 1951, but
by that time the number of guerrillas had also doubled. At the height of the Emer-
gency in 1952, government forces numbered 30,000 troops and 28,000 police. In
addition, thousands of local home guards were trained to back up the police during
emergencies. All these security forces were needed to effectively fight an enemy
whose numbers never rose above 8,000, or perhaps were never allowed to do so.15
On the military side, the problem was the inclination of many commanders to
operate in large formations. They attempted to conduct big-unit sweeps in the jun-
gle, ‘clearing the area of the enemy,’ without much information on their whereabouts.
They launched their battalion into the jungle to try to encircle a known camp in
order to wipe it out. In 1966, ten years after serving in Malaya, Clutterbuck wrote: 
The predilection of some army officers for major operations seems incurable. Even
in the late 1950’s, new brigade commanders would arrive from England, nostalgic
for World War II, or fresh from large-scale manoeuvres in Germany. On arrival in
Malaya, they would address themselves with grease pencils to a map almost whol-
ly green except for one red pin. ‘Easy’, they would say, ‘Battalion on the left, bat-
talion on the right, battalion blocking the end, and then a fourth battalion to drive
through. Can’t miss, old boy.16
While the maneuverist approach to fighting guerrillas was still prominently featured
in US Army textbooks when Clutterbuck lectured on counterinsurgency at US Army
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Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in the mid 1960s, it had long since been removed
from their British equivalents. The method had proved to be costly in man-hours
and resources. Most of all, maneuvers in order to cordon and search hide-outs by
large units through dense jungle were slow, hard to coordinate and noisy. Once con-
fronted with the enemy, only the first few troops ahead of a column could see enough
to shoot at the enemy anyway. In most cases, however, the soldiers would find an
empty camp as the alerted guerrillas avoided such direct confrontations. This nonethe-
less enabled the commanding officer to claim he had cleared an area of the enemy,
which would be proudly marked on the map. 
Thousands of new special Malay constables completed their training by early
1949, enabling the government to man the village police posts to sufficient strength
in the course of that year. This allowed the government to release more combat
troops from static protective duties in the populated areas and use them more flex-
ibly in support of the police when a village was under threat. It also enabled them
to take the offensive into the jungle in order to attack the larger guerrilla camps and
conduct smaller patrols and ambushes. To be successful, however, these actions relied
heavily on accurate and timely intelligence, which proved to be lacking at the outset
of the campaign. Only slowly were the time-honored principles and tactical lessons
of previous campaigns rediscovered and improved upon. 
The lessons came to full fruition in the second, offensive phase of the Malayan
campaign, when all previous experience merged. After the campaign ended, the
assembled experience on successful colonial policing and counterinsurgency opera-
tions was unofficially codified by Sir Robert Thompson, who had played an impor-
tant role as a colonial civil servant in Malaya. His five basic principles for success-
ful internal security operations were laid down in his book, Defeating Communist
Insurgency, written in 1966 after his disillusionment with his advisory role to the
South Vietnamese government and the US Army.17 Thompson clearly rose above the
usual focus on the military aspects of counterinsurgency and the methods used.
Although recommending methods that would be considered rather harsh by the end
of the twentieth century, his analysis gained a timeless quality. The principles more
or less became British doctrine and were taught at Sandhurst. He put particular
emphasis on their application in Malaya and on their misapplication in Vietnam.
While acknowledging the difference in circumstances facing the Americans in Viet-
nam, most analysts of low-level operations have since reconfirmed and elaborated
on his findings.18 Thompson’s five points will be described and used as the context
to explain how the offensive phase of the Malayan Emergency unfolded.
First and most important, the government had to identify the legitimate griev-
ances that fed the insurgency and tackle this central problem. To that end, it had to
define a clear political aim, which in the colonial context was to create a free, inde-
pendent and united country that was stable and economically viable. By removing
the prime cause of discontent, the government would be ‘outbidding the insurgents
for the loyalty of the people.’19 It was the most potent weapon in the counterinsur-
gency arsenal and the essential element of ‘winning the hearts and minds of the
people’ in order to separate the moderates from the insurgents. What facilitated find-
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ing a political solution for the British was the Malay majority’s acceptance of the
inevitability of sharing power with the minorities after they saw the ferocity of the
insurgency after 1948. Moreover, the Second World War had brought home to the
British Isles the notion that self-rule or rapid decolonization was inevitable. This was
not sufficiently understood in countries like France, the Netherlands and Portugal,
where governments desperately tried to hold on to their colonies – and suffered the
consequences. 
‘Winning the hearts and minds’ became a platitude in the course of the 1960s
at the time of the Vietnam War, and again in the 1990s, when the term re-emerged
during peace operations. It was often misused to simply point to the desired effect
of soldiers conducting small-scale humanitarian projects, so-called ‘civic actions,’ to
win over the local population. However important these measures were, the phrase
had a far broader significance and re-emerged implicitly in Thompson’s other prin-
ciples. 
Second, the government had to act in accordance with the law. The law applied
to the government as well as to the insurgents, but the government had of course
the power to change the law. In Malaya it had much latitude to do so after the state
of emergency had been declared in June 1948. As in all pre-war internal security
operations, a series of emergency regulations were deemed crucial to winning the
struggle, some of which called for the suspension of basic freedoms and fundamen-
tal human rights in democracies. The most important regulation was the widespread
registration program. Regularly checking the issued identity cards made it difficult
for the insurgents to move and therefore to supply and communicate as the insur-
gents had poor communications equipment. It thus became difficult to sustain and
coordinate larger operations. In addition to food control measures linked to the cards,
curfews and travel restrictions were imposed. Second in importance, according to
Clutterbuck, was the power to arrest and detain without trial, although control mech-
anisms were created to prevent abuse. Security forces also had the right to search
property without a warrant.20 According to Thompson, the government could be
quite authoritarian in an emergency situation, as long as the laws were applied equal-
ly to all and as long as the people felt it was providing security and meeting their
basic needs.21 None of these regulations achieved any result without effective local
government. ‘Where this is lacking, the regulations may do more harm than good,
since inequitable enforcement brings resentment and nonenforcement brings con-
tempt.’22 Crucial to success in Malaya was that the British, unlike the Americans in
Vietnam, were in full control of all government institutions and able to use the
Malays or Indians who were usually reliable as a result of their aversion to the Chi-
nese Communists.
The concept of minimum force was an integral part of this second principle.
When fighting insurgencies, frustration over the inability to capture those that were
considered bandits rather than a legitimate enemy often caused military forces to
take their anger out on the civil population when suspected of supporting the insur-
gents. This led to collective punishment in most of the colonial wars and again on
a small scale in Malaya. Moreover, methods such as air strikes, suppressive fire from
supporting the civil power 55
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:05  Pagina 55
helicopter gunships and artillery bombardments had frequently been relied upon out
of concern for the lives of an army’s own troops. The use of such indiscriminate
weapons often killed more innocent civilians than enemy forces. Thompson advised
strongly against such methods, instead advocating punishment strictly aimed at the
guilty.
Colonial armies and the Americans in Vietnam often ignored the fact that fear,
rather than ideology, was the primary driving force for most civilians in choosing
sides in the conflict. When fighting insurgencies, there was a point where fear of
the government could come to prevail among the population. In both Indochina and
Algeria the French, partially provoked, engaged in a policy of ruthless suppression.
After having received the order to stamp out an urban insurgency in Algiers in 1957
by any means, French paratroopers, invested with full civil power, broke the insur-
gent cells and gained control over the city. However, their ruthless methods, includ-
ing widespread torture, alienated the Algerians and French alike. In 1947 and 1948,
the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies sought a conventional military solution by
twice relying on a speedy and successful military advance, only to fail dramatically
during the costly and, at times, brutal pacifying campaigns that followed in the coun-
tryside. Their two ‘Police Actions’ eventually caused international indignation and
diplomatic pressure. Both the French and the Dutch were forced to leave their colonies.
Unlike the British, they were unable to dictate the terms for their imperial retreat.
Having learned in previous campaigns that force had to be used in a highly selec-
tive manner, the British in Malaya created an elaborate system of civil-military coop-
eration in order to exercise tight administrative control. This was the key to success-
fully applying Thompson’s third principle of counterinsurgency. The government
needed an overall plan for attacking the cause of the insurgency, not just the guer-
rillas. ‘Unity of effort,’ the process of tying civil and military measures together into
a single effective policy, always proved extremely difficult to achieve because, as one
analyst wrote, ‘it represents the fusion of civil and military functions to fight battles
which have primarily political objectives […] All the political, economic, psychologi-
cal and military means must be marshalled as weapons under centralized co-ordi-
nation and direction.’23
The appointment of Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs as the director of oper-
ations in Malaya was crucial to the development of the overall British strategy and
a mechanism for its implementation. Briggs was a retired officer and a veteran of
the Burma Revolt in 1930-1932 where civil-military cooperation had progressed bet-
ter than in most other operations. He worked directly under the high commission-
er, Sir Henry Gurney. Briggs introduced what became know as the ‘war by commit-
tee system’ that harked back to previous colonial experience, but finally put it on a
formal footing. The foundations of the system were the District War Executive Com-
mittees. Chaired by the district administrative officer, the committee included the
battalion commander and the police superintendent. They worked together to con-
duct day-to-day operations supported by an integrated intelligence committee of sol-
diers and police. For each of the nine Malayan states a similar triumvirate, a State
War Executive Committee, was created. In Kuala Lumpur, the high commissioner
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chaired the Federation Executive Council that issued policy directives and controlled
finance. It took some time for the system to function smoothly. The British commit-
tee system for civil-military cooperation was the alternative to the ‘single command-
er system’ mostly preferred by the French, where the military were in overall con-
trol of some or all levels of government. 
In Malaya, it was only on the highest federal level that civilian and military pow-
ers were temporarily merged between 1952 and 1954, during the height of the insur-
gency. This drastic measure was made possible by the shock effect created by the
killing of Sir Gurney in an ambush in October 1951. Later that year, General Briggs
left Malaya, an exhausted man, only to die a few months later. The man who was
chosen to replace Gurney was General Sir Gerald Templer who arrived in Malaya in
January 1952. Not only was he the first military man to occupy this political post, he
also served as the director of operations. He thus combined military and civil author-
ity in one person and has been called ‘the last of the proconsuls.’ 
Templer combined all the personal experience needed for leading the campaign
through its most critical phase, although it is important to realize that his predeces-
sors had held the line and developed the schemes that he implemented. As a divi-
sional commander he had seen combat in North Africa and Italy, where he was
wounded when his jeep struck a mine in 1944. Templer was director of military gov-
ernment in the British zone in Germany in 1945-1946, after which he served in the
War Office as the director of intelligence and vice chief of the Imperial General Staff.
Although the idea obviously predated him, the phrase ‘winning the hearts and minds’
has often been ascribed to Templer, when he said in 1952 that ‘[t]he answer lies not
in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people.’
He explained: ‘The shooting side of this business is only 25 percent of the trouble
and the other 75 lies in getting the people of this country behind us.’24 Templer per-
fected the committee system by putting extreme emphasis on the civilian side of the
operation and the need for a closely coordinated effort. He insisted that the district
and state committees meet once a day, ‘if only for a whiskey and soda in the evening.’25
With his unstoppable energy and strong and inspiring leadership, Templer played
a crucial role in invigorating the schemes that had already been developed under
Briggs. In 1950, Briggs had evolved an integrated plan for anti-guerrilla operations.
The committee system he institutionalized was the tool with which to implement
what became known as the Briggs Plan, which encapsulated the fourth principle dis-
tilled from the Malayan campaign by Robert Thompson. The government had to give
priority to defeating the political subversion of the people, not to defeating the insur-
gents by killing them. The strategy hinged on denying the guerrillas access to their
chief source of supply, recruits and intelligence – the civilian population. Thereto
the Briggs Plan included the resettlement of almost half a million Chinese squatters
from the jungle fringes to so-called ‘new villages.’ The primary aim of this drastic
measure was denial of food. The guerrillas would often be forced to come out into
the open to reach the villages when unable to obtain food from nearby squatters,
which allowed the security forces to attack them. The villages were encircled with
wire and protected by police with backup from local home guards. It took time,
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money for public facilities, compensation, offers of early citizenship and pressure to
induce the subsistence farmers to move. The committee system took time to bear
fruit and therefore the measures took long to implement – too long for Briggs to
see the results. It did work, in the end, as witnessed by the fact that only six out of
480 ‘new villages’ were abandoned by 1960.26
Physically divorcing the people from the extremists who tried to subvert them
was one method of ‘separating the fish from water.’ A hearts-and-minds campaign
was the other way to deny the guerrillas their most important protective shield – the
people. By the time of Templer’s appointment, the British pledged that Malaya would
become independent by 1957, a promise they would keep. In the meantime, Tem-
pler laid great emphasis on Malayan participation in local government. An elaborate
information or propaganda campaign was another vital element to keep the local
population from embracing the Communists and encouraging the guerrillas to sur-
render. Quintessential to ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the Chinese, however,
was their personal safety. When turning against the Communists or when they were
relocated, the Chinese squatters had to believe the security forces could protect them
against reprisals and intimidation. The primary element of the Briggs Plan was there-
fore security and protection of the population ‘that allow[ed] their ‘hearts and minds’
to be won over.’27
In his book Low Intensity Operations, Kitson emphasized these same principles
as those mentioned by Thompson. However, he put extra emphasis on the tactical
handling of information by operational commanders and the fact that ‘the problem
of defeating insurgents consists largely of finding them.’28 Food denial, intelligence
gathering and the actual act of killing insurgents were intricately linked. Even before
the Briggs Plan became British strategy, individual units found out how concentrat-
ing patrols and ambushes near food sources were likely to be most successful. A
vital part of the organized food denial program was the identification of villagers
who were supplying food to the insurgents. Templer’s tactics combined harsh treat-
ment of villages and individuals caught collaborating with the insurgents with pos-
itive incentives for those cooperating with the government. When sufficient evidence
had been collected to show conclusively that a villager was a supplier, he was dis-
creetly confronted with this evidence by a plainclothes Chinese detective from the
special branch of the police force – the agency with overall responsibility for collect-
ing and analyzing intelligence after 1951. He could escape punishment by becoming
a double agent, which many did, and continue to smuggle food to the Communists
while providing the exact information on the whereabouts and movements of guer-
rillas. If he chose to flee to the jungle, the insurgents had lost a source of supplies
and information in the village, and gained another mouth to feed. Together with
extremely generous rewards for peasants and voluntarily surrendered guerrillas who
provided information that led to a successful ambush or attack, intelligence gather-
ing rapidly improved.29
The British had found that flogging the jungle without information by large num-
bers of troops proved ‘utterly useless.’ Now, the new sources of intelligence, com-
bined with a great deal of planning and coordination, allowed small patrols with local
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trackers to attack camps, with others laying ambushes for the fleeing guerrillas.30
The necessary shift towards smaller scale operations and dispersal of forces was
accompanied by a decentralization of command and control, allowing junior com-
manders considerable initiative in adapting the broader principles and assignments
laid down by senior commanders. Commandos from the Special Air Service (SAS)
played an important role in deep penetrations of the jungle, but the British found
that counterinsurgency was first and foremost a job for regular infantry.31 Battalion
and company commanders who remained in the area longer, often more than a year,
became familiar with the area. Personally knowing the administrators, police, and
special branch paid off. Overall, there was little new theory but much common sense
in their approach, with officers and non-commissioned officers claiming ‘we were
making it up as we went along,’ applying minimum force and finding solutions with
civilian partners as a reflex, rather than as a set of orders imposed from above.32
The fifth and last principle from Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency was
the need to secure the government’s base area and to progress gradually from there.
While maintaining military pressure in all parts of Malaya not cleared of guerrillas,
other areas were designated as sufficiently secured for emergency regulations to be lift-
ed. In time, the security role in these areas could be fully taken over by police and
local home guard.33 Thompson and all other analysts of counterinsurgency that fol-
lowed him emphasized over and over again that successfully defeating an insurgency
required patience. The government had to show extreme determination to see the cam-
paign through to the very end and root out the insurgency before transferring power
to the independent government of Malaysia. The British stayed until the emergency
was finally over in 1960 and after that they maintained a close relationship with the
new Malaysian government. The British Army stayed on in an advisory role and, togeth-
er with Australian troops, again saw action in the jungle in support of the Malaysian
Army during its confrontation with Indonesia over Borneo (1962-1966). However, by
mid-1954 the offensive against the insurgents was so successful that one-man rule was
no longer necessary and Templer handed over his military powers to a soldier and his
post as high commissioner to his civilian deputy. The British would go on to win two
other counterinsurgency operations in Kenya and on Cyprus in the second half of the
1950s. In both cases it would be a long haul. 
As a result of the escalating war in Vietnam and Communist successes elsewhere,
insurgency and counterinsurgency became widely studied. In the course of the 1960s,
those who had been practicing subversion and insurgency, such as Mao and the
Greek Cypriot insurgent leader George Grivas, wrote books on their ideas, principles
and methods. Those devising measures to successfully counter them, people such
as Thompson and Kitson, a civil servant and a soldier, did the same. ‘Unfortunate-
ly,’ Kitson observed, ‘the fact that so much is known by those who have studied the
problem does not mean that the problem has been studied by all those who should
have done so.’ Even in Britain, a considerable number of officers, including senior
ones, consciously failed to understand what was involved and cried ‘that a fit soldier
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with a rifle can do all that is required.’34 This attitude was deeply ingrained on both
sides of the Atlantic. 
The root of the problem was that an officer’s qualities for fighting conventional
war differed from the development of characteristics for the ‘lower end of the oper-
ational spectrum,’ in which Kitson included peacekeeping. Traditional soldiers were
trained to be ‘strong, courageous, direct and aggressive,’ whereas the successful offi-
cer in counterinsurgency developed certain deviousness, a lot of patience and ‘deter-
mination to outwit their opponents by all means compatible with the achievement
of the aim.’ In 1971 Kitson wrote: 
Those who are not capable of developing these characteristics are included to
retreat into their military shells and try not to notice what is going on. They adapt
the ‘fit soldiers with a rifle’ theory, and long for the day when they can get back
to ‘proper soldiering’ by which they mean preparing for the next – or the last –
war, as opposed to fighting in the current one. There are also some sound mate-
rial reasons for not becoming too well qualified in fighting insurgents, because
expertise in this field can result in an officer being channelled away from the main
stream of military preferment, a factor which is more apparent in the United States
than in the British Army.35
Only after the great campaigns of the 1950s were over the principles and methods
of counterinsurgency became part of the curriculum taught at the Royal Military
Academy. Several smaller insurgencies on Borneo, in Aden (South Arabia) and Oman
in the 1960s and early 1970s, but particularly the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland,
kept the interest in low-intensity operations in the United Kingdom alive in the
decades to come. Obviously, the ‘Troubles’ were dissimilar from previous insurgen-
cies. Most of the doctrine and methods from the Malayan Emergency, a rural insur-
gency halfway across the globe, proved politically and practically impossible to apply
in Ulster’s largely urban environment. Moreover, the ever-present media seriously
constrained the British security forces in Northern Ireland. Adherence to the prin-
ciples of minimum force, civil-military cooperation and tactical flexibility were essen-
tial in keeping the violence at ‘an acceptable level,’ but the struggle could not be won
without a proper political solution.36 Despite the frustration within the British mil-
itary over their inability to put a stop to the violence within the borders of the Unit-
ed Kingdom, the British armed forces – like the Australians who shared much of
their experience in Malaya and Borneo – could look back on counterinsurgency cam-
paigns with a certain pride. Compared to the American military’s reaction to their
experience in Vietnam, this gave their soldiers a different outlook on what the prop-
er role of the armed forces was. 
Vietnam: Lessons Unlearned
While lecturing in the United States in 1962 on the patient and restrained approach
in Malaya, a British Army colonel was interrupted by a chuckle from a US Marine
60 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:05  Pagina 60
Corps major. Asked what the reason for his amusement was, the major explained
that in Vietnam, ‘[w]e will work them over with so much steel that six months will
see the end of it.’ For a number of reasons the British experience in Malaya could
not be blindly copied in Vietnam. The Americans, however, instead of using the
applied principles as a basis and expanding on them, ended up using methods and
displaying reflexes that were often diametrically opposed. The US military, like the
French in Vietnam before them, tended to treat insurgency as a predominantly mil-
itary problem. ‘Whereas French and American generals would say ‘turn us loose’,
British ones would repeat, ‘Give us a political solution and a good police establish-
ment.’’37 Not only did the American military leaders fail to build on the British expe-
rience, they also discarded their own historical experience in counterinsurgency. The
US Marine major’s reaction in 1962 was as an exponent of the way the experience
in conventional battle during the war in the Pacific had come to influence the Marine
Corps thinking. Prior to the Second World War the Corps had been the breeding
ground for commanders skilled in low-intensity operations. 
The wide variety of ‘small wars’ fought by the United States in the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth century included suppressing an insurgency in the Philippines
and a punitive expedition in Mexico. Here the US Army played the predominant
role. However, the US Marine Corps became America’s primary overseas police force
and built up considerable experience during a series of guerrilla wars and military
interventions familiarly known as the ‘Banana Wars’ in Central America and the
Caribbean. Between 1898 and 1933, the Marines saw action twice in Cuba, Panama,
Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and again in Nicaragua in pacification
campaigns that often took years and sometimes more than a decade. 
The accumulated wisdom of several decades of small wars was collected and cod-
ified in the late 1930s by the US Marine Corps and eventually published in their
elaborate Small Wars Manual. Quite inopportunely, it appeared in 1940, on the eve
of America’s participation in the Second World War, which would fundamentally
change the country’s foreign policy and military outlook. In 2002, a retired US
Marine Corps colonel, Nick Pratt, called the Small Wars Manual ‘a classic, and […]
more relevant today than anything currently in use by any military service.’ It defined
small wars as ‘operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military
force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of anoth-
er state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preser-
vation of life and of such interests are determined by the foreign policy of our
Nation.’38 President Woodrow Wilson had declared the purpose of these interven-
tions ‘to teach the South American republics to elect good men.’39
Many of the same principles that emerged during British imperial policing and
counterinsurgency can be found in the Marine Corps manual. Minimum force is
one of them. Although Americans, like their European counterparts, had at times
resorted to excessive force and collective punishment such as during the Philippine
insurrection, they eventually learned their lessons: ‘In small wars, caution must be
exercised, and instead of striving to generate the maximum power with the forces
available, the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force. In
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small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our rela-
tionship with the mass of the population. Small wars involve a wide range of activ-
ities including diplomacy, contacts with the civil population and warfare of the most
difficult kind.’40 The handbook explained how in major wars the mission was usu-
ally unequivocally the defeat and destruction of the hostile force. ‘This is seldom
true in small wars.’ Instead, the Marines faced the more ambiguous mission ‘to
establish and maintain law and order by supporting or replacing the civil govern-
ment in countries or areas in which the interest of the United States have been
placed in jeopardy.’ Other than in ‘big war,’ diplomacy had not ceased as a function
and the State Department continued to play a major role in shaping the American
response by exercising ‘a constant and controlling influence over the military oper-
ations.’ However, as in the Second World War, the State Department was often inca-
pable of picking up the civilian administrative tasks in time and soldiers ended up
running medical programs infrastructural projects and establishing new local gov-
ernments. 
Protecting the population and public security was also a central tenet of the Small
Wars Manual. Much emphasis was put on the formation of local constabulary forces
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commanded by Marine Corps non-commissioned officers and used for the protec-
tion of persons and property of the population.41 The Marines learned to rely on
small patrols and avoid big sweeps, for which they mostly lacked the manpower any-
how. ‘Resourcefulness and ingenuity’ were called for when pacifying and the Marines
were mostly given general guidelines to follow and considerable latitude in achiev-
ing objectives. ‘Small Wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intel-
ligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small Wars are conceived in uncertainty, are
conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under inde-
terminate orders lacking specific instructions.’ This degree of ambiguity and the
room for interpretation would be unthinkable in the descriptive American military
doctrine that appeared several decades later, at the time when the US military became
increasingly involved in peace operations.42
By the time the United Stated became fully involved in Vietnam in 1965, the
Small Wars Manual was all but forgotten, except by some older Marine Corps veter-
ans. The experience from the Second World War and the Korean War solidified what
has been called the ‘Army Concept’ of war, or what later became know as ‘the Amer-
ican way of war.’43 The overarching tenet of the American approach was to fight the
Viet Cong with conventional war methods. The US commander in Vietnam, Gener-
al William C. Westmoreland, wanted to pursue a mobile war, attacking large enemy
formations and disrupting their supply lines, as he had done while fighting the Ger-
mans. American military leaders sought a decisive victory on the battlefield and,
when this proved impossible against an enemy that refused to come out into the
open and fight, they chose to fight a war of attrition by killing the maximum num-
ber of insurgents with ‘search and destroy’ missions. 
Instead of gradually pacifying the densely populated agricultural coastal plains
and the Mekong Delta, as some Marine Corps generals suggested, Westmoreland
used most of his resources to aggressively seek out and kill the enemy in the High-
lands and the jungle. Continuously looking for a quick-fix solution, his tactics were
focused on bringing out the enemy in sufficient numbers so he could bring his
forces’ overwhelming firepower to bear. Whenever the Viet Cong chose to operate in
larger formations, as in the siege of Khe Sahn and during the Tet Offensive, it suf-
fered tremendous losses. But, unlike the Americans, the Vietnamese were willing to
suffer these losses. In the meantime, the elusive Communist insurgents continued
to win over, subvert and intimidate the people in the populated areas, thereby main-
taining their access to supplies, information and recruits. The Viet Cong and the
North Vietnamese Army acting in its support would not abide by the American rules
and the US Army refused to adapt to the enemy’s predominantly small-unit guer-
rilla tactics. 
There were some notable exceptions to the mainstream American military expe-
rience in Vietnam. In 1961 and 1962 the US Army Special Forces – specifically
trained in unconventional methods of warfare – secured a great number of villages
in the Highlands by employing proven counterinsurgency methods that emphasized
small-scale patrols, winning the hearts and minds and intelligence gathering. In its
area of operations in the north, the US Marine Corps conducted an overall success-
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ful but small-scale pacification campaign. Not only did the Marines have a long his-
tory in small wars, they were also not committed to the defense of Europe that tend-
ed to exclusively focus commanders on conventional warfare. Harking back to the
small wars experience from the Caribbean campaigns, the Marines created the Com-
bined Action Platoon (CAP) program. A CAP of approximately ten Marines would
integrate their operations with up to fifty National Front home guard forces in the
defense of a village or ‘hamlet.’ They would live, eat and sleep with the local popu-
lation and their mission was to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure in the village
and area, protect public security, help maintain law and order and conduct civic action
projects. Westmoreland marginalized all such initiatives and the program never
employed more than two thousand marines. 44 Another notable exception to the
mainstream performance in Vietnam was the role played by the Australian Army
that – fresh from Malaya and Borneo – served in Vietnam between 1965 and 1972.
The American Vietnam war veteran and Newsweek commentator, Colonel David Hack-
worth, once said, ‘The only people who really know how to fight this thing are the
Australians and the Viet Cong.’45
When looking at successive versions of the US Army’s capstone war fighting doc-
trine, Field Manual 100-5, one can see a brief surge of interest in counterinsurgency
methods and principles in the early and mid-1960s, after President John F. Kennedy
had showed special interest in unconventional warfare and stimulated the expansion
of Special Forces. By 1968, the chapter on military operations against irregular forces
was removed from the main Army doctrine publication.46 During and after the Viet-
nam War, the Army tended to delegate the practice of unconventional warfare, with
its high demands on flexibility, improvisation and ability to interact with the local
population, to the Special Forces.47 The British, while making some use of the SAS,
had always held that counterinsurgency was primarily a job for well-trained, versa-
tile regular infantry units. 
The Americans could have learned a lot more from the British experience, but
Vietnam was not Malaya. While Malayan insurgents had been geographically isolat-
ed in the jungles of the Malayan peninsula, the Vietnamese Communists were amply
supplied with Soviet and Chinese armaments and supplies. In Malaya, the guerillas
belonged to one of three major ethnic groups, which made them much easier to iso-
late. For the United States, tackling the underlying political grievance in Vietnam by
defining a clear political aim was far more difficult than it had been for the British
in Malaya, who were in control of all government institutions. The Americans were
backing an unpopular and corrupt regime, many of whose actions were beyond the
control of policymakers in Washington. The South Vietnamese government readily
accepted military aid, but successfully resisted the pressure for political and econom-
ic reforms. Meanwhile, what the South Vietnamese people wanted first and foremost
was good government, safety and order. 
An integral strategy for counterinsurgency similar to that in Malaya was difficult
to conceive, and a system of civil-military cooperation for its implementation seri-
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ously hampered by poor local government and weak police force and home guard.
On their part, the Americans failed to put sufficient emphasis on a population-ori-
ented ‘hearts and minds’ campaign, and there was never a proper functioning sys-
tem for liaison and cooperation between smaller tactical units and local authorities.
One of the ironies of the Vietnam campaign was that no US Army civil affairs reserve
units were activated during the Vietnam War. Calling up the reserves that made up
the vast majority of the civil affairs personnel had always been politically sensitive.
Civil affairs could have played an important role in an army whose combat units
lacked versatility and – other than the British in Malaya who regarded this as a com-
mander’s responsibility – preferred to delegate interfacing with civilian institutions
and people to its specialized branch. Instead of deploying sufficient civil affairs per-
sonnel, ‘the chequered path of civil affairs was overseen by various civilian-military
hybrids, which, in spite of heroic efforts, never did fire the imagination of US field
commanders, who seemed determined to fight a war of attrition.’48 Ill-fated attempts
from 1962 to create hundreds of ‘strategic hamlets’ in line with the ‘new villages’
in Malaya never succeeded in rendering sufficient protection to the village popula-
tion.49 As a result of poor civil-military cooperation, the failure to protect and win
over the people and insufficient human intelligence on the enemy’s whereabouts,
the American forces tasked to ‘search and destroy’ were in fact ‘flogging the jungle
without information by large numbers of troops’ – and napalm. 
Lacking a reliable political base and framework for operations in South Vietnam,
the American Army preferred to seek a purely military solution. In doing so, it fun-
damentally broke with the desirability to use minimum force. An American general
admitted that since their superior technology had little to aim at, soldiers were apply-
ing firepower ‘on a relatively random basis.’ The population was often in the line of
fire and, in some cases, deliberately targeted. A British brigadier general who wit-
nessed American operations in Vietnam described United States tactics as ‘prophy-
lactic firepower, which means that if you do not know where the enemy is, make a
big enough bang and you may bring something down.’50 Apart from heavily relying
on artillery, twice the tonnage of bombs dropped by the British and American air
forces in the Second World War was brought to bear on North and South Vietnam. 
On the ground, however, over eighty percent of the engagements in 1967 between
the Americans and the Communist Vietnamese took place on the enemy’s initia-
tive.51 By 1968 there were over 600,000 US and allied troops supporting the 670,000
South Vietnamese security forces. With the massive disparity of will on both sides,
and without proper counterinsurgency strategy and tactics, it would not be enough.
Although the Americans actually started to conduct the war somewhat more skill-
fully from 1969 by embracing a pacification program called ‘clear and hold,’ the
South Vietnamese government and their American sponsor never succeeded in sep-
arating the population from the insurgents before public support for the war effort
in the United States crumbled. Following the Viet Cong’s psychological victory in
the 1968 Tet Offensive, US military ground forces started to gradually withdraw.
Approximately 57,000 American troops and at least one million, perhaps even two
million Vietnamese civilians and soldiers died in the war.
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The Return to ‘Ordinary Soldiering’ 
The US military establishment found the suggestion that it had failed on the battle-
field unacceptable. It sought arguments to reinforce the thesis that defeat in Viet-
nam was not due to tactical incompetence and inflexibility, but solely a result of
strategic failure. Military leaders blamed the political decision to slowly escalate the
war instead of applying decisive military force at once. A frequently heard claim was
that American soldiers were fighting ‘with one hand tied behind their back.’ Although
the tragedy in Vietnam was indeed first and foremost the consequence of political
mistakes, the US military cannot be exempted from structurally failing to adjust their
methods and principles to a guerrilla-style opponent and from alienating a popula-
tion they had supposedly come to protect. As a result of the tendency to divert all
the blame to the political level, even the few positive tactical lessons from the expe-
rience in low-intensity conflict were largely ignored. The prevailing strategic lesson
from Vietnam was that the United States should avoid this type of intervention alto-
gether. The high-tech Yom Kippur War between the Israelis and their Arab neigh-
bors in 1973 featured the second largest tank battle in history and only seemed to
reconfirm that Vietnam had been an aberration in the historical trend of warfare.
The most significant failure the American military elite was willing to acknowledge
was its inability to adequately influence policy decisions in Washington. Since the
1980s, the US armed forces sought to correct this by influencing policy decisions
on how and where they would be deployed.52
In his highly influential US Army War College study On Strategy: A Critical Analy-
sis of the Vietnam War, Colonel Harry Summers concluded in 1981 that the United
States had lost the Vietnam War because it had not fought conventionally enough.
The most fundamental ‘lessons learned’ publication to come out of the conflict con-
cluded that the Army should not have deviated from its big-war approach and engage
in some half-hearted counterinsurgency experiments.53 This message was clearly more
welcome that of another, more critical in-house study that had concluded quite the
opposite one year earlier. Summers thesis was embraced by the bulk of the armed
forces during the post-Vietnam process of soul-searching and strengthened the idea
that the sole purpose of the US armed forces was to fight and win America’s wars.
This ‘American way of war’ was articulated and codified in the Weinberger-Powell
Doctrine as formulated in 1984. The doctrine, named after Secretary of Defense
Casper Weinberger and co-drafter, National Security Advisor Colin Powell, held that
military force should only be used if there was a clear risk to US national security
and only as a last resort; that the objective should be unambiguous; that the force
used should be overwhelming and with the clear intent to win; that the operation
must have strong public support and a clear exit strategy.54 A US colonel wrote of
the 1984 Weinberger-Powell doctrine that it codified and distilled, in ‘bumper-stick-
er form, the key components of Summers’ book.’ The Doctrine was perhaps best
summarized by the statement, ‘We don’t do Vietnams.’55
The idea that conventional warfare was the only proper role for military forces
was also reconfirmed in continental Europe in the aftermath of a long series of colo-
nial debacles. The experiences on both sides of the Atlantic perfectly converged in
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focusing on a new single military objective. The Israeli military analyst Martin van
Crevelt wrote: 
When the last colonies – those of Portugal – were freed in 1975, many people felt
that an era in warfare had come to an end. Having suffered one defeat after anoth-
er, the most important armed forces of the ‘developed’ world in particular heaved
a sigh of relief; gratefully, they felt that they could return to ‘ordinary’ soldiering,
by which they meant preparing for wars against armed organizations similar to
themselves on the other side of the Iron Curtain.56
While preparing for conventional battle against the Warsaw Pact forces during the
Cold War years, the Western military retreated to barracks and military practice
grounds. The few lessons from counterinsurgency that had been learned were most-
ly forgotten or ‘unlearned.’ As the United States and the former colonial powers lost
interest in low-intensity conflict in the third world, they further neglected operating
close to civilians and integrating operations with civilian authorities. To their great
relief, they were hardly ever called upon to perform tasks related to public security.
The role military forces had played in supporting the civil power at home during
and before the nineteenth century had already been disappearing in most democra-
cies. The rapid professionalization of police forces in the twentieth century made
civil authorities less dependent on military backup during a breakdown of law and
order. Only the British Army continued to support to the civil authorities during an
internal security operations on a significant scale while containing the insurgency in
Northern Ireland after 1970. When intervening in their former colonies in Africa,
the French delegated most of these internal security operations to its Foreign Legion,
thus keeping much of the experience in low-intensity operations outside the main-
stream army culture. NATO member states and their militaries became fixated on
armored and combined-arms operations and on maneuver warfare theory. After the
détente of the 1970s, the 1980s saw a revival of Cold War tension. During Ronald
Reagan’s presidency, the American military refound its confidence and, provided with
lavish funding, developed the ‘air-land battle’ doctrine aimed at resisting the numer-
ically superior Warsaw Pact armies by relying on superior technology.
While focusing singularly on possible conventional combat in Germany, NATO
treated the civil-military interface as a problem at the margins of military operations,
just as it had been during mobile operations in the Second World War. The func-
tions ascribed to Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) concentrated on population and
resources control and support to the host-nation authorities. NATO CIMIC was geared
towards facilitating conventional military operations by clearing civilian ‘obstacles’
such as refugees and by exploiting civilian resources and infrastructure for military
purposes. As in the Second World War, this happened mostly outside the scope of
tactical units below army corps level, which became used to operating in what was
conceived to be a purely military sphere.57 Soldiers viewed their area of operations
as their near-exclusive domain and considered civilians primarily a hindrance.
The US Army civil affairs branch was also largely consumed by preparations for
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these CIMIC-type tasks in support of conventional warfare in the defense of Europe.58
The acronym CIMIC was absent from American doctrine and only used by the US
military when performing a NATO role. Most of the civil affairs units were config-
ured to meet these needs. Nevertheless, CIMIC covered only a portion of the civil
affairs field of operations that formally still included low-intensity operations and
civil administration. However, as priorities had changed in the previous decades,
Army doctrine for full assumption of government functions in enemy and friendly
territory withered away. Military occupation was not seriously considered on the Euro-
pean battlefield and as a result civil affairs neglected much of its ability to perform
military government activities after the 1960s, when those with ‘proconsular’ expe-
rience from the 1940s left the military. Around 1960 the term military government
was purged and replaced by the generic term civil affairs to emphasize the non-coer-
cive aspects.59 At that time, civil affairs attempted to adapt both doctrine and organ-
ization to counterinsurgency operations, but political deliberations had prevented it
from proving its worth in Vietnam. Thereafter civil affairs doctrine became largely
concerned with the composition of units and not how they would be employed; by
the end of the century, administration of occupied territory had disappeared from its
pages. 
In the 1980s, the civil affairs community, consisting of two hundred active per-
sonnel, and some five thousand reservists, was in a sorry state.60 The US Army often
neglected providing staff officers at general staff level (G5) in headquarters in Ger-
many and, with the Army’s strict focus on Europe, civil affairs was also poorly pre-
pared to support low-intensity conflict.61 One civil affairs officer complained in 1990
that the civil affairs organization had ‘no champion, no sponsor, and therefore, in
spite of its great potential, tends to be lumped together with the ‘ash and trash’
units.’62 Regular Army personnel hardly knew what civil affairs was and tended to
confuse it with the Army’s Public Affairs Division. 
During the mid-1980s, voices were raised to focus civil affairs on conflict at the
lower end of the spectrum and in 1987, Weinberger assigned all civil affairs units
to the newly established Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg. The rationale
behind this was to redirect civil affairs assets towards unconventional warfare at a
time when the Reagan administration was supporting both anti-government guerril-
las in Nicaragua and the counterinsurgency efforts of the government of El Salvador.
It did so without the use of regular combat units. ‘Foreign Internal Defense’ there-
fore became the term for support to irregular warfare to emphasize that the US mil-
itary would only help and not be involved in these unwanted low-intensity conflicts
itself. The shift in focus led to some heated debates within the civil affairs commu-
nity that was continuously trying to prove its value to an Army that was strictly
focused on the conventional Soviet military threat. Many civil affairs officers regard-
ed their general support role in Germany as the goal of the force while seeing uncon-
ventional warfare as ‘aberrations of the core raison d’être for civil affairs.’63
After the Cold War had come to an end, the Persian Gulf War in 1990 seemed
to validate all the hopes and beliefs in future trends in warfare that existed within
Western military forces during the Cold War years. The UN-sanctioned war to evict
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Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait was played strictly by Weinberger’s rules and
executed under the military leadership of General Colin Powell, then chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The type of war NATO had planned to fight on the Ger-
man plain with the US armed forces at its core was instead fought against an infi-
nitely inferior enemy in the Iraqi desert. After their technological sprint in the 1980s
– which left friend and foe in awe – the United States’ armed forces could bring
their tremendous firepower to bear against an enemy that was so unwise as to meet
the Americans on the open battlefield on their terms. The US Army could maneu-
ver and fire at will in a terrain that harbored almost no civilians, had no large urban
centers and no local government to worry about. Before the civilian population threat-
ened to become a problem at the far edges of the American advance toward the
Euphrates, the US and allied forces withdrew from Iraq – leaving the Shiite popu-
lation the American president had called upon to revolt to fend for itself against Sad-
dam’s wrath. 
The conquest of Kuwait was liberation in a classical sense. With close to one
thousand civil affairs personnel in theater and ample time to plan, it could have been
a model for US Army civil affairs in its traditional role. However, with civil affairs
in its civil administrative role on the back burner during previous decades, and as
a result of inadequate political prioritization of this function in the planning phase,
the effort to reconstruct Kuwait was chaotic. The American general left in charge of
operations in post-war Kuwait recalled being handed ‘a dripping bag of manure,’ that
no one else wanted to deal with. Neither the Pentagon nor the US Army had con-
ceived of an adequate plan to reconstruct Kuwait and its institutions, and few assets
were initially allocated. American civilian agencies were no better prepared. The sit-
uation was salvaged with adept improvisation by Army engineers and civil affairs
personnel, and a large input from Kuwaiti volunteers and the Saudi government.64
With its incredible wealth and governing elite that could move right back into power,
Kuwait would not prove the most difficult post-war nation to put back on its feet. 
After defeating Saddam Hussein’s troops with the use of overwhelming force,
and with the Cold War at an end, President George H.W. Bush launched his opti-
mistic but vague vision of a ‘New World Order’ that held some promise of an increased
role for the United Nations in international conflict resolution. He also claimed that
the United States had kicked its Vietnam syndrome, but this proved only partly true.
The syndrome would soon be revived during the coming era of peace operations,
particularly by developments in Somalia in 1993. 
Toward Civil-Military Peace Operations
If conventional warfare and irregular warfare are considered the two main categories
of military operations, where did this leave peacekeeping as a military tool around
1990? Judged from the perspective of civil-military interaction in an area of opera-
tions, United Nations peacekeeping in the preceding decades had followed the trend
of conventional, ‘inter-state conflict.’ In accordance with the principle of non-inter-
ference in domestic affairs, UN peacekeepers had stayed out of the murky business
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of civil war, or ‘intra-state conflict,’ with its nasty tendency to pull soldiers into inter-
nal security operations. Prior to 1989, peacekeeping was almost exclusively focused
on separating two national armies along a status-quo line with the hope of solving
territorial disputes by restoring internationally agreed-upon boundaries, or providing
the shield that allowed them to be adjusted by diplomatic means. Initially, UN mis-
sions were limited to deploying military observers, but over the years these evolved
into what later became known as ‘traditional peacekeeping’: operations with infantry
units physically manning buffer zones between warring armies. The principles of
peacekeeping were consent of the parties involved, neutrality, observation and the
use of force limited to self-defense. Many traditional ‘blue helmet’ peacekeeping
forces succeeded in freezing conflicts in places such as Kashmir, Cyprus and the
Golan Heights, but they often remained stationed there for decades without a last-
ing diplomatic solution ever being reached. 
Peacekeeping along the ‘thin blue line’ allowed for very little contact between
peacekeepers and the civilian population and local civilian administration. Peacekeep-
ing forces engaged in interposition hardly ever found themselves in densely popu-
lated areas or urban terrain. Involvement in public security and administrative sup-
port tasks were generally not conceived to be part of a peacekeeper’s duty. The Unit-
ed Nations operation in recently decolonized Congo in the early 1960s was a notable
exception. Apart from sliding into peace enforcement and law and order tasks with-
out a corresponding UN mandate, it was the first mission to involve a substantial
civilian component. The unhappy experience, involving high degrees of military vio-
lence, substantial casualties, and a nearly bankrupted United Nations, was conscious-
ly ignored until rediscovered after similar experiences in the mid-1990s.65
Like soldiers in conventional operations, peacekeepers expected to operate in an
exclusively military domain and accordingly, local civilians were regarded as an obsta-
cle while executing their mission. This changed drastically in the 1990s after inter-
national intervention in the internal affairs of a state – either with or without the
consent of the government in question – became the norm rather than the excep-
tion in peace operations. In this type of military operation, local civilians were not
only ever-present, they were the raison d’être for such intervention forces. Soldiers
from different national backgrounds did not equally accept this fundamental point.
Often, their different attitudes could be traced back to their national historical tradi-
tion and the interrelated perception of what a soldier’s proper task was. 
While striving to end a civil war, military forces were increasingly confronted with
‘the security gap’ between the military security they tried to create by separating
opposing military factions, and their inability or unwillingness to provide public secu-
rity. This gap was often a source of contention and embarrassment, since relief of
suffering and protection of the civil population was mostly the explicit or implicit
goal of an international military presence. However, protecting the civilian popula-
tion was poorly defined in almost all peacekeeping mandates formulated in the 1990s. 
Frank Kitson warned in 1971 that ‘[t]he problem of co-ordinating civil and mili-
tary measures is complicated enough when the campaign is the affair of a single
nation, but it becomes vastly more so if allies become involved.’66 Kitson was think-
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ing mainly along the lines of the civil administration-military-police triad in coun-
terinsurgency operations. In the new era of peace operations the playing field would
become infinitely more complicated with multilateral governmental organizations
such as the UN, NATO, or ad hoc coalitions in charge of the military side of oper-
ations and the UN, national governments and a host of non-governmental human-
itarian organizations, responsible for the civilian side of conflict resolution. More-
over, soldiers would mostly find themselves in countries ravaged by civil wars, where
local civil administration and police organizations were often non-cooperative, dys-
functional – or, as in two of the following case studies, even completely absent. 
The heady optimism that followed the end of superpower rivalry would unleash
tremendous international political ambitions in ‘peacemaking’ that mostly surpassed
the conceptual thinking for military operations. Although under very different cir-
cumstances and with dissimilar mandates, soldiers in the post-Cold War world were
confronted with many of the challenges that previous generations of soldiers had
faced before them in military governance and counterinsurgency. Their flexibility and
ingenuity would mostly be tested where military and civil spheres converged.
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PART II
Complex Peacekeeping:
The United Nations in Cambodia
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3Making Sense of the Mission:
UNTAC’s Military and Civil Mandates
In 1992, the UN embarked on the most ambitious peace operation in its history.
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was more than a
peacekeeping operation. Not only was the aim to put an end to over two decades of
civil war, it intended to place the country under virtual trusteeship and give the Cam-
bodians a crash course in democracy. For the first time in the United Nation’s his-
tory, a peace mission was supposed to take over the administration of an independ-
ent member state. UNTAC was an early example of a new type of ‘complex peace-
keeping’ that moved far beyond the mere separation of belligerent parties along a
status quo line, and was hoped to be a model for future settlement of civil wars.
With almost sixteen thousand troops and some six thousand civilian personnel at its
height, it was the biggest and most expensive operation under UN command up to
that time. UNTAC had two principle missions to accomplish in merely eighteen
months’ time. The military was to observe the cease-fire and demobilize and disarm
most of the four belligerent parties, while the civilian components had to control the
four factions’ civil institutions and eventually organize democratic elections. As the
military and civilian components deployed in mid-1992 and set out to perform their
separate missions, they discovered that, faced with obstructionism from the two main
factions and with the means, organization and mandate provided to them, it was
impossible to perform either mission as planned. Nevertheless, eighteen months
later, UNTAC had successfully held elections that resulted in a democratically elect-
ed government. The following three chapters explore how the civil and military sides
discovered how their missions – which had been envisaged and planned as sequen-
tial and largely segregated – were intricately entangled. 
Peacekeepers in the Post-Cold War Disorder
In late May 1992, a small group of Dutch Marines assembled on the Thai border
with Cambodia. As part of one of the UN peacekeeping force’s twelve infantry bat-
talions, the Marines were tasked to deploy in one sector in the western region of
Cambodia. The largest part of their assigned sector was jungle area controlled by the
Khmer Rouge, the most notorious of the four belligerent parties in a country that
had been involved in war for most of the previous twenty years. Civil war had offi-
cially come to an end with the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement by all
four parties in Paris on 21 October 1991, but seven long months had passed since
the factions had agreed to disarm and demobilize their forces and sporadic fighting
had erupted throughout the country. 
75
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:05  Pagina 75
As the Dutch tried to cross into Cambodia, they were instantly confronted with
the new realities of soldiering in the post-Cold War era. At the border post, the Dutch
battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Herman Dukers and his advance party were
prevented from reaching Pailin, the heart of Khmer Rouge territory, by three Khmer
Rouge border guards. Dukers made another attempt to cross the border, this time
with 35 heavily armed Marines and an eleven-vehicle UN convoy, but also this failed
to impress the guards in flip-flops. The Thai truck drivers, who were involved in a
lively cross-border trade in Cambodian tropical timber and gems, seemed to have no
such problems. After some negotiations involving the exchange of stacks of ban-
knotes and some Coca-Cola cans, the Khmer guards raised the flimsy bamboo pole
for the Thai drivers and returned to their hammocks.1 From Phnom Penh, the Aus-
tralian UNTAC Force Commander Lieutenant General John Sanderson instructed
Dukers to continue his attempts and to keep up the pressure. The Dutch Marines
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of peacekeeping in 1992 when they refused to let Dutch Marines deploy in their territory to oversee
the demobilization process. 
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set up camp in no-man’s-land. They probed in various ways until there was no other
possibility left than to use force – an option clearly ruled out at this point by the
Australian veteran of the Vietnam War. 
Although the Marines were thoroughly aware of the need for restraint, the inability
to act during their new mission was difficult to digest. They were trained to take the
initiative. ‘They are good, and they know it,’ German General Klaus Reinhardt would
note in his diary seven year later. As the force commander of NATO’s massive Koso-
vo Force he encountered the Marines in Albania in 1999 where he noticed how
everything within their organization was geared towards efficiency. Not only were
the Marines the best light ground forces the Dutch could offer at the time, they were
the only sizeable infantry unit the Netherlands had available for overseas deployment
in 1992. The Netherlands government, traditionally a strong proponent of the UN
and supporter of the international rule of law, was eager to play its part in the ‘New
World Order.’ To this end the foreign minister, Hans van den Broek, and the min-
ister of defense, Relus ter Beek, joined hands, the former primarily to raise Dutch
prestige in the international arena, the latter also to create a new raison d’être for
the Dutch armed forces.2 The end of the Cold War made all Western European gov-
ernments eager to cash in the so-called ‘peace dividend’ by slashing their defense
budgets. After the threat from Moscow had dissolved, participation in peacekeeping
was regarded as the best way to demonstrate the continued value of the armed forces. 
In the UN-sanctioned war in Iraq, the Dutch military, like most of its European
counterparts, had been unable to contribute ground forces to the predominantly
American war effort. The lack of expeditionary military capacity – a major drawback
of a conscript army – and the vast technological gap in military equipment had
become painfully clear to most European militaries in 1991. Only the British Army
proved willing and able to project sizeable force overseas. Even for the British Army,
providing a full armored division had meant cannibalizing four divisions from its
Army on the Rhine.3 The French light armored division that participated in Opera-
tion Desert Storm performed reasonably well, but its capabilities were limited as it
was manned, organized, and equipped much more like an American brigade than
a division.4 The vast Dutch army of conscripts, although relatively well equipped in
the course of the 1970s and 1980s to defend the German plain, was not at all suit-
ed to long and distant overseas deployments. Conscripts could only be deployed out-
side NATO territory if they volunteered, and the armed forces totally lacked strate-
gic lift capacity. Even to contribute substantially to peace operations, the army would
have to reform drastically in the years to come.
Unlike the Royal Dutch Army, the Royal Dutch Marine Corps consisted predom-
inantly of professional soldiers. As a unit trained for amphibious warfare in distant
locations, its battalions were light, easily deployable and trained for both arctic and
tropical conditions. It associated more with the British Royal Marines than with the
Dutch Army, whose military doctrine the Marines did not use. In fact, the Marine
Corps prided itself on having no official doctrine at all and for being a flexible force
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with much emphasis on personal initiative. It had one major drawback: the Corps
was only three thousand strong and consisted of no more than two active battalions
and one reserve battalion. With budget cuts around the corner, the Dutch Marine
Corps played its cards skillfully. Although it had just contributed over four hundred
troops to Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, the Corps had eagerly offered
its battalions for deployment in Cambodia. Their effort would pay off. The Marine
Corps turned out to be the only element of the Dutch armed forces unaffected by
several rounds of budget cuts in the 1990s and was even hoping to expand to three
active battalions. 
During the refugee crisis in Kurdish Northern Iraq in the aftermath of the liber-
ation of Kuwait, the Marines had their first taste of soldiering in the ‘New World
Order.’ Although the military intervention was sold as a peace operation, and later
categorized as a ‘humanitarian intervention,’ it was in fact nothing less than a UN-
sanctioned temporary military occupation of Northern Iraq by an American-led coali-
tion. The aim was to protect the insurgent Kurds from Saddam Hussein’s bloody
revenge. The Marines learned many lessons that would help them cope with the
unexpected in Cambodia. Major Jaap Bijsterbosch was a company commander in
Iraq and would serve as the operations staff officer in the second battalion that
relieved Dukers’ troops in Cambodia. He learned about the importance of coopera-
tion with humanitarian organizations and close relations with the local population
in Iraq. As a thirty-two-year-old major in charge of a small Kurdish sector, he also
learned that when entering an area where there was no government with a substan-
tial military force, you in fact become the government – whether you liked it or not.
‘Iraq was an exciting experience,’ he recalled:
We had been provided with a rather vague mission, but after the return of the first
refugees we became the de facto authorities. We also had to act when there were
property disputes, for instance over houses. If a dispute threatened to get out of
hand I would call the local town elders, the local Peshmerga [Kurdish insurgent]
leader and the religious leader together for a meeting. I would tell them to sort
the problem out amongst themselves, but that I would have the final word if they
had not reached a solution in two days. I made that very clear, but luckily it never
came this far.5
In early 1992, only a few months after the Marines returned from Northern Iraq,
the Dutch government decided to contribute to the mission in Cambodia. It was the
most high-profile peace operation the United Nations were gearing up for until the
Security Council became consumed by the rapid disintegration of Yugoslavia.6 The
stakes were high for the United Nations, because UNTAC was a test case for ‘post-
conflict peace building,’ the most ambitious of four types of international action to
prevent or control conflicts. The new UN secretary general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
had made this categorization for future multinational interventions in An Agenda for
Peace. The paper, presented on 31 January 1992 to the Security Council, provided an
analysis of and recommendations for ways to improve the UN’s capacity to establish
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peace.7 The era of predominantly ‘thin blue line’ peacekeeping that started in 1948
had come to an end, and the development of peacekeeping doctrine now centered
on interventions in civil wars instead of conventional, inter-state conflicts. An Agen-
da for Peace combined older peacekeeping principles and more recent experiences in
Namibia to define four consecutive phases of international action to prevent or con-
trol armed conflict: preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace making – including
the possibility of peace enforcement when consent of one or more of the warring
parties was lacking – and post-conflict peace building. This division in linear stages
found its way into the peacekeeping doctrines of most Western armies, and would
remain the prevailing conceptual framework during the 1990s.8
Throughout 1992, despite some early setbacks to the new interventionism, opti-
mism prevailed over ‘second generation peace operations’ and the opportunities pre-
sented by the use of military means – not force – to bring peace and relieve human
suffering. At the end of that year, the UN was engaged in three massive operations
that involved many tens of thousands of troops: one in Cambodia, another in
Yugoslavia and one started under US leadership in Somalia. Many more operations
with a lower profile were conducted in other corners of the globe. 
Not surprisingly, civil wars and the military interventions dominated much of the
international media. In Time Magazine’s last issue of the year 1992, Cambodia was
called ‘the UN’s biggest gamble.’ The image used in Time to portray the military’s
new role, that of a burly but friendly peacekeeper with a child in his arms, would
soon become a cliché. ‘Ethnic cleansing’ was still written between quotation marks.
The American secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleburger, spoke of an international
court of justice, ‘a second Nuremberg’ to deal with war crimes in Bosnia. However,
the Bush administration cautiously avoided the commitment of American military
forces in the Balkan war. Instead, the United States eventually opted for military
intervention in Somalia, where the president was told there would be fewer risks.
Time’s editorial in the early days of the military intervention in Somalia, titled ‘On
the Road with the US Marines,’ had a profoundly optimistic tone that would never
again be associated with that mission after eighteen US military personnel were
killed in Mogadishu only ten months later. The subtext to the yearly ‘unforgettable
pictures of the year’ captured the optimistic mood of that year, while simultaneous-
ly revealing one of the underlying causes for the failures to come: 
Pictures can capture history, but in 1992 they also changed its course. From Baidoa,
to Los Angeles, to Sarajevo, the power of extraordinary photos captured the world’s
attention and broke through to stir the individual conscience.9
Images like that of a Somali child in Baidoa, ‘too weakened to stand, grasped by a
mother whose arms were barely stronger,’ and that of a four-year-old boy killed by
shellfire from Serbian guns triggered a public outcry in the Western world that ‘some-
thing must be done’ about the massive human suffering.
The problem was that the ‘international community,’ led by the United States
and Western Europe and operating through the United Nations, chose to act upon
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those public calls impulsively, without a well-thought-out peace plan or the will to
offer long-term solutions. The wish to remove the images of suffering from the TV
screens prevailed over the question of whether outside solutions, providing the will
was there, were even feasible. In the Balkans and the Horn of Africa, the interna-
tional community thus entered the murky arena of what soon became known as
‘humanitarian operations.’ In Somalia and Bosnia these interventions in sovereign
states involved the use of military means with the initially limited aim of helping
secure the provision of humanitarian aid and assistance in order to alleviate the suf-
fering of civilians, without the actual intention to end the conflict. ‘Peacekeepers’
were injected into a combat zone without a peace agreement to implement or uphold.
These operations would criss-cross diagonally across the consecutive doctrinary phas-
es and categories distinguished in Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace – while simul-
taneously combining elements of them all – as the mission inevitably moved beyond
the limited, but vaguely defined humanitarian goals. None of the operations appeared
to exist in its pure form in the real world and even in Cambodia An Agenda of Peace
soon appeared to be of questionable use.   
The Paris Peace Agreement
The United Nations, while in the process of reinventing peacekeeping to meet the
new post-Cold War challenges, was called upon to intervene in two types of intrastate
conflicts. The first category originated in the peripheral battlegrounds of the Cold War.
As the United States, the crumbling Soviet empire, and the regional powers lost inter-
est in areas such as Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique and Cambodia, these bloody
civil wars tended to dry up. Simultaneously, a second type of conflict emerged from
the end of superpower rivalry. The end to the Cold War made the superpowers lose
interest and thus their grip over other areas of the world where their rivalry had tra-
ditionally created stability – most often at the loss of citizen’s individual freedoms.
These new civil wars tended to erupt in regions with mixed ethnic populations, such
as in some of the former Soviet republics and in the Balkans, but also in Africa. Par-
ticularly in Yugoslavia, former communist leaders tapped ethnic nationalist sentiments
in an effort to hold on to power, fuelling confrontations between ethnic groups that
soon erupted into full-scale civil wars. The traditional principles of peacekeeping as
laid down in Chapter VI of the UN Charter were thoroughly anchored in consent of
the parties involved, neutrality and the use of force restricted to self-defense by light-
ly armed forces. They proved reasonably successful in ending the first type of con-
flict. Here, both the factions and population were war-weary and the warring parties
tended to be susceptible to outside pressure and imposed solutions. However, applied
to the second type of conflict, peacekeeping under a traditional Chapter VI peacekeep-
ing mandate proved insufficient to deal with stirred-up nationalist sentiments and
unruly warlords who profited from chaos rather than order. 
Cambodia’s civil war clearly belonged to the category of Cold War relics. After the
young Prince Norodom Sihanouk won Cambodia’s independence from France in
1953, he tried to maintain his independence from the United States, China and the
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USSR. This proved impossible, as the war in neighboring Vietnam was raging and
the United States adopted a policy that boiled down to ‘either you are for us, or you
are against us.’ This drove Sihanouk towards China and USSR for aid, while Thai-
land on his western border was firmly in the American camp. 
Sihanouk assumed in 1965 that communist North Vietnam would win the war
against the US-backed regime in Saigon and allowed the regime in Hanoi to move
troops and supplies through Cambodia to the south. The prince was deposed in an
American-backed coup in 1970, but the new government under General Lon Nol –
a thoroughly corrupt and regressive regime – soon came under siege from the Party
of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK). This Maoist insurgent organization, better known
as the Khmer Rouge, rapidly gained new recruits in rural Cambodia. This was part-
ly due to the relentless American bombing campaign in support of its war effort in
Vietnam and in defense of Lon Nol. In 1975, only days before the fall of Saigon, the
Khmer Rouge’s armed forces, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK),
entered the capital victoriously. Immediately, the new regime under Pol Pot started
its reign of terror in an effort to produce a classless Marxist agricultural society.
Between one and two million died as a result of mass executions, forced labor, mal-
nutrition and disease in a widely accepted estimate of what has been called a form
of ‘autogenocide.’ 
Out of strategic rather than humanitarian motives Vietnam invaded Cambodia in
1978. Although the invasion was a liberation for most Cambodians, it was widely
condemned by both Western and Asian powers. Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge con-
tinued to receive massive Chinese aid. Hanoi installed a new communist govern-
ment headed by Hun Sen that relied heavily on Vietnamese and Russian military
support. As a result of geopolitical considerations the United Nations recognized the
Khmer Rouge government-in-exile during its continued war against the State of Cam-
bodia (SOC). In order to create a broad coalition to fight the government army, the
Cambodian People’s Armed Forces (CPAF), the United States and China resurrect-
ed Sihanouk, who still had wide appeal amongst the Cambodians. His royalist party,
Funcinpec, and a small middle class republican movement called Khmer People’s
Liberation Front (KPNLF), both supported by the western powers, joined the Chi-
nese-backed Khmer Rouge in 1982. With the Cold War coming to an end, however,
China decreased its support of the Khmer Rouge and the US was no longer focused
on opposing communist Vietnam. Meanwhile the Soviet Union was eager to with-
draw its support to Vietnam. As the patrons lost interest by the late 1980’s, the civil
war reached a stalemate and the parties realized that outright victory was impossi-
ble for either side. 
Rather than stumbling into this peace operation, as was the case in interventions
in ‘new’ conflicts of the 1990s, a long period of negotiations and planning preced-
ed UNTAC. In 1989 the Vietnamese government suddenly announced its intention
to withdraw from Cambodia. It did so within six months, leaving behind the feeble
Hun Sen regime that was nevertheless in control of the vast majority of Cambodi-
an territory. Without its Vietnamese benefactor and still faced with a coalition of
three insurgent factions, the SOC was under serious pressure to reach an agreement,
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if only to ensure its very own survival. Meanwhile, several Western nations flirted
with the idea of recognizing the Hun Sen regime, forcing the three opposing fac-
tions to reach some agreement with the government in Phnom Penh in order to
share a piece of the pie. Unable to find their way out of the stalemate, the parties
turned to the international community to mediate a settlement. In 1990, Australian
foreign minister Gareth Evans, initiated a plan for ‘an international control mecha-
nism’ that would rule Cambodia temporarily. During the internationally sponsored
negotiations in Paris the use of the former patrons as leverage proved crucial, as it
became clear that the parties would never settle if left to their own devices. Remark-
ably, in October 1991 all four parties agreed to ‘a system of liberal democracy, on
the basis of pluralism,’ as the framework for the new Cambodian constitution in The
Agreements on Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, better known
as the Paris Peace Agreement.10
The Cambodian factions were running out of steam by the Cold War’s end, but the
conflict still proved very difficult to solve within the traditional perimeters set on
peacekeeping. What complicated the implementation of the peace agreement was the
compromise made in the peace agreement on sovereignty in the interim period. In
the transitional phase there were two bodies representing Cambodia’s sovereignty.
First, during the negotiations in Paris the Cambodian Supreme National Council
(SNC) was formed. This quadripartite body was composed of thirteen members, six
from the SOC and two from each of the other three parties. It was chaired by Prince
Sihanouk, who was also its thirteenth member. Under the Agreement, the SNC was
recognized as ‘the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, through-
out the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia
[were] enshrined.’ Second, the UN was declared to be the interim transitional author-
ity for eighteen months, and was formally given the power to run the government
until elections could be held. Although the SNC delegated to the United Nations ‘all
powers necessary’ to ensure the implementation of the Agreement, making UNTAC
the official interim authority, Special Representative Yasushi Akashi delegated most
important decisions back to the SNC. The Japanese UN diplomat stuck to his role
of the honest broker, more than becoming an administrator.
The ambiguous provisions in the Paris Peace Agreement concerning the crucial
question of who held the final authority in Cambodia during the interim period
proved to be one of UNTAC’s largest stumbling blocks. The mission was envisioned
as an operation under a Chapter VI mandate rather than a Chapter VII mandate of
the UN Charter, which would have allowed Akashi to enforce measures. This meant
that decisions would be based on consent of all parties involved and that the inter-
im ‘authority’ could do little to coerce the parties to comply, neither in military terms,
nor in the administrative sphere. Akashi once said that having lived in post-war
Japan, he refused to be ‘a MacArthur of Cambodia.’ Some would later argue this was
what the mandate effectively required, but the means at Akashi’s disposal would not
allow him to rule like a proconsul or colonial overlord.11 
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Another weakness embedded in UNTAC’s mandate was that it had been largely
envisioned along separate military and civilian lines. UNTAC’s military mandate gave
the peacekeeping force four tasks that were to be performed largely before the 
pivotal electoral process could start. On 9 May 1992, UNTAC announced that phase
one of the peace process, the cease-fire, which had been in effect since the signing
of the Paris Agreement, would be followed by phase two on 13 June. During this
second phase, UN soldiers were to demobilize and disarm seventy percent of all four
factions in designated cantonments, continue to supervise the cease-fire and verify
the withdrawal of ‘all foreign forces,’ meaning Vietnamese troops. They would also
support the enormous effort to de-mine the Cambodian countryside. After the mil-
itary component had established a ‘stable and secure environment’ the civilian side
of the mission could truly get underway. 
UNTAC’s civilian mission consisted of six distinct components: civil administra-
tion, civilian police, human rights, electoral, repatriation and rehabilitation. Civil
administration was supposed to assume control over the administrative institutions
of the four parties in order to ensure that they would behave neutrally in the elec-
toral process.12 The UN Civilian Police (CivPol) was to monitor the four factions’
police forces to ensure that they would behave neutrally. The human rights compo-
nent was charged with tempering Cambodia’s authoritarian institutions, such as the
judiciary. The electoral component had to organize and run – and not merely mon-
itor as in previous UN missions – free and fair elections planned for May 1993. The
repatriation of 360,000 refugees from the Thai border camps was left to the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The infrastructural and economic recon-
struction of Cambodia was to be coordinated by UN Development Project (UNDP).
The small education and information branch, although not a separate component,
performed the crucial task of explaining to the Cambodian people what the UN was
planning to achieve. Each of these civilian components set out to recruit personnel
and created its own structures, aimed at achieving its own specified objectives with
little prior coordination. Coordination was concentrated primarily on the operational
level at UNTAC headquarters in Phnom Penh in the person of Akashi, to whom all
component directors reported. 
The Unworkable Military Mandate
Five long months elapsed between signing the Paris Peace Agreement on 23 Octo-
ber 1991 and the moment when UNTAC became operational on 15 March 1992. Its
battalions would only gradually arrive and it was not until June before the force was
fully deployed. All this time was consumed assembling the peacekeeping force and
drafting operational plans that, in an ideal world, would have been ready once the
ink on the Agreement had dried. The force commander and special representative,
as well as most other key personnel, were only appointed in early 1992 while oth-
ers received their commission after June. Akashi and Sanderson arrived in Phnom
Penh as late as March. 
Even after phase two of the mission finally got underway in June 1992 an addi-
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tional four months were needed to complete the deployment of civilian and military
personnel. UNTAC’s delayed deployment had a devastating effect on the peace process
as a whole. The parties may have agreed during negotiations, but the more time they
were given between their signatures and executing the agreements, the more room
they were granted to change their minds in the field.13 By June the Khmer Rouge
had decided to boycott those elements of the peace agreements it saw as conflicting
with its interest. There appears to have been a rift in 1991 between the pragmatic
technocrat forces within the party that had been dominant during the negotiations
and the orthodox hardliners, who regained the upper hand after November of that
year, when their nominal leader, Khieu Sampan, was almost lynched by an angry
mob when he attempted to install himself in Phnom Penh to take part in the SNC. 
In assessing the Khmer Rouge motives throughout the mission, the difficulty was
that the inner core of the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Tha Mok, never
revealed themselves to UNTAC. Sanderson always felt they were fully engaged, but
they preferred to pull the strings from their jungle hideouts.14 Although not neces-
sarily capturing what Akashi called the ‘unfathomable’ minds of the Khmers Rouge,
several documents retrieved from captured Khmer Rouge territory in September 1993
do reveal how party policy towards UNTAC was sold to the inner party members.
By the time the UN finally started to deploy in sizable numbers in May 1992, the
Khmer Rouge was internally denouncing UNTAC as the ‘new enemy.’ The old enemy
was of course the State of Cambodia that was mostly referred to as ‘the Vietnamese
puppet government’ of ‘the contemptible puppets.’ The State of Cambodia and the
UN peacekeepers were described by the Khmer Rouge as colluding in allowing the
Vietnamese troops to remain in Cambodia, thereby keeping the Hun Sen govern-
ment in power.15
The reasons for the tardy military deployment were many. Other missions in
Croatia, Bosnia and eventually also Somalia constantly distracted the UN Secretari-
at in New York. Even before this surge in commitments, however, the Secretariat
simply did not have enough qualified staff to act as a strategic headquarters. ‘The
truth is,’ the force commander concluded, ‘that discounting the much smaller Namib-
ia mission that was ten years in gestation, Cambodia, as the first large complex post
Cold War mission of a multi-faceted nature, was too complex for the Secretariat.’
Sanderson soon accepted that, as the operational commander, he was tasked to run
the largest peace operation in history without the support from a strategic headquar-
ters. The force commander therefore had to produce his own plan, although this did
not stop the Secretariat’s staff members from ‘interfering in the planning, politicis-
ing if you like, and attempting to claim the output as their own.’16 Even when the
Secretariat created a ‘situation room’ in the spring of 1993, this state of affairs hard-
ly improved. Although the phone was finally picked up outside New York office hours
in the final phase of the mission, this did not yet mean that anyone able to make
decisions would answer it.17
What further complicated Sanderson’s work, and that of other UN force com-
manders, was the United Nations’ reliance on an ad hoc international operational
staff. For the purpose of command unity it was important to have all major troop
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contributors have a representative at all staff levels, but this resulted in massive lin-
guistic and cultural barriers in a force dominated by Indians, French, Chinese and
Pakistanis. Sanderson, who for a soldier possessed remarkable diplomatic skills, took
these and many other hurdles very well and his decisiveness would prove instru-
mental in compensating for the lack of planning and preparations at the strategic
level. Nevertheless, for a tactical commander such as Dukers, used to working with-
in a predictable NATO environment, ‘Phnom Penh,’ as headquarters was referred
to, stood for chaos in the early days. Logistical arrangements were scanty, which
proved particularly harmful in a country with almost no infrastructure and left the
poorly equipped battalions virtually immobilized in the early phase of the operation.
The Dutch were lucky to have arranged most of their supply lines independent of
the UN and received most of their materials straight through Bangkok. 
While UNTAC was trying to get its act together in Phnom Penh, the Dutch Marines
were still stranded at the Thai-Cambodian border. Time pressure was rising as all
twelve UN infantry battalions were to deploy by 13 June 1992. The Marines at the
border were confronted with a steady stream of different Khmer Rouge colonels, but
soon found out that military ranks had been subject to serious inflation within all
Cambodian faction forces, whose army divisions were often under one thousand
strong – less than one tenth that of their Western equivalent. It was abundantly clear
that orders to halt the Dutch deployment came from the highest levels in the Khmer
Rouge hierarchy. ‘They are bound to have seen the pictures of the UN in Yugoslavia,’
a Dutch Marine told a Dutch reporter ‘they know they have nothing to fear from
UN soldiers.’18
The Dutch government did not contribute to UNTAC credibility when they
announced that they would hold up the influx of troops from the Netherlands. The
Dutch battalion commander and foreign minister clashed with Sanderson and
Boutros-Ghali respectively over this decision.19 Sanderson wanted to build up a size-
able force on the border to keep the pressure on Khmer Rouge. Stopping the build-
up gave the wrong political signal, but the Dutch – losing sight of the larger picture
– were thinking in more practical terms. Dukers advised The Hague to stop flying
in troops on the basis of potential ‘disciplinary problems’ in Thailand. The Marines
were quartered in a holiday resort near Pattaya, a coastal town in low season, where
hotel managers were bringing in a steady stream of prostitutes. This and the pres-
ence of Dutch reporters and TV crews in the very same hotel made the battalion
staff nervous and the minister of defense, concerned with wives and families back
home as well as his program to launch the Dutch military as a credible peacekeep-
ing force, was equally jumpy. Remarkably, the press showed relative restraint in cov-
ering this story.20
To break the deadlock Akashi, joined by Sanderson, decided to travel from Phnom
Penh to Pailin on 30 May and use their moral authority to demand access to Khmer
Rouge territory in front of the assembled world press. Dukers, with whom they were
in radio contact, was to try once more from Thailand, several kilometers to the west.
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The Khmer Rouge leaders proved quite determined. The special representative of the
secretary general of the United Nations was offended by a couple of young Khmer
Rouge soldiers who refused to lift their thin bamboo pole. This story, which soon
became know as ‘the bamboo-pole incident,’ was broadcast all over the world and
demonstrated the limits of UN power in a way ‘which was both humiliating and por-
tentous.’21 While aware of the embarrassment suffered by the UN forces as a whole,
the incident caused a slight feeling of relief amongst the Dutch Marines. At least
the world could now see that is had not been due to their lack of effort. Moreover,
it increased recognition for the harsh conditions in the sector to which they had been
assigned.22
Not everybody was willing to accept the limits on the use of force in the peace-
keeping mission. The deputy force commander, French Brigadier Jean-Michel Lori-
don, wanted the peacekeeping force to call the Khmer Rouge’s bluff and take more
direct action than his superiors Sanderson and Akashi would allow. ‘It is not a ques-
tion of troop strength,’ he argued in an interview with the Far Eastern Economic
Review. The veteran from the war in Algeria, where he served as a Foreign Legion
company commander, claimed to have done ‘a lot more with 300 troops than is now
being done with 14,000.’ The general was frustrated that UN troops were ‘just sit-
ting and waiting for the Khmer Rouge leaders to agree to disarm their troops.’ He
was convinced that the Khmer Rouge would not dare shoot at UN troops, but added:
‘It is possible … at some point they will try to block the UN move by force. If it
comes to that one may lose 200 men – and that could include myself – but the
Khmer Rouge problem would be solved for good.’ The brigadier was not alone in
overestimating the willingness of the troop-contributing nations to take such risks.
In January 1993, Gérard Porcell, the French chief of the civil administration compo-
nent, saw this as a crucial failure of UNTAC’s will.23 He explained: ‘we don’t have
the will to apply the peace accords. This absence of firmness with the Khmer Rouge
was a signal for the other parties who saw there the proof of UNTAC’s weakness
towards the group that from the start eschewed all cooperation.’24
Sanderson felt that the proponents of enforcement, both within and outside
UNTAC, were ‘moved by the passion of the immediate events’ and argued that
enforcement was never a realistic option. It was ‘beyond UNTAC’s legitimate author-
ity and practical ability.’25
The military component lacked a proper force structure, equipment and mind-
set to take on the Khmer Rouge, an organization that had successfully resisted the
mighty Vietnamese Army for ten years. Moreover, he felt that enforcement might
destroy the peace process as well as the international consensus and he knew very
well that most countries contributing troops would not have permitted their soldiers
being sent into battle against the Khmer Rouge. In early August Loridon was dis-
missed, and became known as ‘UNTAC’s first high-ranking casualty.’
Within the Khmer Rouge party cadre there had been a discussion in May on
whether or not to grant UNTAC access to its territory. A report on this meeting,
which only came into the possession of UNTAC more than a year later, did not reveal
who was present, but the language used showed little room for compromise. It was
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concluded then that if the peacekeepers were let in, they would take over these areas,
gain intelligence which would be used against them, and try to prevent the Khmer
Rouge from carrying out ‘their activities.’ UNTAC soldiers were described as ‘para-
sites’ and the analogy of a worm entering a healthy body was used.26 Although their
colorful rhetoric appeared to UNTAC analysts as an attempt to conceal a fundamen-
tal lack of relevant ideas within the party, the animosity in the descriptions used of
UNTAC seems to prove that the force commander was right in not calling their bluff.
An important motive for Khmer Rouge leaders not to grant the peacekeepers access
was that ‘their activities’ were first and foremost the extremely lucrative trade in trop-
ical timber and gems with Thai merchants on the other side of the border. This trade
relationship had made the communist insurgent organization very rich in the pre-
vious years. UNTAC’s success would mean that their resource-rich territories would
be opened up to all. Revenues would have to be shared within the new government
that, it was feared, would be dominated by the hated State of Cambodia. 
Even though Akashi publicly ruled out the possibility of enforcement, he instruct-
ed Sanderson to engage in contingency planning for this option in September. The
special representative was reacting primarily to outside pressure, mostly from the
civilian side. Since the Khmer Rouge power base was in its area of operations, the
Dutch battalion would bear the brunt of this operation. Dukers became aware of
these preparations when the UNTAC chief of plans, his compatriot Colonel Willem
Huijssoon, inquired about the heavy arms in the unit’s regular equipment. The plan,
euphorically called Operation Dove Tail, involved no more than a company of Dutch
Marines and some Malay and Pakistani units. The Dutch were to be flown to the
Thai side of the Cambodian border by four large UN helicopters to two border cross-
ings and demand access to Khmer Rouge territory from the Thai border. Indicative
of the fact that the operation’s effect was supposed to be founded on moral author-
ity rather than combat capability, was the plan to have the operation executed in con-
cert with UNTAC civilian police, electoral component, civil administration and infor-
mation and education branch. All components were to demand the Khmer Rouges
cooperation simultaneously. 
Dukers considered Operation Dove Tail ‘a ridiculous plan.’27 He and his men were
equipped for a peacekeeping operation and although the plan included some extra
support in the form of armored personnel carriers, the peacekeepers would have
been extremely vulnerable in their white vehicles. It remains unclear how the ele-
ment of surprise was to be attained. First of all the plan was classified under ‘UN
Restricted,’ which guaranteed little secrecy in a multinational setting under UN flag.
Second, cooperation from the Royal Thai Army manning the border crossings was
required. It had by then become common knowledge that its local commanders were
in cahoots with the Khmer Rouge on the other side of the border. When asked to
brief Akashi about his options, Sanderson and Huijssoon both strongly advised against
the plan. 
A force equipped for peacekeeping and widely dispersed could not easily upgrade
to combat capability. Prior to the embarrassment suffered by peacekeepers at the
hands of warlords in Bosnia and Somalia, it was not appreciated that an interven-
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tion force needed ‘escalation dominance,’ the capability and will to take a military
confrontation at least one step further than the adversary, for enforcement to suc-
ceed. Peace enforcement after all, was not much different from going to war against
one of the parties. Even if the UNTAC military would have had anything resembling
the military capability to confront the Khmer Rouge, enforcement measures were
likely to result in retaliation against UNTAC’s soft underbelly – the thousands of
UNTAC civilian staff and NGO workers that the military would have been unable to
protect. Although fully agreeing with Sanderson’s arguments, one of the Dutch bat-
talion commanders wondered what would have happened if Akashi had just walked
on at Pailin in front of the assembled world press and not have allowed himself to
be sent off ‘like a schoolboy.’ He seriously doubted whether the Khmer Rouge would
have opened fire. ‘UNTAC would then have showed determination, instead of just
taking another beating.’28
The bamboo-pole incident became symbolic of the UN’s inability to operate without
all the parties’ consent. On the other hand, its aftermath was a manifestation of
UNTAC’s primary strength: its capacity to improvise despite serious setbacks, move
forward around the obstacles raised by both the Khmer Rouge as well as the State
of Cambodia and use its military component creatively. Initially this flexibility meant
embarking upon the planned demobilization process without the Khmer Rouge, while
keeping all lines for negotiations open. This proved wise, for although its represen-
tatives refused to cooperate militarily and eventually decided to boycott the elections,
the Khmer Rouge remained sporadically engaged at the political level. 
The crisis surrounding the Dutch battalion’s deployment forced UNTAC head-
quarters to find alternative locations for them from which to operate. Huijssoon came
up with a plan that satisfied Sanderson. The primary intent was to contain the Khmer
Rouge in the jungle area around Pailin and deny them the possibility to infiltrate
and support operations in the rest of Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge was known to
keep its supply lines open between Pailin in the west and Anlong Veng, its second-
ary power base on the northern border with Thailand. These two areas had previ-
ously been joined into the so-called Free Liberated Zone, a lengthy patch of territo-
ry hugging the Thai border, which had been conquered through a joint effort of the
three insurgent factions. Compliance with the peace agreement by the two non-com-
munist factions allowed UNTAC to monitor and control their areas within the Free
Liberated Zone. After international pressure had made the Thai bar the Khmer Rouge
from using its territory as a supply route, Pailin was forced to fully rely on a com-
plex pattern of foot-paths through the jungle and country-side to reach the north. 
Sanderson’s attempt to disrupt Khmer Rouge operations from Anlong Veng proved
to be based on the right calculations. From there, the Khmer Rouge was hoping to
strike at the heart of Cambodia in the populous Kampong Thom province. Subse-
quently it hoped to enlarge its influence in the north and east. The Khmer Rouge
called this struggle for central Cambodia the ‘first battlefield.’ The second battlefield
was ‘waging of guerrilla warfare throughout the country in cooperation with the pop-
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ulation in order to get rid of the Vietnamese puppet government.’ The third battle-
field was at the negotiating table in Phnom Penh, where they would continue to
demand that all de facto sovereign powers vested in the SOC were to be transferred
to the Supreme National Council and that all Vietnamese had to withdraw from Cam-
bodia. During a ‘leadership meeting’ held in August 1992, this threefold strategy
was re-stated, but it was acknowledged that the real results would only come as a
result of the armed struggle.29
In order to cordon off the Pailin area in an attempt to cut the Khmer Rouge’s
lines of communications to Anlong Veng, Sanderson positioned one of his strongest
battalions to the north and northwest of its territory.30 He gave the Dutch parts of
the Malay and Bangladeshi sectors, including Sisophon, the provincial capital of the
province of Banteay Meanchey, where the Dutch posted one company and their head-
quarters. They were also put in charge of controlling the strategic Route Five between
Sisophon and the border town of Poipet, which connected Cambodia with Thailand.
A second company was positioned at Phum Nimit, where the Dutch succeeded in
demobilizing some of the government forces, and a third operated from Phum Bavel.
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Finally, a Dutch unit had been able to take control of Sok San, a small KPNLAF
enclave surrounded by Khmer Rouge territory. Like Funcinpec forces, the KPNLAF
was pleased with the UN presence and was fully cooperative with the Dutch. 
Huijssoon knew that the Marines would patrol intensively around the clock when
he assigned them their new area of operations. He knew them to be eager to dom-
inate their ground and that they were highly mobile with many vehicles. The Dutch
were clearly one of the ‘rich-man’s’ contingents within UNTAC. Apart from large
numbers of Land Rovers, they were equipped with forty Haglund BV’s, a snow vehi-
cle used for operations in the arctic region. With their extremely wide rubber tracks
this proved to be the perfect vehicle for patrolling and supplying distant locations
during the wet season, when the jungle roads often turned into mud-pools with
which even regular tracked vehicles would have had difficulty. They also had con-
stant support from four light helicopters from the Royal Dutch Air Force and troops
were equipped with night-vision equipment – that allowed them to operate effective-
ly at night. These were luxuries that were not possessed by the Bangladeshis and
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December 1992. Routes Five and Six are marked on the map.
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Pakistanis, who had to reach most of their destinations on foot. 
The new position chosen for the Dutch companies would also enable them to
reach their original locations if the Khmer Rouge leaders were to change their minds
and come on board.31 For several months, hopes within UNTAC headquarters were
vested in the ‘departing train effect.’ Initially, Sanderson remained optimistic, hop-
ing that the Khmer Rouge were merely keeping their options open and that Thai,
Chinese, Japanese and UN political pressure would eventually force them to join the
peace process and allow UNTAC to enter their territory. In August, Sanderson esti-
mated that despite a delay of two months, the election could be held on the planned
date in May and that the Khmer Rouge would join the peace process in four to six
weeks.32 However, the Khmer Rouge did not jump aboard the departing train and
the UN force was never able to exert its authority in areas under their control. 
Sanderson decided nonetheless to begin the disarmament on 13 June, with only
eight-and-a-half infantry battalions at his disposal. By late September, UNTAC had
cantoned some 52,000 troops, approximately 40,000 of which were government
forces. The remaining 12,000 belonged to the two smaller factions that soon with-
ered away as military and administrative organizations. Many of these non-commu-
nist forces were disarmed in the northwest of Cambodia, where the Dutch were sta-
tioned. However, by refusing to enter phase two of the peace process and disarm,
the Khmer Rouge also prevented its nemesis, the State of Cambodia, from fully dis-
mantling the CPAF. Under SOC pressure Sanderson acknowledged the right of self-
defense for the other factions, which gave them the freedom to delay their canton-
ment.33 The number of cease-fire violations in this period was rapidly rising. The
total of the demobilized troops amounted to no more than a quarter of the coun-
try’s regular fighting forces, and did not include over 200,000 local militia that
UNTAC was eventually also required to disarm. The UN force seized some 50,000
arms, a mere fraction of the number of weapons in circulation in Cambodia. Nev-
ertheless, the playing field had become somewhat less complex as there were only
two credible military forces left in Cambodia. Some 100,000 government troops now
faced approximately 30,000 Khmer Rouge forces, with its core of some 10,000 sea-
soned fighters.
Paradoxically, the Khmer Rouge obstinacy probably saved the UN from serious
embarrassment in the second half of 1992. Sanderson desperately wanted to keep
all factions on board, but the Khmer Rouge’s departure from the peace process was
greeted with mixed feelings within UNTAC military headquarters. Those UNTAC
officers aware of the implications and side effects of the cantonment of over 140,000
troops knew the whole military demobilization plan had probably been a fiction from
the outset. Already in late 1991 Sanderson predicted after a UN survey was conduct-
ed amongst the factions that there were massive obstacles to the demobilization
process. Two problems stood out. First, the Paris Agreement had made the provi-
sion of the demobilized soldiers’ primary needs, such as food, shelter and medicine
the responsibility of the four factions. They were clearly incapable of meeting these
obligations. Second, there was much fear of a serious deterioration of public safety
following the demobilization.34 
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Of those disarmed regular forces the vast majority was sent on so-called ‘agri-
cultural leave.’ This was a yearly routine for every faction at the beginning of the
wet season when fighting was not an option and when some of the troops needed
to work their fields. The only difference this time was that the soldiers would not
return to fight during the dry season. For the State of Cambodia and the two small-
er factions, it was an elegant way of ridding themselves of troops they could not
afford to keep on the payroll anyhow. However, the crucial question was how many
of the unemployed war veterans were going to earn a living for themselves and
their families. Banditry proved to be the easier option for many of the former sol-
diers.
In the northwestern corner of Cambodia, where a relatively large number of these
troops had been demobilized due to KNLPF and Funcinpec cooperation, the Dutch
battalion commander was convinced that the security situation in Cambodia in late
1992 would not have been fundamentally better, had the overall cantonment and dis-
armament process been successful. In fact, ‘[w]e would have been in serious trou-
ble if the cantonment process had succeeded.’35 As chief of plans, Huijssoon was
put in charge of planning and finding sponsors for the retraining and reintegration
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of these demobilized troops. He feared that the security situation would have even
been notably worse had seventy percent of the forces been suddenly released from
their faction’s military control. The vast majority of the soldiers eligible for demobi-
lization wanted to became farmers, but there was already a shortage of de-mined
agricultural land. UNTAC leaflets and posters made many promises to demobilized
soldiers, but by the summer of 1992, there was still no serious UN program for
retraining and reintegration after cantonment. A program for 25,000 demobilized
soldiers was hastily being prepared, but this was all UNTAC had the funds and orga-
nizational capacity to set up. Even this would have been phased in over many months.
Releasing 140,000 unruly veterans into a thoroughly gutted and lawless Cambodi-
an society was likely to have resulted in even more chaos. ‘Add to that the planned
withdrawal of half the UN forces by the end of 1992,’ Huijssoon said, ‘and we would
have headed for outright disaster.’36 
Segregated Missions
The success of UNTAC’s civilian mission had been perceived to be dependent on
the military’s ability to demobilize the four factions. However, no reciprocal depend-
ency between the two missions had been foreseen. The inseparability of the two mis-
sions became apparent as one of two key arguments used by the Khmer Rouge to
refuse cooperation with UNTAC’s military was the lack of UN control over SOC civil
administration.37 The Khmer Rouge was not prepared to lower its ‘protective shield,’
its armed forces, as long as the SOC was allowed to hold on to administrative power
in close to ninety percent of Cambodia and thus survive the transitional period vir-
tually intact. While the Khmer Rouge was generally seen as the prime ‘spoiler’ of
the peace process, increasingly over the months both UNTAC officials and the Cam-
bodian people came to regard the SOC as equally culpable. It could be argued that
the Khmer Rouge was correct in estimating in the course of 1992 that UNTAC would
never be capable of effectively controlling the State of Cambodia.38
Asserting control over the SOC government structures was far more complex
than had been envisaged. Nothing of the sort had ever been attempted by the UN.
At the central level in Phnom Penh, the SOC simply administered around UNTAC
in the areas of policy making where its central administrative apparatus was still
functioning.39 UNTAC officers were kept busy watching an official without function
while the real decisions were made out of UNTAC’s sight in concealed parallel struc-
tures.40 The political party representing the State of Cambodia at the elections, the
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), was thus able to rely fully on service of officials
on the public payroll and access to public assets while obtaining revenue from sales
of those assets.41 In the course of October, UNTAC attempted to strengthen its mon-
itoring and supervision capacity, but its major weakness remained the civil admin-
istration component’s inability to take corrective action.42
At the provincial level, UN civil administrative control was ‘spotty at best and
almost nonexistent in some places.’ The Paris Accords had not paid any special atten-
tion to control at the sub-national level, an omission in the overall mandate that
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would also hamper other operations such as that in Kosovo seven years later. In
many provinces, UN officials arrived only in July ‘because they said accommodations
were not good enough,’ journalist William Shawcross commented scathingly. When
the administrative component was fully deployed, no more than 170 UN officials
were assigned to control 21 provinces and a total SOC civil service numbering
200,000. This left no more than five to eight civil administration officials to be
deployed in each province.43 This was particularly harmful since much of the cen-
tral SOC administration had collapsed and a large share of government control slipped
to provincial governors and generals. 
Once in place in the provinces, the envisaged role of the international officials
towards the provincial administration was that of a shadow administration, monitor-
ing and controlling the governor and his local government apparatus. However, two
out of three UN civil servants found themselves ‘powerless in the face of entrenched
local officialdom backed by all the government’s resources, including police and
troops.’44 The lack of UN civil administrative control over the provincial government
was partly the result of the character and limitations of SOC administration. In Ban-
teay Meanchey, the province where the Dutch headquarters was located, Woong Kaan
was the governor. He controlled several provincial departments, but due to a lack of
financial means these departments amounted to little. The governor’s primary means
of control were his provincial police and the provincial CPAF troops under his com-
mand, institutions over which the UN administrator and his five administrators had
in practice little or no control.45 The military component, on the other hand, was
able to wield some influence in this field. A prerequisite to any effective UN con-
trol on the provincial level would therefore have been a strong mechanism of civil-
military cooperation. This, however, turned out to be one of UNTAC’s greatest defi-
ciencies.
Limited coordination between civil and military components at the tactical or provin-
cial level was the result of a mandate and planning process that foresaw very little
contact between the two. While the military and civil aspects were supposed to be
carried out under one UN umbrella, the Paris Accords were envisaged to be imple-
mented by two parallel but separate organizations. In January 1993, Porcell remind-
ed a room full of UNTAC officers of how the mission had originally been envisioned: 
If one makes a strict interpretation of the Paris Accords at first glance one real-
izes that the Military Component and the Civil Administration Component have
little chance for contact, and the same conclusion can be drawn from a reading
of the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations of 19 February 1992,
which formed the basis of resolution 745 creating UNTAC. Therefore, according to
the Accords as structured, the military personnel and the civilian administrators
would not have had contacts other then those involving official ceremonies or
mundane receptions.46
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In Cambodia, both military and civilian components reported to the civilian UN Spe-
cial Representative, but there was no joint military-civilian staff initially to help coor-
dinate their activities. It was not appreciated that, as Sanderson rapidly came to real-
ize, ‘all operations are now a blend of military and civilian objectives.’47 He much
regretted the lack of integrated strategic planning within the UNTAC mission:
From the very beginning each component conducted a separate survey mission
and prepared a plan of sorts. Some component heads were not even appointed
before the deployment commenced. Unfortunately, this planning shortfall was never
corrected in Cambodia, except in the case of the military and electoral components
which forged a necessary planning and control alliance to see the election through.48
Since the implementation plan viewed disarming and demobilizing the factions as
quite distinct from much of the civilian activity, it initially called for a withdrawal of
half of the military component from October 1992, months before much of the civil-
ian activity was to take place. In case the soldiers were to run into their civilian coun-
terparts, the Lieutenant Colonel Rakesh Malik, from India advised his fellow UNTAC
peacekeepers in a document entitled ‘Do’s and Don’ts for the Peacekeeper in Cam-
bodia’ to ‘limit your liaison with the NGOs/civ[ilian] departments UNTAC,’ adding
that ‘there will be a few of them around.’49
The military and civilian components had no matching geographic zones of
responsibility, which seriously hampered civil-military cooperation. Military contin-
gents were deployed in twelve geographic zones based on areas controlled by each
of Cambodia’s four factions. The military sectors varied in size as they depended on
the number of cantonments and therefore the concentration of Cambodian troops.
This gave the Dutch a relatively small sector in the militarily contested west, while
the Uruguayan contingent controlled an enormous sector in the more stable eastern
part adjoining the Vietnamese border. The civilian component based its operations
on the country’s twenty-one provinces, with 21 civilian administration directors
assigned to these provinces. For the Dutch this meant coordinating their efforts with
three provincial governments and an equal number of UN provincial teams. This
situation was revised in December 1992, when the second Dutch battalion led by
Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Cammaert took control over the single province of Ban-
teay Meanchey. Cooperation with the provincial UN civil administrator was reason-
ably good, but generally considered of little importance as his formal tasks of con-
trolling the administration of the province amounted to little. Most of the dealings
of the Dutch battalion with the provincial SOC governors would be direct instead of
through the UN civil administrator.50
Coordination between the military and civil components was poor, but coopera-
tion between the various civilian components was not much better overall. The direc-
tor civil administration for Banteay Meanchey had a coordinating role towards CivPol,
the human rights component, and the electoral officers, but these organizations with
their own priorities and agendas, tended to be very independent minded.51 Each
reported to its own headquarters in Phnom Penh, where UNTAC’s civilian and mil-
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itary headquarters were initially deployed over 29 different locations throughout the
city. Lack of integrated planning and poor communication in the initial phase hard-
ly facilitated the integration of operations. Each organization operated in a stovepipe
fashion, reporting and communicating only vertically. The ‘managerial stovepipe’ was
a problem that would haunt UN operations throughout the 1990s. In Cambodia, the
wheel had to be invented and it would be reinvented over and over again in future
multi-dimensional peace operations. UNTAC’s components did not even have joint
coordination meetings until March 1993. When he finally called for them, Akashi
regarded these meetings as opportunities for the components to ‘harmonize’ their
various priorities ‘rather than to engage in hard-headed strategic coordination under
his leadership.’52 The Japanese career UN official had a similar approach towards
his own organization as he would display toward the Cambodian parties. He tend-
ed to rely on the art of persuasion and never probed for the outer boundaries of the
powers vested in him as an interim administrator by the Security Council.53
In Banteay Meanchey the director of civil administration hosted a weekly coordi-
nating meeting on Thursdays by January 1993. All four components, which he for-
mally coordinated, as well as the UNHCR, UNDP and the few NGOs operating in
the sector were usually present. ‘Dutchbat’ was also represented at these meetings
by its ‘civil-operations officer.’ The staff officer in charge of personnel performed this
newly created staff-function, for which no official name or separate position existed
within the Dutch military. He became a ‘double-hatted’ battalion staff member sim-
ply because he happened to have most time on his hand – a relative luxury in a
place where the military generally worked seven days a week for long hours. This
ad hoc arrangement was the result of the unforeseen prominence of contacts with
international and local civilian organizations. Laura McGrew, in charge of the human
rights component in Banteay Meanchey, remembered the Dutch as ‘great on a per-
sonal level and professional, polite and friendly. I remember one of them saved me
once from an embarrassing situation in an official meeting, when the UNTAC direc-
tor of civil administration asked me to sit on his lap.’54 Few decisions were made in
these meetings. However, as the elections approached and the security situation dete-
riorated rapidly in 1993, the role of the military sector commander, his staff and
company commanders in coordinating the operation would increase to a point where
the military was running a large part of the operation. 
Winning the Hearts and Minds
Little remained of UNTAC’s original military mission by August 1992. The ‘pure
military’ tasks had dwindled down to ‘stabilizing the military situation’ by monitor-
ing the factions and the cease-fire as far possible. Apart from monitoring a small
number of demobilized forces and guarding the surrendered armaments, a remain-
ing method of containing the sporadic but increased fighting from erupting in war
was bringing the four factions in contact with each other in ‘Mixed Military Work-
ing Groups.’ In the Dutch sector it would take until October for the Khmer Rouge
to show up. On the few occasions where the Khmer Rouge were present, some new
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colonel would do little more than repeat the demands for UNTAC to evict the remain-
ing Vietnamese forces and assure that the Hun Sen government transfer all powers
to the Supreme National Council. Dukers wanted to stop the usually futile meetings,
but he was not allowed to do so. In the course of time he saw the use of continu-
ing the meetings, if only to keep a line open to the Khmer Rouge, most of all on
the company level where his local units were in harms way. Sanderson’s experiences
in the Mixed Military Working Groups in Phnom Penh were no more encouraging
at the time, but the meetings at the central level would also regain importance over
time as the elections approached.55
In September, voices were raised in Dutch parliament to withdraw the Marines
from Cambodia. It was an expensive and still dangerous mission, and the represen-
tatives were questioning the use of keeping their troops in the jungles of Cambodia
after the collapse of the cantonment process.56 Many were eager to contribute troops
to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, in Europe’s backyard, in a con-
flict that was receiving far more media attention. In August, the pictures of intern-
ment and refugee camps shook the world by evoking memories of Nazi concentra-
tion camps. They triggered an emotional outcry and a wide call for more forceful
intervention.57 However, with its Marines Corps fully committed in Cambodia, the
Dutch had to wait until their new Airmobile Brigade was operational before their
armed forces were able to contribute any combat troops for deployment on the Bal-
kans.58 This was not likely to happen before 1994, so in the meantime the Dutch
government had to settle for a communication and a transport unit in Bosnia. 
In early September the minister of defense, Relus ter Beek, accompanied by the
minister of international development, Jan Pronk, visited the troops in Cambodia.
For a brief period, UNTAC and the Marines made the headlines again. The Dutch
public needed to be convinced that the Marines were not ‘bumming around in the
jungle.’ Initially, there was some skepticism in the Dutch press, mainly as a result
of complaints by Marines about not being able to perform the task they had come
for. One Marine was quoted as saying the battalion performed ‘primarily social work.’59
This image was rapidly replaced by a certain amazement at what had been accom-
plished thus far. Soldiers could do more of a peacekeeping operation than separat-
ing, disarming and cantoning factions.
The battalion had started giving free medical care to Cambodians and despite UN
policy guidelines from New York – which stated that medical treatment was to be
confined to UNTAC personnel out of fear of medical supply shortages – in August
the number of civilian visiting medical facilities increased sharply.60 Eighty percent
of the patients treated by the Dutch field dressing station and the two company med-
ical facilities were Cambodians. At the company medical post in Phum Nimit alone,
around one hundred locals were treated per week at what an UNTAC information
officer called a ‘very impressive medical facility.’ The battalion commander was even
convinced that his field dressing station was the best medical facility in Cambodia
at the time. The information officer witnessed how medical treatment ‘seriously con-
tributed to the good relations between the company and the local population.’61 In
turn, these relations facilitated military operations and even the contacts with the
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Khmer Rouge, as some of the families of its soldiers received medical care. More-
over, the experience for the medical staff was considered extremely useful, as the
Dutch had never been confronted with real bullet wounds and mine-related ampu-
tations.
Medical aid was given with the battalion commander’s explicit support as well as
that of the Dutch authorities – once they became aware of its value. It did not hin-
der the treatment of its own personnel, since the battalion was amply supplied with
medicine.62 However, while there was an abundance of medicine for the general
treatment of able-bodied men and women, there was a lack of medicine for the treat-
ment of babies and elderly people. This was particularly painful for the medical staff,
as some of those patients died under their care. Cooperation with other organiza-
tions was usually a way out of such problems. Under the supervision of a company
doctor, a special facility run by three medics from former refugee camps was creat-
ed 300 meters from the Dutch post. The supply of medicine and other equipment
to this facility was provided by the UNHCR, which had been arranged through inter-
vention by the members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
The UNHCR would not always deliver on its promises and little support was forth-
coming from the local authorities, but with help from UNICEF a borehole was cre-
ated and the Dutch built a latrine for the medical post. It was planned that a local
doctor would gradually take over the facility.63 Helicopter support was also provided
to the ICRC for emergency cases in the isolated post in Sok San.64
Compared to other regions, there were relatively few humanitarian organizations
active in the Dutch area of operation. Apart from the international governmental
organizations incorporated in UNTAC, the UNHCR and UNDP and the other UN
subsidiary organizations Unicef and World Food Program, the ICRC and the non-
governmental organizations Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Care, and Danish Cam-
bodia Consultants (DCC) were operating in the area. Most organizations had their
offices in Battambang or Phnom Penh, while only a few had field offices in Banteay
Meanchey.65 Cooperation with the humanitarians was fairly good. Some humanitar-
ian organizations, such as MSF, harbored principle objections to cooperation with
the military, although the Marines noticed that they tended to drop their inhibitions
once the security situation worsened.66 Cooperation with the UNHCR was essential
as the Dutch and other contingents were providing military escort to refugee con-
voys. The Marines would also play a role in the protection of refugee reception cen-
ters in Sisophon. Escort jobs from the Thai refugee camps gave the Marines enor-
mous satisfaction, and were a much sought after job. 
Dutchbat was also supporting the work of UNTAC’s information and education
branch. The branch, largely staffed by Khmer-speaking academics, was tasked to
spread UNTAC’s message. It used various techniques, including videos and hired
actors to explain the purpose of the massive international presence, but first and
foremost to teach the public about the election and the merits of democracy. The
Marines erected bulletin boards for UNTAC in the villages and distributed the print-
ed material provided by information officers. For many Cambodians, especially those
in distant locations and most of all for the Khmer Rouge rank and file, it was often
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still a mystery what those people in their big white terrain vehicles, soldiers and civil-
ians, Europeans, Asians and Africans, had come to do in their country.67 UNTAC’s
ability to communicate its message to the Cambodians was seriously impeded by
Boutros-Ghali’s decision to withhold funds for Radio UNTAC in the initial months.68
The information component’s director, Tim Carney, an American diplomat with long
experience in Cambodia, failed to convince the secretary general that a radio station
was the best way to spread the UN’s message free of interference from the factions.
Eventually the radio station was allowed, but the lack of this most effective means
of providing information in a rural society with terribly poor communications was
felt in the initial period and much enhanced the importance of rehabilitation proj-
ects by the military.
Various small projects were initiated spontaneously to bring immediate improve-
ment to the living conditions of the people. The Dutch initially called them ‘com-
munity relations projects,’ a term taken from the British Army Field Manual that
was circulating in the battalion staff. The manual from the 1980s was on ‘Counter
Revolutionary Warfare,’ the term then in vogue for what had previously been known
as counterinsurgency. Apart from medical aid, the Marines constructed small bridges
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Dutch Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Cammaert officially opens a school in a Cambodian village. Later
in the 1990s, pictures of projects aimed at ‘winning the hearts and minds’ came to dominate the
perception of civil-military cooperation in peace operations.
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in order to make villages more easily accessible and created a small market place
near their compound to stimulate local trade. Elsewhere in Cambodia, engineers built
roads and constructed Bailey bridges. While this was often done for operational rea-
sons, it worked both ways with the Cambodians profiting from the improvement of
the country’s devastated infrastructure. 
For the Dutch a favorite ‘civic action’ activity, as the projects became known, was
support to the resurrection of schools and medical clinics. The Indonesians had their
particular way of ‘nation building,’ which they were used to performing in their own
country. ‘I would not argue that the Indonesians were spreading the word of democ-
racy and freedom of speech,’ UNTAC’s chief of plans recalled, ‘but they were doing
a fine job lecturing on schools and giving physical education to school children, using
funds and materials from Indonesia.’69 Meanwhile, the French picked up where they
left off after decolonization, and eagerly taught French to a generation of Cambodi-
ans that had no memory of French rule. Various UNTAC military units initiated sim-
ilar projects elsewhere in Cambodia. Civic action was certainly not limited to the
‘rich’ contingents, with their lavish logistical means and funds. According to the jour-
nalist William Shawcross, the Uruguayans and Pakistanis were particularly praised
‘for doing fine work in bringing public health and other services to villages.’70
As a major in the Royal Australian Engineers, Sanderson had commanded a con-
struction squadron during the war in Vietnam. Experience here and in other coun-
terinsurgency operations such as in Malaya had made the Australian military thor-
oughly aware of the importance of ‘winning the hearts and minds of the people’
when performing military operations in their midst.71 The general had therefore pro-
posed that the military component should have a mandated ‘civilian side’ with a spe-
cific budget. However, much to his regret, the UN secretariat did not provide him
with a budget for civic action programs, arguing that this was the responsibility of
other UN agencies and NGOs. Sanderson therefore heartily endorsed the local mil-
itary initiatives and propagated the need to build ‘an alliance with the people’ as ‘an
essential part of the military component’s method of operation.’ In March 1993,
headquarters in Phnom Penh tried to coordinate some of these initiatives by nation-
al contingents by creating a small civic action cell headed by a US Army officer expe-
rienced in civil affairs. Battalion commanders were instructed to set up a medical
program, use engineering capacity if available for the benefit of the local population
and appoint a staff officer as the coordinator for civic action. By then, UNTAC had
already been under way for one year and most of the civic action continued to be
local initiatives.72
Altogether, the UNTAC military was able to establish a reasonable program
through the generosity of voluntary donations from individual countries, and accord-
ing to Sanderson ‘close co-operation with other UN agencies and effective use of the
skills that many of the United Nations soldiers brought to Cambodia.’73 Coordina-
tion between the civilian rehabilitation program and the military initiatives was not
always flawless, and according to a US government report this resulted in a clash of
interest at times. 
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For example, UNTAC’s civilian components planned several projects, such as road
building and water sanitation, with private voluntary organizations working in Cam-
bodia. Due to the lack of coordination, some of these projects, which were intend-
ed to provide income and skills to the local population, were pre-empted and com-
pleted by the military as part of its civic action campaign. According to the Force
Commander, providing security and proceeding with the civic action campaign were
crucial to the success of the mission and could not be delayed until the civilians
were in place to begin planning and coordinating rehabilitation.74
Sanderson replied that ‘[o]n the question of military civic action versus rehabilita-
tion, every effort was made to coordinate engineering tasking including with UNDP.
The truth of the matter was that the military component had to get on with the task
for operational reasons and could not wait.’75
Construction work performed by the military for operational needs was not to be
confused with civic action. However, it was becoming increasingly difficult to draw
the line as the military steadily advanced into the humanitarian and rehabilitation
sphere during peace operations in the 1990s. The confusion over the purpose of
civic action became widespread, simply because it was not always clear whether aid
was an ‘end’ or used a ‘means.’ Was ‘doing some good’ a means of winning the
hearts and minds and thus facilitating military operations, or was relief and recon-
struction a military purpose of its own? Were the peacekeepers there to ‘do good’ or
simply to provide a secure environment for others to work in, by engaging in human-
itarian work, rehabilitation, peace building, institution building, state building, or
‘nation building’ – the most confusing as well as ambitious of all terms used for
such activity? 
These concerns were hardly raised at this point in time by the politicians visit-
ing the Dutch sector in Cambodia. While civic action was a traditional and well-
known recipe in military operations, especially low intensity conflict, and had been
practiced by their own UN peacekeepers in Lebanon during the 1980s, the Dutch
tended to treat it as a new magic potion. The two Dutch ministers were thoroughly
impressed with what they saw the Marines were doing to benefit the Cambodians
and set out to stimulate their efforts, while using the positive image it created. Dur-
ing his stay in Cambodia, the minister of development promised the Marines half a
million guilders to use as they saw fit on reconstruction and rehabilitation projects.
With the use of the so-called Potje Pronk (Pronk funds), the community relations
projects thus became ‘Dutch Development Projects.’76 With this money at their dis-
posal, the civic action campaign seriously got underway in the Dutch sector. The
Marines were now able to take on larger projects such as building or renovating
schools small medical facilities, erecting a new police station, drilling wells, digging
shallow water reservoirs and establishing a malaria prevention program.77 The civil-
operations staff officer coordinated civic action, but much of the initiative for and
execution of the projects was delegated to companies in the field. In 1993, the min-
ister raised the total amount to be used by the Marines to one million guilders, the
equivalent of over half a million dollars. ‘You cannot underestimate the importance
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of the Potje Pronk on the success of our mission as a whole,’ the second battalion’s
operations officers would concede.78
Winning the heart and minds, it soon appeared, worked three ways. Not just the
Cambodians had to be won over. Civic action seriously contributed to the improve-
ment in troop morale, as it gave the Marines a sense of purpose in a country where
they saw more extreme poverty and suffering than many had ever considered pos-
sible. Winning the hearts and minds back home turned out to be an unforeseen
advantage, and allowed the ministers of defense and foreign affairs to trumpet the
accomplishments of the Dutch troops in parliament. The visit and the sudden wide
media coverage assured that those who had doubted the use of keeping the Marines
in Asia were now overwhelmingly in favor. How the remainder of their eighteen-
month mission would evolve, however, remained somewhat of a mystery.
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4The Slippery Slope toward Public Security:
Soldiers and Policemen in Cambodia
Interview ith Jap Bjsterbosch, Wllmsad,28uy04.The maxim goes that few plans ever survive the first shot fired on the battlefield. The
same appears to be true for the murky area between war and peace as the military
plan in Cambodia got bogged down almost as soon as UNTAC crossed the starting
line.1 Its leaders therefore had to either abandon the mission or improvise and change
it drastically. However, a decision was postponed for several months. This left UNTAC’s
military to muddle through from August 1992 onwards, while hoping the Khmer
Rouge would join the peace process after all. Parallel to the limited cantonment activ-
ities some of the peacekeepers had become involved in civic action, but when it came
to ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the people, no amount of humanitarianism by
the soldiers would compensate for the lack of security that persisted for many Cam-
bodians as a result of the surge in banditry and political violence. UNTAC’s official
approach to ending the violence in Cambodia was twofold. Violence resulting from
military conflict was a matter for the military component to monitor and negotiate.
Criminal violence was a matter for the UN Civilian Police (CivPol) under the Agree-
ment. This model, based on the rigid distinction between ‘military security’ and ‘pub-
lic security,’ did not match reality in Cambodia and certainly not in Banteay Meanchey
province where the Dutch Marines went far in improvising ways to establish a secure
environment. Their experience would prove to be an early indicator for the expand-
ing role of peacekeepers in the field of public security during the 1990s.
Police Monitors
One of the most obvious problems related to the gap between police and military
operations in peacekeeping proved to be that in areas ravaged by civil wars the local
police were often hard to distinguish from military forces. The strict segregation of
the two occupations, firmly established in Western democratic societies in the twen-
tieth century, was not as clearly defined as the drafters of the Paris Peace Accords
had envisioned. Although CivPol was tasked to monitor all four factions’ police forces,
the only distinguishable police apparatus was that of the State of Cambodia. The UN
estimated SOC police at 47,000 in number, but this was a largely untrained and
poorly equipped force that lacked standardized procedures and a functioning crimi-
nal code. Moreover, the police were seriously underpaid, if paid at all. It was not
until October 1992 that a law was passed prohibiting Cambodian soldiers from arrest-
ing civilians. Although this represented a major change in the official powers of the
Cambodian military, it was unlikely to have much influence over their behavior.2
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The Khmer Rouge’s police force had been estimated at nine thousand, but nei-
ther CivPol nor the UNTAC military were able to distinguish them from regular
Khmer Rouge fighters. The other two factions’ police forces were negligible in size.3
The Khmer Rouge’s unwillingness to disarm had also been linked to police matters,
a causal connection related to its obstinacy and the failure to dismantle the SOC
administrative structures. With the SOC police intact and still under party control,
the Khmer Rouge could not allow itself to be disarmed by UNTAC without making
themselves vulnerable. ‘With the armed forces of the Parties cantoned, disarmed and
largely demobilized as the Agreements required,’ Sanderson concluded in retrospect,
‘the relative power of the police would have been markedly increased.’4
In the course of the 1990s, monitoring and reform of local police became an
ever more prominent element of peace operations. At the end of the Cold War, Namib-
ia had been the testing ground for the use of a large force of UN civilian police mon-
itors in a peace building operation in the wake of intra-state conflict.5 In a rather
benign environment with overall continued cooperation of the parties involved, it
proved a relatively effective tool to control the factions’ police forces, which tended
to play a large role in civil wars. With 3,600 police officers, UNTAC’s civil police
component was the largest ever assembled by the UN. The force, led by the Dutch
Namibia veteran Brigadier Klaas Roos, was charged with ensuring that law and order
among the civilian population was maintained ‘effectively and impartially and that
human rights and fundamental freedoms were fully protected.’ Although the execu-
tive responsibility for public security in Cambodia would continue to rest with the
factions’ police forces, these were envisaged to operate under UNTAC supervision
during the transitional period. Like the UN mission as a whole, the responsibility
given to the CivPol component was extremely ambitious. 
The authority and means given to CivPol did not match its responsibilities. Con-
ventional policing powers are reporting incidents, investigating violations, searching
premises, seizing evidence and the arrest and detention of suspects. CivPol initially
only had the first of these powers in order to control and help transform a police
force that, rather than providing protection to civilian population, instead served to
terrify inhabitants through intimidation and torture. For a large part, the Cambodi-
an government police were not community police, but a politicized force designed
to protect the interests of a one-party state.6 The peace agreements had not speci-
fied any control measures, and a number of missions was not included in the man-
date that would have given it more of an ‘institution building’ character. There was,
for example, no provision for restructuring local police organisations or vetting per-
sonnel, and no program specifically focused on judicial reform. The UN police had
no law enforcement responsibilities, was unarmed and was obliged to work with the
existing police officers.7 The police monitors had no method to follow through on
their investigations into human rights abuses. They could transfer a case to the local
police that was unlikely to do anything. In the likely event that the police themselves
were involved in human rights abuses, the only method of ensuring compliance was
to have UNTAC apply political pressure in response to CivPol investigations. 
The overall poor quality of the international police force and its slow deployment
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seriously hampered the UN’s ability to control the Cambodian police forces. It had
taken UNTAC’s military contingent about five months to deploy, but the CivPol com-
ponent was not fully fielded until November 1992. By then, the planned eighteen-
month mission was half way to completion and the police force lost credibility from
which it never satisfactorily recovered.8 The problematic recruitment of internation-
al police personnel by the UN was one of the causes for its partial malfunctioning.
During the hasty process, the UN had not exactly been choosy. What Cambodia
required, according to UNTAC special prosecutor Marc Plunkett, was trained inves-
tigators ‘who understood the apprehension of offenders, the collection of evidence
and the preparation of prosecutions, and personnel who were experienced in com-
munity policing.’9 Many of the CivPol were not police at all but border guards, secu-
rity guards, anti-terrorist forces, paramilitary police and even civilian clerical staff
redesignated as police, many of whom were not at all suited to the task and set very
bad examples for the Khmers. A large number of police personnel were hardly able
to drive a car while others did not speak an international language, which seriously
limited interaction in the field, especially radio communications. The problems often
originated in the contributing countries. Of the fourteen nations that sent over one
hundred police monitors, thirteen were developing countries. Many of these had
police forces that suffered from problems similar to that of the Cambodian police:
lack of discipline, corruption and human rights abuses.10 On the other hand, some
police officers were of a very high standard and initiated valuable police training pro-
grams, as well as intervening at great personal risk to prevent violence and to bring
offenders to justice. 
While a minority of the military forces was ill disciplined, most notably the first
Bulgarian battalion, it was the CivPol branch that gave UNTAC its worst public rela-
tions problems.11 After several months, the mission was losing popular support, most
of all in the capital where ten percent of the population lived. An internal UN report
based on fifty interviews with the urban population concluded in October that the
Cambodians had started blaming UNTAC for many wrongs, such as corruption,
unsafe streets and the rapid rise in traffic accidents.12 In the meantime, there were
hardly any civic action programs initiated in and around the capital like those impro-
vised by some battalions in the countryside. In Phnom Penh, but even more so in
the rural areas, the rapid rise of crime and overall lack of security seriously under-
mined the people’s trust in UNTAC as a whole. 
Apart from the destruction and harm resulting from sporadic military confrontations
between the two remaining military forces, the Cambodian population faced many
types of threats related to public security. The most common problems were theft,
robbery, extortion, kidnapping, assault and murder, commonly categorized as ‘ban-
ditry.’ These problems were closely entwined with illegal taxation, a common prac-
tice mostly ascribed to underpaid CPAF military as well as demobilized soldiers from
the other three factions. The population hardly mentioned the Khmer Rouge in con-
nection with banditry in the Dutch sector, although this proved hard to monitor.13
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Overall, Khmer Rouge troops were better paid and not located close to the popula-
tion centers. Another threat to law and order was political violence and intimidation,
which rose sharply during the voter registration process in late 1992 and continued
during the electoral process in the following year. This type of violence was ascribed
to both SOC forces and the Khmer Rouge. Finally, there was a wave of serious eth-
nic violence directed at the Vietnamese minority by the Khmer Rouge in 1993 in the
run up to the elections. 
Government soldiers were responsible for a large portion of the illegal taxes raised
throughout the countryside. These were either army units ordered to tax and extort
by their superior officers, or renegade elements both in and out of uniform. As far
as the first group was concerned, Sanderson wrote to Akashi in March 1993, ‘[t]he
root cause of the problem is that there is a war going on out there and SOC can-
not afford to maintain the military force to fight it. The local commanders are left
to their own devices. They have to hold the force together without pay and contin-
ue to hold the NADK at bay. It is remarkable that some of them do as well as they
do and it is not surprising that some of them resort to extortion and other illegal
activities.’14 The second group resulted from the partial and poorly prepared demo-
bilization process. As described in the previous chapter, a substantial part of the now
unemployed troops formed local criminal gangs and started roaming the country-
side. In the Dutch sector, the surge in extortion and violence that plagued the Cam-
bodians as well as the UN mission was largely ascribed to this group, which was
joined by deserters and common criminals.15
Some of the factors contributing to the upsurge in serious crime were related to
UNTAC’s presence and even connected to some of its limited successes in 1992.
Not only was banditry stimulated by the demobilization process as thousands of ill-
disciplined veterans were released into society; local criminals also took advantage
of the absence of state power caused by UNTAC’s presence. Government officials
and local police complained that they were unable to take more forceful measures
due to the requirements imposed by UNTAC to respect human rights. Still another
contributing factor to the rise in crime was the sudden sharp rise in Cambodia’s
population as a result of the successful repatriation of over 300,000 refugees under
UNHCR control. Amongst those returning from the Thai border camps were both
criminals as well as those who were easy prey for thieves.16 On the local level, the
presence of Dutch military posts and the resulting relative security attracted people
and trade. In Phum Nimit, in a matter of months an entire new community grew
up around the encampment of Charlie Company. 
Banditry in Banteay Meanchey
Crime struck particularly hard in the northwestern part of Cambodia, where the
Dutch were stationed. While the number of reported armed robberies had been rel-
atively low in early 1992, their number in Banteay Meanchey rose more sharply than
elsewhere in Cambodia.17 This seemed to mirror the demobilization process in this
part of the country that had been more successful than elsewhere in Cambodia. Ban-
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teay Meanchey was the only province where all four parties had a military presence
and the two smaller factions produced a relatively large share of the 40,000 demo-
bilized troops nationwide. The high concentration of demobilized troops in Banteay
Meanchey makes the province an interesting case in point for the argument by Duk-
ers and Huijssoon that Cambodia was likely to have slipped into further anarchy had
the poorly prepared demobilization proceeded as planned. 
The presence of the important trading Route Five, linking Cambodia with Thai-
land, contributed heavily to the high crime rates in Banteay Meanchey. In the months
following the arrival of Dutchbat there had been virtually no fighting between the
factions as the ‘frontline’ had stabilized along Route Five between Sisophon and the
border town Poipet. South of the highway was Khmer Rouge territory and the area
north of the highway was controlled by government forces. The main threat for the
Cambodian population in the sector was banditry and extortion. ‘The important theme
for this sector is not waging war,’ a visiting team of Khmer-speaking UNTAC offi-
cials concluded, ‘but earning profits.’ Goods coming from Thailand were ‘taxed’ at
various locations along the road, at the only two official government checkpoints at
Poipet and the bridge in Sisophon and at multiple ‘informal’ checkpoints where sol-
diers stood by the road and demanded money. A one-way trip from Poipet to Sisophon
became an expensive journey for the local population.18 Of an even graver concern
to personal security were armed bandits operating in mobile teams of up to fifteen
persons, both active and demobilized soldiers, attacking civilians along the road. 
Dutchbat started to improvise in order to quell the upsurge in crime and vio-
lence. The commander did not stop short of the tasks officially assigned to him after
the demobilization process was derailed by August. Given the quest by the Marines
for alternative ways of creating a secure environment, the strict segregation between
military security and public security was discarded. However, this should not be con-
fused with a conscious decision on the part of the Marines to take on a policing role
in Cambodia. ‘If you are unable to execute the mission you have come to perform,
you use your common sense,’ Dukers reasoned.19 The Marines tried to halt crime
and extortion at checkpoints in various ways. The operations officer, Major Gonza-
les, developed an elaborate and rigid ‘patrol and presence plan’ for his companies
in order to create a maximum dispersal and visibility of UNTAC troops. Foot patrols
and mounted patrols were conducted day and night and concentrated in and around
Route Five and the most densely populated areas.20 Although frequent patrols
improved the situation along the roads, it proved beyond the capabilities of the bat-
talion to totally disrupt extortion activity along the routes. After the Dutch removed
checkpoints, the bandits merely reappeared after the patrols had passed. The meas-
ures along the roads were even reported to increase other forms of banditry as rene-
gade soldiers moved activity from ‘taxation’ at checkpoint towards more violent form
of robbery further away from the unpaved ‘highway.’21
The possibilities for action were very limited since the peacekeepers were official-
ly prohibited from using force, let alone detaining offenders. They would not pur-
sue fleeing bandits or gangs and were not allowed to disarm the Cambodians on
sight, even if they had directly threatened UNTAC. In UNTAC’s standard operating
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procedures, it was correctly anticipated in May that ‘[i]n an environment where decades
of civil war had dislocated the fabric of society’ the potential for criminal acts ‘out-
side the spirit of the Paris Agreement’ was very real. ‘These could include actions
by undisciplined or disenchanted members of the faction or by bandit groups.’ How-
ever, the response to criminal activity was considered ‘a matter for the civil police,
monitored by the members of the UNTAC Police Component.’22
In order to ‘retain credibility among the local population, but also to remain cred-
ible for the Khmer Rouge,’ Dukers asked UNTAC in Phnom Penh to allow him to
take stronger measures against banditry in late August. Force headquarters did not
issue such instructions, as this would have meant a substantial broadening of the
military mandate.23 In order to find more structural ways to address the lawlessness,
Dutchbat therefore increased its cooperation with the local provincial government
and the local police forces. Such cooperation was most extensive with the provincial
authorities of Banteay Meanchey, where the battalion headquarters was located in
the town center. The provincial governor was in control of between 2,200 and 2,700
police officers, including border guards, and a further 2,000 provincial CPAF mili-
tary forces. It was mostly in this capacity that Dutchbat coordinated its efforts and
cooperated with the governor.24
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On their own initiative, Dutch Marines ran checkpoints with Cambodian police and organized joint
patrols with all four military factions in order to improve public safety in their sector. 
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One of the first joint actions occurred when the governor asked for Dutch sup-
port for his police force that planned to remove settlers illegally occupying ground
and building houses in Sisophon. Apart from occupying ground owned by the munic-
ipality, these armed squatters, mostly government soldiers, had driven local inhabi-
tants away from their houses and farms at gunpoint. For the most part, the soldiers
were acting on their own, but they would also render services to local businessmen
and developers for ‘odd jobs.’ Apart from occupying land, they would sell their serv-
ices to protect valuable transports and for settling scores with adversaries or com-
petitors. Construction was big business in Sisophon, a city that doubled in size dur-
ing the first half year of UNTAC’s presence, and several months after the arrival of
the battalion, numerous stone houses were built in an area where an owner of a
wooden house was considered a rich man.25
In coordination with the governor of Banteay Meanchey, who declared the occu-
pation of property illegal, Dukers decided to have his troops support the provincial
SOC police that would otherwise have been no match for the armed settlers. On 27
August, after the governor’s ultimatum deadline had passed, a platoon was visibly
present as backup during an operation that in total involved fifty Dutch troops. They
were allowed to act in case local civil servants and armed police, sixty-five in total,
were molested while ‘upholding the law.’ In order to protect them the platoon was
authorized to use ‘minimum force,’ including the use of warning shots and possi-
bly aimed fire. Troops were equipped with smoke grenades and tear gas, shields and
batons, and prepared to detain ‘amok-makers,’ ringleaders pointed out by the pla-
toon commander in charge. The detailed orders for these crowd and riot-control
measures in a potentially hostile environment referred to UNTAC Standing Operat-
ing Procedures on the use of force, but it is unclear what section allowed such pub-
lic security measures. More interestingly, the operations staff officer who drafted the
plan referred to the British Army Field Manual on peacekeeping operations and his
British manual, Counter Revolutionary Operations, with its elaboration on support to
the civil power. The Marines – used to cooperating closely with the British Royal
Marines within NATO – had brought both to Cambodia, and all the battalion’s oper-
ational orders referred to these two volumes. The counterinsurgency manual was the
most relevant for this particular operation as the orders specifically referred to its
chapters dealing with ‘arrest and evidence’ and ‘crowd dispersal’. The sections ‘tak-
ing over from the police,’ ‘crowd dispersal without opening fire’ and ‘opening fire
with small arms during crowd dispersal’ were specifically referred to.26
Apparently the support operation was sufficiently successful for the Marines to
report on their initiative to the Dutch minister of defense, Relus ter Beek, when he
visited the troops two weeks later. Although Ter Beek had not been aware of the
commander’s intentions prior to the operation, the minister briefed parliament on
the support action as one of the examples of the many activities in which the Marines
were involved that justified them staying in Cambodia despite the failure of the pri-
mary military mission. Neither the minister nor parliament raised questions about
this law and order mission in support of the Cambodian authorities, a task that went
well beyond the UNTAC mandate. Although such measures did not become com-
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mon practice in the Dutch area of responsibility, they did not stand alone. In Phum
Nimit, Charlie Company faced related problems when CPAF soldiers forced local
inhabitants to leave their houses. Apparently the company commander ‘solved the
issue’ after receiving complaints from locals who could thereafter stay.27
Cooperation between Dutchbat and local authorities in order to increase the sense
of security among the local population was expanded on an ad hoc basis. From early
September on, Dutchbat frequently joined the local police on night patrols in Sisophon
in order to protect them from local bandits and ill-disciplined government troops.28
In early October, the Dutch operations officer Major Gonzales called for a meeting
with the governor of Banteay Meanchey to discuss and possibly formalize further
measures against banditry. The battalion’s intelligence officer, the newly appointed
civil-operations officer and two other officers joined him. UNTAC’s civil component
was represented only by the provincial deputy administrator, while CivPol sent no
representative at all. The new Cambodian provincial governor, Morgne Kosal, used
the occasion to announce his plan to create a new specialized ‘mixed police military
unit’ in order to tackle the high incidence of banditry in Banteay Meanchey. This local
initiative was part of a nationwide program developed by the Cambodian ministries
of defense and interior affairs.29 In Sisophon this unit would initially consist of 148
personnel, two-thirds of whom were provincial police and the rest provincial CPAF
troops. Eventually the unit was to be over three hundred strong, the large majority
of whom would be civilian police officers.30 The unit was to report directly to the
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Dutch Marines in crowd and riot control gear supported the local police in the provincial capital
Sisophon in an effort to remove squatters.
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newly created ‘mixed group B,’ chaired by the deputy governor, the former governor
Woong Kaan, with whom the Dutch had established reasonably good relations. 
The local SOC authorities were partially driven by the approaching elections, but
the Dutch commander estimated that the governor was genuinely concerned about
the steadily deteriorating law and order situation. He was therefore willing to have
his battalion contribute to the training of the task force.31 Gonzales made it very
clear, however, that Dutchbat wanted something in return for the support given to
the local police. He called on the military representatives to control their units that
contributed much to the extortion and violence and reminded them that the Dutch
military hospital was frequently treating the victims of this violence. 
After the conference between Dutchbat the SOC authorities in Banteay Meanchey
proved reasonably successful, it was decided to have a weekly meeting with the vice
governor, police and provincial CPAF. It would take another six months and insis-
tence from the Dutch before the local UN Civilian Police branch joined what became
known as the ‘anti-banditry committee.’32 Most of the measures taken by the Marines
in relation to public security continued to be directly coordinated and executed with
local authorities and hardly involved the UN civilian police monitors or UN civil
administration. The UN police, for instance, played no part during the action against
illegal settlers.33 The local CivPol commander had merely been informed of Dutch-
bat’s intentions the day prior to the action. At the time, the police force was still in
the process of deploying and the UN police had only just arrived in more distant
locations such as Phum Nimit. Amongst the villagers they created a frightened impres-
sion as they limited their patrols to set hours, while returning to their headquarters
in Sisophon during the night.34
Some cooperation between the Marines and CivPol did occur. Joint patrols with
the UN police were started and the Dutch coordinated their efforts towards the train-
ing of the new SOC-police task force with the Swedish CivPol commander for Ban-
teay Meanchey. The Dutch military police, the ‘Koninklijke Marechaussee,’ although
officially only deployed to police the Marines, also played a small role in support of
the training, which was divided into general street police duties and criminal inves-
tigations courses. Although it was only a two-week-long course, the training made a
rather professional impression on the Dutch Military Police. In one other incident,
the Dutch MPs also exceeded their mandate by ‘arresting’ eight suspected thieves in
Sisophon and transferring them to the local police.35 The joint training initiative in
Banteay Meanchey was one of the makeshift training programs that emerged after
the security sector gap within UNTAC’s state-building program became painfully
apparent. Some international police developed courses using training manuals they
themselves had brought.36 UNTAC had made no official effort to train a new police
force and training of the existing force was low on UNTAC police’s list of priorities.
As in other regions, CivPol scrounged resources from military contingents such as
the Dutch, who were willing to contribute to any task that might relieve them of
activities related to public order in the hope of contributing to sustainable solutions
for the law and order vacuum in northwestern Cambodia. 
The fact that the Marines had something substantial to offer in return for good
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behavior, often gave them more leverage over the local authorities than UNTAC civil-
ian officers. CivPol, civil administration and the human rights component, all of
whom had a role to play in public security matters, had little to offer but their advice,
which did not always go down very well with the autocratic rulers. What the Dutch
could provide most importantly was security. The local police force could hardly func-
tion, as they were often too terrified to patrol the streets, especially at night. SOC
police often became the victims of attacks by both bandits and Khmer Rouge troops.37
CivPol officers did not patrol at night and their presence during the day added lit-
tle value in the eyes of local police. The Marines, on the other hand, liked to work
at night as it was much cooler and the night-vision goggles they had brought gave
them an edge over their possible opponents.38 Apart from protection, the Marines
provided transport during patrols. Moreover, the Marines had an additional incen-
tive for the local government in the form of their civic action program. Gonzales was
very direct when communicating to the local authorities that ‘results’ in anti-bandit-
ry measures would play a crucial role in allocation of these funds. In 1993, the so-
called Dutch Development Funds were used to build a prison and a courthouse. The
second Dutch battalion enhanced their leverage over the governor of Banteay
Meanchey by providing his private house with electricity from one of their genera-
tors at battalion headquarters. Disconnecting the electric wire to the governor’s house
was a simple, yet effective way of showing the Dutch commander’s discontent.39
Stretching the Mandate
In the course of September and October, activities in support of the civilian author-
ities were steadily increased. Dukers tended to regard this development as inevitable: 
As the only constant and well-organised unit in this area, we are confronted with
and picking up tasks that would normally not belong to a Marine battalion. It
should be obvious, however, that in many areas any form of organization is lack-
ing and that we cannot accept more examples of anarchy and disorganization.40
The commander was aware of the dangers involved in extending his role into the
civilian sphere as well as the legal minefield upon which he was treading. While
UNTAC’s civilian branches had a formal role in public security, the military official-
ly had none. During their cooperation with local civilian authorities the battalion nev-
ertheless faced many of the same problems as the civilian component. By cooperat-
ing with the local police the Marines were substituting for civilian police monitors,
while there was no functioning justice system and no properly functioning criminal
law to guide operations. UNTAC had no mandate to re-establish the rule of law in
an anarchic country where local police and judiciary were under total political con-
trol. Throughout Cambodia there were no more than two to three judges per province,
appointed by the governors and clearly serving party interests. On the measures taken
and the limits to cooperation – set primarily by the limited local human rights stan-
dards – Dukers reported to The Hague: 
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Contacts with local and provincial governments are generally good with a free and
unconditional exchange of ideas aimed predominantly at ameliorating the general
security situation and human rights in the province. As far as the Cambodian leg-
islation does not provide appropriate directives or as far as local legislative and
administrative practise does not match UNTAC measures or directives, or the
norms and values prescribed by Dutch law, the battalion’s personnel only cooper-
ates with the local government if we can reach clear and acceptable agreement.
Until now, this has worked well. We have agreed on tough measures to jointly
combat banditry and reduce illegal taxation and tolls by CPAF military.41
The Marines could not rely on legal support when taking on these responsibilities.
While negotiating a combined policy and deciding what was acceptable behavior, the
commander had to rely on his own judgment. In order to address the lawlessness
that reigned in Cambodia, he had to improvise, which usually meant sticking his
neck out and hoping things would go right. 
Apart from cooperation with local authorities, Dutchbat tried to improve securi-
ty in their area of responsibility by disarming unruly elements. Just as there was no
provision in the mandate for detention and arrest, UNTAC battalions could official-
ly do nothing about civilians openly carrying weapons. Under the initial mandate
and Rules of Engagement, UNTAC had no authority to take weapons from individ-
uals other than through the cantonment process.42 ‘I created my own rules,’ Duk-
ers admitted. He regarded it ‘our duty to do something about the illegal roadblocks
where civilians were extorted.’43 The commander claimed to have paid very little
attention to UNTAC’s Rules of Engagement, which had arrived only after the deploy-
ment in Cambodia.44
While UNTAC was deliberating in October on how to address arms control in a
country ridden with small arms, Dukers instructed his troops to disarm all mem-
bers of ‘local militias’ or other individuals not in uniform and not in possession of
cards identifying them as on-duty faction members.45 In the preceding three months,
Dutchbat patrols had already confiscated several weapons from the unruly militias
on sight, but it now became formal Dutchbat policy that only official faction mili-
tary in uniform and SOC police were allowed to carry weapons. It was left up to the
patrol commander to decide how far he would go in enforcing the directive, depend-
ing on his estimation of the dangers involved. Dukers expected that the disarma-
ment measure would ‘certainly ameliorate the local security situation and facilitate
a return to normal, pre-war conditions.’46 However, he was realistic and accepted
that there was an almost unhampered flow of small arms and ammunition from
large numbers of hidden arms caches to the bandits. Disarming Cambodia was clear-
ly beyond the capabilities of UNTAC. The total amount of arms confiscated by the
Dutch is more likely to have been in the high hundreds than in the thousands. A
number of the weapons would be returned to those owners capable of demonstrat-
ing a weapons pass, which the Marines helped to introduce in cooperation with the
local authorities. Another requirement the Marines introduced before handing back
a weapon was that a faction member showed up in a correct uniform.47 The crux
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of the measure was that it gave Dutchbat a means of controlling and sanctioning,
and thereby establishing their authority. Patrick Cammaert, the second Dutch battal-
ion commander, recalled with a subtle grin: ‘It was very frustrating for them when
we took their weapon in the streets.’ There appear to have been no similar meas-
ures in other sectors at the time, although some troops may have disarmed on an
ad hoc basis.48 It would take more than six months before UNTAC caught up with
Dutchbat regarding the disarmament policy, as it had to wait for legislation on arms
possession to be passed through the slowly turning bureaucratic wheels of UN civil
administration and the malfunctioning Cambodian government departments. 
The Dutch battalion commanders in Cambodia had a degree of autonomy that
would make colleagues in later operations jealous. It was the first sizable deploy-
ments of Dutch troops overseas in some years and the Western military and politi-
cal leaders had not yet suffered the traumatizing setbacks in places such as Srebreni-
ca and Mogadishu. There was not yet a national contingent commander, who would
operate as the Dutch minister of defense’s watchdog in future operations. Moreover,
there was little experience and therefore hardly any frame of reference while execut-
ing an often unclear mandate. Dukers reported first to the Royal Netherlands Navy
Headquarters and subsequently to the Ministry of Defense operational center, both
located in The Hague. The general tendency amongst all three subsequent Marine
battalion commanders was to involve ‘The Hague’ as little as possible, as this ‘would
only lead to meddling by those incapable to properly estimate the local situation.’
They would not report on every single firefight in which the Marines became involved,
as they would only worry the authorities in The Hague and lead to increased inter-
ference.49
All three Dutch battalion commanders who served a tour of duty in Cambodia
felt their primary allegiance was to Sanderson and not to The Hague. Even though
Dukers had briefly clashed with Sanderson over the decision to halt the deployment
in May, he developed a good relationship with the force commander. Within UNTAC,
the lines of command were short for a division-size operation of some 16,000 troops.
The force commander directly commanded his battalions, instead of having a brigade
structure in between, as would be normal in combat operations. Sanderson delegat-
ed much responsibility and set the general outlines of the mission, the ‘comman-
der’s intent,’ in broad strokes. This was done in operational orders drafted by his
chief planner, Huijssoon, when the mission was structurally altered. However, until
December 1992, no changes in the overall mission were provided and UNTAC was
left to muddle through. Sanderson gave most of his instructions verbally, either dur-
ing the regular meetings of his battalion commanders at headquarters in Phnom
Penh, or by telephone.50 As one of the best-equipped units with its own logistical
lines, and positioned in a distant corner of Cambodia, UNTAC headquarters left the
battalion to fend for itself most of the time. Sanderson’s energy was increasingly
absorbed by political matters and by units in more urgent need of attention. All three
Dutch battalion commanders liked this freedom to determine how they went about
creating a ‘safe and secure environment.’ They admired Sanderson as a command-
er, but saw him grow older by the day as the mission progressed into 1993 and as
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he took on ever more responsibility for the mission as a whole.51
Sanderson and Cammaert connected particularly well. Every six weeks the sector
commanders would come to Phnom Penh. ‘I would usually come in half an hour
early on the general’s request to discuss the situation,’ Cammaert recalled. ‘He seemed
to enjoy that.’52 They would call frequently on the phone and Huijssoon even sus-
pected that Sanderson would call Cammaert to hear his perspective on problems that
may have occurred for other battalions.53 They were soldiers of a kind, combining
the qualities of a field commander with that of a diplomat – a blend of skills that
was in ever-greater need in military operations in the post-Cold War disorder. Sander-
son probably spent more time on politics and diplomacy than he did on command-
ing his troops. Cammaert would have a similar experience after he worked his way
up to the position of force commander of the UN mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
(UNMEE) in 2000. Two years later he became military advisor to Secretary Gener-
al Kofi Annan. After completing his mission in Cambodia, Sanderson would serve
as commander in chief of the Australian Army for a number of years, until he retired
from the army and became the governor of Western Australia. The qualities of the
diplomat-soldier, while a rare combination in the early 1990s, would become ever
more important as the role of the military steadily expanded into the civilian sphere.
Not only would this be the case for generals, but also for the military on the tacti-
cal level during the ever-more complex operations in areas ravaged by war. 
The Dutch battalion commanders were overall quite comfortable with the leeway
given to make many of their own decisions, but it placed them in a rather ‘lonely’
position, as Dukers warned his successor Cammaert. ‘You take all these decisions
all by yourself and you hope they work out well. You have neither backing from
Sanderson, nor from The Hague. The Netherlands will probably cover for you when
things go wrong, but what if you start taking casualties?’54 Cammaert operated under
his own rule, accepting that of the decisions a commander had to take – mostly
under the pressure of time and without sufficient information or intelligence – eighty-
five percent are good, ten percent are adequatte and the remaining five percent turn
out to be the wrong decisions.55 Dutchbat’s disarmament policy was launched with-
out asking permission from either Phnom Penh or The Hague. ‘Every day we report-
ed on our activities to Phnom Penh,’ Dukers said, referring to his disarmament
measures, ‘so they were well aware of what we were doing.’56 Headquarters never
told him to stop, so he gathered that Sanderson agreed. Cammaert continued the
policy and recalled that when he told Sanderson during a visit to the Dutch sector
about these disarmament measures, the general started to laugh. Yet he left it at
that.57 The Hague was never formally notified of the weapons policy, however, both
Naval Headquarters and the Ministry of Defense could have been aware if they read
the weekly situation reports closely. 
Sanderson never stopped the Dutch commanders from stretching their mandate
to include disarmament and mixed police patrols. He nevertheless tried to resist the
strong pressure of having his force become formally involved in what he called ‘inter-
nal security operations.’ Although it was not quite clear what his exact interpreta-
tion of internal security operations was at this point, the term rang bells of coun-
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terinsurgency operations, military operations such those by the British in Northern
Ireland, and even policing. In military circles it was also associated with colonial
days and tasks performed by military forces in autocratic regimes, and it was clear-
ly not what the force commander intended his troops to become involved in. Sander-
son later placed the argument against internal security operations in the context of
the debate about the virtues of ‘neutral peacekeeping’ versus enforcement.58
Sanderson dismissed an early draft proposal on mixed units against banditry in
August 1992. The proposal from the UNTAC civil administration component irritated
the general. Although it intended for military peacekeepers to contribute to these mixed
military and police formations, it had been prepared without input from his headquar-
ters. At the time he was still hoping for the Khmer Rouge to join the demobilization
process and considered such mixed units ‘not feasible until all military forces are can-
toned and disarmed.’ He argued that as the factions were de facto at war with each
other despite their stated commitment to the Paris Agreement, ‘what may be seen as
banditry by one faction can be considered by another as a legitimate [act of war by the
other].’59 Huijssoon, as one of his principle deputies, also argued that UNTAC had suc-
ceeded in keeping a neutral posture, amongst other things because it had resisted
becoming involved in public security.60 It was never clarified how a certain military
contribution to public order would impede the military force’s neutrality. This assump-
tion ran counter to Dukers’ argument that he was driven towards measures against
banditry and extortion – often against the CPAF but in cooperation with other SOC
authorities – in order to maintain his credibility with the Khmer Rouge.
Not only was the Western military generally not enthusiastic about contributing
to internal security and public security tasks, Sanderson also feared that this would
overstretch his force. His concern that his means would not match his ends if he
took on additional internal security tasks was very real. He had no more than ten
thousand troops in infantry units at his disposal. Compared to much larger military
operations in Somalia and the Balkans, his twelve infantry battalions were thin on
the ground. In March 1993 he would repeat that ‘[t]he mission is not defending Cam-
bodia. Therefore the UNTAC Military Components will not be drawn into internal
security operations. Nor is the mission to defend the political process. We are in
Cambodia to defend an electoral process.’61 It would be hard to say where ‘defend-
ing the electoral process’ stopped and where defending Cambodia or the Cambodi-
ans started. Nevertheless, the force commander’s decision to focus the efforts of his
military force first and foremost on the elections proved to be sound.
Changing the Guard
The first Dutch battalion handed over responsibility to the second Marine battalion
in a hectic period. The transfer took place in the middle of the voter registration
process, which – although well organized by the electoral component – leaned heav-
ily on military support. In November, Akashi and Sanderson had taken a bold step
by pushing ahead with the elections. In doing so, they adopted Prince Sihanouk’s
proposal to go ahead with elections, despite the Khmer Rouge’s refusal to cooper-
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ate. This meant that at least eighty-five percent of the Cambodian population could
vote. The electoral process started on 23 November and the elections were to take
place in May 1993 as planned. The UN would thus organize elections, if need be
amidst continued civil war, although it was seriously doubted at this point if the
Khmer Rouge was still capable of mounting a large scale offensive. 
Apart from containing the military violence, Sanderson now had to swing the full
force of the military component behind the elections and all the civil components
involved. In order to facilitate cooperation with the civilian components, the military
deployment drastically changed by adjusting the military sectors to the provincial
boundaries. Sanderson explained his move in an interview for UNTAC’s newsletter,
suggesting quite openly that the other aim was to seal off the Khmer Rouge as much
as possible in their enclaves:
Operationally, the redeployment involved a major clockwise rotation of troops.
Within Cambodia’s more unstable regions, for example, the Malaysian battalion
moved westward into Battambang province, enabling its Dutch counterpart to con-
solidate positions to the north, in Banteay Meanchey, a strategically located province
separating the two largest Khmer Rouge-controlled zones in the country. The
Bangladeshi battalion, meanwhile, expanded eastward into Siem Reap, freeing up
the Pakistani battalion to redeploy farther eastward, to accessible areas of Preah
Vihear province. UNTAC carried out smaller-scale redeployments throughout Cam-
bodia’s southeasters areas, close to and around the Khmer Rouge’s more dis-
persed ‘leopard spot’ operating areas.62
For the Dutch this meant a substantial increase of their area of operations. It now
also came to include the districts of Tma Pok and Phum Ampil in the ‘Free Liber-
ated Zone’ and all four factions were represented in their sector. Despite the alter-
ation of the sectors, the force commander decided to keep one Dutch platoon in the
distant KNLPF enclave of Sok San. From here they could more or less monitor the
conduct of the Khmer Rouge around the area. In Banteay Meanchey, the new Dutch
contingent took over areas from the Bangladeshi battalion, which was poorly equipped
and short of logistical means and transport. Although the Bangladeshis had conduct-
ed many civic actions in the area, they had been unable to assert any form of con-
trol in most of the province. According to Cammaert, ‘Bangabatt’ had hardly left their
compound, and in many of the more distant areas of the sector the locals had not
seen a single UN soldier. ‘Our aim was to get as many men and white vehicles out
there, so that everyone could see what we were doing and that we would take care
of security.’63
The decision to push ahead with the elections was daring since the security sit-
uation was still deteriorating nationwide. This was true for both public security and
military security, although the distinction between the two was often quite hard to
make in Cambodia. In November, the rainy season had come to an end, which led
to a marked increase in military infiltrations and artillery exchanges between the
Khmer Rouge and CPAF. Meanwhile, banditry was on the rise and political violence
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surged as the parties started to manifest themselves in the run-up to the elections.
The threats to UNTAC also sharply increased, as international personnel, both civil-
ian and military, suddenly became targets for kidnappings by the Khmer Rouge. UN
helicopters were being shot at more frequently from Khmer Rouge territory. Their
failure to halt the peace process obviously frustrated the Khmer Rouge, but they were
also reacting to economic pressure. The dry season always saw a surge in econom-
ic activity as loggers could once again use the jungle roads. However, on 30 Novem-
ber, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions in an effort to compel the
faction to join the peace process. The imposed moratorium on the lucrative trade in
logs and an oil boycott were to be monitored by the military component and UN
Civilian Police. Although UNTAC had no means of enforcing these measures, mon-
itoring economic activity in combination with diplomatic pressure on Thailand – the
only direct buyer of Khmer Rouge products – appeared to frustrate their transactions
to a certain degree. 
After the hectic registration period, unit rotation and the change of sectors, the
new Dutch battalion could finally settle down in January. In the course of Novem-
ber and December, at the time of the electoral registration the Marines had been dis-
persed over no less than thirty-nine locations throughout Banteay Meanchey. The
static guard duties and logistical support to the electoral component had made inten-
sive patrolling nearly impossible, which had resulted in an increase in banditry and
the number of illegal tolls. There was also some political violence, such as an attack
on a Funcinpec party office in Sisophon with a rocket-propelled grenade. Luckily, the
grenade failed to explode. The battalion held daily morning security briefings for
civilian organizations and the weekly coordination meeting with the UNTAC civil
administrator, electoral and CivPol representatives were continued.64
After the electoral registration was successfully concluded, patrolling was stepped
up with the emphasis on joint patrols and mobile checkpoints. Other than his pred-
ecessor Gonzales, who had created an extensive but rigid patrolling regime, the new
operations officer Major Jaap Bijsterbosch delegated much of the responsibility, leav-
ing the patrolling patterns to his company commanders. With the battalion still spread
over twenty different locations and operating down to individual rifle groups in an
even wider area, this decentralized approach appeared more practical. Rifle groups
of about nine men were positioned at fixed locations in villages, at border locations
and near arms caches of demobilized soldiers. The aim of the patrols was unchanged:
‘We wanted to put as much “blue on the streets” as possible’ – a term commonly
used in the Netherlands for increasing the amount of ‘beat cops.’65 Meanwhile, the
forty Haglund BV snow vehicles that had proven invaluable during the wet season
were temporarily replaced by additional Land Rovers shipped over from the Nether-
lands. With their wide tracks, the vehicles created an intolerable amount of dust that
would literally take half an hour to settle down. This was bound to strain relations
between Dutchbat and the local population. Moreover, the rocky roads were eating
away at their rubber tracks. 
Apart from enhancing public security, the intense patrolling regime was essen-
tial for intelligence gathering and for force protection. As the UN peacekeeping force
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was officially barred by UN rules from creating an intelligence-gathering organiza-
tion – which was considered improper and conflicting with the UN’s need to remain
neutral – little useful information on the factions’ intentions and actions was forth-
coming from UNTAC headquarters. When Cammaert asked for intelligence from
headquarters, he was usually given the reports he or his own intelligence officer had
written.66 The battalion thus had to rely on its own efforts coordinated by its staff
officer, Andrew Blackhurst, a US Marine Corps captain who was on a regular exchange
program with the Dutch Marine Corps. The lack of intelligence made the battalion
vulnerable. Paradoxically, positioning large numbers of small units in populated areas
was considered to enhance their security, although they would not set up camp in
the most violently disputed areas. Their presence provided the local population with
a reasonable degree of protection against attacks by the factions and banditry. This
substantially improved community relations, which in turn increased the flow of
information and thus security for the Marines.67 To further relations with the vil-
lagers, platoon commanders were encouraged by battalion headquarters to adopt com-
munity projects. 
Another informal method of gathering intelligence was through the use of the
battalion’s interpreters. The six former Cambodian refugees the Marines had brought
from the Netherlands proved insufficient, so local interpreters were also recruited.
The official interpreters would normally work in a Dutch military uniform, but when
out of uniform they were sent into the streets and market squares to blend in and
‘and keep their radars open.’ Cammaert recalled how ‘these people are able to cre-
ate a local network,’ which was much harder for the Marines.68 Blackhurst report-
ed that their reports were important in measuring the overall posture of the local
population towards UNTAC:
The translators have expressed that many Cambodians have trust and confidence
in Dutchbat. There is the general feeling with many locals that Dutchbat takes its
mission very seriously and is putting its heart into its work. The many aid proj-
ects that Dutchbat has completed, i.e. wells, schools etc., have helped foster these
feelings of trust with the Cambodian people. This is a point which should not be
considered trivial as it carries a great amount of weight with the people.69
The program of combined patrols with the SOC authorities started by the first bat-
talion was extended to the new zones under Dutch control. Mixed patrols were now
also extended into the Free Liberated Zone by creating special ‘four-faction units’
wearing special blue armbands. The reason for bringing in all of the factions on
these patrols was related to the peculiar character of the zone. Its conquest by a tri-
partite anti-government coalition in the 1980s had resulted in a complicated patch-
work of sectors. ‘It was ideal to have all those guys with you on patrols,’ Bijsterbosch
recalled, ‘as their presence in our Land Rovers allowed us to cross from one sector
into the other without problems and even made it possible to enter disputed terri-
tory.’70 Moreover, the Dutch preferred to have the local factions deal with the illegal
roadblocks and bandits they encountered. The battalion’s mediating role even result-
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ed in a joint CPAF-Khmer Rouge patrol along their border and a UN checkpoint
operated together with all four factions on the border of Khmer Rouge territory. The
Khmer Rouge displayed their enthusiasm for the concept in the Mixed Military Work-
ing Group in Phnom Penh, where they proposed four-faction units in order to solve
conflicts in Battambang and Kampong Thom.71 It proved hard to measure the suc-
cess of the patrols against banditry, but a televised BBC Newsnight item about UNTAC
called the Marine-initiated mixed patrols ‘a sign of hope’ for the future of Cambo-
dia and proof that reconciliation was possible despite the faltering peace process.72
The local SOC leaders were eager to step up joint patrols with the Dutch, espe-
cially at night. In Sisophon, night patrols were conducted by a rifle group of around
thirteen Marines, including (when possible) one equipped with night-vision goggles
and a translator to communicate with the local SOC police. There were signs that
their joint presence was paying off in the towns and villages, but bandits increas-
ingly targeted rural areas to compensate for their loss of income.73 Cooperation with
the local authorities nevertheless continued to be difficult. Whenever the local police
and provincial CPAF troops were not paid by the governor, they refused to join the
Dutch at checkpoints or on patrols. In Sisophon the Marines temporarily solved this
by providing the Cambodians with their own combat rations.74 They were also stim-
ulated to cooperate by the fact that without the presence of the Marines the regular
CPAF units tended to display little respect for the police and provincial army units.
Nationwide, banditry appeared to be increasing and, after a short-lived decline in
incidents in Banteay Meanchey, there was a sudden surge in serious crime. This rise
in armed robbery was linked to the return of large numbers of unpaid CPAF sol-
diers from recent fighting with the Khmer Rouge around Battambang, south of the
Dutch sector. Simultaneously a sudden influx of refugees in February 1993 con-
tributed to a worsening security situation. According to Captain Blackhurst, bandit-
ry continued to be ‘the area of most concern for Dutchbat.’75
While the second Dutch battalion was initially hopeful about coordination with
the UN Civilian Police, cooperation turned out to be as erratic as in Cambodia’s other
provinces.76 The relationship between the battalion and CivPol became more strained
as police monitors failed to show up for planned combined patrols in some districts.
In Sisophon some officers refused to assist the Dutch company in an investigation
into a shooting incident in which a local citizen had died, arguing that according to
the Dutch report it had been ‘too late on a Sunday evening.’ The provincial CivPol
commander Herbertson promised to take disciplinary measures against the police
monitors.77 Although aware of some notable exceptions, Bijsterbosch was unforgiv-
ing in his overall judgment of the UN police in Banteay Meanchey: ‘they were large-
ly inactive.’ Relations between the battalion and CivPol further deteriorated when a
Dutch reporter quoted Cammaert as saying that UNTAC would be better off if two-
thirds of its civilian police monitors were sent home. Although the commander
claimed to have been blatantly misquoted, it is unlikely to have deviated much from
his overall opinion at the time.78
In March 1993, the UN police in Banteay Meanchey finally joined the weekly
‘anti-banditry committee’ meetings. It had taken the Marines some serious effort to
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get the CivPol district commanders to join the conference between Dutchbat and the
local authorities.79 The provincial authorities received a plan for increased coopera-
tion between CivPol and SOC police on the district level with ‘mixed feelings’ and
the next week the vice-governor failed to attend the meeting for the first time since
October.80 However, he returned the week thereafter and, by mid-April, Bijsterbosch
was becoming more optimistic about the results coming out of the weekly meetings.
Since March there had finally been a significant decline in the number of robberies
and murders in the province, which the governor ascribed to the increased number
of patrols, especially those with the Marines. The atmosphere during the meetings
also improved. Bijsterbosch reported:
The meetings are held in an increasingly relaxed atmosphere and ‘doing business’
is becoming an increasingly smooth process. Topics that initially would have been
avoided out of courtesy are now openly addressed. Especially the way in which
topics are addressed has been substantially ‘westernized.’ The vice-governor prom-
ised to put offenders on trial, combat illegal tolls and the use of weapon-licenses
by SOC police and the CPAF. In return they asked for more combined night-patrols
in order to combat banditry.81
However, the ‘free expression of ideas’ earlier mentioned by Dukers also unleashed
the worst inclinations of the autocratic rulers of Cambodia. During the next meet-
ing, the vice-governor not only suggested even more intense patrolling, but also the
creation of a ‘special force’ in order to root out the remaining crime. The vice-gov-
ernor enthusiastically suggested that this unit ‘was to perform as few arrests as pos-
sible.’ Instead, he argued, its members were to shoot the criminals on sight.82 This
tendency amongst the local forces to shoot first and ask questions later had already
been a problem during joint patrols. ‘They would sometimes startle us by running
straight into the bush in pursuit of criminals, mines or no mines, and immediate-
ly open fire on fleeing bandits at a checkpoint.’83 Dutch pressure on the local admin-
istration to put more offenders on trial was related to such incidents, but the Marines
felt they had no choice but to continue cooperating with the local police as it was
the only effective method of countering the high level of crime.84
On 17 March 1993, after legislation was finally adopted by the SOC, Funcinpec
and KPNLF, Akashi issued a directive that made the possession of weapons illegal
without a firearms license from the police force of the relevant Cambodian author-
ity. Those found in possession of a firearm without a license could have their weapon
confiscated according to the new legislation.85 The next month, during a ‘weapons
amnesty,’ the Cambodians could voluntarily hand in their arms or apply for a weapons
license. In April the military and CivPol components, along with local police, began
to enforce the directive at fourteen random weapons confiscation checkpoints. Since
the Dutch had already applied similar rules since October, they did not implement
the amnesty.86 A dip in gun related crime was reported throughout Cambodia after
March, but there was no proof of a direct cause and effect relationship. The meas-
ure proved hard for UNTAC to enforce and it would seem unlikely to have achieved
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such results that quickly. Only fifteen weapons were confiscated per day.87 Moreover,
the Dutch weapons policy had been constant in Banteay Meanchey, where a similar
drop in crime was detected. 
The Marines extended their disarmament policy after February by introducing
‘Operation Entrapment.’ One company of Marines would close off all routes to
Sisophon and confiscate all illegal arms going in and out of the city. The aim was
to give the population and authorities in the city and its surrounding a clear signal
that ‘creating a secure environment could be optimally executed’ by Dutchbat. The
action raised confidence, ‘both amongst the local population and within the battal-
ion, about our ability to counter banditry and other irregularities.’88 As it was a seri-
ous drain on the unit’s manpower resources, the operation could only be executed
a few times in the run-up to the elections, but it gave the Marines a great sense of
accomplishment.89
Overall, there was a large disparity in the caliber of UNTAC troops. Partly, this
could be expected given the different training levels and the quality of equipment.
Some contingents, such as those arriving from Ghana, lacked the most basic equip-
ment and had to be equipped by the UN on arrival. The first Bulgarian battalion
even lacked basic military training and for the most part appeared to consist of ex-
convicts. Many units completely lacked basic language skills in one of the mission’s
two official languages, English and French. The interpretation of the Rules of Engage-
ment also differed substantially. Lieutenant Colonel Steve Ayling, the commander of
the Australian communications battalion that operated throughout Cambodia in sup-
port of all infantry battalions, noticed that the French and the Dutch battalions used
a more aggressive approach to the establishment of control in their sectors than most
other battalions.90 Both battalions were known to shoot back when fired upon. The
French, although effective in their area of responsibility, were criticized for running
their sector ‘like a French fiefdom rather than as part of a multinational operation.’91
In her book on the transition of peacekeeping in Cambodia, Janet Heininger, described
the general impressions of the various contingents: 
The well-equipped and well-armed specialized Dutch battalion stationed in north-
western Cambodia had a reputation for rapid and decisive action in defense of its
soldiers and civilians. The Malaysians, in western Cambodia, also had a tough rep-
utation. Many of their soldiers learned the Khmer language and attempted to devel-
op a working relationship with Khmer Rouge in the region. By contrast, the Indone-
sians and Uruguayans were more passive when threatened. In one incident, thir-
ty Indonesians were asked by the Khmer Rouge to give up their weapons and to
come to its provincial headquarters. They were then held prisoner for five days.92
Another interesting assessment of the overall caliber of UNTAC’s national contin-
gents was offered by General Thon Penh, the head of security for the royalist party
Funcinpec:
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[S]ome of the UNTAC contingents had no teeth. Some military units simply camped
out, did not protect Cambodians, and did not fire back even when the Khmer
Rouge fired upon them… Some troops however, were to be respected. The Dutch
and the Malaysians were to be feared. The Bulgarians he had no respect for. The
Uruguayans were simply after money and artefacts. The Khmer Rouge and all forces
knew which troops were weak and not to be respected, and which could be taken
advantage of. All the factions also knew which troops to avoid and not to anger.93
The Cambodian general was specifically referring to his positive experiences with the
first Dutch battalion. Army Colonel Huijssoon, who visited his compatriots in Ban-
teay Meanchey in January, reported to Sanderson with a hint of national pride that
in his opinion ‘this [second] batt[alion] is even better than the first one and you have
the best the Marine Corps can deliver during the most critical period in the peace
process.’ 94
The standing of the Marines resulted from many months of intense and exhaust-
ing operations that were taking their toll on the troops. ‘We literally reacted on every
single report of banditry by local civilians,’ Bijsterbosch said, ‘which was a serious
drain on manpower. The locals came to see us as the authorities, since there was
no central authority, only the factions in control of their part of the patchwork.’ Much
of their authority was based on their overall appearance. ‘A professional image, cor-
rect uniform, intense patrolling and always have someone looking backwards.’95 Much
of it may have been based on bluff, as there were no official measures to enforce
law and order other than the self-styled disarmament policy. 
One particular incident stood out that helped them earn them their ‘tough’ rep-
utation. On 11 March, a combined patrol consisting of Marines, SOC police, provin-
cial CPAF and CivPol were patrolling the streets of Sisophon when they encountered
a CPAF soldier in civilian dress carrying an AK-47. In line with Dutchbat policy the
patrol commander ordered him to hand in his weapon. According to a Dutch situ-
ation report ‘he refused, and released the safety catch on his weapons. From expe-
rience, our personnel know that a Cambodian always had a bullet in the chamber.’
He pointed his weapon toward the patrol and after he failed to react to a warning
shot the patrol commander signaled one of his soldiers to take him out. Using ‘min-
imum force,’ this meant not shooting to kill, which the corporal did with a well-
aimed shot in the upper leg.96 The man fell to the ground and was taken to a med-
ical post. The incident was widely broadcast throughout Cambodia, and even shown
on UNTAC’s new TV station. Bijsterbosch remembers elation at headquarters in
Phnom Penh about ‘UNTAC finally showing its teeth.’97
Sanderson considered his force lucky so far. Referring to the shooting incident,
he wrote to Akashi that he formally considered ‘this sort of activity’ beyond the man-
date. Nonetheless, he showed his support when he joined the Marines the next night
on a patrol in Thmar Pok. His overall fear was that such actions could lead to reprisals
on the vulnerable UN organization. After the Dutch shot the CPAF soldier, troops
from the same CPAF unit fired at a UNHCR convoy in the area. There were no
casualties but the convoy was held up for eight hours.98 Similar problems, involv-
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ing much higher levels of violence and with more dramatic consequences, also arose
in Bosnia. The Danes, the only contingent equipped with tanks, fired 72 shells on
Bosnian-Serb positions in retaliation for incoming artillery fire near Tuzla in 1994.
They were lauded for their assertiveness within a mission that was criticized for its
overall passive posture. As a retaliatory measure, however, the Dutch UN battalion
and population in Srebrenica were cut off from military and humanitarian supplies
for some time by the Bosnian-Serb troops besieging the enclave.99 Dilemmas about
the use of force in the rapidly changing concept of peace operations would haunt
soldiers in the years to come. 
The incident in Sisophon appeared to be relatively clear-cut as there had been an
imminent threat. Cammaert saw a direct connection between the action by his Marines
and the drop in crime thereafter.100 There were no protests from the CPAF, who
called the man a deserter, and local commanders even appeared to become some-
what more cooperative. However, the sharp but temporary decline in banditry and
extortion seems to have been the result of a complex set of factors, some local and
some nationwide. All developments in Cambodia in early 1993 were centered on the
upcoming elections. Overall, despite their strenuous efforts, the long-term impact of
the Marines on public safety in the northwestern corner of Cambodia should not be
overexaggerated. However, their posture considerably augmented the UN’s credibil-
ity in their sector. By doing so, Dutchbat enhanced UNTAC’s ability to perform the
combined civil-military operation in the period leading up to the crucial elections,
when violence struck throughout Cambodia.
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5‘Sanderson’s Coup’:
Militarized Elections amidst Escalating Violence
In November 1992, UNTAC had been in a serious quandary about whether to aban-
don the mission, postpone it and hope for conditions in Cambodia to improve, or
continue under the then-present reality. On 30 November, following the advice of
the secretary general, the UN Security Council formally authorized UNTAC’s mili-
tary component to remain in Cambodia in full strength and help complete the civil-
ian part of the mission.1 The combined civil-military operation now centered on the
organization of free and fair elections for more than four million Cambodians who
had never had the right to vote and had to be convinced that their vote would be
secret and would matter. However, security progressively broke down instead of
improving during UNTAC’s presence in Cambodia – obviously the envisaged pat-
tern for peace operations. Holding elections amidst continued military confronta-
tions and political violence, with overall public safety dramatically deteriorating as a
result of banditry, demanded an unprecedented degree of cooperation and coordina-
tion between soldiers and civilians. Although the military role in support of the civil-
ians in charge of the electoral process has been recognized in publications on UNTAC,
there has been little appreciation of the extent to which the military component slow-
ly but surely took over key civilian responsibilities amidst escalating violence in Cam-
bodia during 1993. 
Flexible Response 
Many commentators had written off UNTAC by the end of 1992. The mission was
criticized as being soft on the Khmer Rouge and for failing to control the State of
Cambodia’s government structures. With the two largest factions fully armed, and
neither party’s administrative structures in check, there was indeed little reason for
optimism if the original plan was to be achieved.2 The precondition for elections,
the ‘neutral political environment’ was all but absent. The Khmer Rouge was eager
to disrupt the elections, which it boycotted, and the State of Cambodia relied on the
use of force to obstruct and intimidate its political adversaries. CivPol was nowhere
near establishing control over the state police and, due to lack of administrative con-
trol of the government, state resources continued to flow freely to the Cambodia Peo-
ple’s Party (CPP), which represented the State of Cambodia in the elections. 
In order to save the mission, UNTAC had to rely on its ability to improvise and
move forward, bypassing the obstacles raised by the factions. For this, UNTAC head-
quarters appeared to be better equipped. While there were many flaws in UNTAC’s
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mandate, means and command structure, a high degree of operational authority had
been delegated to Akashi and Sanderson. This proved one of the few advantages of
the virtual absence of a properly functioning strategic headquarters in New York. The
UN’s attention, as well as that of the world media, continued to be consumed by
events in Somalia and Bosnia. This allowed the operational commanders to react
flexibly within the parameters set by the Security Council and take key initiatives
aimed at accomplishing the primary remaining goal of the mission – free and fair
elections. 
Pushing ahead with the elections amidst continued violence was a gamble. It
broke with all the rules recently developed for complex peacekeeping, or what also
became known as ‘second generation peace operations.’ Conventional wisdom held
that peacekeepers first established military security, followed by the neutralization of
political strife. Only then could elections be held and other more delicate state-build-
ing measures be implemented. Nevertheless, four factors gave the exercise some
promise. First, elections were a clearly defined goal, which provided the entire UNTAC
operation with a focal point. The peace process terminated when the Constituent
Assembly, elected in conformity with the Paris Peace Agreements, approved the new
Cambodian Constitution and transformed itself into a legislative assembly, and a new
Cambodian government was created. It was a political ‘end-state’ that missions in
Bosnia and Somalia lacked.
Second, the Khmer Rouge was not well positioned to disrupt the electoral process
on a large scale as it controlled only five percent of the population. Its troops and
party cadre were mostly located in remote jungle areas and were not well positioned
to pose a threat to Phnom Penh or most other urban centers. Ninety percent of the
country continued to be accessible to UNTAC since the ruling State of Cambodia,
while notoriously corrupt and repressive, was supportive of the elections as it assumed
it could win at the polls and legitimize its rule. Third, the Cambodian people, although
disillusioned with many elements of UNTAC, continued to be eager to express their
political will. The Khmer Rouge seemed to have lost touch with popular sentiments
and seriously underestimated this force. Moreover, although they displayed repeated
claims of prescience in their few available internal communications, the party cadre
had in fact a poor record at anticipating the moves of their ‘new enemy’. Just as the
Khmer Rouge had miscalculated that UNTAC would not start the demobilization
process without their participation, Pol Pot and his fellow leaders seem to have been
caught off guard when it decided to hold elections with or without them. This was
likely the result of what one UNTAC analyst called ‘center of the world politics,’ the
Khmer Rouge’s tendency to see itself at the heart of all developments.3
The wisdom of the path chosen by the United Nations was first tested during the
electoral registration process that was to take three months, beginning in early Octo-
ber. Other than most of the civilian branches, the electoral component came well
prepared and proved to be UNTAC’s fourth strong point. It had started early 1992
to plan and prepare for the plebiscite, building on the experiences from the Zim-
babwean and Namibian elections. In his analysis of the UN mission in Cambodia,
Trevor Findlay called the electoral component ‘one case where the UN learned from
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previous experience, something that cannot be said for other aspects of the Cambo-
dian operation.’4 During the registration process, over 450 United Nations volun-
teers acted as district electoral supervisors (DESs) and were put in charge of approx-
imately four thousand local Cambodian electoral personnel. They worked in teams
of five, covering the most distant corners of the country. 
By late October, the military force was already protecting and supporting voter
registration, even though it was not yet officially within their mission. In mid-Novem-
ber, Sanderson directed his troops to prepare for redeployment from the zones
designed to accommodate cantonment, to their provincial sectors. This facilitated
their new mission, laid down in Sanderson’s second operational order, issued on 
9 December, to ‘create a secure environment conducive to the preparations for and
later the conduct of an election in Cambodia.’5 For this purpose he was allowed to
keep his twelve infantry battalions and support troops in Cambodia instead of reduc-
ing his force by half as had originally been planned. From 23 November, Dutchbat
supported 39 election registration teams throughout Banteay Meanchey province,
their new sector. Nationwide, the military component supported 834 teams and by
January, twenty political parties had officially registered. The Khmer Rouge’s new
party, the National Unitary Party of Cambodia (NUCP), was not among them. 
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ted the UN civilian effort to organize elections in many ways.
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As the number of eligible voters turned out to be much larger than expected the
registration period was extended to 31 January. The registration of over 4.7 million
Cambodians, then 95 percent of the estimated eligible voters, exceeded all expecta-
tions. In Banteay Meanchey alone, 225,630 voter registration cards were distributed
instead of the intended 178,500. Under Dutchbat protection the registration teams
were even allowed to do their work in some Khmer Rouge villages. It gave UNTAC
the success it needed after the initial setbacks and was the immediate proof that it
had done the right thing. Most of all, it showed the people’s commitment to and
belief in the elections, although the attraction of the laminated voter registration
cards, complete with color photograph and fingerprint certainly contributed to the
success of the registration. It was the most modern object ever in their possession,
a ‘portent of future national modernity, a harbinger of political change and a tangi-
ble sign of the UN’s presence.’6
Despite its limited means, UNTAC’s Information and Education Division played
a key role in stirring the public conscience in Cambodia. Radio UNTAC was finally
operational in late 1992 and became a sensation and household name in Cambo-
dia.7 In its civic education program, it taught ‘the virtues of free speech and demo-
cratic behavior’ and its programs played a pivotal role in convincing the electorate
that ‘your vote is secret.’ The ‘Equal Access, Equal Time’ radio program was launched
in early March and allowed five minutes of airtime to each party. As a result of the
Hun Sen regime’s objection, it took much effort to guarantee free and fair access to
other media.8 A Japanese donation of close to 349,000 radios and 830,000 batter-
ies helped to make the UN radio station accessible to the vast majority of the peo-
ple that had never had access to such luxuries.9
Another weapon in UNTAC’s arsenal was its small human rights component. A
staff of thirty-six led by Dennis McNamara, a New Zealander from the UNHCR,
fought an uphill battle against the entrenched autocrats of the State of Cambodia.
They successfully initiated judicial reviews of numerous cases in which prisoners
were held without adequate evidence or charges, resulting in the release of 370
detainees. The human rights workers worked extremely hard and were most suc-
cessful in stimulating new concepts of participatory democracy among the Cambo-
dian population through the distribution of literature, the preparation of lectures and
by fostering the growth of indigenous human rights organizations. Their effort con-
tributed much to ‘the ferment and enthusiasm’ in Cambodia in 1992, which in some
ways reminded William Shawcross of the Prague Spring of 1968. ‘Here, too, people
were finally being offered political freedom. But here, as in Prague, there was the
threat that spring could be plunged into winter.’10
‘Military Coup’
Since the civil war never entirely ended, despite the signing of the Paris Peace Agree-
ment, Akashi was required to act more as a negotiator between the rival factions
than as an international administrator. The continued non-compliance of the two
larger parties consumed the Japanese diplomat, who avoided any form of confronta-
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tion with the faction leaders and the unpredictable Prince Sihanouk. What his sup-
porters saw as carefully considered tactics and awareness of Asian cultural sensitiv-
ities – such as the avoidance of loss of face and confrontation – his critics saw as
chronic indecisiveness.11 These distractions further hampered the smooth function-
ing of an extremely complex ad hoc organization that, apart from poor planning, suf-
fered badly from a lack of leadership. Akashi failed to direct and integrate his sub-
ordinate staff to work toward a common goal. In short, he may have been an able
diplomat, but he was a poor manager. Ideally, a special representative was both.
Meanwhile, the military role in the electoral process was slowly moving beyond
the mere security and logistical support role stipulated in the new military mandate.
In early December, the second operational order on the primacy of military support
to the electoral process was launched in a meeting between Akashi and his compo-
nent chiefs at UNTAC headquarters. Here, Sanderson made his move to increase
his control in the field of planning. As the chief of military plans, Huijssoon had
long been eager to formalize some form of authority over the civilian branches. While
providing military support to the electoral registration process, it had become appar-
ent that the military could not effectively perform its new job without information
and prior arrangements with the civilian others. He prepared a presentation in which
he proposed the elevation of his military planning staff to become the planning staff
of the entire UN operation. To have his English corrected, he showed the text to his
Australian deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Russel Stuart, one of the driving forces with-
in the Plans Branch who had been handpicked by Sanderson in 1991. After a quick
glance, Stuart told the Dutch colonel that he could not possibly present such a sweep-
ing proposal himself. He needed to have the force commander to launch it. The gen-
eral, who had become irritated with the ad hoc civilian planning, was more than
happy to do so. He would later complain to Akashi that ‘peacekeeping operations
cannot be run as ‘on the job’ training exercises for inexperienced and unsuitable per-
sonnel who are simply looking for an adventure or a change of work environment.’12
Sanderson did not inform Akashi of his intentions prior to the presentation.
The meeting was held within the Wat Phnom complex, the former working palace
of the French governor during the colonial era that now served as UNTAC headquar-
ters. For the occasion Stuart had refurbished the Plans Office in the hall of the majes-
tic building into what resembled a frontline military command post. ‘I don’t know
where he got it from,’ Huijssoon recalled, ‘but there were sandbags, camouflage nets
and a huge map of Cambodia on the wall.’ Here, in front of Akashi and the assem-
bled component directors, Sanderson presented the plan that he later described as
an integrated approach to the electoral process, which established a planning and
control alliance between the electoral and the military components and information
and education branch. ‘Centred around Military Plans in Phnom Penh, and Sector
Headquarters in the field, this also drew in the Civil Police Component with the
other components being added in the wake of their operations.’13 Huijssoon would
later call it ‘Sanderson’s coup,’ although he knew that, in practice, the arrangement
only partially functioned. The other components were not eager to have the military
take over. It was not mandated to do this and ‘members of the other components
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often resented the military’s ‘take-charge’ attitude.’14 Akashi and the civilian compo-
nent directors did go along, however, and accepted a certain level of coordination
and cooperation, which would make the military component the de facto integrator
and driving force behind UNTAC as a whole.15
After the astounding success of the electoral registration, Porcell, the French direc-
tor of civil administrations, admitted to his military colleagues that the civilian com-
ponent had become thoroughly dependent on the military for more than security
and logistics:
From one viewpoint, this participation of military personnel in the realization of
civilian objectives is, for us civilians, a veritable godsend: free of the constraints
of the task which they were originally assigned, the Military Component can uti-
lize its technical competence – which is large – its important materiél and per-
sonnel capabilities as well as its remarkable faculty for organization resulting from
its own techniques of military command, which altogether act to enhance the con-
trol activities normally carried out by the Civil Administration Component. We can-
not but wish that the aid of the Military Component, however unexpected, will
allow our civilian activities to be more effectively carried out.16
According to the original plan, based on the assumption that the operation would
develop along sequential military and civilian phases, Sanderson would only have a
leading role under the Akashi’s overall direction until the cantonment process was
completed. Thereafter the special representative’s civilian deputy, Behrooz Sadry,
would assume a leading position for the civilian implementation of the peace plan.
This in fact never happened. Sanderson would take on an ever more central coordi-
nating role within UNTAC as a whole, to the point where he rivaled Akashi’s influ-
ence on the overall mission. Sanderson, who had considerable international experi-
ence and was ‘always a gentleman,’ seemed to combine management skills with the
qualities of a diplomat. Both were desperately needed to successfully integrate the
military and civilian operations. ‘Akashi may have had other qualities’, Huijssoon
recalled, ‘but he was no match for Sanderson.’ The general never played hardball,
but according to the colonel, ‘those who kept their eyes open could see the stand-
off between the two. In the end, Sanderson had far more influence, also on the civil-
ian component directors.’17
The further breakdown of the overall security situation after January was a catalyst
for the leading role of the military within UNTAC. Much of the violence resulted
from ‘the law of unintended consequences,’ which tended to rule in the wake of for-
eign interventions. Already, the upsurge in banditry and extortion during UNTAC’s
presence were the result of the ill-prepared and limited demobilization and the influx
of large numbers of refugees from Thailand. In addition, the high rate of inflation
caused by the injection of hundreds of millions of UN dollars into the fragile Cam-
bodian economy exacerbated the problem as the real wages of local security forces
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dwindled. The emergence of several opposition parties and indigenous human rights
organizations, another end product of the peace process, further contributed to the
lawlessness by triggering an unanticipated wave of politically motivated violence. 
In December, the Royalist Funcinpec and the KPNLF’s Buddhist Democratic Lib-
eral Party (BDLP) started opening party offices in areas controlled by the govern-
ment, which reacted in a primitive and violent manner by unleashing a wave of polit-
ical intimidation. Although the registration process proceeded smoothly, almost every
day Cambodians lost their lives because of their commitments to opposing political
beliefs. The principal target of the attacks by government officials and armed forces
was the royalist party chaired by Prince Norodom Ranariddh, the son of Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, whose party was rapidly gaining in the polls. In late December,
after an upsurge in attacks on Funcinpec officials and party buildings throughout
Cambodia, Sihanouk strongly denounced UNTAC for its failure to control the vio-
lence, while blaming the State of Cambodia for instigating the violence. The prince
threatened that unless both of them acted vigorously ‘against the poisoning of the
political atmosphere […] social injustice and political terrorism,’ he would stop coop-
erating with both the State of Cambodia and UNTAC.18
Sihanouk’s threat caused alarm bells to go off within UNTAC. His son’s party
was the UN’s best hope for a pluralist political system, while he himself held a piv-
otal position as the head of state and symbol of national unity for the majority of
the Khmers. Yasushi Akashi took a bold step in January that stretched the bound-
aries of the peacekeeping mandate beyond anything previously attempted by the UN.
Mark Plunkett, an Australian human rights officer, was appointed as UN special
prosecutor assigned to fight ‘political terror’ by initiating arrests. In cases of gross
human rights abuses, UNTAC military forces and civilian police were granted the
power of arrest. In addition, they were to protect opposition party offices. Sanderson
had refused to assume responsibility for the protection of individual party candidates,
as this would clearly overwhelm his limited forces.19
At first glance, UNTAC’s powers to address the breakdown in law and order in
Cambodia were impressive. Formally, UNTAC could issue binding directives to pub-
lic security agencies and had unrestricted access to all administrative operations and
information to supervise and control civil police forces in order to ensure that human
rights and fundamental freedoms were fully protected. Throughout Cambodia it could
supervise the judicial and prison systems processes. UNTAC was now also allowed
to arrest, detain and prosecute offenders. 
The problem was that arrest and prosecution were only two elements of the com-
plete justice package that involved police, prosecutors, judges, a prison system and
public administration. While UNTAC assumed direct policing and prosecuting
responsibilities, it had to rely on the thoroughly dysfunctional judiciary system of
the State of Cambodia. The country lacked properly trained judges, prosecutors and
defenders. It proved impossible to find an independent judge as Cambodia’s magis-
trates reported directly to the executive, in the form of the minister of justice. Given
the terrible recent history of retribution in the country, the unwillingness of Cam-
bodian judges to risk their lives in moving away from political direction was under-
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standable.20 The executive powers in the field of law and order put many addition-
al demands on UNTAC as the fundaments of a ‘justice triangle’ of police, judiciary
and prisons were lacking. It had to set up and run its own jail for those detained in
order to grant them the basic conditions it had demanded for the Cambodians. After
CivPol refused to guard this first-ever United Nations detention facility, military con-
tingents had to guard the prisoners. Suspects were sometimes held captive for over
three months without being brought before a judge, which obviously was in itself a
significant human rights violation and led to allegations of abuse being brought
against the United Nations.21 UNTAC did not press its prosecutorial powers very far,
fearing adverse reactions from SOC authorities, who frustrated the efforts to appre-
hend its officials accused of human rights violations. 
For political-strategic purposes, Akashi had taken an exceptional measure that
proved to be beyond anything with which the UN system was ready to cope. He del-
egated the powers of arrest and detention to the malfunctioning civilian police force,
whose unarmed officers were often already frightened to perform their monitoring
duties, and to the thinly stretched military component with no training in law and
order measures. Although he had little appetite to become further embroiled in pub-
lic security tasks, Sanderson was aware of the political importance of the measure
and went along with it. However, it drew very close to granting his force the enforce-
ment mandate for which he rightfully argued his troops were neither equipped, nor
ready to take the consequences. Civil administration officials working with SOC offi-
cials on a daily basis shared the military’s lack of enthusiasm for the idea. 
Dennis McNamara was convinced that the prosecutor’s office could have had a
major deterrent effect on political violence if it had been used more extensively. But
apart from the internal Cambodian obstruction, he witnessed continued resistance
‘of a number of senior UNTAC officials to this innovation.’22 A last and crucial obsta-
cle was the disagreement on prosecution by the UN within the ‘core group’ of coun-
tries involved in the Paris Peace Agreement. While the British, Americans, Canadi-
ans and Australians supported the idea, France and Japan were against it.23 With so
little cooperation, UNTAC foundered when SOC-appointed judges refused to hear
matters brought before them by the special prosecutor.24 The UN balked at appoint-
ing an independent tribunal. Sanderson admitted the unprecedented directive ‘degen-
erated into a farce.’ According to the special prosecutor, Mark Plunkett, it was ‘too
little too late.’25 In all, UNTAC successfully arrested no more than four persons.
Prosecution was initiated for three of them, but none was ever brought to trial.26
There appears to have been little awareness of this revolutionary expansion of the
peacekeeping mandate. For instance, no questions were raised in Dutch parliament
on how these measures would affect their Marines, even though the Dutch press
reported briefly on the new powers of the peacekeepers.27 There is no trace of the
measure in Dutchbat’s reporting or orders. Ten years after completing his mission,
Dutchbat commander Cammaert was not even aware of the powers of arrest once
vested in him, although he once admitted he would have preferred having such pow-
ers to deal with banditry more effectively.28 Overall, there was little the Marines could
do about the politically motivated attacks, in which several Funcinpec party mem-
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bers died in Banteay Meanchey. Cammaert had his men increase their patrols in the
vicinity of party offices, but they were too few to provide around the clock static
guard duties. Overall, there was little his men could do about a person on a motor-
cycle throwing a hand grenade or someone firing a rocket-propelled grenade towards
a party office.29
Security in Cambodia further broke down after January 1993 when government
forces launched an offensive on the Khmer Rouge in an effort to restore the situa-
tion as it existed in October 1991. This caused the insurgents to retaliate.30 Although
Akashi called them ‘ritual dry-season offensives,’ it was the largest series of cease-
fire violations registered by the UN. Akashi suggested placing UN troops in a buffer
zone between the factions – a classic peacekeeping task originally not envisioned for
Cambodia – but Sanderson dismissed this role as impossible to fulfill in Cambo-
dia.31 There was hardly a fixed frontline to control and Khmer Rouge checkpoints
usually popped up out of nowhere. There was little UNTAC could do but attempt to
negotiate local cease-fires, while villagers and the rural population continued to be
victims of indiscriminate shelling by the CPAF and Khmer Rouge forces in scattered
fighting in provinces such as Kompong Thom, Siem Reap, Preah Vihear, and Ban-
teay Meanchey. The faction also continued to lay unmarked minefields, which added
to an already enormous problem. To protect themselves from bandits and faction
forces, villagers in Banteay Meanchey also increased the use of readily available land-
mines as a form of ‘village security.’32
Although the State of Cambodia was blatantly violating the peace agreements, the
Khmer Rouge still posed the biggest threat to the overall peace process. After all, the
government wanted elections while the insurgents wanted to prevent them from tak-
ing place. It was the viciousness of the Khmer Rouge assault on the ethnic Viet-
namese minority and eventually also on UNTAC that made it the obviously culpa-
ble party for its possible failure of the peace process. Xenophobic and eager to exploit
the lingering hatred of Khmers against the Vietnamese, they had frequently kid-
napped and killed Vietnamese. In March, ethnic violence in Cambodia exploded,
causing Cambodia to compete for the international headlines. On 10 March, a mas-
sacre of Vietnamese by Khmer Rouge troops took place at the floating village in
Chong Kneas just south of the provincial town of Siem Reap, leaving 35 dead and
29 injured. Another attack two weeks later killed eight in Kampong Cham province.
In Kampong Thom, Indobat was accused of failing to come to the defense of near-
by villagers during an attack by ten Khmer Rouge soldiers on a video parlor in which
29 people were killed.33 As a result, Vietnamese boat families fled to Vietnam by the
thousands in March, letting themselves float down the Mekong River. UNTAC’s naval
component conducted ‘Operation Safe Passage’ and witnessed over twenty thousand
ethnic Vietnamese crossing into Vietnam. Dennis McNamara admitted that the ‘spi-
ral of violence’ overwhelmed his human rights workers and CivPol officers who sup-
ported him in examining the human rights investigations. UNTAC attributed the
vast majority of over one hundred ethnically motivated killings to the Khmer Rouge.
It attributed 46 of the politically motivated assassinations to the State of Cambodia
and another 37 to the Khmer Rouge. Another 76 murders investigated by the UN
remained unattributed.34
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There were strong indications that Funcinpec had a large share of support amongst
the Cambodians, but the government in Phnom Penh continued to believe that polit-
ical intimidation could win them the elections. The Khmer Rouge apparently feared
the elections would work to their disadvantage since its leaders where sure the SOC
would rig the elections. The prime reason for them to boycott the elections seems
to have been their fear that UNTAC would not deliver on its promise to provide the
conditions for free and fair elections and that they would legitimize the rule of the
‘contemptible Vietnamese puppet regime.’ When UNTAC pushed on despite their
refusal to join the plebiscite, the Khmer Rouge set out to further undermine its capa-
bility to deliver the elections, accepting that they thereby made themselves the pri-
marily culpable party. 
The Khmer Rouge progressively stepped up the pressure on the UN. Military and
civilian personnel had sporadically been kidnapped and shot at in the previous
months, but from March onward, dozens of UNTAC staff became the target of kid-
napping. Later that month, a Bangladeshi was the first soldier to die from enemy
fire during a three-hour attack on his unit in Siem Reap province. In early April, the
situation further deteriorated when the Khmer Rouge murdered three Bulgarian
troops, wounding several others in Kampong Speu.35 Another attack on a Bulgabat
position that month killed yet another soldier. In the meantime, factional fighting
continued, including a large-scale attack by several hundred Khmer Rouge troops on
the city of Siem Reap.
Sanderson estimated that the aim of the Khmer Rouge attacks and intimidation
was to disrupt UNTAC’s cooperation with the population. He saw the attacks on
UNTAC as a violent reaction to the ‘shift in the balance of power to the Cambodi-
an people’ that he witnessed in January 1993. After the successful registration process
it became ever more likely that the Cambodians would be able to express their will
in the plebiscite. In order to keep the operation on track Sanderson had spoken of
the need to forge an alliance with the people, which Michael Doyle called his ‘grand
strategy.’36 This would allow UNTAC to bypass the obstructionist elements among
and within the factions. Successful interaction with the people thereby became the
crux, ‘the center of gravity,’ of the overall UN operation. However, it proved hard to
maintain UNTAC’s credibility.
Between March and the elections in May, the Khmer Rouge seemed to succeed
in causing a rift by instilling fear into both the Cambodians and UNTAC civilian
staff, which still had the primary responsibility for the bulk of the preparations and
execution of the elections. The 450 district electoral supervisors (DESs) were charged
with recruiting and coordinating the work of 48,000 Cambodian elections workers.
One thousand international polling station officers would augment them during the
actual elections. As violence struck in the countryside, the provincial electoral offi-
cer (PEO) for Kampong Thom province wrote at length to Austin about the fears
amongst his personnel. They soon expected to be targeted by the Khmer Rouge,
undisciplined CPAF soldiers, or groups of bandits. He gave a devastating account of
the Indonesian battalion’s inability to provide adequate security and also criticized
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its officers for their apparent unwillingness to coordinate their efforts.37 Two days
later, the Khmer Rouge killed one of his electoral supervisors, a twenty-five-year-old
Japanese UN volunteer, and his Cambodian interpreter. After the murder in Kam-
pong Thom, dozens of UN electoral staff suspended their operations and several
resigned. 
There was also a visible decline in UNTAC’s status among the Cambodian peo-
ple, which was widely reported in the media.38 For the average Cambodian, the over-
all security situation had deteriorated rather than improved over the previous months
as the result of intimidation, harassment and political pressure. Although the UN
electoral supervisors, who were out amongst the Cambodians in the provinces, believed
that the bulk of the people still supported the overall peace process and continued to
be eager to cast their votes, they could sense the deep disappointment of the people,
‘now verging on despair.’ Austin warned Akashi that respect for the blue caps and
white vehicles had gone. According to the electoral component leader there was a seri-
ous morale problem among the electoral supervisors who, ‘like the Cambodians, are
being led on into a charade of an election’ and were ‘in danger of becoming cyni-
cal.’39 While the official electoral campaign was to get underway after 7 April, the elec-
tions on which the peace plan as a whole hinged looked like an impending disaster. 
Protecting the Elections 
Even prior to the killing of the Japanese volunteer, since Sanderson had committed
his ‘coup,’ the military were strengthening their coordination role towards the civil-
ian components. Between 1 April and 7 June, military personnel and UN Civilian
Police were assigned to assist the electoral component ‘in every way possible’ by
increased patrolling, providing transport, escort and communications. To that end,
military sector commanders were put in charge of the coordination of all security-
related UNTAC operations, thereby wresting the last bit of coordinating authority
from the civil administration component as security concerns penetrated every ele-
ment of the operation. Sanderson explained the role he envisaged the sector com-
manders to perform:
Sector Commanders have the responsibility for understanding their patch. Putting
their people out everywhere, operating with the Cambodian people … are all parts
of this. They must know which places are dangerous to go, which are not. Part of
that understanding involves cooperating with the Electoral Component to work out
the best way to see this electoral process through, right down to the district level.40
Apart from gaining the final say on the locations and number of polling sites, the
local military commanders were also given the final authority to decide whether a
political rally could safely take place during the electoral campaign.41 Taking on such
public security duties continued to make Sanderson nervous. He was concerned that
‘supervision and control’ of local police operations during such electoral gatherings
would make UNTAC responsible for their outcome. The general wondered who – if
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things did get out of hand – would make ‘the decision to open fire or launch the
baton charge?’42 Nevertheless, he directed his operations staff to take charge of coor-
dination with UN Civilian Police and civil administration over these efforts. During
the political campaign that lasted until 20 May, over fifteen hundred campaign ral-
lies were held in which the political parties were able to reach over 800,000 Cam-
bodians. The campaign was quite a remarkable feat in a totalitarian state and con-
firmed the enthusiasm of the people. Most importantly, no violent incidents took
place during the rallies. 
After panic struck over election security following the murder of the Japanese
official and his interpreter in Kampong Thom, the military component had to step
up security measures. Briefly, there had been talk within UNTAC headquarters about
bringing in UN military reinforcements, but these would take too long to become
operationally effective and be too costly – if available at all. As an alternative to the
expansion of UNTAC peacekeeping force, the military Planning Branch came up
with a scheme that would simultaneously clarify the distribution of responsibility
between UNTAC and the three complying factions. Huijssoon advised Akashi that
it was possible to ‘hire’ 145,000 local faction forces if, for reasons of legitimacy, the
factions would put their troops at the disposal of the Supreme National Council.43
This was, after all, still the legitimate authority during the transitional period dur-
ing which UNTAC could cooperate without losing its neutrality. Since the Khmer
Rouge walked out of Phnom Penh and left the Supreme National Council and the
Mixed Military Working Group on 12 April, it was suddenly much easier to do busi-
ness with the remaining three factions who all wanted the elections to succeed. The
two smaller factions, who had their power base in the Dutch areas of control, gained
in importance both as a counterweight to the SOC and by legitimizing the continu-
ation of the peace process without the Khmer Rouge participating. 
UNTAC formalized its security arrangements with the local military in late April
and early May.44 The complete plan for securing the elections was drawn up by the
Mixed Military Working Group Secretariat, which formed part of the Plans Branch
and appeared to have gained some policymaking powers as the military component
became the driving force behind the electoral process. It was still the force comman-
der’s key instrument for doing business with the military factions and was run by
another one of Sanderson’s Australian trustees, Lieutenant Colonel Damien Healey.
Along with Lieutenant Colonel Stuart, he had built up a great deal of experience in
Cambodia by working there long before UNTAC’s actual deployment. The plan, which
Huijssoon called the ‘Frog-Spawn Plan,’ gave UNTAC the sole responsibility for secu-
rity at the polling stations. In the two-hundred-meter zone around the polling sites,
no local factions were allowed and nobody but the UN military could carry a weapon.
The military and CivPol provided security within the perimeter around the site, and
it was hoped that this would keep them out of range of most direct fire of weapons
such as the popular rocket-propelled grenades – ideal for hit-and-run tactics. In the
rest of the country, in between the polling zones, SOC police, CPAF and the other
two military factions were left in charge of ‘internal security.’45 As had become com-
mon to Sanderson’s decentralized style of command, the sector commanders were
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left to work out the details of the Elections Security Plan with the local UNTAC
branches and local authorities. 
The CPAF was still thoroughly unreliable, which made the plan questionable.
Electoral staff workers were skeptical, with some calling it a farce to have the local
CPAF forces protecting polling sites when those same forces had recently instigat-
ed an attack on Funcinpec.46 However, including the unruly CPAF troops in the
process was deemed an effective way of channeling their energies in a positive way.
It gave the military units a clear mission and was hoped to have the crucial side
effect of curbing banditry in the run-up to the elections. Although politically moti-
vated attacks made the headlines, banditry and extortion were still considered a seri-
ous threat to both civilian UNTAC teams traveling the country and to the Cambodi-
an population.47 Since the peacekeepers would have their hands full providing close
protection to several thousand polling sites during the elections, formal cooperation
with the CPAF seemed a chance worth taking. 
The intrusion of the Plans Branch into electoral matters went as far as changing
the existing schedule of the polling period. The original plan was to conduct two
days of elections at two hundred mobile polling stations in the distant corners of the
country. UNTAC would then proceed with the three-day main electoral operation in
the more densely populated areas. From the military’s perspective this would have
made the electoral process particularly vulnerable to small-scale attacks that could
impede the whole polling process. News about a single armed attack on a mobile
polling site was likely to travel fast in Cambodia, which might cause the majority of
the electorate to remain at home. Instead, the military proposed to Austin that he
go all-out in the first three days. Huijssoon and his Australian deputies reasoned
that if UNTAC could reach over sixty percent of the electorate as soon as possible,
the elections would be valid even if some attacks took place during the first day. ‘If
I mow my lawn, I first do the large patches and then trim the corners,’ the colonel
reasoned. ‘We all agreed on this within our branch, so I went to Austin’s office.
Austin asked for two days to contemplate, and in the meantime he would ask Sander-
son – who had been fully briefed on the plan – for his opinion.’48 There continued
to be some grumbling within the electoral component about the domineering mili-
tary, but the usual way of solving this was to have the ever more influential force
commander take up the matter with Austin before it was sent to Akashi. The out-
come was predictable. In the course of April, the military component ‘pervaded almost
every aspect of UNTAC’s mandate.’49
By early May, attacks on UNTAC were taking place at an almost daily rate, killing
and wounding ever more international personnel. However, the Khmer Rouge also
started to reveal their limitations and weakness. Their offers to pay villagers for rock-
et or grenade attacks on UNTAC apparently failed to persuade the Cambodians. In
Banteay Meanchey, local civilians reported such incidents to the peacekeepers.
Although the Khmer Rouge continuously fed rumors of impending attacks on the
northwestern cities of Sisophon, Siem Reap and Battambang, an ill-fated assault on
Siem Reap by several hundred Khmer Rouge fighters showed their inability to con-
duct large-scale military offensives.
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The increased determination of the peacekeepers also paid off at this point in the
operation. Some of the battalions that had been previously criticized showed their
worth during several confrontations with the Khmer Rouge. The Bangladeshi battal-
ion beat off an attack in April.50 The Pakistanis had been given the difficult task of
containing the Khmer Rouge around Anlong Veng in the distant and thinly popu-
lated northern zone. When one of their platoon’s position at Choam Khsan in Preah
Vihear came under three consecutive attacks on the night of 8 April, they defended
their positions vigorously. During the third wave, the Khmer Rouge troops drove buf-
faloes ahead of them for cover. The official body count by UNTAC reported two con-
firmed deaths among the attackers. However, within military headquarters the story
went that the local Buddhist clergyman, who – despite the Khmer Rouge’s official
secularity – was asked to perform the burial service, claimed to have counted no less
then fourteen bodies of Khmer Rouge fighters.51 According to the Pakistani sector
commander, their defensive actions earned the gratitude of the villages in their vicin-
ity.52 His troops seemed to function better at what the military called ‘the higher end
of spectrum of violence.’ The Dutch had noticed earlier that the Pakistanis had not
been particularly good in community relations. When they took over part of their
sector in December, ‘we were initially scowled at, which was something we had never
experienced in our own sector.’53
Even the Indonesians, who had been notorious for their passive posture and coop-
erative stance toward the Khmer Rouge, struck back when they came under Khmer
Rouge fire one week prior to the elections. They even pursued the fleeing guerrillas
and occupied their small encampment, wounding two, according to local villagers.
Trying to convey a more positive message to the Ministry of Defense in The Hague
than the gloomy picture painted in the world media, Huijssoon reported that the
series of daily incidents had come to an end. It showed that the Khmer Rouge could
be deterred if UNTAC showed resolve in defending its positions. In late April, Sander-
son reportedly had ‘kicked’ some of his commanders, including the Pakistanis and
the Indonesians, in an unspecified place. Apparently, this paid off.54 Despite some
setbacks, the military peacekeepers seemed to be regaining their own confidence as
well as that of others in the course of May. 
Dutchbat needed no push as they appeared to have found the right balance between
robust operations and the need for restraint. Cammaert and his company command-
ers also needed to rely on their diplomatic skills. Their task in Banteay Meanchey
was comparatively complex, as they had to mediate between and cooperate with all
four factions in the local Mixed Military Working Groups. In all other sectors the
UNTAC commanders were dealing with just the CPAF or with two factions. Diplo-
macy combined with his Marines’ firm stance toward the factions had resulted in
the joint patrols which, in combination with their mobility, their equipment and their
relatively small sector, enabled them to establish a strong presence and penetrate
most of their province. 
The first Dutch battalion had been left to improvise while performing its initial
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mission to ‘stabilize the security situation.’55 The two principle tasks assigned to this
battalion were the remainder of the demobilization effort and the less publicized
mission to cordon and contain the Khmer Rouge in their western zone through pres-
ence patrols. Although Sanderson continuously warned against becoming embroiled
in ‘internal security operations,’ Dukers’ Marines had also become heavily involved
in public security duties – although still mostly in a supporting role. The largest part
of the battalion’s energy went into providing direct security for the local population
– originally not a military task. They did so by patrolling for bandits, dismantling
illegal toll-points, disarming unruly troops, militia and civilians and by supporting
local authorities in their policing role and CivPol in its monitoring function. These
task were largely performed on the Marines’ own initiative and had been executed
as a reflexive response to the chaos they encountered rather than as part of a coher-
ent plan. It was obvious, however, that the battalion could not provide blanket pub-
lic safety in this small part of the dysfunctional Cambodian society and it remained
unclear where this improvised mission would stop. 
The focus which the first battalion had lacked after their original military mandate
proved largely illusory, was provided to the second Dutch battalion. It took over all
the above-mentioned missions in December, but with the registration process and the
elections as a focal point for the UNTAC military component, the Marines were again
provided with a center of gravity for their operations. Now focused on the elections
in May, they started to describe their tour in Cambodia as their own Tour de France,
the world’s longest and most famous bicycle race. The first stretch of their course had
been the registration process and now they were facing the last two étappes. First they
had to get through the campaigning period, after which they faced the actual elec-
tions – the climbing the Alpe d’Huez, the longest and steepest of all climbs.56 Although
their sector was still relatively calm and relations with the Khmer Rouge in the Free
Liberated Zone seemed reasonably good, the Marines remained vigilant as ‘crashes of
the cyclists’ were not unlikely to occur during the remainder of their race. Cammaert
nevertheless noticed that the local Khmer Rouge military leaders in his sector appeared
somewhat embarrassed at having to break off their contact with the Dutch and their
joint patrols just prior to the eruption of violence in March.57 Contacts with the small
local Funcinpec and KNLFP units remained good overall.
As indicated in the previous chapter, levels of regular crime and extortion appeared
to be going down in April. Captain Blackhurst, the US Marine Corps officer in charge
of intelligence gathering for the battalion, expected bandit activity to remain low until
the elections.58 This was partly due to the increasingly smooth cooperation with local
SOC and other two faction authorities. The captain saw a clear relation to the upcom-
ing elections, in which all parties wanted to be seen as ‘tough on crime’ – a politi-
cal occurrence not uncommon in seasoned democracies in the Western world. This
and the involvement by the Mixed Military Working Group in Phnom Penh caused
local military leaders to tighten their grip over their forces, although recent payment
of CPAF troops in Banteay Meanchey clearly facilitated the fight against crime.
Despite its relatively small population of 360,000, Banteay Meanchey was con-
sidered a crucial sector for the operation as a whole. Reginald Austin was amongst
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those emphasizing that the elections in the province were ‘extremely important,’ most
of all because the presence of the two non-SOC districts, Thma Pok and Banteay
Ampil in the Liberated Zone, gave much greater validity to the UN-organized event.59
Because the Khmer Rouge feared that elections manipulated by the Phnom Penh
regime would legitimize its rule, they hoped that a serious disruption of the elec-
toral process would raise doubts over its validity. To counter any argument by the
Khmer Rouge that the whole electoral process was a sham organized by the State of
Cambodia with UN cooperation, UNTAC needed unanimous agreement to the con-
trary by the three factions participating in the election, which made a representative
election result for the two smaller factions in their own territory crucial. Elections
in the Free Liberated Zone would take place under the very noses of the Khmer
Rouge who, although sharing control of the area with Funcinpec and the KPNLF,
were clearly still the strongest party in the zone. Apart from making the two elec-
toral districts politically important, this obviously made the electoral process in Ban-
teay Meanchey particularly vulnerable to attacks. In the last weeks prior to the elec-
tions all three military factions attacked Khmer Rouge positions to push them back
to the positions held at the time of the Paris Peace Agreement. For this purpose,
Funcinpec’s armed forces even demanded from UNTAC the permission to retrieve
some of its arms, most of all mortar and artillery munitions. The UN secretariat was
strongly against the idea, while Sanderson and Akashi reportedly supported it. Dutch-
bat decided to look the other way while some of the depots were visited by the fac-
tion’s troops.60
Sector One became Sanderson’s showcase for the UNTAC military component.
He would very often direct international visitors and press to Banteay Meanchey,
where all four parties were represented and where the people had mostly positive
things to say about UNTAC troops. Visitors included the Australian minister of for-
eign affairs, Gareth Evans, Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping Marrick Gould-
ing, ambassadors and many other high-ranking officials. When Sanderson himself
visited the battalion – directly after the Marines shot the off-duty CPAF soldier in
the streets of Sisophon – he joined them on a night patrol in Thma Pok. The gen-
eral and the other officers from headquarters that followed in his wake were impressed
with the combined patrols and checkpoints ran with the SOC police and the CPAF,
still the only such cooperation in Cambodia.61 They also lauded the unique four fac-
tion patrols in the Liberated Zone – although reduced to three factions in April. Such
visits cost time and energy, but the Marines were thoroughly aware of their impor-
tance for UNTAC’s as well as the Marine Corps’ public relations.
Another reason for Sanderson to put Banteay Meanchey in the spotlight was the
relatively smooth civil-military coordination in the sector. The daily security briefin-
gs for UNTAC personnel and other civilian organizations held by its operations offi-
cer at eight in the morning became ever more crowded, to the point where he was
addressing eighty people. In the course of April, no civilian organizations but the
Red Cross entered the Free Liberated Zone unescorted by Dutchbat. During the cri-
sis of confidence in UNTAC during March and April, when criticism from civilian
officers in different sectors poured in at headquarters, there were no complaints com-
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ing from Sisophon. Interdependency certainly helped forge the civil-military relation-
ship, although the Marines – like many others within the military component – at
times forgot how dependent they were on the effort and success of the ‘civilian other.’
There may have been some irritation in civilian circles about the pedantry of the
Dutch, but they did not combine it with the overbearing quality that often annoyed
humanitarian and other civilian workers confronted with, for instance, the US mil-
itary. Moreover, there was always their willingness to provide escorts and their abun-
dance of logistical means to compensate for their know-it-all attitude. A doctor from
Médecins Sans Frontières, a humanitarian organization known for its policy on non-
cooperation with the military, called the Marines ‘arrogant and sober.’ This he assured,
was meant as a compliment. He was impressed with their willingness to cooperate
and they were remarkably efficient in helping him build a small hospital.62 Smooth
civil-military cooperation was of course facilitated by their overall command of the
English language down to the lowest ranks, which was lacked even by the officers
of many of the other contingents. 
The ‘kick’ Sanderson gave some battalions also improved overall cooperation
between the various branches in some of the sectors. In order to command a sec-
tor, some contributing nations had appointed a full colonel to command a battalion
instead of a lieutenant colonel, who they regarded as of insufficient weight to run
the battalion while simultaneously coordinating the efforts of the electoral, CivPol
and information components. Cammaert performed these tasks himself. Just prior
to the elections, so-called UNTAC joint coordination centers were created on the sec-
tor level to manage the elections, adding to the number of coordinating meetings in
which the commander and his subordinate officers found themselves during the first
months of 1993. 
Cammaert did most of his business in the three provincial Mixed Military Work-
ing Groups in order to minimize the effects of the continued low-level military strug-
gle. Apart from this ‘purely military’ coordinating mechanism, all the other coordi-
nating mechanisms were civil-military in nature. Here, the battalion was usually rep-
resented by one of its staff officers. There was also the weekly anti-banditry commit-
tee with the local governor, SOC police and the provincial CPAF. The weekly civil
administration meeting with the various UNTAC components had initially been of
some use, but no serious decisions would be made there in the course of 1993 as
the civil administrator lost his coordinating influence – if he ever really had any. In
March a more important meeting with the UN district electoral supervisors was added
to the list. In the various districts, the Dutch company commanders had already
established close relations with the DESs, who would be in charge of the hundreds
of local electoral staff and who were living in the villages among the Cambodian peo-
ple. In the weeks before and during the election, they as well as a group of 27 Dutch
international polling station officers were stationed at the various Dutchbat military
locations for security reasons.
In February, the Dutch had joined the weekly ‘political party round table discus-
sion meeting’ with local politicians, organized by the UN electoral staff. Here the
military representative and his CivPol colleague were frequently asked about the secu-
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rity measures for Cambodian party officials. During one of these meetings in May,
the Cambodian party representatives said they were more afraid of robberies by local
bandits than of politically motivated attacks on the polling stations. Elsewhere in
Cambodia, international electoral staff also mentioned banditry as equally or, at times,
even more threatening than Khmer Rouge terror.63 Politicians of various parties also
brought up the desperate need for support of the judicial system after the elections.
During the operation in Cambodia it indeed became clear that the UN had made a
crucial mistake by not supporting the establishment of basic procedures for the rule
of law. In February, Cammaert visited the local prison in Sisophon. Although the
shackling of prisoners had been abandoned under pressure of the human rights
component, 42 persons were still cramped into a small room and the commander
knew there was little chance that they would ever see trial.64 Meanwhile, Dutchbat
would be faced with the moral dilemma created by its support to the local police
work that probably helped bring some of those prisoners there. The battalion had
helped to install a water pump to help improve the situation in the prison, but san-
itary conditions remained extremely poor. In the northern part of their sector, where
Funcinpec and KPNLF were known to rely primarily on summary justice, the Marines
helped establish the facilities of the ‘justice triangle’ of a police station, courthouse
and a prison.65 The first two were built, but the cell blocks were never erected after
disagreement emerged over the ground on which they were to be built. 
Initially, cooperation between Dutchbat and the electoral component on the provin-
cial level in Sisophon was far from smooth. Cammaert called the Egyptian provin-
cial electoral officer in charge of elections in Banteay Meanchey ‘a disaster.’ After he
left on a three-week holiday only four weeks prior to the elections, the Dutch com-
mander called Reginald Austin to demand his replacement. The electoral officer’s
inertia was partly compensated for by his young British assistant who worked extreme-
ly long hours. He and the Dutch operations officer Bijsterbosch met on a daily basis
to coordinate their efforts and prepare the polling stations. Although the actual elec-
toral planning and the crucial training and coordination of the local staff continued
to be a civilian matter, it was Dutchbat that ultimately decided on the number and
location of the polling stations. Due to security concerns the number of polling sites
was reduced sharply from over 144 planned in March to a mere 57 in May, which
allowed protection by over a full rifle group at each site on average.66 To the bene-
fit of all involved, the Indian elections officer that was brought in to replace the
Egyptian was an experienced professional. Cammaert called him ‘a very arrogant and
authoritarian man,’ but he and the Marines praised him for getting the local organ-
ization up and running. Although he had just arrived in Sisophon and Cambodia,
he instilled confidence in both his civilian staff and the military working with him
and he was confident that the elections would go ahead as planned, which was doubt-
ed in many quarters at this time.67
For a long time, sector one was relatively quiet despite its explosive potential,
especially compared to volatile provinces such as Siem Reap and Kampong Thom.
In the preceding months, there had been incidents related to banditry and some
shots were fired in anger at the Marines’ positions, often by intoxicated CPAF troops.
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The Khmer Rouge sometimes probed the Dutch, but there had been no attacks by
them directly aimed at Dutchbat or the civilian component elements it protected.
Nevertheless, the KPLNF enclave of Sok San near Pailin, which continued to be
manned by a small Dutch unit, was at times cut off from supplies by the Khmer
Rouge and at times the massive UN-chartered Soviet-built supply helicopters were
used for target practice. By early April there was tension everywhere in Cambodia,
but not until later that month did the Marines feel hostility directly aimed against
them when Khmer Rouge troops at a checkpoint refused to let a marine patrol pass
on account of ‘not being able to guarantee their safety.’68 There had been a recent
influx of two hundred fresh, well-equipped and well-paid Khmer Rouge soldiers in
the Thma Pok district. The appearance of three of their tanks in the northern part
of the Liberated Zone, which had gone unnoticed by the Marines, indicated that they
still had access to the area from Thailand. Thereafter the overall tension in and
around the Liberated Zone rose sharply. The increase in hostilities was related to the
efforts by the three compliant factions to contain and possibly push back the Khmer
Rouge for electoral purposes. 
The first serious ‘crash’ for Dutchbat occurred when the Khmer Rouge ambushed
a combined patrol of Marines and Japanese CivPol officers. One Japanese police offi-
cer was killed and four Marines injured when their convoy was attacked with rock-
et propelled grenades and small arms. The Marines had fired back, but were hard-
ly able to identify the enemy in the bush. Patrols were stopped in the area and all
UNTAC movement now took place under Dutchbat escort. In this same period, some
ten UN vehicles were stolen from unarmed UNTAC workers at gunpoint. Although
several district electoral supervisors stopped working in the area, the majority stayed
to finish the job. 
Cammaert knew that the news also struck hard in Phnom Penh, ‘where they had
put their cards on the French and Dutch.’ Even these battalions now seemed vulner-
able.69 Just before the ambush, Sanderson had raised the threat level for Cambodia
as a whole to ‘alpha,’ which meant precautionary. After the assault he raised the
security level for Banteay Ampil and Thma Pok from ‘alpha’ to ‘bravo.’ On 12 May,
Cammaert joined the first patrol in Banteay Ampil since the ambush. It was at this
point that it was most difficult for the Marines to show restraint. Cammaert admit-
ted that his fingers itched when he saw a truck full of cheerful Khmer Rouge fight-
er pass by him close to the location of the ambush. ‘You have the weapons,’ he
thought, but with their blue berets there was nothing to do but stick to the peace-
keeping mandate. After the attack, the Khmer Rouge refrained from targeting Dutch-
bat directly, but another incident occurred two weeks later when a small Dutch patrol
north of Sisophon ran into a unit of fifty troops. A standoff between the Marines
and the insurgents ensued in which they were threatened and forced to hand in their
radio equipment, but they refused to give up their weapons and vehicles. Apparent-
ly the Dutch had caught the Khmer Rouge in preparation for a military action that
they did not want to be reported.70 On 7 May, Pol Pot’s forces once again showed
their contempt and ruthlessness when they attacked a train near Battambang, killing
thirteen civilians.
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In Banteay Meanchey, the Khmer Rouge had tried to undermine the confidence
of locals and civilian international staff in Dutchbat. They failed, but nevertheless
the districts of Banteay Ampil and Thma Pok remained the only ones with ‘securi-
ty stage bravo’ in Cambodia. The elections conducted in Khmer Rouge territory were
considered a likely target for their nationwide effort to prevent elections from suc-
ceeding. During a visit by Sanderson and Austin it became clear that the electoral
process in Banteay Meanchey and Siem Reap were considered the most probable tar-
gets for attacks. Right up to the elections there were doubts about the feasibility of
elections in the two volatile districts. Battambang and Kampong Thom were the other
two provinces likely to be targeted. The Khmer Rouge remained extremely unpre-
dictable and it was hard to assess if its command and control structures were still
functioning properly throughout the country. Within the military component there
were increasing doubts about the strength and cohesion of the Khmer Rouge. How-
ever, the political rupture that was predicted at various stages in the peace process
would never occur. After reading one of many such claims in an intelligence report
one of Sanderson’s close advisors scribbled in the margin for his boss to see: ‘One
dollar for every time I have heard this.’71
The force commander became crucial in steeling UNTAC’s nerves during the
stormy weeks prior to the elections. There had been talk amongst UNTAC civilians
of canceling the elections, and Akashi openly said that the killing of one more elec-
toral worker would lead to the withdrawal of all UN volunteers, raising questions
about the feasibility of the elections. Sanderson was probably not particularly charmed
that the special representative was giving away UNTAC’s breaking point to the Khmer
Rouge.72 He visited all the sectors in mid-May and what he witnessed among the
troops in the country was far more reassuring than during the gloomy senior board
meetings with the other component directors in Phnom Penh. The security plans
and the cooperation between the various components impressed him as good and
all were determined to hold elections in the largest possible area.73 Huijssoon was
also surprised by what he witnessed as he inspected the provinces prior to the elec-
tions. He was particularly curious about the performance of CPAF troops in their
new security role in concert with UNTAC. It taught him never to underestimate what
a military force – even one for which he had had very little respect in the preced-
ing year – could do once it was given a clear mission. Uniformed government troops
showed up in incredibly large numbers and, despite some initial critique about the
plan to involve them, the troops seemed to perform well. He was equally impressed
with the performance of some of the much-criticized UNTAC battalions.74
In a country with little or no infrastructure, the logistical support operation for
the elections by the military component was massive. In order to facilitate the elec-
tions, the military component provided logistical support to 1400 polling stations
run by 6,500 electoral teams and was responsible for moving 2,500 generators, tens
of thousands of tables and chairs, thousands of polling kits, camping kits and almost
two million bottles of drinking water.75 In addition, the military component protect-
ed and provided essential communications and engineers, reconstructed some large
bridges and hundreds of small bridges to give the population of remote areas access
to polling sites. 
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To report on the last irregularities in the electoral preparations, Sanderson sent
out some of his special investigations teams to the provinces. After having spent
three days inspecting the various districts of Banteay Meanchey, the inspectors shared
Cammaert’s optimism. The team had just visited the Malaysian battalion in Battam-
bang, where there were surprisingly few security concerns and where civil-military
cooperation was proceeding in ‘extreme harmony.’ Also, sector one was ‘very well
prepared for the elections’ and Dutchbat was ‘prepared even for a worst case sce-
nario with the well laid out field defenses and obstacle systems which they have pre-
pared in all their deployment areas.’ The inspectors found it ‘indeed a refreshing
change to listen to the optimistic and pragmatic view’ of the provincial electoral 
officer. The electoral supervisors in the district were ‘quite optimistic and in good
cheer.’76 Despite some small incidents, the situation in Banteay Meanchey was
described as ‘relatively calm.’ The Marines – who, apart from being bicycle enthusi-
asts, liked to talk in naval metaphors – had prepared their ship for ‘heavy weather.’
In Banteay Meanchey the Khmer Rouge had given clear signals that they still intend-
ed to disrupt the elections.77 Yet, ‘the mood amongst the cyclists was excellent while
preparing for the climbing of the Alpe d’Huez. Everyone is determined to make it to
the finish line.’ 
Despite continued artillery exchanges between the factions in Banteay Meanchey and
the other front-line provinces, the expected explosion of violence did not occur in
the two weeks prior to the elections. In Phnom Penh and various provinces, the elec-
toral staff’s morale continued to be shaken all the same by constant reporting on
Khmer Rouge troops movements and preparations for attacks. After some electoral
staff threatened to withdraw from the countryside, Cammaert promised Sanderson
that he would take over the elections if necessary: 
The lieutenants, sergeants and corporals would have run the polling stations – it
could not be that difficult. We had not been working those six months for noth-
ing. We had come to hold elections, so we were going to hold elections.78
Sanderson was reassured by such optimism, although it was unlikely that the mili-
tary could have pulled it off alone all over Cambodia. UN military observers did
indeed step in as electoral staff in the two besieged districts in the Liberated Zone
and in Kampong Thom. In a relatively small province where the amount of sites
had been cut to less than half, it may have been an option, but managing 1400 sites
and substituting for 48,000 strong local election workers would have been quite a
challenge for the military. 
The necessity and possibility of a complete military takeover of the elections, at
least in some provinces, seems to have crossed the general’s mind. Only once, a
week before the elections, did Huijssoon see his boss abandon his role as the always
calm and diplomatic leader. Or rather, the general admitted to almost having lost his
temper during a senior board meeting. After being overwhelmed by the negativity
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among the component directors, he came to the colonel’s desk to blow off steam
and admitted to having been on the verge of saying to the assembled staff ‘why don’t
you all go back to Bangkok and we will run the elections!’79 On 21 May, only two
days prior to the first polling day, Akashi added fuel to the fire when it had become
crucial to convince everyone of UNTAC’s ability to hold elections. Despite Sander-
son’s attempts to head this off, the special representative gave a speech, based on a
spurious analysis from someone in the general’s own military information cell, ‘there-
by terrorizing the UN and all the non-military parts of the mission, and giving the
media a field day in predicting disaster.’80
Peace at the Ballot 
The contrast on the first day of the elections could not have been greater. Right up
to the elections, the international and local media had generated fear, but a team of
Khmer-speaking information officers sent into the country to move among the pop-
ulation was amazed by what they witnessed at the polling stations. The turnout for
voting on the first day was well beyond expectations. In Kampong Cham, the coun-
try’s most populous province, the voters were in high spirits. 
People want to vote [...] People walked long distances in the rain on the first day.
People coming out of polling station are happy, even jubilant. People are laugh-
ing and joking outside of the sites. Crowds packed into the back of large trucks
are singing and dancing.81
Even in one of the frontline districts in Battambang there were no disruptions and
the atmosphere at the sites was friendly, even festive. There appeared to be no fear
of imminent Khmer Rouge attacks amongst the population. The polling site was
heavily defended by local security forces, who kept the required two-hundred-meter
distance from the polling sites. Local electoral staff played a crucial role. Especially
in areas where the electoral civic education program had been disrupted during the
violence prior to the elections, some people did not know how to vote and marked
their booths instead of their ballots or dropped their ballots into the booths instead
of into the designated boxes. 
There were some indications that SOC authorities tried to appear as the co-hosts
or organizers of the event. In one place the CCP had put up flags at the main
entrance to the polling site. The information officer who saw them also found fake
opinion polls posted around the sites, forecasting a sweeping CCP victory and removed
these as well as the flags. Local government officials would organize villagers into
groups and escort them to the polls. In response, Radio UNTAC stressed that the
people should not wait for orders from commune chiefs to go to vote and not let
their vote depend on who transported them to the polling sites. The radio station
did a great job covering the elections throughout the country, contributing much to
the excitement among the Cambodians who keenly listened to its popular reporters,
eager to know that the elections were proceeding just as peacefully elsewhere in the
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country. The most important message of all in a repressive communist society, ‘your
ballot is secret,’ appeared to have taken hold. The first day at the polls was almost
completely quiet and 42 percent of the electorate cast their ballot.82
During day two, some incidents of shelling and small arms fire did occur. Some
small-scale Khmer Rouge attacks took place simultaneously at several locations in
Kampong Cham. ‘There was a great possibility for panic and mayhem,’ reported a
civilian information officer, but it did not happen. The response from the various
UNTAC elements involved, the Indian and Indonesian battalions, the military
observers, electoral and CivPol, ‘were reasoned and coordinated.’ The CPAF respond-
ed quickly and chased off the attackers. The Cambodians generally considered UNTAC
overly cautious and spurred the foreigners on to reopen the polling sites.83 In the
first two days of the six-day-voting period, an incredible seventy percent of electorate
had voted. 
Although the elections were carried out like a military operation throughout Cam-
bodia, the elections in Banteay Meanchey were more militarized than anywhere else.
This was particularly true for the Free Liberated Zone.84 The heavy reduction of the
number of sites by Dutchbat enabled the Marines to turn them into defendable posi-
tions.85 Moreover, the battalion had developed a plan to deceive the Khmer Rouge. 
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In close consultation with the electoral staff we relocated a number of the polling
sites to new locations thus preventing the Khmer Rouge from preparations aimed
at creating havoc. Meanwhile, we had arranged for massive transport to get the
voters from the old to the new locations. The voter turnout was extremely high.86 
There was one incident in the Dutch sector at a polling site near Poipet on the sec-
ond day. As elsewhere, the few incoming grenades one hour before closing time in
the late afternoon appeared to alarm the international staff more than eager voters.
The Cambodians stayed in line in front of the polling site while the Marines and
the electoral officers took cover. It was not the first time the Dutch noticed that you
only had to duck when the local Khmers braced themselves for impact. Over twen-
ty years of war had made them specialists in the art of estimating point of impact
of incoming projectiles by their sound. Dutchbat was very pleased with the cooper-
ation from the local security forces. Even the CPAF turned out to be supportive.87
The local Mixed Military Working Groups with the three factions again proved their
worth as the primary tool for the Sector Commander to coordinate with and control
the local factions. 
Again, the Khmer Rouge displayed the most puzzling behavior. To everyone’s sur-
prise, some two hundred of their unarmed troops showed up at the polls in Poipet
on the second polling day in Banteay Meanchey.88 An unknown number of civilians
from Khmer Rouge villages cast their ballots in Thma Pok and villagers from Khmer
Rouge territory continued to show up on the fourth and fifth day. They even asked
UNTAC for transport to the polling sites. In western Cambodia, Khmer Rouge cadre
were apparently telling their villagers to vote for Funcinpec now that the elections
appeared to be an irreversible success.89 The Khmer Rouge was now hoping for a
place in a government dominated by the Royalist party. If their leaders had had
indeed planned to disrupt the elections, they had abandoned this goal after the sec-
ond successful day at the polls. UNTAC had prepared for elections amidst civil war
and had taken a calculated risk. Paradoxically, the election period in the frontline
province of Banteay Meanchey had been one of the calmest weeks since the arrival
of the Dutch second marine battalion in December. 
After six days of polling, 89.5 percent of the Cambodian electorate had cast their
vote in an election that turned out to be a sweeping success. In Banteay Meanchey,
91 percent of the registered voters turned up at the polls. The elections were not
only an astounding success for their tranquility and the tremendous voter turnout;
the outcome proved to be better than anything for which UNTAC could have hoped.
Funcinpec, the most cooperative opposition party, won convincingly with over 45.5
percent of the votes. The CPP received 38.2 percent of the votes, which was a defeat,
but not embarrassing enough for them to seriously denounce the results.90 Close to
62 percent had voted for parties other than the then ruling CPP, which was suffi-
cient proof that the vote had been secret and that intimidation had failed where
UNTAC information and education had worked. The outcome was mirrored in Ban-
teay Meanchey, although here the smaller BLDP gained eight percent in their strong-
hold, as opposed to 3.8 percent nationwide. This outcome, endorsed by the Securi-
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ty Council, enabled Sihanouk, who would soon become the king in a new constitu-
tional monarchy, to form a Funcinpec-CPP-BLDP coalition government under two
prime ministers, Ranariddh and Hun Sen. The coalition would be in for a bumpy
ride in the coming months and years.
Although only six out of 120 representatives to the new Cambodian parliament
were elected in Banteay Meanchey, the polling in the province attracted much atten-
tion from all over the world. Dutchbat’s essential credibility, which had been built
over the previous year, was crucial to UNTAC’s success in one of the most political-
ly complex and volatile corners of Cambodia. The skepticism over the UN’s perform-
ance perceived amongst both the Cambodians in predominantly urban centers and
the electoral staff in many of the provinces failed to take hold in the areas controlled
by the Marines. Apart from their ability to reconcile and temper the four unpre-
dictable factions, much of their success depended on smooth cooperation with a sig-
nificant number of local and international civilian partners. For a military unit basi-
cally trained to interact violently with a monolithic military adversary they performed
remarkably well. Not only did they take civil-military cooperation beyond anything
previously accomplished by peacekeepers, the Marines stretched their mandate to
contribute substantially to public security in a province ridden with violent crime.
On the streets they basically took over much of the role of the UN Civilian Police
as they integrated a monitoring role towards local provincial CPAF and SOC police
in their combined patrols and checkpoints. Their finest hour came when they were
able to hold elections in territory partially controlled by the Khmer Rouge. During
the last days at the poll, after the elections appeared safe, ‘a colorful party of inter-
national observers,’ including Austin, the Australian and American ambassadors and
many staff members from UNTAC headquarters, visited Thma Pok. Prince Rana-
riddh also dropped by in his own power base and thanked UNTAC at the occasion.
All wanted to be a witness to the miracle of how the elections were proceeding
unhampered under the very noses of the notorious Khmer Rouge and to chuckle
over the appearance of Khmer Rouge party members and soldiers at the polls.
The cause for the almost flawless elections has been a source of speculation ever
since. The prevailing question was who had held the key to peaceful days at the polls.
Had it been primarily UNTAC’s performance that dissuaded the Khmer Rouge, or
was it premeditated restraint on behalf of the insurgents? After their violent cam-
paign of intimidation and attacks on Cambodians and the UN, why did the Khmer
Rouge stop short of disrupting the elections? Although they were not at all well posi-
tioned to launch large-scale attacks, this did not sufficiently explain why, despite some
isolated incidents of shelling, they refrained from attacking vulnerable civilian per-
sonnel. 
Cammaert argued that the Khmer Rouge did intend to disrupt the elections, but
did not get the chance in Banteay Meanchey. One of the local Funcinpec military
leaders confirmed that the Khmer Rouge was apprehensive about conducting more
attacks to disrupt the elections because of the heightened level of security around
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the polling stations. Blackhurst believed that the use of three local factions along-
side Dutchbat was likely to have ‘contributed greatly’ to the surprisingly calm situa-
tion. The Khmer Rouge was known to look for soft targets and, according to the US
Marine, there were simply no easy targets in sector one. ‘All polling stations and
Dutchbat locations were ‘hard’ targets with a vigilant execution of the watch and
good all-around defense.’91 Even though the Dutch Marines were given many pats
on the back for running the elections amidst the Khmer Rouge, it is important to
acknowledge that the much-criticized Indonesian battalion and ill-equipped
Bangladeshis pulled it off in their volatile sectors that also bordered Khmer Rouge
territory. Raoul Jennar, a staunch critic of the UN mission in Cambodia, including
its military component, acknowledged that the ‘impressive security measures’ taken
by UNTAC throughout the country in cooperation with the three factions were crit-
ical. ‘[F]or the first time since the mission began, UNTAC showed determination and
firmness’ and ‘[a]s Khmer Rouge defectors related months later, the deterrent effect
dissuaded them from trying to sabotage the electoral process.’92
In his analysis of the peace process in Cambodia, Trevor Findlay suggested that
it was primarily a combination of Chinese diplomatic pressure and the lack of a plan
or strategy that caused the Khmer Rouge to remain passive. He gives little credence
to the idea that UNTAC dissuaded them from attacking. The Chinese had indeed
been harsher towards the Khmer Rouge, even voting against them in the Security
Council in April, and there are indications that they told their nominal leader Khieu
Samphan not to disrupt the elections. However, a Chinese official denied having
pressured the insurgents. Findlay also mentions Western pressure on Thailand to
sever its remaining links with the Khmer Rouge as a likely determining factor. While
diplomatic pressure and fear of further isolation are likely to have played a role, there
had been few indications that either the Chinese or Thailand had been able to curb
Khmer Rouge violence in the course of the previous year. If the Khmer Rouge expect-
ed the elections to turn into a success, they would have tried to disrupt them from
day one, or in the days directly prior to that.93 After all, successful elections result-
ing in an internationally recognized government dominated by the former State of
Cambodia was their worst-case scenario. 
The Khmer Rouge leadership seems to have had a plan, but it was based on the
assumption that it would not be necessary to disrupt the elections. Although it is
still hard to reconstruct their exact motives and plans, the crux of the matter was
that the Khmer Rouge leadership had lost touch with both the Cambodian people
and political developments in the country. At this crucial juncture, the Khmer Rouge
expected a small portion of the eligible voters – probably no more than twenty-five
to thirty percent – to turn up at the polls.94 Had they been able to sense the mood
of the people, their choices are likely to have been different. Khieu Samphan revealed
both the surprise and the disbelief when he said ‘[h]ave these people no shame!
Where in the world does ninety percent of the people vote in an election? In fact, I
have proof that in a large number of the provinces ninety percent of the people did
not vote.’ Sanderson was initially puzzled by what he called ‘a blatantly stupid state-
ment’ by someone who he considered ‘far from being a stupid man.’ The general
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concluded that Khieu Samphan had said it because he believed it, because this was
what he was told by the Khmer Rouge party cadre.95
The Khmer Rouge had led themselves to believe the ballot would turn into a fias-
co. A low turnout of voters would be made up of predominantly CCP supporters
and such results would be unacceptable to the UN. They therefore initially felt no
real urge to create havoc at the polls on a serious scale, as this would unnecessari-
ly incriminate and isolate them even further. Once the turnout was so overwhelm-
ing on the first day they were unable to react. The Khmer Rouge were poorly posi-
tioned and prepared and its organization had a time-consuming decision cycle. Mean-
while, the polling sites were well protected and it was particularly at this point that
the close-knit civil-military collaboration under military leadership, the decisions to
bring in the three local factions in on the security plan and the reversal of the polling
schedule paid off. After some half-hearted attempts to disrupt the elections on day
two, the Khmer Rouge leaders showed erratic behavior and started to send those vot-
ers it had allowed to be registered to the polling stations to vote for Funcinpec. The
contradictory signals given by the Khmer Rouge directly after the elections showed
how much its leadership was in disarray. Its radio station denounced the elections
as a farce, while a Khmer Rouge official in Pailin was reported as saying that a gov-
ernment by the ‘Sihanoukist Party’ would be acceptable to them. In the end, after
Funcinpec’s victory, the Khmer Rouge announced that it accepted the results of the
elections – a plebiscite their forces had tried to violently disturb in the previous
months.96
Had the Khmer Rouge gone all-out to target the elections, it would almost cer-
tainly have found a soft spot in the security measures around the elections. But if
UNTAC was indeed fortunate, it certainly was responsible for much of its own luck.
Both the impressive security measures and the ‘determination and firmness’ men-
tioned by Jennar would have been impossible without the closely integrated military
and civilian operations that centered on the Plans Branch and the military sector
commanders in the provinces. ‘Without them,’ Sanderson knew, ‘United Nations
civilian casualties would have resulted and there could not have been an election.’
To have the military assume such a dominant role without having a civilian rebel-
lion within UNTAC on his hands was a diplomatic triumph. Although Sanderson
did not immediately boast of his success, he suggested seven years later that where
UNTAC military staff had not assumed the primary coordinating role ‘the mission
fell well short of its objectives.’ He made a notable exception for the UNHCR refugee
return program.97
The Khmer Rouge leaders also appear to have been contemplating their moves
after the elections. In the chaos expected after the failed plebiscite, the Khmer Rouge
hoped to reinvigorate the tri-partite coalition to once again counter ‘the contemptible
puppets.’ For the aftermath of the elections the Khmer Rouge was planning to launch
an offensive, hoping to deliver a serious blow to what they expected to be a feeble
SOC government that ideally lacked international recognition after rigged elections.
A speech delivered by what appears to be a senior Khmer Rouge official to the mil-
itary cadre of the 519th Division in Banteay Meanchey in the direct aftermath of the
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elections suggests that their armed forces were preparing for a large scale offensive
in the months of June, July and August. The elections were implicitly accepted as a
serious defeat, but the aim was now to join ‘the north,’ the provinces Banteay
Meanchey, Siem Reap, Preah Vihear under Khmer Rouge control. This would create
an enlarged Liberated Zone from south of Pailin to east of Anlong Veng.98
Even after the elections the possibility of a three-party coalition against the Khmer
Rouge was clearly not contemplated. Moreover, there appeared to be no inkling in
party circles of the approaching combined offensive of the SOC, Funcinpec and
KPNLF armies after they officially joined their forces into the Royal Cambodian
Armed Forces (RCAF). In this August offensive the new coalition that emerged after
the renversement des alliances launched a series of attacks. They overran all Khmer
Rouge territory in Banteay Meanchey and conquered their Thai border hideout Phum
Chat, which meant a serious blow to their plans to reunite the Free Liberated Zone
from Pailin to Anlong Veng. When Sanderson visited Phum Chat after its conquest
by the RCAF, he confirmed that the Khmer Rouge’s construction of a command and
logistical base in preparation for their offensive had been well under way.99 In early
1994, the RCAF even occupied Anlong Veng, but the new armed forces clearly lacked
the discipline, cohesion and staying power to occupy and defend their new positions
and seemed distracted by the opportunities for pillaging. The Khmer Rouge would
reverse many of their losses on the battlefield, reconquering Anlong Veng and even
threatening Battambang, although this was the result of the RCAF’s weakness rather
than Khmer Rouge’s strength. Over time, the insurgents were increasingly margin-
alized in their jungle hideouts and were finally defeated militarily in the course of
the 1990s. 
Successes, Failures and Lessons 
If the elections had been run like a military operation, the battle was won, but the
political outcome of the war was still undetermined. Although UNTAC’s guarantee
of a secret ballot in May 1993 rescued the entire peace process from failure, the mis-
sion had been more than elections alone. The ‘comprehensive solution’ to the con-
flict called for by the Paris Peace Agreements had not materialized. However, the
transition to an internationally recognized constitutional government was completed
and thus the mission of the transitional ‘authority’ ended. UNTAC was the midwife,
Akashi had claimed, but it had helped to deliver an unhealthy child. In October 1993,
two years after the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements, the international com-
munity walked away and largely left it to fend for itself. The shaky interim coalition
government that now governed Cambodia was still facing an uncertain transition to
the real constitutional democracy the country had never been. 
Apart from the creation of a legitimate government, there were several success-
es to report. The UNHCR had returned over 360,000 refugees from Thai border
camps and the Information and Education Division had done much to help create
a free press. The small Human Rights component had sown the seeds that made
people more assertive in demanding certain civil rights that helped to counter the
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authoritarianism embedded in Cambodian political culture.100 But UNTAC has been
rightfully criticized for many of the things it did not accomplish. The ‘transitional
authority’ had trusteeship-like pretenses, but never lived up to its name by failing to
wield any real authority over the local civil administrative structures, thereby giving
the Khmer Rouge its most viable argument for non-compliance. After the elections
this was also felt by Funcinpec co-administrators, especially at the provincial level,
where they were hardly able to govern alongside the firmly entrenched SOC auto-
crats. The problem of recruiting sufficient administrative personnel with the required
qualities would haunt the UN in future missions. 
Demilitarization, the primary military mission, had failed. A new, downsized nation-
al army was being forged, but the CPAF elements that clearly dominated it continued
to terrorize the countryside while the threat of 10,000 well-armed Khmer Rouge troops
remained. When the Dutchbat left as one of UNTAC’s last contingents, Cambodia was
once more at war with the Khmer Rouge. The poorly conceived plan for cantonment
of 140,000 troops never functioned, but if it had, the consequences for public order
are likely to have been even more devastating. It should have taught a valuable lesson
to future intervention forces that the unorganized release of tens of thousands of war-
hardened combatants into a dysfunctional society was a recipe for chaos. 
UN operations in Cambodia should also have been an early indicator that the seg-
regation of what was considered the ‘purely military’ security mission – the separa-
tion and demobilization of regular armed forces – and the responsibility for public
security would be hard to maintain. The hugely expensive UN civilian police force
never had a serious impact either on neutralization of or intimidation by factional
police on regular crime. The law-and-order crisis was mainly the result of the unin-
tended consequences of the peace process, but it seriously undermined the mission’s
overall credibility and particularly that of the military peacekeepers, even though pub-
lic security was outside their official responsibility. Showing that UNTAC was will-
ing to protect Cambodians proved crucial but difficult with a small number of troops
and a low-quality police force. The peacekeepers obviously did have a positive impact
in this respect anyhow. In February 1994, UN military liaison officers reported that
‘internal security in Cambodia had become more precarious following the withdraw-
al of the military component of UNTAC.’101 Bandits were still roaming the country-
side and remained the largest threat to the average Cambodian. The successful elec-
tions also did not halt abuses such as political attacks or murders of ethnic Viet-
namese. Only after 1994, after the economy grew and some discipline was slowly
brought into Cambodia’s armed forces, would public safety substantially improve. 
Sanderson continuously warned against military involvement in what he called
internal security. His troops were to protect the electoral process, not Cambodia. This
did not answer the question of who would protect the Cambodians, whose ‘hearts
and minds’ UNTAC had to win in order to forge that crucial alliance. The Force
Commander made the realistic decision to curtail his troops, not only because of the
few troops at his disposal, but also because soldiers were obviously not trained as
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policemen. There was a large difference between improvised measures to counter
banditry or political violence and the assumption of full responsibility for the out-
come of public security operations. Fear of the loss of UNTAC’s credibility had driv-
en Akashi to grant the force the unprecedented power to arrest and detain in spe-
cial human rights violations, but the process was unsuccessful. The lack of guidance
on how to deal with regular crime left a wide gap in which soldiers either chose to
do nothing or decided to experiment with no legal guidance. In the crime-infested
northwestern corner of the country, banditry forced the Dutch Marines to push their
mandate to the outer limits and, at times, beyond that. 
Rather than being an aberration in peace operations, the weakness or absence of
local police or UN CivPol – and the resulting pulling power of the public security
vacuum on intervening military forces – proved to be a recurring problem. It would
become one of the main characteristics of peace operations and other military inter-
ventions throughout the 1990s and thereafter. Nevertheless, the inevitability of a mil-
itary role in tasks bordering on policing after their injection into a society ruled by
violence instead of law was largely ignored. Even though the Dutch Marines appear
to have gone further in performing a public security role than any other contingent,
and found the right balance between action and restraint, their experiences never
made it to the internal 73-page mission evaluation by the Royal Netherlands Navy.
The problems of banditry, political intimidation and the measures taken by the
Marines were not amongst their official ‘lessons learned.’ There were no references
to public security, disarmament, mixed-patrols or other forms of support to or coop-
eration with local or international police and administration. Similarly, there were
no explicit references to the integrated civil-military operations or planning on the
tactical level that proved critical for the election’s success. There was only one refer-
ence to the need for dedicated personnel for civic action, since this had consumed
much time and the Marines thought they might have done a better job. Neverthe-
less, it contained some prophetic words: ‘Under different circumstances the coordi-
nation and direction of activities in support of the local population could be crucial
and even become the primary goal of a mission.’ However, it placed this under the
heading ‘personnel,’ and far way from lessons on operations.102
There are three likely reasons for the neglect of relevant codified learning on the
tactical level. Although they applied specifically to the Netherlands in the early nineties,
these explanations probably hold some universal truths. First of all, within the mil-
itary there was an overall tendency to leave matters on, or just outside, the param-
eters of the mandate out of such assessments. Military involvement, especially in
public security on the tactical level, involved measures that Huijssoon had called ‘bal-
ancing on the border of the abyss.’103 In the official evaluation, this murky business
was clearly ignored rather than presented for others to see and use. The example of
the off-duty CPAF soldier shot by a Marine in March is an interesting case in point.
According to the Dutch situation report, the man in civilian dress was asked to hand
over his AK-47 by the patrol commander. Only then, after his refusal, did the stand-
off emerge. When the local apparently threatened to shoot, he was taken out by a
shot in the leg. The difficulty was not the handling of the standoff, which was done
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in an exemplary fashion, but its cause. Although the regular situation report to the
Ministry of Defense held that the commander had acted ‘in line with the relevant
UNTAC instructions’ by demanding him to disarm, these were in fact Dutchbat’s
own instructions. The Marines were not yet officially allowed to disarm at this point.
Akashi’s official instructions on disarmament would only be implemented weeks
thereafter. While their self-styled disarmament policy, mostly in cooperation with local
authorities, had a very positive effect on security and was condoned by the force com-
mander, it could have resulted in a row if anyone had decided to make one or go
strictly by the book. Lucky for the Marines, nobody did. The Marines and the Dutch
ministries of defense and foreign affairs, including that of international development,
rather publicized civic action, or the ‘Dutch Development Projects’ that had proven
to be such a key ingredient for establishing close relations with the local population. 
The second reason for ignoring public security and integrated civil-military plan-
ning and operations, or civil-military cooperation, was that it did not fit the format
used in official evaluations. Such reports tended to be elaborate on logistics, com-
munications, personnel and materiél in operations and paid little or no attention to
the unique and original methods and measures developed in Cambodia. Although
the Marines’ Cambodia experience, with many examples of successful improvisation
and correct reflexes, lived on within this small and close-knit group of soldiers, lit-
tle was done to codify and analyze this experience.104 The Dutch armed forces lacked
an organization that could codify experiences and draw the relevant lessons. During
his last year in service before retirement, Colonel Huijssoon helped set up a small
‘Section Lessons Learned’ within the Royal Netherlands Army, but as in most mili-
tary establishments in the following years, there appeared to be a large difference
between ‘lessons learned’ and ‘lessons applied.’ Moreover, the Marines were not Army
and their self-claimed ‘different blood groups’ allowed for very little transfer of knowl-
edge. The Navy evaluation was classified and written primarily for internal use. 
A third, closely related reason for neglect of many relevant lessons, is the ten-
dency in most armed forces to return to what they considered ‘business as usual.’
The Marines were eager to trade in their light-blue UN berets for their original navy
blue ones and return to their original trade and prepare to be warriors. In the early
1990s, when peace operations were often still treated as an abnormality rather than
as the military’s new core business, such measures bordering on or penetrating the
civilian sphere were seen as an aberration, even a perversion, of the military trade.
The Dutch Marine Corps was eager to return its men to their training schedules
within the Anglo-Dutch NATO Amphibious Force, which had become thoroughly
disrupted during the previous two years that saw its entire force deployed in North-
ern Iraq and Cambodia. 
There were many other obstacles to a successful transfer of knowledge both on
the tactical, operational and strategic levels within the international military and polit-
ical establishment. Few Western nations had contributed substantially to UNTAC –
only the French, Australians and Dutch – but even in these countries, its influence
was limited. Moreover, many experiences and lessons went overboard once skepti-
cism of UN peacekeeping took hold after Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. This caused
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the military side of the larger interventions to be regionalized. When NATO took
over in Bosnia, the military and civil lines of command and control were rudely sep-
arated. Sanderson repeatedly preached the importance of the integration of military
and civil operations on the operational level and this particular message ended up
in the many evaluations of the mission as a whole. But the UN’s failure in Bosnia
and their own experiences in Somalia would teach the Americans the opposite les-
son and drove them to segregate the two spheres once they became a embroiled in
peace operations. 
Peace Operations after UNTAC
It is impossible to judge UNTAC’s accomplishments without putting its perform-
ance in the context of later operations. In the direct aftermath of the UN mission
in Cambodia, when the vast majority of analyses of the mission were written, most
commentators correctly called it a qualified success.105 Before the end of 1995, when
compared to the unfolding disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and the even larger tragedy
in Rwanda, UNTAC stood out as a beacon of light in spite of its many flaws. More
revealing than measuring UNTAC’s performance against these costly failures, how-
ever, is to compare it to the interventions on the Balkans during the latter half of
the 1990s. With the benefit of hindsight, the mission in Cambodia was a success
most of all for what it accomplished in a mere eighteen months with limited means.
Though the cost of the mission, over two billion dollars spent in two years, was con-
sidered ludicrously expensive at the time, the primary mission was accomplished at
a bargain price compared to the costly open-ended commitments and half-baked suc-
cesses of NATO and the UN in Bosnia and Kosovo.106
If a military force the relative size of those in Bosnia and Kosovo, 60,000 and
45,000 respectively, were to be projected on a country with the proportions, popu-
lation and complexity of Cambodia, it would have consisted of well over 100,000
troops compared to the 16,000 actually on the ground. Unlike UNTAC’s battalions,
the forces deployed in the Balkans were not lightly equipped units, but NATO-stan-
dard forces equipped with tanks, artillery and backed up by massive air support. With
such massive military power, the enforcement option called for by some in the lat-
ter half of 1992 might have stood a chance. Still, it is most unlikely to have result-
ed in the ‘quick fix’ they had hoped for. In case the insurgents had not backed down
at the sight of such overwhelming force, the jungle terrain, poor infrastructure and
the Khmer Rouge’s insurgency style of operations would not have suited a Western-
style conventional military force. 
The ability to use force, either in self-defense or to enforce an agreement, was
the prime reason to inject soldiers into a conflict zone. The use or non-use of force
continued to be the main topic surrounding peace operations, especially after the
operations in Somalia and Bosnia slowly went down the road to ‘enforcement.’ In
March 1995, as the UN was withdrawing from Somalia and muddling through Bosnia,
Sanderson argued: 
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Force creates its own dynamics and has to be controlled. Unlike the law of physics,
in which every action had an equal opposite reaction, actions in war are likely to
be magnified several-fold as passions are compounded by the fatal consequences
of conflict. In these circumstances, an escape route from the vicious cycle of vio-
lence is likely to remain distant until one or all sides bleed themselves to exhaus-
tion. This terrible reality seems to be little understood in many quarters.107
Sanderson made the right decision in adhering to the traditional peacekeeping ethos
in Cambodia. Nevertheless, the assertiveness of some units, the long period of pas-
siveness of many others, and the vigor with which some of those executed their right
of self-defense in the run-up to the elections, all proved that a broad interpretation
of self-defense had a deterrent effect. Sanderson’s correct estimations also did not
automatically imply that the strict adherence to the use of force for self-defense was
applicable to ‘new’ conflicts. It is important to realize that despite the violence in
Cambodia, the conflict was a Cold War relic close to running out of steam. The civil
war was dissimilar from those fueled by the emerging forces of ethnic-nationalism
or religious fundamentalism. In Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as East Timor and mil-
itary ground operations thereafter, the ability to use force in order to accomplish the
mission rather than merely in self-defense would prove crucial. However, its discrim-
inate use – absolute adherence to the principle of minimum use of force similar to
that incorporated in British counterinsurgency doctrine – would prove quintessen-
tial. Mostly, the possible use of force combined with a strict set of military rules laid
down in a peace agreement proved to be a sufficient deterrent for the warring par-
ties to back down. 
Throughout the decade there continued to be a certain fixation on the dilemma
surrounding the use of force, or on ‘peacekeeping versus peace enforcing.’ This
would distract military and political leaders, as well as their military forces, from
contemplating the next move of the obstructionist forces – often called the ‘spoilers’
in the aftermath of a military intervention. In the Balkans, it would emerge after
1995 that, faced with such a massive military intervention force, the former belliger-
ents would abide by the military rules imposed by the peacekeepers. However, they
would redirect their obstructionist effort into the civilian sphere. They would do so
mainly through the use of the police and the administrative apparatus that tended
to be entwined with their military forces in order to prevent international civilian
administrative control, to further terrorize their opponents and to try to accomplish
their original war aims. The signs had been there for UNTAC. As in Cambodia, the
civilian side of the mission would prove to be the soft underbelly of ‘peace building’
operations. 
International civil administrative staff and police were called upon to counter this
problem, but little or nothing was done in the coming years to substantially improve
their abilities. Since the inevitability of a large military responsibility for certain civil-
ian tasks was not recognized, and treated as an aberration rather than a pattern in
peace operations, NATO’s military establishment would be caught off guard. When
it entered Bosnia it would fail to learn most of the lessons on public security and
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the need for closely integrated military and civilian operations. However, the true
test of military ingenuity and flexibility was already taking place simultaneously with
the operations in Cambodia. In Somalia, soldiers found themselves in an altogether
different situation, namely a country in total anarchy with no international civil
administration or civil police force to speak of. 
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6‘Peacekeeping’ in a Power Vacuum:
The Reluctant American Occupation of Somalia
In Cambodia, soldiers had gone beyond any role previously performed in a peace
operation. They had extended their activities far into the civilian sphere in order to
save the UN mission from imminent failure. Parallel developments were taking place
in Somalia, but under very different circumstances and with different results. Between
December 1992 and May 1993, a powerful intervention force under United States
command was given a much narrower mission to secure the delivery of food aid to
a starving population amidst the reigning anarchy in Somalia. Confusion over the
mission soon arose as there was no agreement to uphold – and therefore no peace
to keep – and most of all, because no clear distinction was made between security
for humanitarian goods and security for Somali people. The crucial question that
emerged was how far a military intervention force should go in assuming the pre-
rogatives of the state and help rebuild it, even if this was not part of the explicitly
assigned mission. 
As will be argued in the next chapter, those contingents interpreting their man-
date broadly proved to be most successful. However, whatever positive experiences
came from the intervention in Somalia in the first half of 1993 would be overshad-
owed by the death of eighteen American soldiers in Mogadishu in October 1993,
leading to the withdrawal of US troops and the eventual embarrassing evacuation of
all UN personnel in March 1995. These events have labeled the Somalia interven-
tion as an outright failure. This triggered a revisionist version of events stimulated
by the US government, portraying the first, American-led phase of the operation as
an overwhelming military success – because it stuck to its narrow humanitarian mis-
sion – while passing all the blame for the failure onto the UN because it chose to
do ‘nation building.’ This distorted version of events obscured the ability to see both
the missed opportunities and the relative successes during the early phase of the
intervention. As a result, the lessons learned from Somalia were often the wrong
ones.
Hobbesian Anarchy
On the night of December 9, 1992, heavily armed US Marines landed on the Soma-
li coast near Mogadishu. To their initial bewilderment and eventual outrage, they
were greeted by TV floodlights on the beach in what became a historic scene. The
media’s cameras played a crucial role in getting these warriors to this distant corner
of the world in the first place. Pictures of starving Somali children had been broad-
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cast around the world throughout the previous months. The Marines were the spear-
head of the Unified Task Force, or UNITAF, a force given what appeared to be a
straightforward task of securing the delivery of relief supplies that failed to reach the
hungry Somali population. The pocked and shattered buildings told of the ferocity
of the battles waged in the capital by the warring militias. 
In the absence of a functioning Somali government, there was no formal peace
agreement, but the population appeared to accept the presence of the foreign troops.
They even applauded them at the Mogadishu airfield as they disarmed some of the
marauding gunmen that had terrorized a large part of the population and prevent-
ed the food from reaching those in need. As the Marines expanded their control over
the city in the next days, they came under incidental fire, ranging from sniping at
patrols by bandits to deliberate attacks by militia. Such attacks on the peacekeepers
continued in the months to come, but operating under a mandate that allowed ‘all
necessary means’ to accomplish their mission, the Marines fired back, even engag-
ing when they felt directly threatened.1 They tended to rely on a heavy show of force,
which mostly proved successful in discouraging the militias from seriously oppos-
ing them.2 On 11 December, two Marine Corps Cobra attack helicopters fired their
rockets and destroyed two militia vehicles whose crew members had been unwise
enough to take a shot at them.3
By accepting Washington’s offer to send in troops – strictly under US command
– the United Nations was confronted with the best and the worst that the United
States had to offer. On the one hand, the array of options presented to an interna-
tional intervention force was expanded by the incredible speed of their deployment,
the massive display of firepower, the great US military logistical machinery and over-
all military professionalism. An Australian officer who arrived two weeks into the
operation was overwhelmed by its size: ‘It was like being plonked into the middle
of a movie set: CH-53 helicopters went past us... Tents, Marines, bulldozers, trucks,
aircraft of every type. It was big! A dozen ships offshore. The airport was a hive of
activity.’4 On the other hand, the United Nations was faced with the narrow view of
American military and political leaders of the role of their armed forces. Conditioned
by both the negative memory of the Vietnam War as well as their recent success in
the Gulf War, the reigning military and foreign policy inclinations in the United
States proved woefully inadequate when confronted with the erratic dynamics caused
by the injection of a 38,000-strong military force into a complete power vacuum.
The process of state collapse in Somalia has been explained from different perspec-
tives, emphasizing sources of conflict inherent in Somali society as well as external
factors. Domestic explanations emphasized the continuity of the ‘primordial social-
cultural idiosyncrasies’ inherent in a society dominated by intense rivalry between
large family-oriented clans. The Somalis are a culturally, linguistically and religious-
ly similar people, but the country is populated by six large clans and over twenty
sub-clans. Somali people tended to identify with their clan rather than the state, espe-
cially in times when the state has shown weakness. Those emphasizing external
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intervention, mainly the proponents of the dependency theory, point to the change
brought about by foreign intervention as the prime source of political upheaval in
modern Somalia. As usual, it was the explosive combination of both that created the
conditions for anarchy. 
A long legacy of colonial and post-colonial interventions hampered the develop-
ment of Somalia as a nation-state. Until its independence in 1960, the Italians ruled
in the south and the British in the north. After the unified state of Somalia was cre-
ated, an all-too-familiar post-colonial African pattern unfolded. In the next nine years,
parliamentary democracy of sorts stumbled on, until a military coup established the
head of the armed forces, General Siad Barre, as president. His Marxist system ini-
tially attracted the Soviet Union as an ally, but in the course of the late 1970s and
early 1980s, Moscow switched sides. The Soviets teamed up with Barre’s more pow-
erful archenemy, Ethiopia, after its new regime under Mengistu embraced commu-
nism, thereby losing traditional US support. After the Somali forces were routed in
the 1977-78 war with Mengistu, the state began losing its internal monopoly control
over violence and the clans increasingly started to arm themselves against each other. 
Geopolitical concerns inspired the United States to step into the void in the early
1980s as the prime sponsor of the thoroughly repressive and corrupt government
in Mogadishu. A plethora of political and mostly militarized opposition groups
emerged over the decade to challenge the reign of Barre, who increasingly fell back
on his own Darood-Marehan clan. In order to ‘divide and rule,’ the dictator had fed
much of the hostility between the clans in this period by distributing weapons he
obtained with foreign support. Towards the end of the decade the warlords (warran-
leh) gained control over the mediators (wadaads), the traditional local clan elders who
played a crucial role in administration and conflict resolution.5 Ever more terrible
human rights abuses by the dictator combined with the thaw in the Cold War made
Washington withdraw military and financial support. As a result, Barre’s regime
crumbled. The civil war in Somalia, unleashed partly by the end of superpower rival-
ry, was unlike the Cold War relics that dried up in the late 1980s and which proved
relatively easy to resolve by adapting traditional UN peacekeeping from inter-state
wars to internal conflict. 
While the world’s attention was firmly focused on events in the Gulf, an alliance
of rival clans defeated Barre militarily in January 1991 after a long and bitter civil war.
The dictator was deposed when the two largest armed opposition groups under Aideed
and Ali Mahdi, under the umbrella of the United Somali Congress (USC), entered
Mogadishu. With alliances between clans being merely temporary conveniences in
Somali clan-based culture, the factions, which had joined forces for the sole purpose
of overthrowing the regime, started to fight among themselves over the spoils of vic-
tory. Although Aideed’s Somali National Alliance (USC-SNA, hereafter referred to as
SNA) bore the brunt of the last offensive before entering Mogadishu, his attention
was diverted to pursuing the remnants of Barre’s forces in the South. This allowed
forces loyal to Ali Mahdi to capture the presidential palace in 1991. The leader of the
USC declared himself interim president in the hope of gaining international recog-
nition. Support only came from the Italian and Egyptian governments, both of whom
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had backed Barre to the bitter end, making them even more suspect in the eyes of
the other factions refusing to recognize Ali Mahdi’s interim rule. It would seriously
hamper former Egyptian foreign minister Boutros-Ghali in his attempts to mediate
between the warring parties when serving as the UN secretary general.
Ali Mahdi’s militia, based on his Abghal sub-clan, found a formidable opponent
in Aideed’s Somali National Alliance (SNA) that centered on the Habir Gedir sub-
clan. Ali Mahdi had 5,000 to 6,000 troops at his disposal, while Aideed controlled
an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 militia that were better equipped with former Soma-
li Army weapons. Some 1,500 of his troops were in control of most of the capital,
while Ali Mahdi’s USC had its power base in the northern part of the city.6 Confi-
dent of his ability to position himself as the dominant leader in Somalia, Aideed
clearly had the most to lose from outside intervention. He opposed UN intervention
because he feared it would ratify his opponents’ questionable election in a UN-spon-
sored conference in Djibouti in 1991.7
The civil war broke down roughly along clan lines. However, while no warlord
could have maintained power without crucial support from his own clan, the source
of conflict has often been oversimplified. It has often been attributed entirely to tra-
ditional feuds and rivalry caused by genealogical affiliations, or the problems with
authority inherent in a largely nomadic society that made up fifty percent of the pop-
ulation. One Somali proverb encapsulated this schismatic view of Somali society: ‘Me
and my clan against the world. Me and my brother against my clan. Me against my
brother.’8 The saying was endlessly reproduced throughout the 1990s to emphasize
the tribal roots of the conflict. It was often used to underline the hopelessness of
solving Somalia’s problems through outside intervention. The same theories were
used on both sides of the Atlantic by those opposing forceful intervention in the
Balkans, arguing that Yugoslavia was being torn apart by age-old feuds between eth-
nic groups rather than a political power struggle by elites in the aftermath of the
disappearance of the old communist order. As in Yugoslavia, Somali elites chose to
mercilessly exploit clan or ethnic affiliation to further their own interest. The war
was first and foremost a power struggle for control over the state, in which the war-
lords manipulated the clan structure in order to recruit the force necessary to seize
territory and resources.9
Social scientist David Laitin posits an explanation for how clan warfare spiraled
out of control in 1991 and 1992. The normal prize after a coup in Africa, he argued,
was control over the state apparatus and the subsequent access to state wealth. What
caused the costly war of attrition, Laitin argues, was that it was fought over the declin-
ing resources made available to coup winners after the end of the Cold War. The
Somali state had lived on foreign aid handouts from its inception until its implo-
sion. After this support was withheld, the meager national resources, already dimin-
ished by the militarization of the state, proved insufficient for a new leader to estab-
lish control and redistribute the state wealth amongst his former allies or rivals in
order to negotiate a peace.10
As if the political landscape was not complicated enough for the contesting clans
and intervening forces, much of the fighting took place between members of the
‘peacekeeping’ in a power vacuum 165
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:05  Pagina 165
same clan. Although from different sub-clans, Ali Mahdi and Aideed were both from
the Hawiye clan and were fighting for control over Mogadishu. They formed ad hoc
alliances with members of other clans and sub-clans based on the level of rewards
these expected to receive by joining. Before American forces arrived in Kismayo,
Omar Jess, the leader of the faction in the South closely aligned to Aideed, killed
some one hundred elders within his own sub-clan in order to tighten his grip on
society in his struggle for control of southern Somalia. His long-time rival was
Mohammed Siad Heris, alias ‘Morgan,’ the former dictator’s son-in-law. Morgan was
in control of one thousand well-organized troops from the former state army.11 What
further blurred the picture was the warlords’ frequent failure to effectively control
their own subordinates or affiliated groups, while gangs of unaffiliated armed ban-
dits also terrorized the weakest in Somali society. 
The prolonged civil war caused the already faltering state, civil society and thus
basic services, to collapse and Somalia to sink into what has been called a ‘Hobbe-
sian anarchy.’ The army, the administration and the regular Somali police force, the
latter being one of the few institutions not founded on a clan basis, had all melted
away. Meanwhile, traditional modes of mediation by elders completely failed amidst
the chaos. The Somali people suffered the horrible brutality of living ‘without law
or institutions to regulate relations among groups or to protect the most vulnerable
from the most vicious.’12 Somalia became the archetype of what in the 1990s com-
monly became referred to as ‘the failed state.’
At the outset of the international intervention, the underlying dynamics of the
civil war in southern Somalia were not sufficiently recognized. The drought that had
plagued East Africa for most of the previous decade had been particularly severe in
Somalia, increasing competition for access to wells and crops. Much of the incom-
prehensible warfare in the South was a struggle for productive farmland, or rather,
a land grab by clan-based nomadic groups, primarily the two Hawiye militias. The
nomadic clans, traditionally cattle herders with a strong warrior cult, regarded them-
selves as more noble than the farmers and tended to see themselves as the ‘real
Somalis.’ Their victims were primarily the southern agricultural peoples in the Lower
Shabelle, Lower Jubba and Bay regions. These so-called ‘minority groups’ were the
largely unarmed Ranhanweyn, numbering over a million people centered on the Bay
region, and the smaller African Negroid Bantu and Benadir tribes. The victimized,
non-belligerent parties in Somalia were also the most productive, mostly in agricul-
ture. The breakdown of political order brought about a total disruption of agricultur-
al production and in 1991 and 1992, and displaced the farmers to relief centers in
Mogadishu, provincial cities and Kenya.13 In two years of civil war, hundreds of thou-
sands Somalis were driven from their homes and perished from malnutrition. Mil-
lions were threatened by disease and violence.
In the course of 1992, the attention of the Western world, solidly focused on the
Balkans, was slowly drawn to the unfolding human catastrophe in the Horn of Africa.
What has been called a famine of ‘biblical proportions’ would never have occurred
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if the available relief goods had reached the needy. However, humanitarian aid was
preyed upon by a mixture of the warring factions and unaffiliated bandits. The mili-
tia leaders used food to pay their fighters and buy weapons that allowed them to
extend their control and subsequently their access to wealth. The young men who
were drawn to the warlords, most of whom had been simple herdsmen, lived better
lives than ever before. Food aid was the primary source of income and replaced Sovi-
et and US financial support to the former government to keep the system afloat. It
became the main basis of power and General Aideed proved most successful in
siphoning off his share of the loot. He was firmly in control of most of Mogadishu
after conquering much of the city from the south in the course of 1991, including
strategic locations such as the port and airfield, through which the bulk of food aid
arrived. In this environment, humanitarian organizations, the UN organizations, the
International Red Cross and dozens of NGOs, had an increasingly difficult time get-
ting the food out to the most needy, who were located mostly in the hinterland.
Khalil Dale, a British Red Cross worker, recalled: 
I’ve been to Afghanistan, two or three times. I’ve been to Sudan, I’ve been to a
lot of war zones and famine camps and cholera camps. But I’ve never ever seen
anything like Somalia was at that time. And it was certainly the most frightening
place for me, it was the most insecure, unpredictable. You just didn’t know what
was going to happen next.14
In order to protect themselves from looters, aid organizations were compelled to hire
local armed guards, who were often affiliated with the armed militia. They account-
ed for the funds expended for this purpose as ‘technical support,’ and so gave rise
to the name ‘technicals’ for the jeeps and pickup trucks mounted with heavy machine
guns driven by the gunmen. Much of the military capacity and organization of the
militias and bandits was centered on these armed vehicles. They were also referred
to as ‘Mad Maxes’ by Western troops, as the technicals roaming the barren land-
scape reminded young soldiers of vehicles used by bandits in the post-nuclear anar-
chic society portrayed in the popular Mad Max movie trilogy from 1980s.15
While saving lives and performing courageous work, the aid organizations had
become part of the problem in Somalia. Reliable sources say that the ICRC alone
employed between 15,000 to 20,000 armed guards and it was diverting one third
of its worldwide budget to Somalia.16 The relief agencies indirectly fuelled the appetite
for arms, while simultaneously becoming hostages of their own guards, who start-
ed demanding exorbitant wages for their services. Apart from direct payments for
security, the humanitarian aid organizations provided the warlords with substantial
funds for transportation, housing, and food storage.17 Aid organizations indirectly
helped to finance the militias and arguably prolonged the civil war. 
In mid-1992, a cease-fire was negotiated and the Security Council authorized the
deployment of a small peacekeeping force to supervise it and help protect food stores
from looters. Operating under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the United Nations
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was provided with very limited self-defense Rules
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of Engagement that proved woefully inadequate after the cease-fire rapidly broke
down. The force, consisting of less than five hundred Pakistani troops and some
observers, bunkered down at the airport and spent most of their energy defending
themselves from attackers. After Aideed obstructed the UN operations, nations that
had indicated their willingness to contribute troops withheld their units. Meanwhile,
the media attention given to the plight of the Somalis caused international pressure
to rise rapidly. Boutros-Ghali accused the Security Council of ‘fighting a rich man’s
war’ in Yugoslavia while not lifting a finger for Somalia. By November 1992, CNN
was broadcasting starving Somalis for a few minutes every hour of the day.18
Limits of US Military Intervention 
It was against this background that President George H.W. Bush initiated the inter-
vention in Somalia. He had just lost the 1992 election to Bill Clinton who, riding
the ‘wave of optimism surrounding the future role of the United Nations in the post-
Cold War era’ had vigorously criticized him for failing to intervene in either Bosnia
or Somalia.19 Bush had indeed done nothing to transform his vague vision of the
‘New World Order’ into policy. Although Clinton had won the White House on a
domestic agenda, he gave early indications of what was to turn into his new foreign
policy ‘assertive multilateralism.’ The parting president was eager to leave office on
a high note, so when chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell,
recommended that a mission led by the United States under UN auspices could
make a difference in Somalia, Bush gave the go-ahead for an intervention that would
fundamentally alter the practice and perception of peace operations.20 Surprisingly,
the recommendation to intervene thus came from the military – not from the State
Department – which, according to one diplomat, ‘was absolutely dumbfounded when
the military made the offer.’21
On 25 November 1992, the Bush administration informed Boutros-Ghali of the
willingness to lead in organizing and commanding an international intervention. On
3 December, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution declaring the
situation ‘intolerable’ and authorizing a US-led force to use ‘all necessary means, to
establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief opera-
tions in Somalia’ and prepare the way for a UN-led force.22 It did not specifically
authorize the rebuilding of the political, institutional and economic order in Soma-
lia, or what the Americans commonly referred to as ‘nation building.’ It was wide-
ly known, however, that Boutros-Ghali sought to include ‘peace building,’ the UN
term referring to the establishment of civil institutions and structures enhancing a
society’s capacity to deal with conflicts peacefully. 
No formal deadline was set for the commitment, but it was hoped within the
White House that the force would be out by 20 January 1993, just before the Clin-
ton’s presidential inauguration. This would have allowed for a mere six-week time
span for military operations. When Bush made his ‘Thanksgiving decision’ to inter-
vene in Somalia militarily, he was advised of the impossibility to have the troops out
that soon and military planning was more realistically based on at least a three-month
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deployment.23 However, the message that the Americans wanted to leave as soon as
possible was loud and clear – and certainly not lost on the Somali warlords.
The intervention, designated Operation Restore Hope by the US government, was
authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which meant that consent and
agreement of the parties to the conflict was not necessary. In principle, force could
be used to accomplish the mission – not merely self-defense, as was the case in con-
sent-based Chapter VI operations. 
Compared to the UN mission in Cambodia, Bosnia, or the UN follow-up force
in Somalia, UNITAF was blessed with a homogeneous staff and ‘Unity of Command.’
As the force commander, US Marine Corps Lieutenant General Johnston would lead
38,000 troops centered around 24,000 American forces.24 While almost half of the
American troops were US Army, the operation was clearly dominated by the Marine
Corps. The force commander reported straight up to his fellow Marine Corps Gen-
eral Joseph Hoar, commander in chief at Central Command, one of four regional
strategic headquarters whose theater included the Horn of Africa. On the tactical
level, with the exception of the Moroccan sector, all sectors were controlled by Amer-
ican forces or their close allies with whom they had a long working relationship. On
the military side of the spectrum, many of the ingredients for success were present.
On 5 December, the president’s special envoy, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley,
arrived in Mogadishu ahead of the troops.25 Oakley, who had served as the ambas-
sador to Somalia between 1983 and 1984, would lead the United States’ Liaison
Office, the diplomatic presence in Somalia. The former ambassador basically per-
formed the role of a special representative as Akashi did in Cambodia. The Chapter
VII mandate and the military power of the forces he indirectly controlled allowed
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him to take a far more forceful posture towards the local parties, but his role was
intended to be much smaller, in line with the mission’s narrow security objectives.
There was no parallel civilian mission to oversee. He and his small State Depart-
ment staff were to provide political advice to the military forces, establish political
relations with Somali leaders and liaise with the humanitarian community and the
remainder of UNOSOM. 
No formal guidelines were given for the relationship between Oakley and John-
ston, but they would establish a close working relationship and seldom disagreed on
the scope of the mission.26 The ambassador was liked by the military. In the eyes
of one officer, the imposing and straightforward Southerner compared favorably to
the State Department’s other ‘immaculately suited, yuppie-preppie types named Kent
or Chip or Buffy who had majored in condescension at some Ivy League school.’27
Oakley’s office in the Cocono oil company compound was located one mile from
UNITAF headquarter and down the street from Aideed’s residence. Johnston’s staff
was located in the US Embassy compound, which had been thoroughly gutted after
it had been evacuated in January 1991 after the marauding militias took over the
capital.
In the two days before the Marines landed, Oakley met separately with the two
dominant factional leaders in Mogadishu in order to prepare a smooth landing for
the Marines. He assured Aideed and Ali Mahdi that the forces arriving in Somalia
had no intention of interfering in Somali politics or in disarming the factions. The
intervention had the sole purpose of ending the famine, and the foreign troops would
only fight if attacked. In return, the warlords agreed not to resist the intervention
force.28 On 9 December, just before the troops arrived, an Air Force C-130 aircraft
dropped millions of leaflets over Mogadishu in what was part of what the American
military called ‘psychological operations.’29 The message read that UNITAF had come
to help, but repeated for a broader audience that all opposition would be met by
force. This pattern would be used throughout the operation as the troops fanned out
into the countryside, guaranteeing their arrival was unchallenged. 
South central Somalia was divided into nine humanitarian relief sectors. After
Mogadishu and the strategic airport at Bale Dogle, the Marines moved on to the
towns of Baidoa and Bardera, where famine had struck hardest. Meanwhile, other
contingents started arriving. The French Foreign Legion based in Djibouti soon joined
the Marines and helped secure Baidoa before they took control of Oddur near the
Ethiopian border. A battalion group from the Canadian Airborne Regiment occupied
Belet Huen and a Belgian parachute battalion, together with a US Army task force
from the 10th Mountain Division, soon took control of Kismayo after the Marines
secured the local airport. In January, the Australians would take control of Baidoa.
Between December 9 and the end of the year, all geographic objectives were secured
for the purpose of humanitarian relief. 
Providing security to relief operations was obviously a success. By late December
and early January there was consensus worldwide that the US-led intervention enabled
the relief organization to deliver much-needed supplies much more effectively. As a
result, many thousands of lives were saved.30 However, escorting convoys and feed-
‘peacekeeping’ in a power vacuum 171
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:05  Pagina 171
ing the people was not a strategy for solving Somalia’s problems, it was merely a
task. According the official US Army After Action Report of the Somalia mission,
the Bush administration recognized that lasting peace in Somalia could only be
achieved by disarming the warlords, reconciliation and assisting in the restoration
of law and order and societal infrastructure. However, these goals exceeded the pres-
ident’s intent for US participation in the intervention.31
Rapidly handing over to a UN peace-building mission was considered the ‘exit
strategy’ for US forces. This was unlikely to materialize in the proposed time span,
given the world organization’s extremely inefficient planning process and the dra-
matic shortage of troops. By the middle of 1993, the UN had 80,000 peacekeeping
personnel deployed in seventeen different missions, consuming a budget that totaled
nearly three billion dollars. The United Nations follow-up force, United Nations Oper-
ations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), hoped to be able to assume responsibility in the
second half of January. More realistic estimates held that it would take three months,
but UNOSOM was barely ready to do so when command was transferred on 4 May
1993, with only 16,000 UN troops on the ground. 
The limits of the American plan for the intervention in Somalia were dictated by a
combination of political naivety and certain inhibitions that pervaded American mil-
itary culture. Bush jumped into the power vacuum in Somalia with the stated inten-
tion of not affecting Somalia politically. In his television address on 4 December he
had said: ‘To the people of Somalia I promise this: We do not plan to dictate polit-
ical outcomes. We respect your sovereignty and independence … We come to your
country for one reason only, to enable the starving to be fed.’32 The assumption that
a large military force could be apolitical in an intervention, hand out the food and
retreat ‘without at least attempting to deal with the primary source of hunger – which
was political, not meteorological or logistical’ appears to have been genuine. Although
such naiveté was widespread in the early 1990s, it was somewhat surprising for the
pool of skilled and conservative foreign policymakers in the Bush administration who
had only recently intervened militarily in Panama, the Gulf, and northern Iraq.33
The underestimation of the mission’s implications can also be traced back to the
government’s recent success in northern Iraq. The assignment in Somalia remind-
ed General Hoar and his staff at Central Command of Operation Provide Comfort,
when in the aftermath of the Gulf War, a major humanitarian success was achieved
in only a few months.34 However, returning hundreds of thousands of refugees to
a Kurdish US protectorate outside the reach of Saddam Hussein was a highly polit-
ical goal. It was partly driven by geopolitical concerns that were lacking in Somalia
– arguably to the disadvantage of the Somalis. The strict limitations set on UNITAF’s
goals were primarily dictated by the fundamental preoccupations, frustrations and
fears of the US military that were intricately linked to Vietnam. The ‘Vietnam syn-
drome’ had only recently, but still only partially, been vindicated by the preponder-
ant military victory in the war against Iraq, a success that had given Colin Powell
an almost heroic status amongst US military personnel. 
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Powell’s plan for the Somali intervention was based on the doctrine that carried
his own name. What by the late 1990s was commonly known as the Powell Doc-
trine was in fact the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine from 1984. According to Powell,
the doctrine was drawn up in the direct aftermath of the suicide bombing that result-
ed in the killing of 241 servicemen in Beirut in October 1983. At the time he was
serving as national security advisor alongside Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberg-
er. It was first and foremost designed to avoid ‘another Vietnam,’ or as Powell once
put it, ‘half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the American people could
not understand or support.’ The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine held that military force
should only be used if there was a clear risk to US national security; that the objec-
tive should be unambiguous; that the force used should be overwhelming; and that
the operation must have strong public support and a clear exit strategy. It had become
Holy Scripture to a generation of military leaders that, like Powell, had served in
Southeast Asia and had been severely scarred by this humiliating experience.
Powell agreed to the operation because he recognized that public and political
pressure on the administration to intervene in Bosnia and Somalia was rising. Of
the two he regarded Somalia as the easier option.35 By taking the initiative, he sought
to dictate the conditions under which the armed forces were used. His opposition
to US military involvement in the ethnic conflict in Bosnia in the early days of the
Clinton presidency brought the general into a head-on collision with Madeleine
Albright. In her capacity as the US ambassador to the United Nations, and as a
strong advocate of using force to end ethnic slaughter, she once stared at Powell and
asked: ‘What’s the point in having this superb military you are always talking about
if we can’t use it?’ In his memoirs, Powell wrote about the incident: ‘I thought I
would have an aneurysm. American GIs were not toy soldiers to be moved around
on some sort of global game board.’36
The confrontation between Powell and Albright was an early manifestation of the
growing tendency within the US military elite to prescribe and circumscribe what
wars it would fight and not fight.37 The mainstream view of the purpose of the armed
forces was only to ‘fight and win America’s wars.’ These were perceived to be a form
of symmetric warfare prepared for against the Soviet Union and finally fought against
a less formidable opponent in the Iraqi desert. In the years following the Gulf War,
the US armed forces would grudgingly and half-heartedly make the operational shift
from preparing solely for all-out conventional warfare, to the murky and rapidly evolv-
ing concept of peace operations. As if Beirut, Panama and northern Iraq and a host
of other ‘small wars’ in the more distant past had not occurred, the US armed forces
tended to regard anything other than their preferred line of business as an aberra-
tion. 
In the case of Somalia, the threat to national security was clearly lacking from
the list of Powell’s preconditions. However, if he could not dictate to what end the
military would be employed, then at least he would determine how. Parallel to the
Doctrine’s advocacy of overwhelming force and limited and rigid objectives as the
US administration’s main policy guideline on military intervention, a powerful new
term entered the American military lexicon during the early 1990s. ‘Mission creep’
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became a code word for describing the incremental expansion of tasks beyond the
parameters set by the originally assigned mission. Although this often-used term was
highly influential in approaches to military operations there existed no common
understanding or definition of what ‘mission creep’ was.38 It failed to distinguish
between venturing beyond the parameters set by a mandate, broadening the inter-
pretation of an often vaguely defined mission, or a conscious policy decision to alter
or expand the mission. Generally, it was used in conjunction with the need to avoid
‘nation building,’ another poorly defined notion, which, from an ideal in the Kennedy
era, had become a term laden with negative emotive impact in the aftermath of Viet-
nam. Those continuously raising the flags on ‘mission creep’ assumed that a large
military presence in itself would not affect the operational environment – and demand
the mission to be adapted to new challenges and threats. Somalia proved them wrong.
Cosmetic Success
As soon as the Marines had hit the beaches in December 1992, they were confront-
ed by ambiguities caused by the narrow interpretation given to ‘creating a secure
environment.’ Colonel Gregory Newbold, the commander of the first Marine detach-
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ment in Somalia, instructed his troops to confiscate every weapon they saw around
the airfield they had secured. He was convinced that the most effective way to end
the violence was disarmament and every weapon taken by his Marines earned them
a standing ovation from the crowd that had gathered.39 French Legionnaires, assum-
ing the systematic confiscation of weapons was UNITAF policy, even started taking
small arms they found in vehicles. However, when Force Commander General John-
ston arrived in Mogadishu to assume command he ordered Marines and French
Legionnaires to stop confiscating all visible weapons. He reminded his forces that
they were not actually there to disarm the Somalis, but were told to take only tech-
nicals and ‘crew-served weapons,’ which are defined as any weapons system that
requires more than one individual to operate, such as machine guns, mortars, tanks
and artillery pieces.40 As long as they made no hostile gestures, Somalis were allowed
to retain their AK-47’s and other small arms.41
At this point it became apparent that no clear distinction had been made between
security for the delivery of humanitarian goods and security for the Somali people.
US political and military leaders, although in control of the largest and most mus-
cular ‘peacekeeping’ force in history, initially chose to disarm only when the action
directly assisted in the restoration of humanitarian relief.42 This meant that initial-
ly only heavy weapons were removed from the immediate vicinity of the areas where
UNITAF operated – not confiscated or destroyed – while the militias’ arms caches
were left alone.43 Technicals were stored at designated sites, but continued to belong
to their previous owners. Paradoxically, most Somalis – including the faction lead-
ers themselves – seem to have expected to be disarmed, as witnessed by the dramat-
ic drop in the price of an AK-47 just prior to the arrival of UNITAF. 
The strict limitations on disarmament signaled the factions to simply hide their
battlewagons and other heavy equipment in urban areas or move them into the coun-
tryside.44 Combined with massive US firepower and the obvious eagerness of Amer-
ican forces to leave Somalia quickly, this initially led to a policy of ‘respectful coex-
istence’ between UNITAF and militia leaders. On the ground this translated as ‘don’t
bother us in getting the food out and we won’t bother you.’45 From the very begin-
ning of the troubled US-UN cooperative effort, Boutros-Ghali wanted the Americans
to give a much broader interpretation to ‘creating a secure environment’ and follow
through with a comprehensive disarmament program. He knew that a follow-up force
under his direction would not have the same military capacities and feared that Soma-
lia would plunge back into anarchy unless the clan armies were disarmed. On Christ-
mas Day he harshly criticized Bush’s minimalist policy. It was an early sign of the
animosity between the US government and the secretary general that would escalate
in the years to come. 
The conflict over structural disarmament touched on the very heart of the mis-
sion and was entwined with the crucial matter of with whom UNITAF was going to
work – and therefore empower. The policy that assured the safe arrival of the troops
as negotiated by Oakley had a dangerous long-term side effect. The United States
did not seriously attempt to establish a transitional political authority, but by reach-
ing an agreement with the two high-profile faction leaders the Americans gave them
‘peacekeeping’ in a power vacuum 175
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:05  Pagina 175
unwarranted legitimacy and further raised their political profile in Somalia and inter-
nationally. All Somali faction leaders were keen on promoting the impression that
they were receiving foreign, and preferably US, backing. Especially Aideed always
made sure cameras were present when he met with American dignitaries. 
UNITAF’s initial superficial and short-term success in stabilizing the security sit-
uation therefore depended primarily on what critics of this policy have referred to
as ‘waltzing with warlords.’46 According to David Laitin, Oakley presented an ‘uncon-
vincing strategic calculus’ for his actions in retrospect. The ambassador argued that
accommodating the warlords was a first step to seriously involving civil society in
the reconstruction of the country.47 For the moment, this option was chosen as there
were realistic fears that the warlords, faced with the possibility of losing the military
capacity on which their power was based, would resist forcefully and cause signifi-
cant UNITAF and Somali casualties. The ambassador’s initial decision to accommo-
date the warlords was the result of orders from Washington to get food as quickly
as possible to the starving population in the countryside, and not to get involved in
reconstituting Somali society. 
While many commentators agree that Oakley sided too closely with the warlords,
it was undeniable that the quick opening-up of the routes for humanitarian aid saved
many lives. The initial military plan foresaw the creation of rudimentary security to
most of Mogadishu and a large build-up of troops before moving out into the hin-
terland. It anticipated the possible resistance of at least one of the factions. Impa-
tient aid agencies, whose complaints were widely covered in the media, demanded
that the Marines moved inland more quickly. ‘The delay in sending troops to Baidoa,
where up to one hundred bodies are being picked up from the streets every day, is
criminal’ said Russ Kerr, the vice-president of the NGO World Vision.48 Gun battles
between the clans were raging in the streets and aid workers, many of whom were
receiving death threats, were unable to perform their job in what the media had
dubbed ‘The City of Death.’ 
When ‘Task Force Hope,’ consisting of 700 Marines and 142 French Legionnaires
under Colonel Newbold, finally arrived on 16 December they received a liberators’
welcome. Oakley, and what an Army major called ‘the State Department and CIA
emissaries’ had visited local leaders the preceding day and impressed upon them not
to resist. The troops, who made it a habit to have aid organization bring relief sup-
plies on the day of their arrival, were met by cheering and waving crowds and a ban-
ner saying ‘We Are Happy For The Intervension’ (sic) suspended across the street.49
This was what a humanitarian intervention was supposed to look like, and the mas-
sive numbers of reporters at the scene made sure the world saw it. 
In early January, US Army Major Martin Stanton had a similar joyful experience
when he escorted a food convoy to Quorleey, a village in the fertile Lower Shabelle
Valley seventy kilometers west of Mogadishu. On the way he and his colleagues were
surprised to see how ‘cornfields and banana plantations abounded as far as the eye
could see,’ but when the convoy reached Quorleey, his vehicles were swarmed by a
massive crowd of cheering, jumping and hungry people. It was a reminder of the
true causes of the famine. The spectacle reminded Stanton of a Rama of the Jungle
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movie. ‘We were the first UNITAF soldiers these people had seen, and they were
coming out to see their “benefactors.” The major remembered that day as a ‘strange
but happy mission,’ and actually one of the few times during his deployment when
he thought ‘we actually might have helped a few people.’50 More of these scenes
would unfold elsewhere as the Marines escorted food trucks to some of the villages
worst hit by the famine in the coming days and weeks, but it was probably at this
point when most spectators in the Western world switched their TV sets to another
channel. Most Americans would only tune back in ten months later, when the bod-
ies of their dead soldiers were being dragged down the streets of Mogadishu by an
angry Somali mob, making them wonder what could possibly have gone so wrong.51
While the Western public was rapidly losing interest in Somalia after the initial
humanitarian success, this was only the beginning of an exhausting and often frus-
trating experience for the troops on the ground. Just hours after their arrival in
Baidoa, the Marines and their French colleagues started patrolling the city day and
night. They also set up checkpoints in and around the city and confiscated every
openly displayed weapon they encountered. Newbold’s weapons policy was far more
restrictive than that in Mogadishu and elsewhere in the country, and soon helped
curb banditry and extortion.52 In Baidoa, the security the troops provided to the peo-
ple soon proved far more important than the food they helped deliver. The locals
‘repeatedly emphasized that Americans will be respected as long as they appear strong
and unafraid.’ Newbold continued to translate this into displays of overwhelming
force. Days after their arrival, American and French patrols received sniper fire from
a compound belonging to one of Aideed’s allies in the region. The Colonel surround-
ed the site with a large force and ordered them to come out. The thirty gunmen that
emerged were disarmed and sent off and six confiscated technicals were dragged
behind US armored vehicles for an overall enthusiastic population to see.53
Meanwhile an uneasy peace had descended over Mogadishu by late December.
Boutros-Ghali initiated a preparatory meeting for a peace conference to be held
between fourteen political factions in Addis Ababa in early January. In order to find
a third way between appeasing the faction leaders and disarming them forcefully,
the UN helped broker an accord that would lead to voluntary disarmament and
national reconciliation and prepare a framework for the formation of a Somali gov-
ernment. On 29 December, there were signs of reconciliation when Aideed and Ali
Mahdi embraced in front of thousands of Somalis and the reporters’ cameras on
Mogadishu’s ‘green line’ that divided their zones of influence. The carefully orches-
trated peace rally was meant to reassure President Bush during his New Year’s visit
to Somalia. However, while the president spent New Year’s night onboard one of the
many US military vessels offshore, Aideed called UNITAF headquarters to claim he
was under heavy mortar fire. An analysis of the shell craters showed that it had in
fact been Aideed who was firing at his enemies, but was trying to manipulate the
events to his advantage.54
In Oakley’s recollection, Mogadishu was calm after ten days, with no shootings
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and no arms being carried in the streets.55 Although the situation in the capital had
indeed hugely improved, Mogadishu seemed anything but peaceful to the Australian
officers from the advance party tasked to prepare the way for the Australian troops
that were to take over Baidoa in mid-January. They still had to get adjusted to the
nightly ‘crack and thump’ of rounds hitting the US embassy compound building
where they were staying and where UNITAF headquarters was located.56 Sniper fire
continued to harass US troops and convoys. Around Christmas, the commanders
were actually short of troops to implement plans for increased security in the streets.
Towards New Year’s, the Marines stepped up their patrols in Mogadishu and John-
ston introduced a more aggressive arms control program aimed at confiscating all
visible weapons in the streets, a policy copied from the apparently successful meth-
ods used by Newbold’s Marines in Baidoa.57
In conjunction with this new ‘no visible weapons policy’ on the street, UNITAF
embarked on a more serious endeavor to control the warlords and their arms caches.
Oakley and UNITAF’s operations officer Brigadier Anthony Zinni, one of the rising
stars within the US military establishment, had gotten Aideed and Ali Mahdi to place
a portion of their arsenals in designated weapons storage sites by late December.
Expecting to gain from this cooperation, Ali Mahdi seemed to be in overall compli-
ance and would continue to be in the coming months. Soon, however, the refusal
of Aideed’s forces to allow Marine patrols to enter his sites to verify his compliance
with the agreement, combined with an increasing number of attacks and even
ambushes on US troops by the warlord’s militia from such compounds, caused an
escalation of violence. On the evening of 6 January, Johnston decided to answer these
provocations and ordered his troops to confiscate, with force if necessary, the weapons
in two storage sites after Oakley had revoked the weapons permissions earlier given.
The commander of the Marine Division in Somalia, Major General Charles Wilhelm,
knew he was probably ‘stirring up a hornet’s nest,’ but regarded this necessary to
‘clean this city up.’ On a political level, Oakley considered the timing of the opera-
tion to be opportune, because Aideed, after continuously appearing with US military
and State Department personnel in front of his own media’s cameras, ‘had convinced
the Somali people that he was the hero of the United States.’58 Early the next morn-
ing, after their demands were apparently ignored, Marines supported by tanks and
rocket firing Cobra attack helicopters raided Aideed’s armory, reportedly killing thir-
ty gunmen.59 The following week, the Marines conducted large-scale raids on two
arms markets, one in Aideed’s and one in Ali Mahdi’s area. They found some arms
and substantial amounts of ordnance, but the best equipment was apparently removed
as the word of the operation had preceded the Marines.60
On the one hand, UNITAF was getting tougher with Aideed, but on the other
hand the Bush administration openly displayed its eagerness to withdraw. Only two
days before raiding the warlord’s arms warehouse, Johnston had publicly announced
a plan for the handover of command to UNOSOM II on 20 January, the day before
Clinton’s inauguration. The Force Commander was under considerable political pres-
sure to turn over the mission as soon as possible, even though at Central Command
in Florida it was widely believed at the time that the factions would simply await the
178 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:05  Pagina 178
departure of the bulk of UNITAF and subsequently return to the status quo.61 While
there was little confidence in political reconciliation or success for the UN force,
American troops were planned to be progressively withdrawn over the following two
to three months. 
Then, on 11 January, there appeared to be a breakthrough when 14 clan leaders
reached an agreement in Addis Ababa. They agreed to a cease-fire and a voluntary
disarmament program to be monitored by the intervention force. These efforts were
seriously undermined by a quarrel between UNITAF and the UN over the respon-
sibility for the eventual disarmament and cantonment plan. Again, Boutros-Ghali
wanted to hold the powerful US-led force in Somalia as long as possible and hoped
it would assume responsibility for the disarmament process that would probably take
a year or more to execute. The UN refused to accept responsibility for the process
at this point. The pledges for disarmament and demobilization would be repeated
in March during a follow-up conference in Ethiopia, but this led to no tangible result. 
In mid-January the security situation in Mogadishu improved, but only temporar-
ily. According to the Marines, the weapons sweeps and an intensified patrolling
regime, did the job, but an uneasy and ill-defined peace persisted between UNITAF
and the warlords. In fact, ‘respectful coexistence’ was rapidly unraveling between Jan-
uary and March. Large-scale confrontations were postponed primarily because those
who expected to gain from a continuation of the armed struggle for power – most
of all Aideed and those affiliated with him – were waiting for the Americans to leave.
For the time being, most security problems appeared to be coming from ‘bandits,’
the generic term used for unidentified thugs and thieves. Nevertheless, Aideed’s radio
station started to incite violence towards the intervening forces. Occasional clashes
between the intervention force and militia elements persisted through January and
February. 
There were a number of reasons for Aideed and other warlords to increase their
opposition towards UNITAF. First of all, the international force began pushing into
the countryside in order to ‘pacify’ the provinces in January. Although not all con-
tingents pursued this with equal vigor, by moving into the interior, the force start-
ed to disrupt the hideouts in which the factions and bandits had stashed their weapons
or to which they had withdrawn. The second reason for the unraveling of the uneasy
peace was UNITAF’s increased weapons searches, with sweeps in Mogadishu and
into provincial towns such as Afgoye, Jowhar, Baidoa and Kismayo.62 This was done,
however, at a point when the limits of what UNITAF actually could and would do
were becoming more obvious to the warlords and bandits. The intervention force
initially overwhelmed and intimidated the Somalis. This situation was best exploit-
ed by the French in Oddur and the Marines in Baidoa. However, this momentum
seemed to be lost. 
The weapons policy was still half-hearted and complex in most places. Although
the ‘Four No’s – no technicals, no roadblocks, no visible weapons, and no banditry
– were praised in the US military evaluations for their ‘admirable simplicity,’ the lat-
ter two were far from simple to apply.63 Major Stanton, from what he witnessed on
the tactical level in his sector around the coastal city Marka, would have preferred
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large-scale disarmament, even though he recognized this would have taken months
and possibly a year. This, in his opinion, would have firmly established the interna-
tional intervention forces as the ultimate (albeit temporary) authority in Somalia. ‘As
it was,’ he complained, ‘we didn’t confiscate their weapons, but set out a series of
confusing restrictions on the major groups. For example, you may not have a ‘tech-
nical’ unless it’s parked here in this collection yard, or you cannot be showing any
visible weapons. This conveyed to the Somalis that we were afraid of (or at least con-
cerned about) their power.’64
At the time, many considered Boutros-Ghali’s ideas of total disarmament over-
ambitious. To make their case, skeptics such as Oakley referred to the unlikeliness
of clearing all illegal arms out of Washington or New York.65 Although ridding Soma-
lia of all its small arms would have been impossible, few doubted that reducing the
factions’ ability to resume their large-scale war of attrition was a prerequisite for any
long-term success. More important in the short term, was an effective weapons pol-
icy in the streets. As the Dutch Marines had discovered by refusing to go strictly by
the book in Cambodia, controlling small arms on the streets had the positive effect
of enhancing the intervention force’s authority and credibility in the eyes of the local
population. Banditry instead of faction-warfare was the biggest immediate threat to
their lives. However, no more than 4,621 rifles were confiscated by UNITAF nation-
wide between 10 December 1992 and 3 April 1993. Of those arms, 710 had to be
returned to guards hired by the relief organization. This was a meager harvest for a
force numbering 38,000 troops and probably even somewhat below the ratio of
weapons confiscated by the Marine battalion in Cambodia outside their UN man-
date.66
A third fundamental problem facing UNITAF in its relationship towards the war-
lords was it relationship with the attitude of the Somali population. There was a dan-
ger of losing popular support of those who welcomed the troops, as well as failing
to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Somalis who were more apprehensive about
the outside military presence. The warlords capitalized on any form of resentment
amongst the population in order to oppose the intervention force by using and manip-
ulating civilians to cause incidents that embarrassed UNITAF. This was revealed in
February when large-scale riots broke out in Kismayo and Mogadishu. 
Attitude Adjustment
Obviously, the posture and attitude of the troops on the ground towards the people
they had come to help was critical, but their patience and restraint was being thor-
oughly tested. Being in Somalia certainly did not earn them the gratitude many sol-
diers had expected before setting out on their humanitarian mission. Young GI’s had
a hard time identifying with anything they witnessed around them. It was obvious
that there were many ‘bad guys’ around, but it was still hard to pick them out of an
urban crowd or even in a rural village. When able to identify them, they were often
frustrated with the limitations set on their ability to engage. Meanwhile the ‘good
guys’ were not unconditionally pleased with the foreigners’ actions and presence.
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African-American troops – many of whom had been especially keen on helping the
Somalis – were taken aback when the Arabic population looked down on them, feel-
ing infinitely superior to black persons with their predominantly West African fea-
tures.67
Many of the foreign troops were surprised when they failed to witness the piti-
ful scenes of starvation they had seen on their television screens earlier. Although
there was clearly deprivation, the real famine had taken place in the interior, where
a minority of the soldiers operated. Some units deliberately rotated troops through
the countryside to make them aware of the purpose of their presence. Meanwhile,
relations between the US Marines and the relief workers in the southern part of
Mogadishu steadily deteriorated.68 The killing of relief workers by armed Somalis in
Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Baidoa in January and February contributed to a more
strained relationship between UNITAF and the humanitarian community.69 These
attacks were triggered by the NGOs laying off some of their unreliable, but extreme-
ly expensive guards, who were often regarded as redundant now that UNITAF pro-
vided security for relief convoys. However, the Marines in Mogadishu were reluctant
to provide close protection to the relief workers in their compounds, arguing that
they were overstretched already. Most of the other contingents were more forthcom-
ing and developed better relations.70 Some of the resentment could also be traced
back to a fundamental culture-clash between the ‘warriors’ and the ‘humanitarians.’ 
With children stealing anything they could grab from military vehicles and com-
pounds, with troops often being ‘needled’ by male teenagers throwing stones and
spitting at patrols, and while there was always the risk of bandits or militia taking
pot shots at the soldiers, many lost their patience and some their restraint. In order
to keep people away from their vehicles in Mogadishu many Marines started carry-
ing tent stakes or baseball bats, also knows as ‘Somali-be-good sticks.’71 Crowd and
riot control situations, either around food distribution points or in response to polit-
ically motivated rallies, were amongst the most depressing for all international forces
in Somalia. Most Western troops lacked any form of training for such public secu-
rity duties and US forces were initially prohibited from using non-lethal weapons
such as cayenne pepper spray. This forced them to do riot control the ‘old-fashioned
way,’ with rifle butts and bayonets.72
In the course of December and early January, General Wilhelm saw his Marines
as well as soldiers ‘lose their discipline and, he thought, their humanity. The anar-
chy in the place was like a relentless sun beating down on their sunburned fore-
heads day after day. Somali crowds pushed the troops to their limits. The Americans
reacted harshly, shouting back and brandishing their weapons. They hated everything
about Somalia.’73 After a month in the country General Wilhelm called for a ‘thirty-
day attitude adjustment.’ The order was reiterated to ‘smile and wave’ to Somalis
and he conveyed to the troops that ‘if you can’t still wave at kids, or are trying to hit
people, [you] are losing the bubble... It doesn’t make a damn bit of difference how
many weapons we confiscate if we lose the allegiance and support of the ninety-five
percent of really good people... This country doesn’t need a bunch of new oppres-
sors wearing brown uniforms.’74
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Three weeks later, a Marine sergeant driving a Humvee on the streets of Mogadishu
saw a young Somali boy reach into his moving vehicle and snatch his expensive sun-
glasses. The Marine leaned out the window and discharged his M-79 grenade launch-
er, loaded with a canister of buckshot over and behind his right shoulder. Fragments
from the canister wounded two Somali boys, one of whom was standing nearby sip-
ping grapefruit juice. A panel of officers and enlisted men, after hearing numerous
witnesses and examining the evidence, determined that the Marine had used exces-
sive force.75 On 14 February, an Army platoon was conducting a weapons sweep
through a village. As in many earlier sweeps, only a few small arms and some ammu-
nition were found, but no armed Somalis. Then two Somali men suddenly ran away
and some of the troops gave chase, firing warning shots into the air and yelling at
them to stop. One soldier pursued one of the men into a bushy area away from the
buildings and, after shouting ‘there he is,’ fired what he said was ‘a warning shot
in the dirt’ in order to convince the Somali to stop running away. After examining
ballistics and medical evidence and hearing testimony from a colleague who heard
the soldier admit to killing the man, a court-martial panel convicted him of ‘negli-
gent homicide.’ However, the convening authority later set aside the conviction. Aside
from the question of his criminal innocence or guilt, the panel found that the warn-
ing shots fired in and around the village were excessive under the circumstances.
His platoon leader, Lieutenant Brian Mangus, later argued that the Rules of Engage-
ment were vague and that he had received no in-depth briefing: ‘I’m sure if I don’t
understand the rules of engagement my soldiers don’t either.’76
Australian Major Michael Kelly, who often saw the Marines work in Mogadishu,
argued that the US Marine Corps possessed ‘the power and credibility that often
obviates the need to resort to that power through intimidation.’ However, the Marines
tended to be somewhat indiscriminate in their reliance on their intimidating pos-
ture. Although he had worked in anarchic Somalia in the previous months, the British
International Red Cross worker Khalil Dale described his first encounter with the
Marines as still somewhat of a shock:
They stopped us [at a road block], pointed their guns at us, and I remember one
of them shouting to me, ‘Hey, mother fucker, get your arse over here’ – very aggres-
sive, rude, and I was just amazed, I thought well surely they can tell the differ-
ence between a European Red Cross worker and a local Somali militia, but obvi-
ously it wasn’t so.... [I]t was fairly obvious to me and my colleagues that they hadn’t
been briefed and they certainly had no cultural briefing.77
He had better experiences with the Belgian forces in Kismayo, who also built a good
rapport with the local people.78 However, while the Marines may have lacked the
subtlety for this type of operation and Belgian Paratroopers – with their wide African
experience – were somewhat more culturally aware and diplomatic in their approach
to civilians, the Belgians, like the Canadians and the Italians, were involved in some
serious incidents of undisciplined fire and even torture of young Somalis. Most of
these excesses were related to infiltrations in compounds and other forms of theft.
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They caused serious embarrassment for UNITAF and their respective governments.
The torture and murder of a sixteen-year-old Somali prisoner by a Canadian corpo-
ral even triggered the disbandment of the entire Canadian Airborne Regiment sev-
eral years later. 
These and the other incidents gave rise to the notion of the ‘strategic corporal.’
In peace operations, the tactical, operational and strategic levels were drawn ever
closer together, causing a single unwise tactical move by a corporal or soldier on
patrol to instantly change the character of an entire operation and, when broadcast
by the ever-present media pool, possibly affect strategic considerations.79
Although some of the incidents involving American troops were broadly reported
in the press, in relation to the number of US forces on the ground, they had an over-
all good disciplinary record. Two Somalis were reportedly killed because of excessive
force by US troops between December 1992 and May 1993.80 There are abundant
examples of soldiers and Marines showing admirable restraint, given that the Rules
of Engagement were very lenient on self-protection – mostly giving the soldiers the
benefit of the doubt. Many US combat troops regarded their treatment of Somalis bet-
ter than that of the Belgians and Italians, and especially Nigerians and Tunisians. One
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A US Marine at a checkpoint in Mogadishu. US forces, ‘overequipped, security conscious, and psy-
chologically tense,’ were criticized for inspiring fear, while also being perceived as fearful by the Soma-
li population.
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soldier said, ‘we treated the Somalis better than any other nation and they treated us
worse.’81 Resentment against US forces, the Marines in Mogadishu in particular, were
caused by their general mode of operations, rather than by excesses.
The highly complex and unpredictable environment in which troops were inject-
ed exacerbated certain traits in US military culture, and particularly in Marine cul-
ture. Even more so than the Army, the Marines – a highly professional force trained
as shock-troops – saw themselves primarily as a combat force and tended to treat
all other tasks but ‘to fight and win America’s wars,’ with a certain disdain. The ‘jar-
heads,’ as the Marines called themselves, proudly carry their unit’s nicknames such
as ‘Hammerheads’ and ‘Suicide Charley’ Company.82 Marine culture, with its extreme
emphasis on discipline and the need to break down the individual civilian in order
to rebuild him as a Marine, created good war fighters, but often troops that lacked
the ability to interpret rules flexibly. This was considered not particularly desirable
in all-out conventional warfare waged by large combat units that had shown their
military effectiveness in the recent war against the Iraqi army by relying on their
devastating firepower, technology and discipline. 
The effects of this cultivated warrior ethos were exacerbated by an excessive Amer-
ican focus on force protection. The preoccupation with avoiding casualties arose after
the Vietnam War, but was strengthened in the wake of the suicide bombing in Beirut.
It would eventually lead to a ‘no casualty’ edict from the White House after the oper-
ation in Somalia had gone awry. During the 1990s, force protection became a mis-
sion in itself, listed above all other goals and prevailing to the level where some con-
sidered it to be an endstate.83 Gérard Prunier, a French commentator witnessed how
the ‘overequipped, security conscious, and psychologically tense US forces’ inspired
fear, while also being perceived as fearful in their flak jackets and helmets. They cre-
ated a distance between themselves and the population by relying on mounted patrols
and heavy displays of force. Their large convoys were often protected by helicopters,
whose rotor-wash had a devastating effect on the cardboard roofs of Somali houses
when hovering low over built-up areas. Prunier contrasted the American ‘human
tanks,’ as Somalis jokingly called them, with the French troops who seemed more
at ease with their environment, always wearing berets or desert-hats and flak jack-
ets only when they were about to go into combat. They tended to be more friendly
and open to verbal contact, but ready to instantly switch to a fighting mode. The
French, one third of whose 2,100 troops in Somalia had served in nearby Djibouti,
often wore the native futah, a wide, dress-like garment well adapted to the hot weath-
er when off-duty. Officers tended to mingle with the population and relief workers
when ‘off-duty,’ and earned a reputation for excellent human intelligence gathering.
At the same time, they engaged in long and intense patrolling, sometimes march-
ing for days on end, and cleared much of Oddur of its arms.84 The French were
generally regarded as highly successful, but their sector was known to be relatively
tranquil upon their arrival while they had a relatively large force at their disposal. 
Kelly argued that the role of the Marines might have been limited to securing
points of entry and ‘the territory to be occupied and establish credibility.’85 A differ-
ent type of force would then be needed for the next phase of operations. The prob-
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lem was that the replacement of one type of unit with the other proved impossible,
since throughout the 1990s high-quality and sufficiently equipped troops were in
short supply. Soldiers were going to have to be everything at once, performing the
role of the combatant, ‘beat cop’ and humanitarian worker and constantly adjusting
to the changing environment and a wide variety of players in the field. In order to
capture the complexities of a new type of operation, Marine Corps General Charles
Krulak, developed the influential notion of the ‘Three Block War’ in the aftermath
of the intervention in Somalia. He described how, 
in one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing dis-
placed refugees – providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they
will be holding two warring tribes apart – conducting peacekeeping operations.
Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All on the same
day, all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the three-block war.86
Strong resistance to this new reality persisted within the US armed forces that tend-
ed to rely heavily on specialized forces for all other functions than conventional com-
bat. Such opposition, although present in all Western military establishments, was
clearly stronger throughout the US military ranks than among Europeans, Canadi-
ans and Australians. 
As if not enough distance had been created between US troops and the local pop-
ulation, ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the Somalis was further complicated by
the severe restriction set on civic action. Despite the inclinations of US military per-
sonnel to provide direct aid to the population, medical units were initially even barred
from providing basic public health services such as inoculations.87 Officers on the
tactical level were angered by the strict limitations set on the use of US medical and
logistical means by Central Command and by UNITAF headquarters’ failure to press
for the necessary approval with the State Department. Colonel Frederick Lorenz,
UNITAF’s senior legal advisor, was given the unpleasant task of reigning in the ten-
dencies to engage in civic action, which was limited to unofficial, voluntary work.
Knowing that fears of ‘mission creep’ reigned supreme amongst US military and
political leadership, and ‘force protection’ had become their prime concern, the engi-
neers justified their efforts to repair and improve 1800 kilometers of roads as cru-
cial for the security of the troops, rather than support of the humanitarian work of
the NGOs. ‘If the roads are so potholed that you can’t drive down the road,’ Lorenz
conveyed to Washington and Tampa, ‘it makes you vulnerable to banditry.’88
In fact, attacks on relief convoys had already decreased dramatically despite con-
tinued inter-clan and factional conflict in the interior. Unhampered by looting, most
of the food was getting through to those in need and the death rate in Somalia was
reportedly down to one third of what it had been prior to December. However, ban-
ditry against civilians seemed to be increasing with criminals and militia redirecting
their efforts towards ‘soft targets.’89 As had become apparent in Cambodia, there
was no substitute for safety and order when it came to winning over the people, but
the mandate regarding public security was all but clear. 
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The Public Security Vacuum
The broadly worded mandate confronted the troops on the ground with the public
security dilemma of whether and how to enforce the law – and if so, what law to
enforce. UNITAF did not officially accept responsibility for internal security, or pub-
lic security in Somalia, but there was a lot of ambivalence in the language used to
describe ‘a secure environment.’ In his address to the nation, Bush directly addressed
the thugs that were ruling Somalia at gunpoint when he said: 
Let me be very clear: our mission is humanitarian, but we will not tolerate armed
gangs ripping off their own people, condemning them to death by starvation. Gen-
eral Hoar and his troops have the authority to take whatever military action is nec-
essary to safeguard the lives of our troops and the lives of Somalia’s people... the
outlaw elements in Somalia must understand this is serious business.90
The president’s tough talk did not correspond with the instructions to the troops
patrolling Somalia’s violent and unpredictable streets. In the first days of the inter-
vention, the dilemma was illustrated when the media described how a Somali woman
was being attacked in the streets of Mogadishu while hesitant Marines and Legion-
naires looked on.91 This incident caused UNITAF substantial embarrassment and
raised the very basic question of whether the intervention force was there to prevent
‘Somali-on-Somali violence.’ Responsibility for public security proved to be a peren-
nial problem in the future of peace operations, but was not solved in Somalia and
would not be solved in the years to come. 
Fifty kilometers south of Mogadishu, in Marka and the Shabelle Valley, Major
Stanton considered his American battalion ‘the only law west of the Pecos.’ While
this was translated primarily into an active program to suppress bandit activity in
the city and countryside, the troops he sent out on patrols would only intervene in
‘violent scenes of Somalis beating up Somalis’ if it looked like someone might get
killed. ‘Otherwise the smartest thing was to let them fight it out.’92 A Marine offi-
cer in the more turbulent capital, however, did not regard it his duty at all to stop
Somali-on-Somali violence in the neighborhood he was supposed to control. 
There is a common misunderstanding that UNITAF’s Rules of Engagement for-
bade any interference with Somali-on-Somali violence.93 The Rules of Engagement
have been called ‘one of the bright spots’ of the mission in Somalia and to some
extent, they were.94 In the official Marine Corps history of the mission, field histo-
rian Captain Dawson argued that the Rules of Engagement, those printed on the
pocket-sized card issued to all troops, were sound and clear in the head of each
Marine as he hit the beaches. A Marine could ‘shoot anyone who posed a threat’
and did not have to wait to be shot at first.95 However, the reason why Lieutenant
Brian Mangus, Stanton, and many troops on the ground challenged the clarity of
the rules was exactly this preoccupation within the Rules of Engagement – especial-
ly the condensed version they carried in their breast pocket – with opening fire for
self-protection. 
While the Rules of Engagement were initially occupied with possible hostile action
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directed against the force, engagement revolved around a far broader set of issues.
A reoccurring problem concerning Rules of Engagement was that while simplicity
was the key, since their applications fell to eighteen-year-olds rather than lawyers,
they revolved around complicated matters at the heart of the mission.96 First, as
mentioned above, there was the proper use of force, or ‘orders for opening fire’
(OFOF). It can be argued that these were a huge improvement over the restrictions
set on for instance UNTAC soldiers operating under a peacekeeping mandate that
allowed them to fire only when attacked – although even these rules could be broad-
ly interpreted as the Dutch and French had shown. Second, although not widely pub-
licized, deadly force could be used in Somalia against ‘armed elements, mobs and
rioters’ threatening ‘human life.’ Third, there was the question of the use of force
in relation to the confiscation of weapons. Dawson praised the confiscation of crew-
served weapons as another example of the clarity of the rules before landing. With-
out prior clarification, however, the commanders were authorized to use ‘all neces-
sary force’ to seize technicals. This left it up to the commander to determine whether
to shoot such a vehicle on sight. Johnston decided to have his subordinates chal-
lenge and approach technicals, only to use all necessary force if these weapons were
not voluntarily surrendered.97 It did not take long for other shortcomings of UNITAF’s
weapons policy to surface – as witnessed by the confusion and rapid evolution, and
widely different interpretations of the rules in that field.
Fourth, there was the problem of the apprehension or arrest of Somalis and the
subsequent handling of these detainees by military forces, which proved one of the
thorniest problems throughout the operation. Woven through all three issues was
the notion that the minimum amount of force should be applied whenever possi-
ble. The detention of Somalis had been anticipated by US military legal staff and
was described in the Rules of Engagement, but it was largely ignored by the higher
echelons and therefore poorly thought through.98 Moreover, all these rules were writ-
ten with self-protection, disarmament of crew-served weapons, and the delivery of
relief goods at their foundation. Since the troops had no formal policing role, the
act of arrest was usually left out of the procedures. The Rules of Engagement on the
pocket-sized card described how the detention of civilians was allowed ‘for security
reasons or in self defense.’ However, on top of self-defensive motives, the compre-
hensive version of UNITAF Rules of Engagement clearly authorized the detention
of civilians interfering with the accomplishment of the mission. This brought the
issue back to the fundamental question of whether the mission was to take ‘what-
ever military action’ to safeguard the lives of Somali people as Bush in his capacity
of the Supreme Commander of the United States armed forces had said – or sim-
ply protect the delivery of food. 
There were two clauses in the Rules of Engagement that seemed to take away
any doubt on the issue of detention. One said that an armed individual or crew com-
mitting a criminal act short of threatening UNITAF was to be detained by US forces
by applying the minimum amount of force. Another one allowed the detention of
persons who committed a criminal act ‘in areas under control of US forces.’99 Def-
initions of criminal acts and areas under UNITAF control were not provided and
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there was no specific reference to public safety. Nevertheless, there were ample legal
grounds to intervene in Somali-on-Somali violence. It was all up to the command-
er, whose interpretation of the rules was determined by the strategic guidance he
received from his superiors. Since the goal of the intervention was unclear and evolv-
ing, public security involuntarily became a part of the mission
Once a Somali was detained, new problems obviously arose. With the absence of
a functioning local police force or justice system, the options to soldiers witnessing
a crime in progress were very limited. They either had to ignore violence or theft,
or intervene and be confronted with the absence of a follow-up procedure. When an
American patrol came across a gang rape being committed in broad daylight, sol-
diers intervened and held the offenders captive on the spot, only to be confronted
with the extreme embarrassment of having to let them go.100 The Rules of Engage-
ment said that detainees were to be handed over to US military police (MP) and
afforded the same rights and treated as prisoners of war under the Geneva and The
Hague Conventions. But military police officers were in very short supply. Early plans
for the deployment of three MP battalions were changed and US forces were initial-
ly only allocated three MP companies.101
Like UNITAF’s disarmament policy, detainee policy would evolve. In spite of the
military leadership’s resistance to ‘mission creep,’ it was recognized that at least a
minimal level of law enforcement would have to be allowed so commanders and
their legal advisors made the rules up as they went along. The US military’s legal
advisors, Staff Judge Advocates (SJAs), played an important role in adjusting and
reinterpreting the Rules en Engagement, walking the streets of Mogadishu and secur-
ing the ‘feedback loop’ from the grass-roots level through UNITAF headquarters up
to Central Command.102 On 24 December it was reconfirmed that the detention of
civilians was allowed ‘under exceptional circumstances.’ Detention by UNITAF was
limited to those suspected of ‘crimes of a serious nature,’ in cases where ‘the fail-
ure to detain would be an embarrassment to the US’ This meant soldiers could act
when they witnessed a murder, torture or inhumane treatment, rape, and assault
resulting in serious injuries. Although not specified in the instructions, catching an
offender in the act remained the sole basis for detention. There would generally be
no investigations into tip-offs or other indications of crimes. 
With military police officers in desperately short supply and a lack of prison facil-
ities, in most cases a Somali caught committing a crime either against UNITAF or
the local population would be held for a couple of hours and then released. The futil-
ity of apprehending Somalis became apparent and was a source of much frustration
for the troops who risked their lives pursuing and capturing criminals. By 9 Febru-
ary, Johnston established a formal detainee policy. Detainees could be held on a local
military contingent’s facility for a maximum of 48 hours. If there was sufficient evi-
dence, a detainee was to be moved to the UNITAF detention facility at Mogadishu
University. There he could be held up to 72 hours for a probable cause hearing. The
probable cause determination was made by either the UNITAF chief of staff or the
operations officer in consultation with the UNITAF staff judge advocate, Colonel
Lorenz.103
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Within the first two months, UNITAF’s mission thus had expanded or had ‘creeped’
substantially, but this is where the Force Commander drew the line for the use of
military assets to fill in the law-and-order vacuum. Although the matter of military
tribunals had been raised prior to deployment by judge advocates, this was done only
in the context of detainees who had threatened the force or the relief effort. This mat-
ter was also ignored by the higher echelons.104 The lack of any follow-on legal pro-
cedure for those Somalis against whom probable cause was made out continued to
plague the troops on the ground. In some cases, such frustration manifested itself in
harsh treatment and even summary justice, incidents that could alienate the local pop-
ulation. No solution to the follow-up procedures in criminal cases was possible until
some form of local police organizations and court system was resurrected. 
According to the Australian contingent’s legal advisor, Major Michael Kelly, the source
of UNITAF’s lingering problems surrounding the public security vacuum was the
lack of a sound legal framework for the operation. The absence of civil government
and functioning institutions prevented Somali civil law from being applied. The
absence of a host nation state also precluded a treaty to regulate UNITAF’s assump-
tion of certain sovereign rights for an interim period. This form of pacific or non-
belligerent occupation was applied in Cambodia and would be the framework dur-
ing peace operations in Haiti, in the Balkans after 1995 and in East Timor in 1999.
Kelly argued that in the absence of a government in Somalia, the laws of occupa-
tion as laid down in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the one ‘Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War’ could and should have been used as
a legal basis and guideline. Kelly considered the idea after he arrived in Mogadishu
in early January and would influence the Australian commanders’ approach toward
the law-and-order vacuum in Baidoa. 
Kelly’s American colleagues, responding to the limits set on Operation Restore
Hope by their political and military superiors, had come to a different legal inter-
pretation. Johnston’s principle legal advisor, Colonel Lorenz, and Central Command
legal advisor Colonel Walt Huffman did discuss the application of the Fourth Gene-
va Convention, but the Americans determined that UN Security Council Resolution
794 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – authorizing ‘all necessary means’ to
provide security for the delivery of relief supplies – provided adequate legitimacy.
They and US political and military leaders argued that, since there had been no inter-
national armed conflict over Somalia, and they were not an invading force displac-
ing a local government, the laws of occupation as set forth in the Fourth Geneva
Convention did not apply. They were clearly apprehensive about the legal require-
ments on the ‘occupation force’ to provide for the civilian population as laid down
in the Geneva Convention.105 On 1 December, a week prior to the intervention Lorenz
had advised his commander: 
Although we do not seek to enter as an occupation force, recent experience in Iraq
demonstrates that [when] we establish control over an area with no government
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infrastructure, we may be held to occupation force standards. Under internation-
al law an occupying force is responsible for the public welfare, to include safety,
sanitation and a whole host of other requirements. We have to make every effort
to limit our responsibility in these areas, to ensure we act within our capabilities,
and be sure that the primary mission is still accomplished.106
For a number of valid reasons, the most obvious being public relations, it clearly
made more sense for the Bush administration to hand out the food under the guise
of UN ‘peacekeeping’ than by invoking the image of military occupation. For rea-
sons of legitimacy, this was unnecessary, and the practical implications were dread-
ed. Moreover, it was expected that any reference to occupation would have a stifling
effect on international contributions to UNITAF and its UN successor.107
Nevertheless, Kelly convincingly argued in the aftermath of the operation that
even in the absence of a state of war or armed resistance, UNITAF’s presence sat-
isfied all the criteria for the laws of occupation to apply.108 He regarded the failure
to take the law of occupation as a guideline for operations in Somalia a missed oppor-
tunity first and foremost, because of its practical use in dealing with the public secu-
rity vacuum. It provided for the temporary administration of justice and guidelines
for dealing with and local law, including departing from it when necessary. It also
gave guidelines for the reconstruction of a judicial capability where there was no
local capability. Moreover, he countered US fears of being overwhelmed by obliga-
tions towards the civilian population by pointing out an important caveat in inter-
national law. An occupation force was only obliged to meet the needs of the popu-
lation in the field of health, sustenance, and welfare to the extent of its spare capa-
bilities. Precedence could always be given to operational demands.109
Primarily as a result of the exclusion of any form of ‘nation building,’ a conscious
decision was made at Central Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to deploy-
ment in Somalia not to deploy major civil affairs assets in Somalia. Early plans, based
on recent experiences in Kuwait and Northern Iraq, where one thousand civil affairs
and three hundred specialists had been deployed respectively, had called for the inclu-
sion of a downsized civil affairs brigade of an estimated two to three hundred per-
sonnel in the force structure. In Kuwait, these specialists had helped reconstruct gov-
ernment services, while in Kurdish Iraq they were deployed primarily as an inter-
face with the humanitarian organizations. However, sizable civil affairs units as well
as a larger military police detachment were ‘carefully removed’ from the force pack-
age.110
Regardless of how the mission in Somalia was interpreted, the large humanitar-
ian dimension would have required a large civil-military interface. However, there
was an additional reason for the objections within the senior-command level within
the US military to injecting these specialist forces. Almost the entire five thousand
strong civil affairs capacity consisted of US Army Reserves. The only active-duty unit
was the 212-member strong 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. According to Ann Wright,
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an American diplomat, both the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs at State
Department and the Special Operations Division at the Pentagon ‘tried desperately’
to convince the Joint Chiefs of Staff to activate these reserves. But to no avail.111
Apparently the senior military leadership was well aware that the president would
not consider calling up the reserves – a move that was traditionally politically sen-
sitive.112
In the end, only a maximum of thirty-six civil affairs personnel from the 96th
Civil Affairs Battalion were deployed in Somalia.113 Six four-man tactical teams joined
the Marine and Army battalions in the provinces. The rest, augmented by regular
military personnel and civilian personnel from USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response
Team (DART), manned the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) at UNITAF
headquarters. Requests for additional civil affairs personnel were denied. The CMOC,
a concept developed in northern Iraq to coordinate military and humanitarian efforts,
was headed by US Marine Corps Colonel Kevin Kennedy, who reported straight to
Zinni. Kennedy, who was experienced in working with relief organizations and famil-
iar in the region, treated relief organizations as the CMOC’s ‘customers.’114 He per-
formed very well in cooperation with and support of Phillip Johnston who ran the
UN Humanitarian Operation Center (HOC) that was eventually co-located with the
CMOC. Through this novel UN coordinating mechanism, Johnston was given the
challenging task of coordinating all humanitarian operations, executed by a wide
range of aid organizations that traditionally cherished their independence. Accord-
ing to Johnston, Kennedy took over much of the coordination within the HOC when
illness forced him to leave Somalia and did much to streamline the organization.
Although the degree of coordination varied from one sector to the other, depending
on the strategy and attitude of the local commander, relations between the military
force and the humanitarian community were reasonably good. Kennedy argued that
the poor relations between the Marines and relief organization in southern Mogadishu
were the exception, rather than the rule in Somalia. 
The success of the CMOC concept in northern Iraq and Somalia, with its pre-
dominantly humanitarian focus, caused civil affairs, and its reemerging NATO equiv-
alent, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), to be approached predominantly as a tool
dealing with the military-humanitarian interface. In practice more than in theory,
both civil affairs and CIMIC would also concentrate on civic action – humanitarian
projects of an ostensibly non-political nature that contributed to the well being of
the local population as well as enhancing the profile and acceptance of the military
force. For the future development of both concepts this narrow view tended to obscure
the traditional roles played by civil affairs personnel in running a military govern-
ment in occupied territory and reconstructing or supporting local administrative capa-
bilities. 
Benevolent ‘Mission Creep’
It remains speculative to what extent the decision not to apply the laws of occupa-
tion and the reluctance to include a robust civil affairs and military police capacity
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hampered UNITAF in its ability to seize and exploit the opportunities that were
emerging in the field. Faced with chaos and anarchy before them, tactical command-
ers were forced to fill the administrative and public security vacuum haphazardly.
This was usually done by the commanders, ad-hoc Civil Military Operations Teams
(CMOT), MPs and legal advisors. On the motives for taking on additional tasks, Stan-
ton said that ‘it was instinctive to try to impose order, to re-establish services and
some kind of authority’ in the coastal town Marka.115 His motivation did not differ
much from that of the Dutch Marines in Cambodia, who were simultaneously cross-
ing the boundaries of their mandate halfway across the globe. Commanders wanted
the results of their strenuous efforts to create some security to somehow stick, instead
of being merely cosmetic. Compared to Cambodia, where some form of local gov-
ernment and UN civil administrative capacity were present, the tactical command-
ers in Somalia faced an even broader challenge in the civilian sphere. With their
security mission even more poorly defined, local military commanders constantly felt
the pull of the power vacuum. It was at this point that ‘mission creep’ was coined
by those eager to stick to the narrowly defined parameters of the humanitarian mis-
sion. The term ‘mission creep’ also found its way toward America’s coalition part-
ners in Somalia, although they were overall less apprehensive about the assumption
of additional responsibilities. 
As noted before, Oakley has often been criticized for his fixation on the battle for
turf in Mogadishu and his ‘top-down’ approach that seemed to legitimize the status
of the warlords on a national level. In defiance of such criticism he has argued in
retrospect that he stimulated a reverse ‘bottom-up’ development at the provincial
level. During his visits to the provinces ahead of the troops, he first explained the
objectives of the force and told the local warlords not to oppose UNITAF – or face
the risk of being annihilated. The ambassador also set a pattern by meeting with
other local leaders, ‘a broad cross-section of the local population’ in order to convey
that the Marines were coming to ‘help Somalia save itself’ and not to impose any
particular settlement. He or one of his deputies leading the advance team of ‘CIA
and State Department types,’ as one military officer described them, stimulated the
local communities to come forward with some kind of representative body.116 The
selection of this group, usually consisting of fifteen to twenty persons including clan-
elders, religious figures, political leaders and women, would be left to the commu-
nities themselves:
We said: you decide. You can pick your representatives any way you want. You can
do it on the basis of local custom, clan custom that is, you can do it on a reli-
gious basis, you can pick straws, roll dice... just give us something to work with.117
Although the intentions of these meetings were likely to have been limited and in
support of the humanitarian effort, Oakley claimed in 1996 that his objective had
been to ‘lay the groundwork for the revival of local political institutions.’118 On anoth-
er occasion, however, he also acknowledged, ‘we were not thinking far ahead. We
were not thinking about rebuilding the country or what the power structures should
be.’119
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If there was any political guidance for the local UNITAF commanders in the
course of December and January, it was to restore the authority of the clan elders
and preferably avoid cooperation with the local warlords. Oakley’s State Department
officials were in desperately short supply and mostly appeared only at the initial
meetings directly following the arrival of units in their sectors. Much of the politi-
cally sensitive decisions on who to work with – and thus strengthen – had to be
made by the commanders on the ground. The battalion commanders clearly had
received no training or instructions for this role. Having to rely on gut feelings, polit-
ical tact and improvisation in absence of a prescribed political-military strategy and
advice in the field, some were more successful than others. They were always at risk
of empowering certain undesirable local leaders by legitimizing their position. 
Two six-person Army civil affairs teams supported the Marines in Baidoa and one
was deployed with Colonel Bedard’s Marines in Bardera. Their preparation and focus
was initially narrow.121 Colonel Werner Hellmer, a Marine Corps lawyer, was in charge
of the Civil-Military Operations Team to which the scarce civil affairs assets were
allocated in this area. His primary concern was coordinating the humanitarian effort
with the relief agencies and – rather surprisingly for a civil-military operations offi-
cer – initially commented that ‘dealing with the Somalis was well beyond his char-
ter.’ After it became clear that State Department support in working with the locals
was extremely limited, Bedard accepted that he and his men ‘were stuck with it.’120
Although many commanders improvised well, this tendency within the US armed
forces to initially treat anything outside combat or security operations with a certain
disdain is likely to have been a greater obstacle to their ability to fill the vacuum
than the lack of sufficient numbers of civil affairs personnel. 
In Baidoa, the first local leader to approach Colonel Newbold was Omar Elmi, a
local militia leader affiliated with Aideed. According to the official, unpublished
Marine Corps history of this episode, Elmi delivered his letters of credentials and
good wishes from Aideed and pointed out the locations of ‘his rivals’ from the Soma-
li National Alliance. The SNA, in fact, was Aideed’s faction, so it remains unclear
whether the Marines had a clear picture of the local political situation.121 However,
it struck the Marines that his intentions were hardly honorable. In other provincial
towns and villages across Somalia similar ‘SNA officials’ or other militia represen-
tatives – usually relatively young men and inevitably wearing sunglasses – approached
the tactical commanders. Newbold’s Marines put their faith in the group of local eld-
ers that presented themselves next day. Their primary concern, public safety rather
than food aid, inspired Newbold to apply his more stringent weapons policy. Later,
many other elders approached the Marines and tried to convince them that those
claiming to be the elders were not recognized as such by the community. 
Both Newbold and Bedard, who used his two-day stopover in Baidoa as a source
of inspiration for his operations when he deployed in Bardera, were aware of the
danger of being perceived as picking sides in the ever-present factional strife. New-
bold and Hellmer, who were at the time advised by one of Oakley’s State Depart-
ment representatives, suggested that the different groups try to reach an agreement,
after which they came forward with – what Hellmer at that time perceived to be –
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a ‘thoroughly good cross-section’ of the Baidoan community. Following the policy of
non-interference in local politics, Newbold was extremely keen not to impose any
solutions, or even ‘implying that a certain policy was preferred.’122 In the month that
the Marines were in control of Baidoa their CMOT facilitated the creation of three
local committees, dealing with security, relief and the elders. They seemingly failed
to appreciate that they were in fact including many of Aideed’s representatives who
immediately dominated the security and relief committees.123 Also in Marka, US
Army Lieutenant Colonel James Sikes and his civil affairs officer were determined
to ignore ‘the local SNA officials,’ only to accept the authority of the clan elders. It
is not clear, however, how they determined who was truly representative of the com-
munity.124
The most important committee to emerge in Baidoa was the security council,
which bore some resemblance to the ‘Anti-Banditry Committee’ stimulated by the
Dutch Marines in Sisophon, Cambodia. In Baidoa, the elders selected as represen-
tatives asked the commander to help create a local police force. This is probably
where the story of the reconstruction of the Somali police in the areas under UNITAF
control starts. It is not quite clear where the initiative first emerged. Overall, the for-
mation of local police can be considered the most crucial and potentially most suc-
cessful part in the whole UNITAF phase of the Somalia intervention. Its relative suc-
cess, although short lived in most places, has caused many to claim the credit.125
Similar developments occurred in the Canadian, Belgian and French sectors. 
The reason for the confusion over where and how the Somali police force
reemerged was that the former Somali police officers principally came forward on
its own initiative. Prior to the fall of Barre’s regime, Somalia’s police force was approx-
imately 15,000 strong. It was independent of the dictator’s security police and wide-
ly regarded as one of Somalia’s most stabilizing influences. Its officers were gener-
ally respected and, other than the military, which had relied primarily on Soviet train-
ing, the police forces were Western trained and relatively apolitical. After the war-
lords took over, the police disappeared for their own safety and often returned to
their clans, but usually did not take sides in the civil conflict.126 The Somali police
took much pride in their work and re-emerged all over the country in the wake of
the deployment of UNITAF forces. While in Baidoa the council of elders came for-
ward with the initiative, in Mogadishu they emerged on their own and started to per-
form some very basic community policing in their own neighborhoods. On 19 Decem-
ber, Oakley and General Johnston drove a Humvee across Mogadishu and ended up
in a massive traffic jam. They were getting increasingly nervous about someone toss-
ing a grenade at their vehicle, when suddenly a former Somali police officer in his
old green uniform with a blue beret, got out in the intersection. He blew his whis-
tle and started waving a baton and to their great surprise all the vehicles obeyed and
the traffic jam disappeared.127 No less then three thousand police officers would gath-
er on their own and present their services to UNITAF.128 The ambassador and the
general then started to ponder the possibility of using this potential asset. It was
handed to them on a silver platter – especially when compared to police reconstruc-
tion efforts in future peace operations. 
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At this point Oakley came to realize that it would be impossible for the US forces
to conclude their mission with any substantial claim of lasting success unless they
engaged in some rudimentary institution building. The ambassador argued in retro-
spect that he did all that was possible to build up local police within tight restric-
tions set by both the US and the UN.129
We had a big fight with Washington since the State Department and Pentagon
said, ‘No, this is mission creep. You can not do it.’ We countered that it wasn’t
mission creep; it was force protection. We wanted the Somali police, whom we
knew had a good reputation with the Somali people, to be out there on static
guard duty guarding the gates. They spoke Somali; we didn’t. They understood the
body language; we didn’t. They can deal with crowds in their own way. They don’t
have to shoot them or hit them with gun butts, thereby provoking a nasty response.
We’d rather let them do the job. We had a long, ongoing fight with Washington.130
On 12 January, the night Oakley’s third request to National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft for official approval was declined, the first Marine was killed by hostile
fire during a patrol in a dark alley. Washington instantly gave the go-ahead, but he
was informed that no material support from the American government would be
forthcoming. UNITAF would have to scramble for funds and materials locally.131
General Johnston was initially reluctant to have the military force assume respon-
sibility and oversight of the police force, which he considered outside his mandate,
but came around when it became obvious that it would help his troops. He charged
Zinni with overseeing the operation. The commander of the UNITAF military police,
Provost Marshal Lieutenant Colonel Steven Spataro, was put in charge of vetting and
equipping the policemen. The prime motive for creating a rudimentary police force
was relieving soldiers of the task of patrolling dark allies, performing static guard
duty at facilities and humanitarian aid distribution points and having to control crowd
in the cities. Both the White House and Central Command considered anything else
‘beyond the mission.’132 Little policy guidance would be forthcoming from Washing-
ton in the coming weeks. The government was in transition and the new Clinton
administration was unlikely to engage itself in foreign policy matters at this early
stage. 
There were other obstacles to the reconstruction of a Somali police force. The
State Department, although more receptive to the idea, was worried about violating
congressional prohibitions on aiding foreign police forces. The police force was there-
fore called the Auxiliary Security Force (ASF). Also, the United Nations were not par-
ticularly forthcoming at this stage. Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan initially refused to
engage in institution-building activities on the grounds that government institutions
at the national level had to be established first, before local police forces could be
erected. UN humanitarian coordinator Philip Johnston was a staunch supporter of
the ‘bottom-up’ effort to resurrect the local police ahead of national reconciliation.
On his own initiative he backed it with financial and material resources and would
propose a ‘detailed plan to make it a major element of the UN program.’ It would
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take until April for the police to be officially paid. In the meantime, the World Food
Program supported the police force with food rations for police officers and their
families.133
The Bush administration’s motives for objecting to more formal American engage-
ment in institution building soon became obvious. Two crucial problems emerged
after the limited and improvised police reconstruction program got underway. It
would have to be determined to whom the police force would answer and what the
police would do after it had apprehended a person. UNITAF refused to shroud itself
in the robes of the sovereign and take direct responsibility for the police. In the
provinces, UNITAF units often adopted the police force, with the local military com-
mander performing more or less the mayor’s role. Also, in Mogadishu, Marine units
would co-locate small military outposts with ASF police stations to protect them
against militia and bandits and engage in joint patrols. The French and the Aus-
tralians were seen as taking very direct control over the local police forces, with tan-
gible results in their levels of confidence and performances.134
In Mogadishu, the problem was compounded by the decision to work through
the warlords. Again, UNITAF was extremely lucky to have a potentially independent
police commander, Brigadier Ahmed Jama, who proved acceptable to both Aideed
and Ali Mahdi. However, Jama declined the offer made to him by UNITAF officers
to chair the police committee when Oakley allowed that committee to include polit-
ical representatives from the clan-based factions. These non-police officials were unac-
ceptable to Jama, who wanted no political interference. His fears that the thugs with-
out any proper police background would dominate the committee meetings proved
correct in the following months. The factional problems would continue in the cap-
ital but nevertheless, by March 1993, there was a 3,000-man police force in
Mogadishu. Two thousand officers took to the streets in the rest of southern Soma-
lia. They were unarmed and underequipped, however, which did not allow them to
reestablish their authority as long as UNITAF would not fully disarm the militias.135
The second problem was what to do with ASF detainees. The haphazard, but
rapid and temporarily successful, efforts to establish new local police forces created
some alternative for the unwelcome task of the foreign troops handling detainees.
Most of these could now be transferred, but the intervention force was confronted
with the next stumbling block. Spataro warned Zinni in late January that without a
judicial system, the police could not effectively function.136 In that case, it would also
have to be determined what law applied in Somalia and a prison system would have
to be erected. Also the new Clinton administration was all-too eager to push those
problems to UNOSOM. In the meantime, with little backing from Washington or
the United Nations, some of these tasks were taken in hand by more visionary offi-
cers at UNITAF headquarters and some of the tactical units deployed throughout the
country. The inevitability of institution building had become obvious, but concerns
over ‘nation building’ contributed to ‘mission creep’ – rather than prevented it. As
Major Stanton found out in Marka: ‘Better had there been a comprehensive plan
outlining a long-term strategy for the reestablishment of government in Somalia.
This would have made mission creep unnecessary. As it was, UNITAF proceeded
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further and further into nation building. We had gotten on this bus and now we
didn’t have a clue as to where it was going. We just knew we couldn’t get off.’137
The very presence of US troops in the power vacuum of Somalia had created its own
momentum. A window of opportunity seemed to present itself in January 1993, when
UNITAF reached the peak of its strength with 38,000 troops in theater. By securing
relief operations, the intervention had drastically upset the existing predatory order
based on weapons and food aid and temporarily undermined the power of the war-
lords. At this point the American-led force was the sole organized entity capable of
exercising authority in the areas it occupied and had, unwillingly, become de facto
the state. According to Kelly, the force ‘clearly had the capacity to exert control over
this territory and assume the prerogatives of the sovereign and in fact did so in a
broad variety of areas.’138 Officially, however, despite the fact that there was no sov-
ereignty to offend, UNITAF refused to accept responsibility and to replace the exist-
ing disorder. The window would not be open for long as the warlords were sensing
the limits of the US’s willingness and the UN’s ability to fill the vacuum. 
Walter Clarke, the American deputy chief of the diplomatic mission in Somalia
and one of Oakley’s later critics, blamed the ambassador and the force commander
for wearing narrow political blinders. They refused to accept the ‘implied authority’
in a nation without a government. Clarke, who later became director of the new US
Army Peacekeeping Institute, is hardly alone in charging Johnston and Oakley with
suffering from ‘political myopia.’139 While Oakley portrayed police reconstruction as
one of their major successes, Martin Ganzglass, an American lawyer who became
involved in police and judiciary reconstruction in May, blamed the ambassador for
not paying sufficient attention to the resurrection of local police forces.140 Others,
however, praised Oakley and Johnston for staying within the parameters of the mis-
sion and maintaining the exact scope envisioned by the Bush administration. This
raises the question of how much influence the leaders at the operational level could
wield over the interpretation of the mission. The judgment on the missed opportu-
nities in Somalia, and those responsible, can best be assessed in the context of a
comparison with those who best exploited the opportunities that arose in the field.
Ganzglass based much of his critique on what he had seen the Australians do with
minimal means in the Bay region after taking over from the Marines. He lauded
them for adopting ‘the right approach.’141
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7Securing and Governing Baidoa:
Australia’s Living Laboratory in Somalia
Australian troops arrived in Somalia one month into the operation, just as UNITAF
was reaching its peak strength of 38,000 in mid-January 1993. An opportunity for
peace seemed to present itself as the warlords’ military capacity was temporarily neu-
tralized. By this point, however, the intervention process stalled, as there was no plan
on how to proceed. Complex issues such as disarmament and restoration of govern-
ment and services continued to be outside Washington’s scope, but the United States
continued to treat the two most powerful warlords, Aideed and Ali Mahdi, as legit-
imate political players. Washington’s ability to provide strategic direction was tem-
porarily paralyzed by the handover of government from Bush to Clinton, while Colin
Powell and the US military elite – already wary of the new administration’s inter-
ventionist foreign policy ambitions – were effectively opposing the possibility of using
the US military in anything resembling a ‘nation building’ role. In the meantime,
the United Nations provided little direction on the policy level and proved unable to
assume operational control of the mission – leaving the US-led military forces to
play the role of reluctant and often ineffective vacuum fillers. Boutros-Ghali contin-
ued to seek national reconciliation through the warlords, while his Secretariat failed
to raise an adequate civil administrative or civilian police capacity necessary to engage
in institution building from the bottom up. 
In the meantime, at the tactical level a wide variety of approaches to the vacuum
resulted from the ill-defined parameters of UNITAF’s mission and the relative auton-
omy for the commanders in the field. The Australians soon found themselves taking
the mission beyond anything attempted by other contingents. In the aftermath of the
failed intervention, the idea emerged that the Australians had arrived with ‘a full-
fledged civil affairs plan’ for the reconstruction of the police and judiciary in the Bay
region. This view was echoed by Walter Clarke, and also picked up by Robert Oakley
and those defending American actions, or inaction, in the first months of 1993. The
idea that the Australians came fully prepared for this specific mission apparently served
as an explanation for the opportunities missed by the Americans in Somalia. This is
a myth, however, that obscures the more fundamental sources of their relative suc-
cess.
The Legacy of the Marines 
On 5 January, after having spent almost a week in Mogadishu, a small reconnais-
sance team led by Australian Colonel Bill Mellor, headed out to Baidoa. Mellor was
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the senior national commander at UNITAF headquarters and went to prepare the
way for the Australian Battalion Group, which had been assigned to the Bay region
on 21 December. The landscape they traversed on the seven-hour drive reminded the
officers of inland Australian scrub country, ‘monotonous and flat as a pancake.’ It
was predominantly open savannah with patches of camel-thorn bushes. The Amer-
ican convoy on which they traveled was, as always, an impressive display of firepow-
er, with the menacing roar of helicopter gunships constantly overhead and escort
vehicles ‘bristled with guns barrels pointed in every direction.’ 
Baidoa at the time was still commonly referred to in the Western press as ‘The
City of Death,’ but the responsible Australian policy makers did not mind the high-
profile sector. Serving in a merely supporting role in past peacekeeping operations
and in Cambodia, the small professional Australian Army was also eager to be oper-
ationally deployed in a proper area of responsibility.1 The Marines in Baidoa were
glad to see the Australians and their eagerness to be relieved showed while briefing
their visitors.2 The reconnaissance party also met with some fellow Australians in
the hard-pressed humanitarian community, in order to add to the incomplete intel-
ligence picture of the region.
When battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel David Hurley arrived one week
ahead of his troops, his first impression of the US troops at Baidoa airfield was some-
what of a shock. Having expected the airfield to be a lightly defended base, he instead
found the Marines living in a congregation of tents ‘amidst a military junk yard over-
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run by hundreds of Somali adults and children, either milling about, scavenging or
begging.’3 The next day, while his troops were on a military transportation vessel on
the Indian Ocean, news of the first Marine killed by hostile fire reached the ‘Dig-
gers,’ as the Australian troops were commonly referred to since their baptism to fire
in the trenches during the First World War. It would sharpen their senses for what
would be the first operational deployment for the Australian Army since its with-
drawal from Vietnam in 1972.
For Operation Solace, as the Australians had somewhat more modestly called their
contribution to Operation Restore Hope, the contingent would be deployed for a set
period ending late May. They expected to be transferred from US to UN command
in the near future, but Brigadier Zinni told Mellor quite early that he should not
expect this to happen before the US presidential inauguration or anytime soon there-
after. Although the UN obviously lacked the capacity assume another large-scale oper-
ation soon, it also lacked a sense of urgency to take control. Viewed from New York,
where Boutros-Ghali had only a handful of officers on his military staff, the Amer-
icans seemed to be running a smooth military show from Central Command head-
quarters in Tampa, where General Hoar had over 500 US personnel in his head-
quarters alone.4 Most UNOSOM staff in Mogadishu had been sent on Christmas
leave and, despite the Secretary-General’s personal interest in Somalia as a test ground
for his ‘peace building’ ideas, the Secretariat in New York was distracted by other
commitments. Although there was no strategy for reconciliation or operations for-
mulated by the United Nations until late March, the assumption by the Australians
that they would be working under UN control at some point gave them a different,
more long-term perspective on their mission. 
The 930-strong Australian battalion group would take charge of the entire Bay
province, the region worst affected by warlordism and hunger. The Australian sec-
tor had an estimated population of 180,000 and measured approximately 140 by 120
kilometers. The provincial capital Baidoa, 240 kilometers northwest of Mogadishu,
contained between 50,000 and 60,000 inhabitants, one-third of whom were refugees
from the countryside. Baidoa was southern Somalia’s most significant inland town,
with the region’s main market at the crossroads between Mogadishu, Bardera, Hud-
dur and Belet Huen. The area was inhabited predominantly by the agricultural Ran-
hanweyn clan and had substantial arable lands. The Australian contingent centered
on Hurley’s infantry battalion, 1st Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR), with
an attached cavalry squadron with thirty armored personnel carriers. Hurley official-
ly took over the Baidoa humanitarian relief sector on 19 January. Mellor would play
a dual role as the commander of Australian Forces Somalia, that also included a
naval vessel offshore and a small air force element, and senior representative to
UNITAF headquarters.5 Attached to his national headquarters were Michael Kelly in
his role of legal advisor and a detachment of six military police personnel. The Aus-
tralian battalion group would initially operate under the US Army’s 10th Mountain
Division and from March, directly under UNITAF headquarters. The last two weeks
of its deployment in May, after the Americans had transferred command, the Aus-
tralians were officially part of the UN force, UNOSOM II. 
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Despite their arrival one month after the American entry, there was no clear intel-
ligence picture regarding the situation and threats in the Bay region. Most informa-
tion had been gathered through informal channels. Hurley spoke via satellite tele-
phone to Phoeby Frasier, the daughter of the former Australian prime minister, and
Lockton Morrissey, a former member of the Australian Army’s Special Air Service
Regiment (SAS). Both were NGO workers in Baidoa. The information that reached
the troops and junior officers in Australia was scant, and in early January overall expec-
tations were still based on the TV images of warlords roaming the countryside in
technicals.
Approximately half of the US Marine force had been withdrawn from Somalia by
mid-February, leaving the 3,500 Marines that remained in southern Mogadishu and
the battalion in Bardera frustrated by the constant postponement of their departure
date.6 Increasingly, the Marines in Mogadishu had to deal with crowd and riot-con-
trol situations, like US Army and Belgian paratroopers in Kismayo during the Feb-
ruary riots. The use of ‘David and Goliath’-type slings by Somali youths prompted
the use of Plexiglas facemasks to fit over Kevlar helmets. Non-lethal weapons such
as cayenne pepper spray were issued, but permission for the use of such non-tradi-
tional military methods still had to come from General Johnston himself on a case-
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An Australian soldier ensures that humanitarian aid is distributed in an orderly way. Australian
troops in Somalia generally appeared more at ease with their environment than US forces.
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by-case basis. Somali crowds were quite often stirred up by Aideed’s radio station
broadcasting anti-UNITAF propaganda, but on 3 March, General Wilhelm refused to
take the risk of alienating Aideed and his supporters by closing down the radio sta-
tion.7 The Marines would continue to patrol around the clock both on foot and in
vehicles, which kept the warlords from controlling the streets. However, they stopped
most of their foot patrols at night after two Marines were shot in separate incidents
in January.
Baidoa became the pride of Marine Corps operations in Somalia and Oakley repeat-
edly called it the ‘model’ for what was being accomplished through Operation Restore
Hope.8 In his enthusiasm to underline the success of the Marines in Baidoa, the
Marine Corps field historian Major David Dawson wrote about the situation halfway
January:
While [the Marine Task Force] was responsible for Baidoa, it had changed from
‘The City of Death’ into a peaceful rural town. The security provided by the Marines
and their coalition partners enabled the relief agencies to deliver thousands of tons
of food, enough to fed more than a hundred thousand people. No longer afraid
of looters, merchants reopened their stalls in the market places. A nascent police
force had begun enforcing the law. Instead of fighting, members of the various
clans were holding meetings to resolve their differences. The various councils
organized with the help of the [Civil-Military Operations Team] formed the nucle-
us of a local government. On the morning of 16 January, exactly one month after
Task Force Hope had arrived, children went to school in Baidoa for the first time
since the civil war began.9
Admittedly, Baidoa had come a long way from where it had been one month earli-
er, when large numbers of bodies were picked up from the streets every day. In early
December, regular citizens had cowered in their homes, only going out to scramble
for food and water. Refugees living on the outskirts of town struggled for survival
in total squalor, while being indiscriminately preyed upon by armed bandits. In the
hinterland, many villages were abandoned, huts caved in and the field just outside
Baidoa were covered with fresh, shallow graves.10 After the arrival of the Marines,
the self-appointed ‘head of airfield security’ Hassan Gutaale Abdul, in charge of 132
armed bandits equipped with several technicals, was no longer able to demand two
to five thousand dollars for each relief plane landing.11
Although the food crisis would last until mid-March in the countryside, large-
scale starvation had clearly ended in most places by January. However, if the picture
was indeed as rosy as presented by Dawson, the Australians would only have had to
consolidate on the US successes. This was definitely not the case. In fact, the situ-
ation in May as portrayed by Australian Army field historian Bob Breen was pretty
much that portrayed by Dawson. This was after months of intense, inventive and
often violent military operations by the Australian battalion group. Still, Breen was
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far more skeptical about UNITAF’s overall impact on the Bay region than his Amer-
ican colleague. 
During the first night spent at the airfield base in Baidoa, the constant crackle
of gunfire in the city caused quite some excitement amongst the Diggers. With ban-
dits eager to spend their money gained from theft and extortion, Baidoa was still
thriving on drugs, the arms trade and prostitution and, especially at night, it was a
dangerous place.12 Lockton Morrisey from CARE Australia had become used to receiv-
ing death threats on an almost daily basis, but the former commando told the Aus-
tralian reconnaissance party ten days earlier that he was now seriously afraid of being
gunned down like the Irish UNICEF doctor in Kismayo. In a very tense briefing he
portrayed the Marines as not particularly cooperative with the relief organizations
and heavy handed with the locals.13 Major Dick Stanhope, who would lead the Aus-
tralian Civil-Military Operations Team (CMOT), also asserted that the Marines were
‘extremely hesitant to assist the NGOs’ in Baidoa. They refused to provide close phys-
ical protection for the approximately one hundred strong expatriate staff that occu-
pied compounds and warehouses concentrated along ‘NGO Road.’ The argument
used by the Marines in Mogadishu, that the relief organizations’ high degree of dis-
persal did not allow for protection, was not valid in Baidoa. Instead, the Marines had
concentrated on escorting convoys and confiscating weapons. Then, on 15 January,
a Swiss relief worker was killed by a shot in the back of the head in a nearby vil-
lage.14 Two days later, just before the Australians took over, three armed gunmen
robbed the Médecins Sans Frontières compound of a large quantity of cash. The
humanitarian community had become thoroughly disillusioned with Marines and
sent a letter to UNITAF headquarters stating that they would all leave Baidoa if one
more worker was killed or wounded by bandits or militia.15 The failure to protect
the relief organizations in the epicenter of the famine would mean a serious blow
to UNITAF’s prestige.
It is difficult to assess the level of acceptance of the Marines by the local popu-
lation. The improved security obviously pleased the majority of the population. Dur-
ing a visit to a village, Hurley witnessed how the people were very pleased to see
the Americans, ‘some even clapped as we drove past.’16 Nevertheless, an Australian
platoon commander who joined the Marines that first night on a patrol was struck
by ‘the hatred in Somali eyes as the Marines drove past them.’ Obviously, there were
those who gained and those who lost from their presence. The platoon commander
would soon find out that those people he encountered in the streets during a night
patrol, were – not coincidentally – the ones least fearful of being mugged, raped or
shot and the least pleased to see UNITAF. His overall first impression was that the
Marines saw their mission as getting a job done rather than helping the population,
and concluded that the Somalis felt this. The ‘Hammerheads,’ the Marine battalion
that had taken over from Newbold’s Marines around New Year had, in their own
parlance, ‘kicked Somali butt,’ but had become frustrated and bored when quick and
measurable success proved elusive.17 In their searches for bandits and weapons, the
Marines came down heavily on the people and property, ‘busting’ houses and han-
dling all suspect males roughly. Just before handing operations over to the Aus-
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tralians, they ‘took down’ Buurhakaba and other villages. However, Newbold and his
successor adhered to the ‘carrot-and-stick’ method and always made sure to combine
weapons sweeps with food delivery. In Baidoa, more had been done in terms of civic
action than by Marine units elsewhere – which meant going beyond his comman-
der’s intent. Marines and engineers had started clearing some of the streets of wrecks
and debris and delivered food, clothes and medical supplies to orphanages.18
Three local committees had been set up with the support of Colonel Hellmer’s
CMOT. The security committee met on a daily basis, the elders’ committee assem-
bled every other day and the relief committee three times per week.19 US officials
in Mogadishu described these local representative bodies in Baidoa as the best exam-
ple of the ad hoc policy they helped establish in the provinces. Cooperation and rep-
resentation was said to function better than for instance in Bardera and Kismayo
where the stronger faction leaders were still intimidating local representatives.20 How-
ever, it is unlikely to have represented anything like the nucleus of a local govern-
ment, as Dawson claimed. Hurley was not that impressed when he wrote in Janu-
ary: ‘The Marines have done a lot of good work in making their presence felt, but
have not set up too many lasting community development committees. We will take
that on.’21
The Baidoan Security Council, which Hellmer regarded a ‘thoroughly good cross-
section’ of the local community, was in fact dominated by Aideed’s local SLA repre-
sentatives who used it to further their own interest. The NGOs were not at all pleased
to see that the Marines included bandit elements of the SLA in the relief commit-
tee, elements they knew were only recently involved in looting their shipments. Most
of the NGOs boycotted the meetings.22 US commentators emphasizing early UNITAF
success tended to present the councils of elders as the traditional and therefore ideal
pastoral representatives of the Somali people. It soon became clear, however, that the
instructions to embrace the traditional elders and work around the warlords were
rather simplistic. The elders themselves were often highly politicized and at times
affiliated with USC-SNA or other factions. They were mostly viciously corrupt, siphon-
ing off food aid into the local markets, and sharing much of the blame for the abun-
dant food aid not reaching the truly needy – mostly refugees and others outside the
local clan system. 
In the official Marine Corps account, a local police force was up and running in
Baidoa during the first two weeks of 1993. The assumption that a police reconstruc-
tion could be successful in merely two weeks after the conception of the idea caused
another American analyst to use this version of events as an example that it ‘does
not take a long time to make a difference.’23 In the Australians’ account they start-
ed the effort to select a police force from scratch on 4 February. They found that it
would take months before the initiative showed any promise of helping them in the
short term, let alone become effective as an autonomous force in the long run.24
Just as the Australians arrived in Somalia, the militias and bandits were finding
ways of resuming their criminal activities by moving around UNITAF as they became
aware of the limitations set on the actions of the foreign soldiers. The Marines had
removed the overt military style security threat by confiscating technicals and some
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of the heavier militia arms and had conducted largely ineffective arms sweeps in
Baidoa and some villages. Most important, Newbold had barred the public display
of weapons and thereby set an example that would be followed by the overly cau-
tious UNITAF headquarters elsewhere in Somalia. It would be up to the Australians
to start dealing with the underlying threats posed by bandits who – outside the view
of the Marines – continued to rule Baidoa and the countryside at the point of a gun.
They would also find out that they could hardly ignore the fundamental political
problems posed by the minority rule of Aideed’s local associates over the predomi-
nantly Ranhanwayn Baidoan population. Although he had no clear idea of the polit-
ical complexities he would face, the day his first men went on patrol in Baidoa, Hur-
ley wrote in a letter to his wife that his most difficult task would be ‘dealing with
the political aspects – the chief and elders, clan factions and the relief agencies. All
very convoluted and sensitive at the moment.’ He modestly added: ‘Hopefully we
will make the right decisions.’25
Urban Security Operations 
Conspicuously absent from the Marines’ official account of their deployment in Baidoa
were the area’s two main thugs, Gutaale and his associate Hussein Barre Warsame.26
Both were affiliated with Aideed and acted as the local branch and armed element
of his USC-SNA, called the Somali Liberation Army (SLA). Their Duduble sub-clan
was allied to the Habir Gedir and dominated Baidoa without any real challenge to
their authority. Like other smaller local warlords, they paid tribute to Aideed or other
major militia leaders. Major Kelly later investigated both and described Warsame as
second in command to Gutaale and his ‘chief weapon in the regime of intimidation
and terror.’ Breen describes a somewhat more loose affiliation: 
Warsame organised banditry, political murders and looting while Gutaale’s crimi-
nal associates extorted money and probably did their share of looting as well.
These two villains were both Aideed supporters and agreed to keep out of each
other’s way while they conducted their respective criminal activities.27
Although hampered in their criminal activities, neither Gutaale nor Warsame had
been seriously marginalized during the Marines’ five-week-long presence.28 After the
Australians took over from the Marines, they presented themselves and the SLA as
the legitimate political leadership for the Bay region.29 There were other urban gang
leaders like Salat Mohammid Ibrahim. ‘Gaaney,’ as he was also known, was a much-
feared politically unaffiliated rival of SNA-SLA in charge of a small group of gun-
men. After rapidly drawing up an intelligence picture of the local political patterns,
the Australians decided ‘not to concede any political legitimacy in terms of political
authority’ to Aideed’s associates. The Australians did not recognize the security and
relief committees set up by the Marines. An alternative framework was established
that incorporated what Kelly called ‘the responsible elements of the community.’30
Apart from the local warlords, the Australians faced two types of deliberate threats.
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First, there were the mostly unidentified nomadic bandits who terrorized the coun-
tryside or entered the city ‘to rob, rape and loot.’ Some of those came from Mogadishu,
Kismayo and Bardera. The second potential threat came from criminal guards
employed by all relief organizations, mostly the less-experienced NGOs. Additional-
ly, there was the ever-present danger of the abundance of guns owned by Somalis
defending their private homes and businesses, who could easily mistake a patrol for
criminals at night.31
Back in Australia, the battalion commander and his staff had formulated four
simultaneous tasks based on the scarce information available at the time. The first
was the straightforward task of protecting the battalion’s base. Second was the far
more daunting task of creating a secure environment in Baidoa for the conduct of
humanitarian operations by the aid agencies. The Australians anticipated providing
close protection to the NGOs, but obviously had not considered the details and com-
plexities involved. The third task was the protection of humanitarian aid convoys.
This was a relatively easy task, but also here they expected to work closely with the
relief organizations in organizing the controlled handout of humanitarian goods. The
Australians had seen chaotic scenes and expected having to handle crowd control sit-
uations. The fourth task would be patrolling the countryside, or ‘patrolling in depth.’
The four rifle companies were planned to rotate through these tasks in nine-day
cycles. One rifle platoon mounted on a truck was assigned as the Quick Reaction
Force (QRF). Troops allocated to the support company often wanted to leave the
monotonous life at the base and volunteered for basic infantry work, almost acting
as a fifth rifle company later in the deployment. The variety of tasks, while disrupt-
ing operations, was intended to motivate the troops and prevent them from becom-
ing bored and stale performing static guard duties at Baidoa airfield.32
During the first days of patrolling, Major Bob Worswicks, one of the company
commanders, saw how his Diggers were very keen on dominating the town. Initial-
ly, patrols would be limited to three hours, as they had to acclimatize to tempera-
tures of 40° Celsius in webbing and flak jackets. The large majority of patrols were
conducted on foot, which seemed to be appreciated by the locals.33 During their first
patrols, the Australians were confronted with the adaptability of the children, who
until recently had combined ‘gifty! gifty!’ with ‘Americans number one’ and singing
‘Jingle Bells.’ Now, they had rapidly learned to say ‘G’day mate’ and ‘Australians
number one!’ Although the majority of the populace seemed to welcome them, or
at least accepted their presence, they were often being stared at with a certain degree
of hostility – something for which their small ‘Soldiers Handbook’ had prepared
them.34 Like the Marines, Australian patrols were initially constantly needled, and
the troops had their mettle tested by young men spitting and throwing stones. This
led to several scuffles, with soldiers wrestling the men to the ground in the few cases
when they were caught. Mostly, they just had to swallow the insults, which gave rise
to talk of the need to be more assertive.35
Nevertheless, an Australian private saw security in the city improve, ‘because we
absolutely saturated Baidoa with patrols.’ He was convinced that ‘nothing could go
on in that city without us knowing about it.’36 Worswicks noticed how his section-
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sized patrols would compete against each other, keeping score back at the base of
the amount of patrols conducted and the number of weapons confiscated – even
about the number of shots fired at them. His men would often catch only three or
four hours of sleep between patrols and his troops worked a seven-day week through-
out their deployment. He proudly wrote in his diary that they were true testimony
of ‘the ANZAC legend,’ referring to their grandfathers’ and great-grandfathers’ roles
in the two World Wars as part of the Australia New Zealand Army Corps. It was
there during the Gallipoli Campaign, and later in the jungles of Papua, New Guinea,
that the Australians had established a reputation for an urge to dominate no-man’s-
land and for vigorous jungle patrolling. The Australians were proud of their ‘patrolling
ethos’ and the intensity of their patrolling regime in the Bay region was remarked
upon by General Johnston and other visiting American officers. However, the extreme-
ly high tempo of operations soon started to take its toll on the soldiers and by late
January there were fears that they could not keep up the pace of operations.37
An effective, but exhausting method of patrolling in built-up areas was the ‘brick
method’ used by the British Army in Northern Ireland. Half platoon patrols were
broken down into three groups of four or five men, known as a ‘brick,’ that would
patrol along roughly parallel axes while maintaining constant communications. This
allowed them to cover a large area at once and in a short period of time, giving the
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highest degree of deterrence by their presence while simultaneously offering the
largest chance of catching bandits, as the bricks could respond to each other’s calls
for support.38 These methods were picked up during the extensive contacts between
the Australian and British military. Like most of their American counterparts, the
Australians had not received specialized training in urban patrolling or house search-
es.39
Base security turned out to be an arduous task. The concertina wire fences put
in by the engineers created a barrier, but it required constant patrolling and the ten
observation posts needed constant manning. The mostly unarmed infiltrators were
well aware of the restrictive Rules of Engagement and not easily intimidated by warn-
ing shots. Hurley soon found out that frustration over the faltering detention policy
was the biggest source of ‘attitude problems’ among his troops. Soldiers worked hard
and put their lives on the line to capture infiltrators as well as bandits while on
patrol, but in most cases suspects had to be released. The commander tried to ‘nip
it in the bud’ before it became really serious by giving a stern warning that anyone
found physically abusing Somali citizens would be sent home to Australia in dis-
grace. Once a semblance of a local police force was established after February, infil-
trators had to be transferred to their custody. However, this would mostly end up by
them being released within 24 hours.40
By early February, after a temporary amelioration of the security situation, vio-
lence in Baidoa was again on the rise despite the intense patrolling regime. At the
local market a woman was shot dead and her son wounded in the leg during a sim-
ple argument. Several other incidents of violence and intimidation were reported.
There were regular security problems emerging as bandits extorted money and intim-
idated women lined up at the Bay project, an NGO-funded pump site at the edge of
town. There were also frequent reports of young women being raped at that loca-
tion. An Australian patrol would regularly drive off bandits who took over the pump
site, leading to a scramble of the women for free water, but the bandits – who often
simply hid their arms under their robes and dispersed amongst the crowds – would
return as soon as the Australians left. In all these security operations it proved very
hard to create an element of surprise as they were closely watched by a network of
‘Somali cockatoos,’ often children, who would report their movements.41 That same
week a bus and a truck were ambushed in separate incidents, causing over twenty
casualties, and six nurses from CARE Australia were detained by bandits in a rural
village and only released after being intimidated.
Some of the violence continued to be directed against the Australians. ‘The local
people are generally friendly and don’t appear concerned about our patrol,’ Captain
Andrew Somerville wrote in his diary on 3 February. But it was ‘uncomfortable and
hot patrolling in webbing and a flak jacket, wondering if a bandit is going to pop
up and shoot at you.’ Especially at night, Baidoa was still ‘a crazy and violent place.’
Two weeks later, a scout was saved by his flak jacket when a young man in the streets
stabbed him with a knife and slipped back into the crowd.42 A row over an aban-
doned sea container in the streets was used by a local bandit leader’s men to stir up
resentment against the Australians, leading to a nasty crowd and riot control situa-
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tion where the Diggers had stones and even a hand grenade thrown at them. Luck-
ily, the grenade bounced into a ditch before exploding.43 There continued to be inci-
dents with rock-throwing youths, and the company commanders had to actively dis-
courage what became known as ‘adjusting Somali attitudes,’ that was initially allowed
by some patrol commanders and their junior non-commissioned officers. It proved
hard to convince the young soldiers that, when challenged by other young men, phys-
ical retaliation often proved counterproductive.44
There was still considerable confusion regarding UNITAF’s weapons policy and bat-
talion headquarters’ interpretation thereof. The Australian government had previous-
ly expressed support for Boutros-Ghali’s broader disarmament proposals, but provid-
ed no specific instruction to its troops regarding a weapons policy.45 The prime source
of confusion continued to be the armed guards hired by the NGOs. Distinguishing
bandits was hard enough as it was. ‘The only way of identifying them in a crowd,’
a platoon commander found, ‘was if they were pointed out by the Somalis, or if they
were armed.’46 In the absence of an effective weapons registration system for NGO
guards, a weapons card was introduced and distributed, which facilitated Hurley’s
new directive to confiscate every single unregistered firearm.47 There were however
limitations to Hurley’s arms policy. As the supply of arms was endless in this part
of Africa, he decided not to try to close down the local arms market, instead con-
centrating his efforts on reducing demand. 
The Diggers liked the order to confiscate all unregistered weapons. The number
of weapons taken was considered the most obvious measure of their effectiveness.
However, two problems would continue to haunt the troops. The NGO guards, using
their licensed weapons, were often engaged in banditry at night, while ordinary house-
holds and shopkeepers obviously clung to their weapons to protect their life and
property. The rules were therefore applied with some flexibility. When operating in
small villages in the countryside especially, patrol commanders would at times decide
to leave the weapons with their owners. However, nowhere was the disarmament
effort more vigorous than in the Bay region. In all, the Australians confiscated over
nine hundred weapons, mostly small arms but also some heavier weapons. This was
a substantial share of the grand total seized by UNITAF in southern Somalia, which
was somewhere between four and five thousand by May.48
It soon became clear that without accurate intelligence, weapons searches or any
other type of proactive, and often provocative security operations were unlikely to be
effective. The job was very different from conventional tactical intelligence gathering
through patrol reports, satellite imagery and radio intercepts. The Australian special-
ized intelligence gathering capacity would eventually be large for a battalion, espe-
cially when compared to the Dutch Marines in Cambodia. Unlike the UN Secretari-
at, which regarded it as conflicting with a peacekeeper’s neutral stance, the Ameri-
cans put no limitations on intelligence operations. Initially, two non-commissioned
officers from the Australian Intelligence Corps, Brandon Thomson and Wayne Dou-
glas, were assigned to support the battalion’s regular intelligence section. The most
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trusted interpreter working for the Marines helped select an additional three local
interpreters who apart from translating, were able to keep their eyes and ears open
while moving freely within the Baidoan community.49 Part of the intelligence mis-
sion was to keep track of sentiment towards the Australians and identify potential
threats, but most of the efforts were directed towards identifying the nature of ban-
dit and militia activity, finding weapons caches and charting criminal organizations.
Intelligence personnel would also play a crucial role in drawing up a reliable picture
of political affiliations – mainly to undermine the SLA’s efforts to maintain control
of Baidoa.50
Apart from using interpreters and their local networks, there were several ways
of gathering information. After the first two days of intense patrolling in January,
Thomson and Douglas advised the infantrymen, probably after hearing the Somali
translator who had previously worked for the Marines, that if they looked less stern
and tense, and slightly more relaxed, more information was likely to flow towards
them. The daily stream of stories, tip-offs and complaints – although often unreli-
able – helped complete the intelligence picture if properly analyzed. After the Aus-
tralians had demonstrated their willingness to confront local criminals and bandit
groups and act on reliable tips, more Somali citizens came forward with relevant
information. Thomson and Douglas often ventured into town or into the country-
side. Collecting information from locals was often dangerous, so they were always
escorted by at least two soldiers. These were mostly troops from support units who
were keen to get away from their work as clerks, cooks or mechanics at the airfield.
Hurley also allowed pairs of snipers to set up secret observation posts inside or on
the outskirts of town. Using thermal imagers, they were able to maintain surveil-
lance in an area of interest at night. 
After the battalion staff acknowledged the timeliness of accurate intelligence for
this particular operation in the second half of January, six additional specialized count-
er intelligence personnel were called for and sent from Australia. This allowed them
to operate in three two-man ‘CI Teams’ with an interpreter each. A number of the
counterintelligence personnel had experience and skills acquired while serving in the
SAS or military police.51 Although the battalion staff initially treated the ‘outsiders’
with some suspicion in the very beginning, they were quickly appreciated.52 Coop-
eration with American intelligence personnel from UNITAF headquarters proved
useful, but little of their information helped to establish a picture of Baidoan socie-
ty and the threats to security. Ninety percent of all intelligence in support of opera-
tions came from their own efforts.53 The overall environment was favorable for human
intelligence gathering. The security situation was such that the Australians could go
anywhere to gather information and ‘There was no local government to bind our col-
lection efforts in a bundle of bureaucratic red tape.’ Most of the conditions were cre-
ated by their general style of operations and interpretation of the mission. The pop-
ulation was eventually quite talkative and the humanitarian community turned out
to be anxious to assist in improving their own and overall security.54
American forces had originally deployed only with technical intelligence support,
such as signal intelligence and imagery gatherers. These turned out to be of little
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use in Somalia’s low-tech environment, so in January they brought in human intel-
ligence teams. While the Australian Army had retained a handful of such special-
ized personnel, the comparably sized Canadian Army had allowed their expertise in
this area to run so low that they had no deployable capability.55 The Australians had
included the initial two intelligence officers ‘almost as an afterthought.’ The teams
had to learn a lot on the job. Although specialized in human intelligence gathering,
they were not trained to operate in an urban environment like Baidoa where build-
ing a picture of the threat to life and property was almost like undercover work by
police investigators.56
In late January, the number of violent incidents between UNITAF and gunmen
rose with the unraveling of the state of ‘respectful coexistence’ throughout Somalia.
The gunmen in Baidoa became bolder and during February the Australians were
involved in a series of firefights. Usually, a bandit discovered by a patrol would shoot
off a burst of rounds in the general direction of the Diggers and flee. In all, eleven
serious confrontations ensued until May.57 When a night patrol was attacked on a
night in February the Australians all adopted firing positions and returned fire. As
he was pinned down in an alleyway, the corporal in charge decided to regain the ini-
tiative by firing a light anti-tank weapon to suppress the heavy fire coming from a
building. The projectile went high into the building, causing the roof to collapse on
the four gunmen inside, allegedly Islamic fundamentalists working under the guise
of the Islamic Relief Agency. They survived without serious injuries, but were detained
and sent off to Mogadishu main prison.58 In all such contacts, the young corporals
in charge of their sections lauded their training, since the well-practiced drills allowed
simultaneous quick thinking, which avoided major casualties. However, luck certain-
ly contributed in that there were no deadly casualties due to hostile fire. Corporal
Bill Perkins’ section came under fire at approximately the same crossroads later in
the mission. One of the two scouts Perkins had sent across the road ‘heard an AK-
47 being cocked and saw the bandit.’ Perkins added, ‘He knew his life was in dan-
ger and he initiated the contact. At the same time one of my other soldiers on the
other side of the road was wounded – this was all happening in a split second and
we were under heavy fire. I decided to withdraw the section and later on we found
out the second scout, who had initiated the contact, had four rounds hit him – two
in the night-vision goggles around his neck, one into his rifle and one into his trouser
leg. So he was a pretty lucky boy.’59
Like most units deployed in Somalia, the First Battalion, Royal Australian Regi-
ment, was first and foremost trained for aggressive combat operations. Nevertheless,
it came relatively well prepared to cope with rapidly changing levels of violence and
the discriminate use of force in Somalia. As will be further explored, the battalion
had been specifically training for low-level operations in Northern Australia in the
two years prior to their deployment. Moreover, Hurley recalled how, 
[m]uch to the chagrin of many soldiers in 1 RAR, in 1992 the year’s training pri-
ority was Services Protected Evacuation [of Australian citizens in cases of internal
conflict and the breakdown of law and order]. Particular emphasis was given to
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reducing levels of aggression and to developing the appropriate attitude towards
Australian and host nation nationals. Operations under strict Rules of Engagement
and Orders for Opening Fire were practised in many imaginative scenarios [that
involved manning vehicle check points and crowd and riot control]. Had we known
what was to occur in early 1993, perhaps our application would have been greater.
The long hours in helmet and flack jacket paid dividends, however, in the streets
of Baidoa and in its surrounding villages.’60
When the unit was alerted for deployment to Somalia, its troops were put through
refresher training on the rules for opening fire. Also here, they acted out scenarios
that helped them deal with different levels of threat, lethal or non-lethal, and the dis-
criminate and proportional use of force. When a patrol bumped into a robbery that
left two shop owners with gunshot wounds, they gave chase after two armed gun-
men, charging through houses and leaping over backyard fences. When one of the
gunmen fired a hurried burst of rounds, they could only respond with warning shots
in the air with civilians still milling around. Before the exchange of gunfire they had
been cheering the Australians on ‘like a crowd at a football game,’ but now the peo-
ple were dispersing in all directions. One of the bandits dropped his rifle and a ser-
geant continued the chase. However, Breen writes, ‘[r]ealising that the running ban-
dit was increasing his lead against the Australians, who were wearing patrol web-
bing and flak jackets, Douglas decided to close the distance with a 5.56-mm bullet.
Thoroughly exhausted, he dropped and took aim. However, because the bandit was
unarmed and running away, the Rules of Engagement did not allow Douglas to shoot.
He lowered his rifle and watched the bandit make his escape.’61
Although the Australians continued to operate with the Rules of Engagement,
there were cases that bordered on abetting an imminent threat that allowed them to
engage. One night in February a four-man sniper team with night-vision goggles
stealthily crept up to bandits manning the Bay Project water point. When one came
close enough to challenge one of the men to put down his weapons, one of the
snipers reported, ‘the man turned, ran to his left raising his weapon to his shoul-
der. I initiated with two automatic bursts, killing the man.’62
After the five major fire fights during February the level of reported violence
dropped significantly in the city.63 Clearly, confrontations were not the sole cause for
this temporary success, but the decisive and controlled response contributed to their
overall acceptance as the word got around quickly in Baidoa. 
Two Schools of Thought
From their arrival, the Australians took a broad view of the secure environment they
were supposed to create. They fully accepted that their mission was to provide secu-
rity for the Somali population and not merely safeguard the delivery of food aid.
However, this still allowed for a wide range of interpretations. Two basic interpreta-
tions of the mission were current amongst the Australians. On the one hand were
those who wanted to emphasize deterrence through the widest and most visible
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armed presence while focusing on community relations in order to diffuse tension
in the city. This school of thought was in line with the methods of traditional peace-
keeping missions, although the aim – maintaining law and order – was much broad-
er. On the other hand, there were also those who felt that the mission meant oper-
ating closer to a combat role, using infantry to aggressively pursue and eliminate
bandits and their criminal organizations. Most members of the Australian battalion
group were initially on the ‘find ’em and fight ’em’ end of the spectrum, that bore
some resemblance to the ‘search and destroy’ tactics adhered to by American troops
while fighting the insurgency in Vietnam. This attitude was based on expectations
raised back in Australia, when officers and men anticipated facing a substantial armed
threat posed by warlords and their small armies equipped with technicals and some
medium weapons systems. Not unlike many American troops in Somalia, the poten-
tial confrontations were actually anticipated with a certain eagerness.64 Twenty years
after the pull-out from Vietnam, a new generation of Australian soldiers was eager
to find out if they had what it took to operate ‘under fire.’65
Some of the company commanders advocated more raids on houses in search of
arms caches, and wanted to seek confrontations with bandit groups. When two com-
panies were assigned to the city simultaneously, competitiveness as well as coordi-
nation problems increased.66 Major Anthony Blumer’s company pursued a series of
aggressive searches of buildings, sometimes using sledgehammers to quickly enter
houses like the Marines had done before him. His troops tended to aggressively
question any Somali male that acted suspiciously. Some of the searches proved suc-
cessful. Reacting on a tip by the newly appointed police chief, Colonel Aden Nuur,
his troops found two 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, a heavy machine gun and several
AK-47’s, ammunition and documents in a compound housing a hotel and brothel.
Such raids left behind angry local criminals or militia leaders. A few raids, howev-
er, turned into slightly embarrassing scenes with broken doors and angry suspected
bandits, their families, or completely innocent civilians – and no weapons found.
The Australian engineers who had to fix things regarded this as one their more unen-
viable tasks, as it also included trying to appease the civilians whose property was
damaged. Measured against the number of arms seized and bandits arrested, Blumer’s
company was successful. He was eager to react to any intelligence from the count-
er intelligence teams and not concerned about aggravating those loyal to Aideed.67
He and many of the junior leaders found it hard to accept the limitations set on
their actions and ability to engage the ‘enemy,’ and made pleas for increased assertive-
ness.
Hurley and his operations officer Major John Caligary faced a dilemma that bore
little resemblance to the choices faced in full-scale combat aimed at destroying an
identifiable enemy. They knew that the troops could be more aggressive, but at the
risk of stirring up and unsettling the city rather than stabilizing and diffusing ten-
sion. A tactical approach leaning predominantly on deterrence by presence was safer
and more in line with the overall mandate, but meant that the battalion was like-
ly to lose the initiative to the bandits. The dilemma was hardly ‘classic’ in the his-
tory of peace operations, since the options for different approaches in Somalia were
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far more marked than in more traditional UN operations. Traditional peacekeeping
was all about deterrence through presence, with hardly any possibility for proactive
measures. Even the Dutch battalion commanders in Cambodia, who were lauded
for their assertiveness, were largely restricted to deterrence and dependent on con-
sent of the warring parties. In Somalia, the vaguely defined security mission com-
bined with the mandate to use ‘all necessary means,’ and therefore loose Rules of
Engagement, left a wide array of possible tactical responses to the commander. Hur-
ley felt he was ‘free to undertake offensive operations rather than remain reactive
and static.’68
Maintaining sufficient pressure for deterrence without escalating the level of vio-
lence was related to a fundamental theme in military command philosophy. The com-
mander could play it safe by reigning in his company and platoon leaders, prescrib-
ing in his orders the methods and means to execute their tasks. This entailed the
risk of micromanagement and left subordinates to demand permission for anything
not specifically defined in orders, with a likely loss of initiative and effectiveness.
The commander could also define the mission, specify his intent and give his sub-
ordinate commanders full responsibility to act within the framework of these inten-
tions. This allowed them to fully use their ingenuity to take the actions and enforce
measures they considered necessary, as Blumer would have preferred. From these
two war-fighting command philosophies known as Befehlstaktik and Auftragstaktik,
‘command by order’ and ‘directive command,’ the latter – better known as ‘mission
command’ – had become en vogue in Western military establishments in the last
decades of the Cold War.69 In a treatise on British counterinsurgency experience at
West Point in 1971, US Army Major J.W. Woodmansee suggested to cadets of the
US Military Academy that while fighting the war in Vietnam, the American military
had stuck too closely to a centralized and order-driven command system. He said
that although ingenuity was a hallmark of the American soldiers, ‘a system of decen-
tralized execution and mission-type orders is essential to benefit from this national
characteristic.’70
The US military emphasized the virtues of mission command in their doctrinal
development during the 1980s. At the time, German command philosophy from the
Second World War became a prime example in the development of the concept of
‘Air-Land Battle,’ aimed at resisting the Warsaw Pact armies. However, even in train-
ing for maneuver warfare on the German plains, mission command proved hard for
the American military to fully put into practice. Perhaps the overall reluctance in
mainstream American culture to delegate authority – related to a ‘zero-deficiency
culture’ within the military – hindered command theory from being put into prac-
tice.71 However, all of the armed forces struggled to work with mission-type orders
that seemed to clash with the changing nature of military operations at the close of
the twentieth century. Modern warfare on a high-tech battlefield, but particularly
peace operations with their legal constraints and extreme emphasis on avoiding mil-
itary and civilian casualties constantly raised the question of what level of violence
was justified to accomplish a goal. Governments committing troops and the officers
commanding them increasingly watched over the shoulders of the ‘strategic corpo-
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ral’ since any technical mistake could undermine the legitimacy of the entire inter-
vention force. 
The Australian Army traditionally delegated a large degree of authority to junior
commanders. However, the commander’s choice for a relatively high degree of direc-
tive control was partly forced upon him by another dominant trend in military oper-
ations short of war during the 1990s. Hurley became consumed by tasks in the polit-
ical and administrative sphere – essentially civil affairs tasks. The shortage of time
to command his battalion compelled him to leave much of the decision making to
his company commanders and their subordinates. This caused some differences in
approach within the Australian battalion group, but the overall effects would be off-
set by their rotation through the sector. 72 Hurley was frustrated by the lack of time
he was able to spend with his troops. He had not been given helicopters, which kept
him from visiting and guiding his troops as they increasingly fanned out into the
countryside. Reaching the far edges of his sector would have taken merely twenty
minutes by helicopter, but instead he was forced to take a four-hour ride on a Land
Rover. Major Caligary witnessed how Hurley was at times not entirely happy with
the ‘lonely life of command.’ It was the same isolated position Dukers had prepared
Cammaert for when transferring command three months earlier in Cambodia. After
an hour-long conversation with his commander, Caligary wrote:
We all have peers to laugh and talk frankly to but he has no one. I think he appre-
ciates being able to speak honestly to someone now and then. By the time he left
I had a better grasp of the complicated politics [pertaining to our mission].73
Since no single tactic held the promise of success, Hurley opted for a mix of both
schools of thought. Convinced by some of the arguments put forward by Blumer, he
allowed the company commanders to increase their pressure on local criminals and
nomadic bandits. More house searches were allowed, including the use of three explo-
sive detection dogs, all as long as the company commanders reacted on reliable infor-
mation. Simultaneously Hurley decided to increase the battalion’s presence in the
city by having his troops occupy several NGO compounds along the ‘NGO Road’ in
the city. This redeployment served two purposes. It provided close protection to the
relief workers, who were still anxious after the murder of their Swiss colleague. As
more guards were laid off, there was an increasing number of armed robberies and
the Australians offered to hold their money in a safe at their base. They had already
established a direct radio link via the non-military Motorola system that allowed the
NGOs to call for protection from nearby patrols or possibly the Quick Reaction Force
– something the Marines had failed to do.74 On top of static security, the redeploy-
ment enabled the company to react more swiftly to reports of criminal activity else-
where, adding to stealth and deterrence. By March, one full company was dispersed
over ten NGO compounds supported by six armored personnel carriers.75 Contacts
between the Diggers and the relief workers were good overall, but living so close
together at times created small problems such as soldiers swearing and deliberately
leaving an explicit porn magazine in the toilets of the friendly Irish nurses at the
Catholic Relief Center.76
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In the course of February, Australian operations had become increasingly assertive.
The combination of captured, wounded and killed bandits and more raids on build-
ings had certainly angered individual bandits and the criminal networks supporting
Aideed. Moreover, the layoffs of guards by NGOs continued to add to the tension
between the gunmen and all foreigners, both humanitarian and military. For the
moment, the Australians seemed to have taken away the initiative from the crimi-
nal elements in urban Baidoa. It was not yet clear, however, whether they had attained
the right level of deterrence or if they had stirred up a hornet’s nest, potentially
resulting in violent retaliation and more strained relations with the local communi-
ty.77 Hurley had taken a calculated risk, but was bracing himself.
Initially, one Australian company was assigned to the countryside to follow up the
Marines’ first sweeps of some of the villages in the Bay region. Its first action con-
centrated on Buurhakaba, a small town along the main route to Mogadishu seventy
kilometers south of Baidoa. The Marines estimated that half of its population con-
sisted of bandits and their families. A thoroughly corrupt clan leader allied to Aideed
dominated the relief committee and therefore the distribution of relief goods, which
caused those affiliated to other groups to be passed over. Against the advice of Aus-
tralian counterintelligence Sergeant Thomson, and much to Blumer’s dismay, Amer-
ican helicopters had dropped leaflets and used loudspeakers to announce the impend-
ing security sweep on 22 January.78 The Australians were trained in executing cor-
don-and-search operations and lesson one was the element of surprise. Blumer’s
troops had been quite keyed-up to find arms caches and catch armed bandits off
guard, but not surprisingly, the bandits as well as the dominant clan leader had fled
and arms were taken along or hidden. As a result, many of those left behind turned
out to be friendly and even cheered the Diggers on as they secured the village in a
rather tense combat mode. Like Blumer, his American colleague Major Stanton was
puzzled when he led a large-scale, over two company nightly sweep into Afgoi in
the Shabelle Valley one week later, only to find out that the highly complicated night-
ly airmobile operation had been publicly announced by psychological operations per-
sonnel the previous day. It was typical for what he called UNITAF’s usual ‘schizo-
phrenic,’ preponderant but simultaneously risk-averse policy.
The Australians took more risks, but found it hard to surprise the enemy during
cordon and searches in the flat countryside, especially when noisy and dust-gener-
ating M-113 armored personnel carriers were used in support. 79 The ‘bush telegraph’
also worked well in Somalia and was often quicker than the Diggers. Generally, when
entering a village during January and February the population turned out to be eva-
sive and mostly reluctant to provide information on bandit activity. Much of the infor-
mation provided had to be taken with a grain of salt, as villagers often directed the
Australians to another village, where many ‘bad men’ were likely to be found. Major
Doug Fraser later acknowledged his and others’ initial naiveté, as he was manipu-
lated into performing a series of searches following information on rival clans, or
inaccurate or false reports by local village elders leading to exhausting wild goose
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chases. The uncovering of large underground stores filled with relief food controlled
by some village elders and the plump, well-fed people living next to starving refugees
brought home to the Australian the nature of the corrupt society they had come to
help. It angered many of them, but on average they did not lose sight of the ratio
of victims to perpetrators, which proved harder in urban Mogadishu. It reinforced
their cooperation with the relief workers to help organize the orderly distribution
process, even if this meant involvement in crowd control. The cooperative military-
humanitarian effort increased the leverage of both soldiers and relief workers with
the elders in the negotiation process. 
These initial operations – including a few airmobile operations using US heli-
copters and often supported by armored vehicles – were mainly successful in assert-
ing an Australian presence by shows of force, demonstrating their mobility and fire-
power. But the emphasis rapidly shifted to smaller-scale operations in depth. Due to
the size of the sector, companies were deployed over vast distances. Long-range pla-
toon-sized patrols for intelligence gathering could take up to a week. A young lieu-
tenant was sent on a nine-day patrol south of Baidoa in order to conduct what he
called ‘offensive operations’ to uncover bandit activity by patrolling by day and night,
both mounted and on foot and conducting a number of small-scale cordons and
searches.80 Platoons often operated individually, staying out in the field and living
in the villages in order to deter bandit activity, while its sections were deployed as
far as thirty kilometers from platoon headquarters. The aim was predominantly to
keep the bandits off balance and to gather information on their activities.
Some of Hurley’s subordinates were frustrated that they had little to show for
their efforts, as they were inclined to measure success by the number of bandits cap-
tured and arms seized. Hurley overall was more pleased with the results. Knowing
that his troops could not stay behind in every village, he hoped to follow up these
operations by placing police stations in each town once the new plans for an inter-
nal security force materialized.81 The effectiveness of cordon and searches increased
after a second company was committed to the countryside after security in Baidoa
and at the airfield had improved.82 More stealthy approaches while laying a cordon
also enhanced the effectiveness of their searches. Infantry would creep up and lay a
nightly cordon around a village known to be terrorized by a bandit gang or thor-
oughly dominated by criminals and their families, from which bandit groups were
known to carry out raids on Baidoa, other villages or travelers and merchants. They
would leave one side open for the armored vehicles to make their noisy approach in
the morning, driving fleeing armed bandits into the blocking positions. All such
actions would be similar to what one British officer in Malaya had called ‘flogging
the jungle without information by large numbers of troops’ were it not for the Aus-
tralians’ extreme emphasis on intelligence gathering before any action. They would
first send specialized intelligence teams to the villages to draw up a picture of ban-
dit groups’ structures and their relations to the community. 
In March the big challenge was to reduce the number of ambushes on the main
road to Mogadishu. Reports of robberies, killings and sexual assault were on the rise
as bandits increasingly looked for easy prey. In addition to regular security opera-
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tions along the roads at least one platoon was committed to nightly ‘mobile count-
er-ambush patrols.’ These heavily armed and rather unconventional patrols used mod-
ified six-wheeled Land Rovers equipped with infrared headlights. The driver and the
machine gunner in the cupola wore night vision goggles, which allowed the eight-
man crew to follow potential targets for ambushes with their headlights turned off.
When a so-called ‘night rider patrol’ caught the highway robbers red handed, or
found them lying in ambush at the side of the road, the Rules of Engagement allowed
them to attack in order to ‘protect life,’ after verbally challenging them to throw down
their weapons.83 Another method that stretched the Rules of Engagement to their
limits was ‘white light’ ambushes. Using armored vehicles placed on likely routes
for bandit groups on pitch-dark nights, a patrol would flood them with light and
challenge them to lay down their weapons in Somali. Although Hurley allowed some
of these innovative methods – much to the pleasure of his men – he continued to
emphasize deterrence through presence, maximum dispersal, and the need to keep
the bandits off balance. 
The increased level of tension feared by Hurley never materialized in the remain-
ing three months of the Australian occupation of the Bay region. Instead commu-
nity relations steadily improved. Although the antipathy against the American troops
in Somalia has often been exaggerated and generalized on the basis of the tense and
complicated situation in Mogadishu, it is safe to say that US and Australian troops
created very different levels of resentment. Relations between UNITAF and the Soma-
lis in Baidoa were still tense when the Australians arrived in January. Although young
men also tested the Australians and the overall population was initially evasive, pop-
ular support for the troops visibly increased. Some of it can be attributed to civic
action projects, such as rebuilding schools and playgrounds, support to the town’s
water supply, the provision of basic medical services and help in restarting local agri-
cultural activity.84 Most of it was due to the Australians’ substantial contribution to
personal safety and their overall posture towards the Somalis.
Many of the Australian troops at times longed for more conventional infantry work,
but public security was not treated as a task that fell to them by default.85 Extreme
reluctance to accept the ‘policing role’ was the norm among most US Marine and
Army personnel, if it was accepted at all. Hurley concentrated his efforts on protect-
ing citizens from being robbed, extorted, raped or murdered. The Australian version
of the Rules of Engagement followed that of the Americans, but with a few modifi-
cations, giving all Australian military personnel ‘a general humanitarian duty to pre-
vent the commission of serious crimes (such as murder and rape).’ Although crimes
against property were not included in this duty, the repression of a criminal act nec-
essary to establish a ‘secure environment for humanitarian relief operations’ was
allowed and broadly interpreted.86
Apart from a preventive public security role based on deterrence by presence, the
Australian commander allowed his troops to react to incidents. They were not quite
as apprehensive about intervening when they came across Somali-on-Somali violence
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during patrols, even if these were smaller-scale brawls. They also reacted to crimes
that took place outside their view, such as crimes reported to a patrol or roadblock,
if there was any chance of apprehending the offenders. In February a patrol com-
mander was approached by a Somali man who claimed his wife and teenage daugh-
ter had just been abducted by criminals. Two sections from the Quick Reaction Force
went to search down a creek line and quickly spotted the two women being led away
by armed bandits. After being called to halt and drop his weapons in Somali, one
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Australian soldiers lift a Somali ‘bandit’ on to their truck. The powers of arrest and detention were
vaguely defined in UNITAF’s mandate, but the Australians chose to broadly interpret their man-
date to provide a secure environment.
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of the bandits immediately fired at one of the sections, after which the group retreat-
ed to a deserted house by the creek. The other section reacted immediately and deci-
sively, with a few men storming the building while the others covered them. The
swiftness of the action totally caught the four bandits by surprise. They surrendered
and were detained, after which the family was reunited.87 By April information on
the whereabouts of gangs of armed men streamed in. This allowed ‘Charley Com-
pany,’ whose order of the day was to ‘chase and detain bandits,’ to do their job with
much increased efficiency. The company detained eight bandits in just two days,
adding to a total of over seventy arrested bandits and factions members.88 Neverthe-
less, there were clearly limits to the public security role Hurley was willing and able
to perform. Apart from refusing to close down the arms market, he declined to take
on drug dealings and prostitution. ‘The Mafia-style empire within the town remained
in place,’ Kelly acknowledged, ‘as it could be maintained covertly without the need
to openly roam the town armed.’89
The Australians struggled just as hard with the harsh Somali conditions, but
looked more at ease in the Somali environment than their American colleagues.
Although always in flak jackets, the Australians hardly ever wore helmets. Instead
they donned their typical broad-rimmed ‘slouch hats’ that protected them well from
the relentless sun. They hardly ever wore sunglasses on patrols or at roadblocks, like
the Americans, facilitating the all-important eye contact in Somali culture. They did
not wear desert fatigues, like the American ‘chocolate chip’ camouflage that tended
to stand out in savannah country, but most of all in the more lush areas of the Bay
region and the southern river valleys. Their typical light brown and green camou-
flage patterns were unlike the regular green worn by other contingents and blend-
ed in almost perfectly with the vegetation in the Bay region’s scrub country that was
not unfamiliar to them. Their futuristic Austrian Steyr rifles with telescopic sights,
apart from being deadly accurate in firefights, were short, which made them easy to
handle in crowds and urban terrain.90
An NGO director noted that the Australians were not ‘barrack bound,’ while he
saw the Marines with whom he had worked as hiding too much behind sandbags
on the heavily protected Baidoa airport. They ‘worked into the community; they got
to be friendly with the community; they got to know the community.’ To emphasize
the objectivity of his account, the Australian aid worker maintained that ‘even agen-
cies like Médecins Sans Frontières’ had said that ‘the Australians provided some-
thing that had never been seen by military forces in a peacekeeping role.’91 Hurley’s
motto was ‘Gentle in manner, resolute in deed’ and the overall posture was friend-
ly, but not familiar. Although a few Australian soldiers displayed outright racist atti-
tudes towards the Somalis, like soldiers in all Western UNITAF contingents, their
posture remained overwhelmingly friendly and ‘consumer oriented’ – with the pop-
ulation and the relief organizations being their clients. It was probably partly due
the Australians’ overall good-humored and laid back attitude prevailing on the sur-
face, combined with a undercurrent of fanaticism fuelled by the urge to prove them-
selves, that made them resilient to setbacks and resistance in Somalia’s unpredictable
and volatile environment. Satisfaction grew over time, when the level of violence
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towards the population and number of contacts continued to drop in March. ‘By
April, the town could almost be described as quiet on most nights.’92
The vast majority of American combat troops hated their deployment in Soma-
lia and seriously started to doubt its purpose after the humanitarian crisis was more
or less resolved. Even Major Stanton’s overall good-humored book, Somalia on Five
Dollars a Day is highly cynical about his five months in Marka, one of the more suc-
cessful American-occupied sectors. Though quite a few Australian soldiers and jun-
ior officers were also disappointed, the source of their disappointments generally dif-
fered. When they embarked, American and Australian troops had similar expecta-
tions about military-style confrontations with the warlords’ militias, and once deployed
many preferred more latitude to fight the bandits. Like the Americans, the Australian
Army had little peacekeeping experience prior to 1992.93 Yet, among the Diggers,
there seems to have been little doubt as to the goal of their mission, which they gen-
erally saw as helping the Somalis rebuild themselves. Although there was some doubt
about the attainability of that goal and despite the wear and tear after four months
in theater, overall morale remained high. Sergeant Graham McBean noticed how
most of the Australians regarded the experience in Somalia as ‘the most rewarding
episode in their professional career.’ This sort of appreciation was unlikely for Amer-
icans troops at the time.94
Counterinsurgency Reflex 
The divergent response to the challenges faced in Somalia and the difference in
appreciation of the mission can be traced back to the overall perception of and
approach to the military profession in the United States and Australia. The Vietnam
experience left deep marks in both societies, but it did not have the same devastat-
ing effect on the Australian military psyche. A possible explanation for Australian
operations in Somalia therefore lies in the fact that these military operations – effec-
tively internal security operations – were close in nature to counterinsurgency. After
the Second World War, the Australian Army had become proficient at this type of
operations, which during the 1980s became known under the generic term low-
intensity conflict.
Counterinsurgency operations in Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam provided a contin-
uum of experience for the Australian Army. The Australians had already gained sub-
stantial experience in jungle warfare fighting the conventional Japanese Army dur-
ing the Second World War, but were left to reinvent the wheel fighting an irregular
enemy, as the British were lax in passing on their hard-learned knowledge of the
previous years. Although the Australians only joined the Malayan campaign in 1955,
when the outcome had already been determined, their battalion was used extensive-
ly for internal security duties. These were mostly mop-up operations that entailed
countless hours of patrolling and waiting in ambush to produce a few fleeting con-
tacts. This was after all what counterinsurgency for infantrymen on the tactical level
was in essence about. 
After Malaya gained independence it could not defend itself against incursions
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by Indonesia, and the British became involved in the border conflict after 1962. Also
on Borneo the Australian contribution was belated and limited, but valuable, and
included clandestine cross-border raids.95 Australian doctrinal development remained
largely haphazard and the Army continued to borrow from the British. When it joined
the American war effort in Vietnam in 1964, the Army’s structure was still based
on a traditional British-style tropical warfare divisional organization. It had a strong
tactical emphasis, as it traditionally left the operational and strategic levels of com-
mand to the British and Americans. According to the Australian military analyst
Michael Evans, the Army left this war in 1972 as experts on counter-revolutionary
warfare in tropical conditions in Asia. However, the tactical lessons, first drawn up
in three separate pamphlets The Enemy, Ambush and Counter-Ambush and Patrolling
and Tracking between 1964 and 1966, were only compiled in 1972 and received a
very limited distribution. Only in 1988 was all learning material from the Vietnam
War formally integrated as a training bulletin called ‘Infantry Battalion Lessons from
Vietnam.’96
In search of a new purpose and longing for greater autonomy, the Australian
Defence Force shifted its emphasis to ‘continental defense’ of northern Australia
against potential hostile incursions, something it had not done since the Interbel-
lum. However, the Australians would not go down the path of American and conti-
nental European military establishments, described in chapter one. After a series of
frustrating and distracting counterinsurgency-style experiences in former colonial ter-
ritories, Australia’s allies found comfort in focusing strictly on large-scale symmet-
ric warfare against a clearly identified enemy on the other side of the Iron Curtain.
Instead, the Australian divisional commander Major General R.J. Hughes complained
in 1974 that after focusing on a recognized threat in the last thirty years, the Army
now had to defend the homeland without a potential enemy. From an expeditionary
force modeled for tropical warfare, the small Army had to reconfigure and develop
military doctrine to face the extraordinarily difficult task of defending the Australian
landmass without any guidance on the type of war it would have to fight. It was
given ample room and time to interpret this vague strategic guidance, but in the
next twenty years personnel shortages, lack of resources and organizational weak-
ness haunted the Australian Defence Force.97
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Army came up with the ‘Total Forces Con-
cept’ with a dual capability. It aimed at combining both heavy forces for higher-level
conflict and light mobile forces for low-level contingencies, for a strategy of defense
in depth. Overall, much emphasis was placed on a high degree of dispersion, mobil-
ity and endurance. The Australian officer corps fell back on what they knew best,
the tactical level of operations, neglecting the operational art that they had left to the
British and Americans in previous wars.98 By 1987, the new Defence White Paper
reiterated the defense of Australia, but with an emphasis on lower-level operations,
simply because there was no potential enemy with a military capability for a major
attack in the region. Despite the momentous changes following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Australia clung to continental defense until 1997.99 Michael Evans
wrote about the Army’s slow response to strategic change:
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The case of Australian Army doctrine for continental operations is a cautionary
tale of how the development of detailed planning for a doctrine of war can become
so ingrained in the logic of its authors that it becomes, as was the case with the
French Army during the 1930s, an elegant but abstract dogma unrelated to broad-
er political realities.100
Yet, while the Australian defense policy between 1987 and 1997 may have been an
anachronism, serendipity had it that the continuous emphasis on low-level military
operations prepared the Australian Army better than most NATO partners for many
of the post-Cold War challenges that were so far removed from conventional armored
maneuver warfare. 
Rather than invoking the image of peacekeeping, as was common amongst other
UNITAF contingents, the Australians classified their mission as a low-level opera-
tion. According to Hurley, the operational environment and tactical approach that
best suited operations in Somalia were similar to the concept of operations propa-
gated in the Defence White Paper.101 Reflecting on several months of operations in
Somalia, Warrant Officer Paul Angus said ‘[w]e have not done a thing here yet that
is not low level operations,’ adding smilingly, ‘so someone must have looked into
the crystal ball, because our training in the last years, since the White Paper of 1987,
has been low level operations, and that is exactly what we are doing.’ He also laud-
ed the Australian Army’s emphasis on individual skills and discipline for operating
in a jungle environment, which brought everything back to the soldier instead of
relying on an elaborate and high-tech organization.102 While most armies contribut-
ing to Operation Restore Hope started to ponder having to adapt tactics and training
to peace operations, Sergeant Graham McBean concluded that ‘[o]ne of the big les-
sons to come out of this deployment is there aren’t too many big lessons to learn...
Our training doctrine for low-level conflict is sound.’103 As a source of inspiration
for operations in Somalia the Australians often referred to counterinsurgency. Hur-
ley claimed to have approached the operation ‘as though it was similar to a coun-
terinsurgency operation.’ Also Kelly held in retrospect that the contingent had based
its strategy on counterinsurgency, suggesting that they pre-empted this type of oper-
ation. Nonetheless, neither elaborated on the degree to which the historical lessons
and principles of counterinsurgency were applicable in Somalia and to what extent
they influenced their planning and choices once the operation had unfolded.104
The British were the only power to win a clear-cut victory over communist insur-
gents and came to be considered experts in counterinsurgency. The assembled wis-
dom on counterinsurgency operations was unofficially codified in 1966 by Sir Robert
Thompson. His five basic principles for successful internal security operations were
laid down in his book, Defeating Communist Insurgency, gained a timeless quality.
However, before making the attempt to compare UNITAF’s mode of operations to
the counterinsurgency ‘model,’ one has to recognize the most fundamental differ-
ences between circumstances and conditions under which UNITAF operated in Soma-
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lia and, for instance, the Malayan campaign on which Thompson based his analy-
sis. First, there was no coherent enemy to defeat, only security to be established.
Second, there was no state to defend. All counterinsurgency theory is based on the
assumption that the military is there in support of the civil power, which was a well-
established colonial administration during the war in Malaya and an unstable and
corrupt regime for the Americans in South Vietnam. In Somalia, there was also no
international interim administration or other form of civil component to defend or
support, only the humanitarian community to protect. The third fundamental ele-
ment missing from the equation in Somalia was a long-term perspective. Everything
about the American intervention was ‘quick fix.’ The history of British counterinsur-
gency used at West Point in the early 1970s taught young cadets that, apart from
decades of hard-learned strategic, operational and tactical knowledge, the most impor-
tant lesson to be learned from the British was that effective counterinsurgency
required patience. This, the author of the treatise admitted, was not an American
character trait.105
Reflecting on his actions in relation to counterinsurgency in 1994, Hurley referred
to two of Thompson’s principles. He started by mentioning the fifth and last in the
list when he referred to the need to ‘establish a secure base and expand in steps to
establish controlled areas.’ This was the most straightforward of all principles and
also the one most easily translated to a purely military operation. However, what
made Thompson’s treatise rise above most earlier learning was his ability to move
beyond the military aspects of fighting an irregular opponent, and merge civilian
and military measures and objectives on all levels – political, strategic, operational
and tactical. First, he mentioned the need for a clear political aim, which in the post-
colonial setting of the 1960s was ‘to establish and maintain a free, independent, and
united country which is politically and economically stable and viable.’ UNITAF’s
complete lack of a long-term perspective, and the conscious omission of any politi-
cal and economic goals, made this principle non-applicable.
Second, Thompson emphasized the importance of operating in accordance with
the law. He advocated the use force in a highly selective manner, implicitly referring
to the concept of the minimum use of force and ruling out any form of collective
punishment. The Australians proved proficient in the application of the right bal-
ance of force and restraint. Overall UNITAF adhered to this principle more strictly
than Thompson is likely to have envisioned. One should bear in mind that over the
previous thirty years, the negative effects of any use of excessive force on commu-
nity relations, and therefore perceived legitimacy, was magnified manifold as media
communications had improved radically, even in the underdeveloped world.
The third, and arguably pivotal, principle in the effective execution of a coun-
terinsurgency campaign on the operational and tactical level was the creation of a
comprehensive plan for integrated civil and military operations. Thomas Mockaitis
wrote in his treatise on British counterinsurgency that the development of a distinct-
ly British approach between 1919 and 1960 was ‘a history not of campaigns but of
principles as these were applied by soldiers, colonial administrators and police.’106
The formalized triangular committee system for civil-military cooperation on the dis-
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trict, state and federal level in Malaya, also known as the ‘war by committee-struc-
ture,’ was a culmination of this experience. It only became fully effective when tem-
porarily placed under the single-headed executive leadership of the High Commis-
sioner General Gerald Templer. It was made possible by the extraordinary level of
control that Great Britain could exercise as a colonial power over local institutions
and therefore over subject peoples. In his second and last concrete reference to coun-
terinsurgency, Hurley readily admitted in 1994 that the absence of a host govern-
ment – with crucial institutions such as a police force – was the most structural dis-
similarity between operations in Somalia and counterinsurgency.107 However, creat-
ing an apparatus for civil-military cooperation was part of Hurley’s approach and
addressed more broadly than most UNITAF contingents. 
‘The battle in the populated areas,’ Thompson wrote to illustrate his fourth prin-
ciple, ‘represents a straight fight between the government and the insurgents for the
rural population.’ He prescribed giving absolute priority to countering the subver-
sion of the people, rather than killing or capturing guerrillas. Mirror-imaging Mao
Tse-Tung metaphor of the insurgent being a fish and the water being the populace,
the British in Malaya had set out to isolate the insurgents from their population base.
The key to the Briggs Plan had been the controversial, yet effective, forced reloca-
tion scheme of almost half a million rural Chinese, combined with an elaborate infor-
mation campaign aimed at winning over the population to the government’s cause.
Providing the population with security against retaliation from the insurgents proved
absolutely crucial to winning them over, which in turn was indispensable for human
intelligence gathering. Minus its forced resettlement program, this principle was a
clearly relevant element for Somalia if ‘insurgents’ were replaced by bandits or mili-
tia, but the Australians made no reference to it while comparing their operation to
counterinsurgency.
Permeating all Thompson’s principles was his emphasis on fighting the cause of
an insurgency instead of merely eradicating the symptoms. Translated to Somalia,
this was the fundamental flaw of the intervention as the cause for anarchy and star-
vation was the absence of a functioning government infrastructure, not the food
shortage UNITAF was addressing. Another binding element in Thompson’s thesis
was the time-honored maxim of ‘winning the hearts and minds,’ which was inher-
ent in at least three of his leading principles: the overall political goal, the minimum
use of force and countering the subversion of the population. Combined, these two
dominant themes in the approach to fighting an insurgency merged in the estab-
lishment of ‘the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the local population and
acceptance of its capacity to coerce where necessary.’108
The Australians applied most of the basic counterinsurgency principles not as a
plan, but as a reflex. Hurley referred to counterinsurgency in retrospect not because
he consciously applied its theoretical principles as has been vaguely suggested, but
because many of them were unmistakably applicable and part of his military cultur-
al background. Moreover, many of the ideas and methods prescribed on the ‘pure-
ly’ military side of the spectrum of counterinsurgency were ingrained in Australian
military tradition. The Australian’s strong tactical emphasis, the need for flexibility
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and latitude given to junior leaders to achieve their objectives, a decentralized com-
mand system, dispersed and small-scale patrols penetrating the countryside, count-
er-ambushes, the futility of big sweeps, the importance of winning the hearts and
minds in relation to the all important human intelligence gathering effort – all these
tactics and techniques were better applied by the Australians than most of the other
contingents because low-intensity conflict was considered the norm in soldiering,
not an aberration. 
The Military Governor of Baidoa 
The refusal of US diplomatic and military leadership to accept what some have called
‘the implied authority in the absence of the state’ in Somalia, fueled the question to
what extent the intervention force had become the de facto government. The com-
parison to counterinsurgency also gives rise to the question if, in the absence of the
pivotal element in counterinsurgency theory – a colonial administration or host-
nation state – UNITAF came to perform this role by default. Templer’s success in
Malaya had been partly due to his dual role as high commissioner and as military
commander; he was, according to Mockaitis, ‘the last of the proconsuls.’ Johnston
and Oakley could not accept this authority on the operational level in Mogadishu,
and the United Nations failed to come forward with an adequate interim adminis-
trative structure. Tactical commanders had to cope with the effects of their refusal.
Talking to Kelly on 13 February, Hurley ‘mused about being the “governor” of Baidoa,
with his staff officers being the ‘ministers’, and lamented the inadequate prepara-
tion his politics course at the Royal Military College Duntroon had given him for the
situation he now faced.’ In retrospect, Hurley admitted that he was in essence the
‘military governor’ of the Bay region.109
The different levels of success between Mogadishu and Baidoa have in retrospect
been ascribed to ‘a full-fledged civil affairs plan’ or a ‘well-defined game plan,’ with
which the Australians – unlike the Americans – allegedly arrived in Somalia.110 The
tendency by some American commentators to ascribe the Australian approach to the
power vacuum to a preconceived plan apparently originates in Kelly’s writings on
this episode. Kelly suggested the existence of an Australian ‘civil affairs strategy’ for
the reconstruction of local institutions in his argument that the laws of occupation
applied in southern Somalia and that UNITAF should have based its approach on
its provisions in order to address the power vacuum.111 However, he only advised
Hurley of his legal assessment during their meeting on 13 February, one month after
his arrival in Somalia and a time when he was already involved in rudimentary insti-
tution-building efforts such as the recreation of a Baidoan police force.112 At UNITAF
headquarters the Australian legal advisor’s input was much appreciated, but he was
told that his specific views on this matter were his own, and not shared by the Aus-
tralian government.113
Hurley considered the question of whether UNITAF constituted an occupying
power under the Fourth Geneva Convention unanswered. Nevertheless, he accepted
most of the responsibilities involved and would increasingly draw on Kelly’s much-
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needed legal advice. However, the decision to take on tasks outside the original mis-
sion was not reflective of a preconceived plan or strategy based on legal obligations.
Instead, Hurley wrote, it ‘reflected the pace at which developments were happening
on the ground and UNITAF’s and the UN’s inability to provide timely advice and
policy direction.’ He readily admitted ‘mission creep’ was occurring in the course of
his deployment. In some cases, in order to avoid the implied negative connotation,
he preferred the term ‘mission stretch’ to emphasize the deliberate nature of his
decisions to interpret the mission broadly.114
Major Stanhope’s liaison team became Hurley’s most important tool in manag-
ing the administrative and political complexities in his sector. The field artillery bat-
tery commander and his forward observer parties had expected to perform military
liaison duties with other UNITAF units and higher headquarters, so his twenty-two-
strong unit had not been prepared for civil-military operations. Although experience
in the Second World War and in counterinsurgency operations had brought home
the importance of civil affairs, the small Australian Army had long since lost a spe-
cialized capacity to perform this function. After military liaison duties proved of less-
er importance, Hurley assigned Stanhope and his men to act as a Civil-Military Oper-
ations Team to represent him on the local committees the Australians inherited from
the Marines. Their most important point of contact was the committee of twelve rep-
resentatives of the 41 elders, the leader of whom they met once every two days. They
were also to coordinate with all other organizations and individuals that approached
the contingent. Stanhope broke his unit up into four teams, consisting of one offi-
cer and three others, each with their own transport and communications.115 These
teams would also assist the companies in the provinces, liaise to local elders in the
villages and proved crucial for gathering information on key people, banditry and
political activity. 
Although obviously not keen on political entanglement, the Australians were not
as apprehensive as the Americans to become involved. Hurley accepted that with
nine hundred troops at his disposal he was the most powerful player in the Bay
region, and every step he took and each contact he made was highly political and
therefore better considered and preferably based on adequate intelligence. The polit-
ical alternative to the SNA-SLA in Baidoa that was able to raise its profile after
UNITAF created rudimentary security was the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM),
representing the indigenous Ranhanweyn people. The fairly homogenous and pri-
marily agricultural Ranhanweyn people constituted ninety percent of the population
in the Bay region, but had no significant armed organization to defend itself from
the armed factions from the traditionally nomadic clans that overran and occupied
the region in 1991.116 Effectively, Hurley chose sides with moderates in the SDM
against SLA as he regarded this in the best interest of maintaining a secure and
politically more stable environment. He distanced himself from the SLA after its ini-
tial attempts to gain recognition from the Australians, and the commander denied
their requests and offers for cooperation on security operations. 
In early February, while the first steps were taken to reconstruct an independent
new police force, a self-proclaimed chief of police from the SLA paraded three hun-
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dred men down Baidoa’s main road as an ‘instant police force’ and offered to coop-
erate with the Australians. He was immediately informed that such displays would
not be tolerated.117 The SLA police chief had been put forward by one of Aideed’s
strongmen who had traveled down to Baidoa for this specific purpose. Thomson and
Douglas had gathered this information during the last two weeks of January, when
they were in frequent contact with SLA officers in order to rapidly draw up an intel-
ligence picture of its local political and armed branch. In order to impress the two
Australians the SLA had paraded no less than 450 militia in their presence. Their
contacts soon revealed that Gutaale, although not operating openly in the city as he
used to, was behind all the efforts to push the SLA ‘police,’ militia and other repre-
sentatives into the emerging local institutions.118
Hurley’s decision to ignore and marginalize, as much as possible, the local war-
lord was not in line with the policy adopted in Mogadishu. Here, Oakley and John-
ston stuck to the line of involving the two major warlords as much as possible. Also
Zinni would later argue that it was crucial to give everyone with power a forum, or
otherwise they would resort to violence.119 In the capital the result was that too much
influence and authority was ceded to the warlords, thereby avoiding potential mili-
tary confrontations, but postponing problems for the UN force for which UNITAF
was supposed to pave the way. It should be noted that Hurley’s assertiveness was
facilitated by the weaker popular power base in Baidoa of those loyal to Aideed. How-
ever, at the same time the Australians were providing the type of security that allowed
those who were opposed to the rule of the warlords – clearly also a majority in
Mogadishu – to come forward.120
This being Somalia, politics in the Bay region was obviously more complicated
than two monolithic parties representing a minority and a majority. The SDM was
an overall moderate political movement, but consisted of no less than three factions.
As a result of its inability to organize armed resistance against incursions, part of
the SDM aligned itself with powerful outside organizations in the hope of gaining
protection. As a result, the SDM was split into one Ali Mahdi-oriented branch and
one Aideed-oriented branch. To their dismay, the Australians had no choice but to
acknowledge the authority of the SDM ‘governor’ who was affiliated with the pro-
Aideed faction. His efforts were primarily aimed at raising taxes, ostensibly for the
reconstruction of local administration, schools, sanitation and police, but he had a
record of self-enrichment prior to UNITAF’s arrival. Early information on the politi-
cal nature of both parties from both Stanhope and the counterintelligence specialists
proved crucial for choosing who to marginalize and which political factions to foster.
The Australians facilitated and fostered the development of a new united SDM branch.
In late February and early March, an SDM conference was held which the Australians
secured against disruption by the SLA with an extra company and additional armored
vehicles. Their involvement went further than that.121 On the night of 1 March, a desk
officer volunteered to escort counterintelligence personnel into town to meet with
members of the SDM. ‘It was quite “hairy” patrolling down little alleyways on to the
house where the meeting took place,’ he noted in his diary when he returned at two
o’clock at night. ‘It was excellent. I sat and talked to an expatriate Somali who works
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in Yemen, who has returned to Somalia for the SDM election to take place in the
next couple of weeks. It was refreshing to finally meet some Somalis who had a pos-
itive, progressive approach to fixing this country’s problems.’122 The Baidoa confer-
ence succeeded in electing both new SDM representatives for the upcoming UN-
sponsored Addis Ababa conference and a local representative body.123
Hurley was content with the progress made in March, but also worried about
becoming more embroiled with local politics by the day. ‘It is not really my job,’ he
wrote back home, ‘so I will be glad when the UNOSOM II political officer arrives
next week (at last!).’124 He hoped to be able to concentrate more on commanding
and monitoring his troops in the field and on organizing a big cleanup of the city
with the cooperation of the local population. However, his hopes were raised too
high, since UNOSOM political advisors would only visit infrequently.125 The only UN
representative working in Baidoa was Patrick Vercammen, a young Belgian who was
officially a UNOSOM ‘humanitarian assistance officer.’ While he had substantial expe-
rience in humanitarian work, he was not at all trained in civil administration or in
dealing with local politics. He saw his work primarily as coordinating the efforts of
the NGO community, but although he was friendly with his former colleagues, they
made it very clear from the beginning that they would not accept much UNOSOM
oversight. He was given no staff and hardly any funds and found himself in a rather
isolated position with little to no guidance from UN headquarters. Stanhope
empathized with Vercammen and brought him a box filled with food when he first
arrived in his barren UN office in February. They soon established friendly relations
and were in daily contact. He basically latched on to the Australians who tried to
involve him as much as possible, but continued to lead in all institution-building
efforts. Vercammen scrambled for funds and materials to facilitate their efforts. 
On 8 March, the NGO community wrote a protest letter to Boutros-Ghali, lament-
ing the total lack of accomplishments by UNOSOM in reconciliation, institutional
and infrastructural reconstruction and the failure to even support its own field staff.126
The secretary-general, like the Americans, was awaiting the outcomes of a national
peace process and refused to take any action to fill the void in which the military
contingents were trying to find their way. In late March, the first concrete steps
towards reconciliation on the national level were undertaken when sixteen faction
leaders met in Addis Ababa. They agreed on an interim government, a cease-fire and
total disarmament, and the creation of a national police force. Meanwhile, a new UN
resolution was drafted to provide the new UN force with a mandate to enforce its
provisions. The NGO Human Rights Watch criticized this process for being ‘a con-
versation amongst warlords.’ The Australians were extremely aggravated by UNO-
SOM’s refusal to permit the newly elected SDM representatives to attend the meet-
ing in Ethiopia. Instead, the UN continued to work with the established faction lead-
ers affiliated with Aideed and Ali Mahdi.127
The most imminent concern in Baidoa continued to be the maintenance of law and
order. The idea that the Australians had arrived with a plan has led to the common
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misconception that they came fully prepared to assist in the reconstruction of the
police and the local court system. In an influential analysis on the Auxiliary Securi-
ty Force, Lynn Thomas and Steven Spataro maintained that the Australians brought
police trainers and integrated ‘judicial experts’ into their force after having studied
the situation.128 However, the military police detachment had not anticipated per-
forming any such role, and would only do so to a limited extent since the detach-
ment was already seriously under strength. MP Sergeant Peter Watson, who had
served in the New Zealand Army and civilian police force, was in charge of just five
corporals. Attached to Colonel Mellor’s Australian Forces Somalia Headquarters in
Mogadishu, they were initially tasked to provide security for the headquarters and
perform policing duties for almost one thousand personnel.129
Kelly’s task was officially not planned to go beyond the normal legal advisory role
to the contingent commander. Driven partly by his personal and professional inter-
est in the legal aspects of the mission, Kelly played a substantial role in lifting the
institution-building effort in Baidoa to a higher level. His work cannot be seen in
isolation from the initiatives by Lorenz, Spataro and some of the UN staff in
Mogadishu. By February, the ASF in Mogadishu was clearly showing some prom-
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Unarmed Somali policemen of the newly created ‘Auxilary Security Force’ join Australian infantry
on patrol in urban Baidoa. The Australians went further than other peacekeeping units by resur-
recting a judiciary and penal system.
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ise.130 At UNITAF headquarters, Kelly had established a close working relationship
with Lorenz and Spataro, and was able to convince them that the relative success in
Baidoa should be exploited and serve as a model for the rest of Somalia.131
With both UNITAF and UNOSOM providing lackluster support, the ASF contin-
ued to struggle for funding, civilian expertise and political guidance. Instead of send-
ing support, the UN and the United States sent a steady stream of consultants to
report on the potential of police reconstruction. After the UN had fielded three inves-
tigators in January who proposed a five-hundred strong UN Civilian Police contin-
gent, the US Department of Justice team concluded in March that the ASF could
work, but needed close to thirteen million dollars to function in Mogadishu the com-
ing half year. This would have been a modest sum considering that the United States
was spending thirty to forty million to keep its troops afield each day. In April, Mar-
tin Ganzglass was somewhat surprised when he was sent as yet another consultant,
this time by the State Department. The American lawyer, a former Peace Corps legal
advisor to the Somali government in the 1960s, was given a somewhat broader
assignment to include, apart from police reconstruction, reviewing the potential for
the resurrection of a judicial system.132
Without formal international control, accountability continued to hamper the func-
tioning of the ASF. Oakley argued that the Police Committee set up to take charge
of the police in Mogadishu was non-partisan and that it somehow ‘reported to the
Somali people.’133 Ganzglass and Brigadier Ahmed Jama regarded the ten appoint-
ments of police, army and former secret service colonels and generals, five by Ali
Mahdi and five by Aideed, as highly political and problematic in the long run.134
Ganzglass and the former Somali police commander argued that Oakley should have
strictly limited the committee to former Somali national police and expanded the
effort to the provinces, where the police was operating in a vacuum, or under con-
trol of the more active UNITAF contingents, but frequently under control of local
warlords. Ganzglass suggested that the ambassador refused to challenge the control
by the warlords in Mogadishu in order to get the Committee and the police force
off the ground as soon as possible. He also criticized the Americans for their exces-
sive focus on Mogadishu and the failure to create non-partisan local councils else-
where in the country to rebuild local courts and police forces.135
Without a coordinated and internationally funded program for police support, it
fell to the different UNITAF contingents to help create and support regional police.
This resulted in very different levels of performance by the local police units. Address-
ing a RAND Corporation conference in the year 2000, Oakley held that the Soma-
li police performed effectively in the vast majority of the cities and towns.136 While
he correctly lauded the Mogadishu police for its overall performance under extreme
pressure, its success here depended to a large degree on the operational control exe-
cuted by Brigadier Zinni and Spataro. As long as the ASF was propped up by US
Marines, Italians and other UNITAF units, the police held their ground, although
one source in the State Department called the force ‘unarmed and with uncertain
loyalties.’137 Thomas and Spataro were more critical of the overall performance of
the police, concluding that ‘[i]n Mogadishu and some outlying areas (such as the
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French and particularly the Australians sectors), the police performed reasonably well
during the UNITAF period. In other areas they performed poorly, even being con-
trolled by local warlords. Only in the Bay region was there any serious support for
judiciary or penal rehabilitation.’138 The efforts by the Australians were widely regard-
ed as by far the most effective in re-establishing a degree of law and order, but even
‘the Baidoa model,’ as it was sometimes referred to, was obviously not without its
flaws. 
Hurley’s primary motive for energetically pushing the police program was that
policing-type jobs were absorbing his soldiers. Clearly, there was a simultaneous urge
to make a lasting impact.139 On 4 February, he presented a plan for the establish-
ment of a local Auxiliary Security Force in Baidoa. Stanhope was tasked to liaise with
the emerging police force and UNOSOM, that was hoped to start supporting the
force soon.140 There is no evidence to support the claim that earlier efforts by the
Marines were built upon. The process was started from scratch with the distribution
of leaflets in Baidoa and a briefing to the Council of Elders advising them that any-
one with at least two years’ previous police service prior to January 1991, no crimi-
nal record and the approval of the elders could be a member of the ASF. Although
not always adhered to, these criteria were the same throughout southern Somalia.
Candidates were to be checked against the old nominal rolls found in Mogadishu
containing the names of former members of the Somali National Police. Stanhope
informed UNITAF legal staff on 8 February of the contingent’s intentions to give
high priority to the re-establishment of a police force. Three days later, an important
meeting was held with the local elders to select a police commander acceptable to
all elements and determine the initial thirty members of the force. Hurley had antic-
ipated ‘a lot of inter-factional squabbling,’ but he was now hopeful of soon having
a local security force and ‘a jail to throw the people we catch into.’141
On 15 February, the ASF started operating in Baidoa with twenty policemen.142
By March, the force numbered seventy-five and new uniforms arrived from a large
stock that had been ordered before the war in Italy and had withered in a depot in
Kenya since. They would soon be issued their traditional blue berets, handcuffs and
nightsticks. Two vehicles would be ‘on loan’ to the ASF from American stocks left
over from the Gulf War.143 Batons, whistles, belts, badges, boots, typewriters, filing
cabinets and even weapons were eventually all scavenged. However, even though the
ASF in Baidoa was given priority by UNITAF headquarters, its poor equipment
remained a serious impediment. After having served unarmed for almost two months,
UNITAF authorized the issuance of weapons in March, so the Australians handed
out the first three M-16s confiscated from bandits. Eventually, 25 percent of the total
force was equipped with firearms, the maximum allowed by UNITAF headquarters.144
The Australians accepted responsibility for the supervision of prisons, but were glad
to share this task with the International Red Cross, which also provided food for
both prisoners and prison guards. Lacking material support from UNITAF or UNO-
SOM, the contingent’s engineers started restoring the police stations, the central
prison, police cells and eventually also the courthouse.145 Initially the ASF was paid
in food provided by World Food Program and the Red Cross. Later, they received
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wages from UNOSOM in local currency, which for some mysterious reason had
retained some of its value in Somalia. The police were trained with some support
of Australian MPs and regular infantry, but most of the training was done by a for-
mer instructor from the Somali Police Academy. By April, 260 policemen were recruit-
ed, more or less trained, and deployed throughout the Bay region.146
Kelly, Thomas, Spataro and Oakley all describe the police reconstruction effort in
Baidoa as a success story. Bob Breen, however, was not convinced of its effective-
ness after conducting his field research towards the end of the Australian deploy-
ment. The prime goal for its creation was eliminating the need for UNITAF to per-
form police functions in the short term. Even in Baidoa, this proved elusive. Although
it was no longer necessary to hold Somalis in the battalion’s temporary detainee facil-
ity once the police had been established with a detention facility, Hurley regarded
his battalion as still ‘very much a police force in town’ and his troops continued to
arrest persons right up to their departure – although in decreasing numbers.147
From February to May, the cautious and reluctant police officers were often includ-
ed in operations, and patrol commanders tried hard to raise their profile and status
in the eyes of the locals. However, the Australians were not always impressed with
their performance, for example, in crowd control situations at food distribution points.
They also failed to show up when called upon by the Australians to help when a row
between SDM and SLA women escalated from shouting insults to hurling rocks at
each other, leaving some wounded. Instead, a section of Australians was sent down
to disperse the crowd of violent women.148 The police proved quite susceptible to
bribes and intimidation by bandits, and often proved incapable of holding detainees
for much longer than twenty-four hours. It was after all a still underpaid, unarmed
and underequipped police force. One notorious bandit called Gaardub was even
released twice by the police, adding much to the anger of the Australians, one of
who was wounded in a scuffle to recapture him.149 Meanwhile, the Australians still
lacked the authority to hold detainees longer than forty-eight hours in their own facil-
ities. Only very serious cases were referred to Mogadishu.
Creating a politically independent police force proved hard in Somalia. The veri-
fication of names by the Police Committee in Mogadishu against the old record was
sloppy and caused the Australians to step up their interrogation of police recruits.150
While the initial security committee set up by Marines had been dominated by the
SLA, Kelly and Lorenz found that the local Ranhanweyn politicians, now largely in
charge, were also eager to use the ASF to further their political goals. This meant
giving priority to tax gathering over investigating and detaining criminals in order
to protect lives and property of ordinary Somalis. Tax revenue was hoped to be used
for payment of SDM civil servants and the party hoped to use the police as their
own security force against Aideed’s SLA.151 
Breen rightfully corrects the image of a smooth-running Somali police force in
Baidoa and elsewhere, an image that has been used too easily to underline Ameri-
can success in the UNITAF phase versus the United Nations’ eventual failure. How-
ever, his healthy skepticism, based mainly on accounts of Australian soldiers in the
field, fails to measure the relative rapid success compared to police monitoring and
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reconstruction efforts in other interventions such as Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and
East Timor. Here, meager progress or modest levels of success mostly required mas-
sive and costly efforts and took years. Lack of progress there often resulted from
poor cooperation between military peacekeepers and UN Civilian Police. Moreover,
police reconstruction in Baidoa, despite its many flaws, was still far more effective
than in most places in Somalia. When the Australians were preparing to be relieved
by French forces in May, Kelly saw the ASF performing most of the regular polic-
ing in Baidoa. Breen also fails to mention the Criminal Investigations Division (CID),
which the Australian legal advisor considered a key element in raising the effective-
ness of the police force. 
Regular Somali police lacked the training to perform careful investigations and
gather criminal evidence or reliable criminal intelligence. The Police Committee in
Mogadishu – dominated by two major factions – was reluctant to re-establish a crim-
inal intelligence branch, which had existed within the regular police force prior to
1991. The Australians decided to press ahead anyway and established a unit of twen-
ty handpicked former criminal investigators. These retained a considerable degree
of independence from the police commander, Colonel Aden Nuur, and were put in
charge of monitoring any corruption in the police force and the emerging judiciary.
The police commander was specifically warned not to interfere, and reminded that
UNOSOM paid his wages and could remove him, which in reality meant that the
Australians could do so, as they were clearly running the whole operation.152 They
became increasingly disillusioned with the police commander, who had been accept-
able to all parties for a reason as he clearly avoided any trouble with the major ban-
dit leaders in the region. The Australians showed their willingness to intervene when
they fired his deputy police commander after the counterintelligence personnel dis-
covered he tried to strike a deal with bandit elements. Nevertheless, other local police
commanders, such as in the provincial town Dinsoor, performed admirably. Kelly
also had full confidence in the CID commanders, with whom he, the battalion’s intel-
ligence team and MP Sergeant Watson all cooperated closely and effectively.153
The creation of the ASF in Baidoa, although more successful than in most places,
was not unique. However, the Bay region was the only sector where any serious sup-
port was provided to the rehabilitation of the judiciary and penal system. Also in
this respect the Australian efforts have often been lauded and portrayed as the path
that UNITAF should and could have taken to seriously prepare the way for the Unit-
ed Nations mission.154 Justice system reconstruction in Baidoa was a trial balloon
and emerged from a cooperative effort by some individuals amongst UNITAF’s legal
staff and the Australians. With the rising number of detainees held in Mogadishu
prison, the inevitability of some support to the reconstruction of a judiciary system
was becoming apparent to UNITAF headquarters and in Oakley’s Liaison Office. To
this end, the American military legal advisors met with a group of Somali lawyers
and judges from southern Mogadishu, all of whom were aligned with Aideed. This
triggered more criticism that the United States was again ceding too much author-
ity to the dominant warlord and neglecting other parties.155
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After Kelly’s arrival in January, he became involved in efforts by Lorenz and Philip
Ives to form the US Liaison Office to assemble a broader cross section of Somali
lawyers. In the period between January and late March, these local initiatives were
emerging in the virtual policy vacuum that existed in Washington and New York. It
was a time when the Americans in Mogadishu started to recognize there was little
chance of raising viable institutions by working merely through the warlords. At the
same time the new Clinton administration was under increasing pressure from Colin
Powell and the Joint Chiefs to stick to the plan to get out of Somalia as soon as pos-
sible. Nevertheless, Lorenz and Ives organized a conference on 3 March that was
attended by forty-three lawyers under UNITAF protection. Although the UNOSOM
office was asked to participate in the process, no representative was present and the
UN failed to encourage judicial reconstruction efforts afterwards, waiting instead for
political guidance to follow the Addis Ababa conference held later that month. Quite
happy with the vague arrangements made in January, some of those aligned with
Aideed questioned the need for the creation of a new steering committee to carry
forward the revival of the Mogadishu courts. Nevertheless, some positive results came
from the meeting as this committee was created and headed by a former professor
at the University of Mogadishu and supreme court judge, Dr. Abdullah Ossable Barre.
Dr. Ossable had impressed Lorenz and Kelly as very capable during a meeting in
the previous month.156 It was also agreed that the old Penal Code of 1962 applied. 
Lacking formal UNITAF backing and devoid of any UNOSOM support, the ini-
tiative never showed much promise in Mogadishu. However, Kelly basically took the
effort from there and with Lorenz’s support directed his efforts towards Baidoa. The
conditions here were better with less hindrance of factional infighting after the Aus-
tralians had temporarily neutralized the SLA. Moreover, they found a willing com-
mander in Hurley who was not hampered by fixed ideas that all ‘mission creep’ was
dangerous. During a meeting with Dr. Ossable and a former Ministry of Justice offi-
cial on 22 February, a list of former judges and court personnel from the Bay region
had already been obtained, which allowed for the selection of judicial personnel. Dick
Stanhope’s CMOT personnel were given the list and they traced down some of the
former local judges and even court personnel.157 On 6 March, Hurley, Stanhope and
Vercammen held a meeting with Dr. Ossable and another former leading Mogadishu
judge that Kelly and Lorenz had brought in. After consultation with the committee
of local elders it was agreed upon that the old penal code applied. Lorenz had some
colleague judge advocates in Washington dig up an English copy of the Penal Code
of 1962 in the Library of Congress, which, together with some old cases, allowed
the legal officers in Somalia to follow and verify the proceedings. This English ver-
sion and commentary had in fact been written by Ganzglass in 1969. A regional
court was established in Baidoa and five district courts were eventually established
in the major towns. Seven local judges from before the civil war were selected, and
a president of the Court of Appeals and a chief prosecutor were appointed.158
Courtrooms had to be built or refurbished and were usually co-located with the
local police station, which facilitated protection by Australian troops. In the mean-
time, Australian army tents were used. During the first trial under the new judici-
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ary system, a car thief was convicted and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for
armed robbery. After various offenders had been released from police cells in the
recent past, Stanhope had permanently stationed one of his CMOT teams at the
police station to monitor detention and judicial procedures. Later in March, two ban-
dits arrested by the Australians were released under dubious circumstances by the
Somali judges.159 Kelly spoke of ‘teething problems,’ but held that after initial close
monitoring by the Australians, the judiciary was functioning well and was ‘totally
independent’ of the Australian force or UNOSOM. Apart from criminal matters, the
courts also started to deal with family and other civil disputes.160 Despite the lack
of UNITAF and UNOSOM support, the UN was unwittingly paying the judges as
the Australians and Vercammen simply put down the names of the judges as police
officers in the highest pay scale.
An important incentive for the creation of a justice system was the Australians’
desire to capture and prosecute the major local warlords. By March they were con-
fident that their removal from local society would seriously ameliorate the security
situation. The effort was hoped to work both ways as such a high-profile case was
likely to help build local confidence in the courts and the rule of law. Warsame was
arrested on 13 March and sent to Mogadishu Prison after he had threatened to kill
Australian troops. Meanwhile, Hurley had his sights set on the overall bandit leader
Gutaale.161 Between them, the bandit leaders were suspected of some one hundred
murders. The criminal investigations were a collaborative effort of the Australian
counterintelligence personnel, MP Sergeant Watson, and Kelly, but local criminal
investigations staff from the old police force proved to be extremely helpful. The cre-
ation of the CID was in fact a by-product of these investigations into the dealing of
Warsame and Gutaale. A very strong case against Warsame was established after
long and laborious interviews with twenty-two eyewitnesses, who dared to come for-
ward now that he was in captivity and gave horrific accounts of the atrocities he had
committed in the previous two years. The most infamous of these was the so-called
‘truck massacre,’ when Warsame and his men robbed and shot dead sixteen people
returning from the market. The accounts were corroborated by hospital records and
other physical evidence.162
After the evidence was gathered, Kelly went back to Mogadishu to prepare for the
trial. He reviewed the evidence with Lorenz and the UNITAF Chief of Staff before
it was submitted to General Johnston, who determined that he could be held and
tried.163 While Kelly was on his way back to Baidoa, news broke that Warsame had
been released from Mogadishu central prison. An investigation into the release by
Lorenz showed that Gutaale had traveled down to Mogadishu to bribe a judge loyal
to Aideed into signing a release order. The judge was arrested by Spataro and held
at the UNITAF detention facility. The whole episode was a serious blow to the Aus-
tralians’ prestige among those who had just taken the risk of giving evidence, but
also to Australians’ confidence in the Mogadishu judicial and penal system. Warsame
would remain at large, but did not dare return to Baidoa. Instead he continued to
lay low in Mogadishu. An important by-product of the investigations into the two
major bandit figures in Baidoa was the unraveling of their criminal empire. It showed
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how they had taken many shops, private houses and hotels by force, and gave some
clear insight into the command structure and functioning of their organization.164
Angered by the release of Warsame, Hurley issued orders to search Gutaale’s
premises and to arrest him. His detention and possible trial were hoped to further
assert the Australians’ authority and reinforce confidence in their ability to deal with
the major thugs. The opportunity emerged when Thomson and Douglas, who had
done much of the investigations into his case, recognized his car as it approached
them in Baidoa on his return from his trip to secure Warsame’s release. They had
four soldiers with them and, as the vehicle was forced to stop for a donkey cart,
Thomson ran toward the car and dragged Gutaale from behind the wheel. They
packed him in their Land Rover and immediately drove off to the base, ‘leaving
Gutaale’s car with its engine running, driver’s door open and a group of shocked
passengers with mouths agape in the back seat.’165 According to Thomson, the effect
of the arrest and trial was that many of his henchmen packed up and left Baidoa.
This time, Gutaale was held in the UNITAF detention facility guarded by American
MPs and only transferred to Baidoa prison just prior to his trial. In the meantime,
the same team that had worked on Warsame’s case went to work on the flood of
evidence that was coming in after his capture. The case focused on two of his worst
crimes. In August the previous year, Gutaale had deliberately driven his Fiat armored
vehicle into a group of refugees, hitting fifteen women and children. He had stopped,
reversed, and crushed the bodies while his gunmen mounted on the vehicle were
allegedly ‘cheering and yelling in delight.’ A former policeman who had helped clean
up the carnage was among many giving detailed evidence in this case. The second
charge was of a robbery of an International Red Cross warehouse, where sixteen local
employees were shot and killed.166
The two-day trial of Gutaale commenced on 24 April and was a test case for the
rudimentary legal system. The court found him guilty of the murder of thirty-one
people and many cases of robbery. Under the provisions of the 1962 Somali law, he
was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. Both his lawyer and the prosecution
appealed, the latter having expected a death sentence.167 It took the Australians some
effort to gather the six judges willing to fill the required seats at the appeal hearing,
but during a one-hour session, Gutaale was indeed sentenced to death. Ten minutes
later, Kelly and the other Australian officers present witnessed how a firing squad of
ASF policemen executed Gutaale in the prison next door in the police compound. 
Conclusion
By May 1993, the Australian contingent in Somalia had had gone quite far in assum-
ing a role similar to military governance. For the troops on the ground, their role
resembled that of assistance to the civil power in a counterinsurgency operation, with
the notable distinction that the civil power was under construction and, for the most
part, temporarily replaced by some of their own officers. They were not alone in fac-
ing these challenges, as all UNITAF contingents struggled with the lack of guidance
from the political level and absence of substantial international civilian or military
238 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:05  Pagina 238
civil affairs personnel. Like Hurley, Major Stanton recalled how he and his colleagues
in a regular infantry battalion staff were ‘handed the reins of government’ and came
up with thoughts and suggestions on how to go about business in Marka ‘like improv
actors performing without a script.’168 Even though they did not face the same chal-
lenges circumstances as the Marines in Mogadishu, the Army battalion arguably gave
the best performance of all the US forces in filling the power vacuum. Oakley called
Marka ‘a sort of living laboratory’ in this respect. The French would also look back
at substantial successes in Oddur and the surrounding Bakool region, but no con-
tingent had taken the experiment as far as the Australians. It has to be remembered
that the assumption of the governmental role and the reconstruction of local servic-
es by the Australians were all in support of the provision of security, rather than
planned or executed as a primary role.169
The Australians had some advantage by arriving late, but Hurley and his staff
had come as ill prepared as any UNITAF contingent to engage in institution build-
ing. Claims that the Australians had come fully prepared only seem to serve the pur-
pose of absolving others for the missed opportunities and wasted months elsewhere
in southern Somalia in early 1993. Their chief advantage over the Americans was
their different mind-set, which can be ascribed to the ‘counterinsurgency reflex.’ Part
of that mind-set was also determined by their focus on a fixed exit date in May, which
gave the Australians a somewhat longer perspective and prepared them to operate
under the United Nations that was expected to take on additional responsibilities.
The Australian government gave their contingent substantial latitude to execute their
ill-defined mission. Provided this freedom, the Australians showed their capacity to
improvise with their commander ready to exploit every opportunity to try make the
relative degree of public safety created by intense military operations more than cos-
metic. Their flexibility showed in the use of the Stanhope’s liaison teams, the legal
advisor, the intelligence staff and eventually also the MP Sergeant, none of whom
where specifically trained and prepared for the sort of mission they ended up exe-
cuting. Their different military mind-set showed in the acceptance and execution of
constabulary-type duties, without which the creation of institutions and fostering of
local political alternatives to the rule of the warlords would have been impossible.
From late March, the Australians had been well on top of the security situation, with
close protection of the NGOs and wherever possible also the Somali population. They
engaged in much broader disarmament and exerted far more control over the coun-
tryside than the Americans, Belgians and Italians, who tended to stay locked up in
the main towns instead of venturing out. Only the French seem to have rivaled their
success in stirring up the hideouts of nomadic bandits. 
Australian institution-building activities have been described as a successful exam-
ple of a ‘bottom-up’ approach to ‘nation building,’ that was in stark contrast with
UNITAF’s and the UN’s ‘top-down’ approach that focused on the warlords. It was
confirmed in the following years in several conferences that no success in reestab-
lishing order was ever to come from nationwide measures focused on those already
in power. Smaller-scale grass-roots initiatives have yielded some results in creating
several oases of order and safety in Somalia.170 Nevertheless, Bob Breen sensed there
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were doubts among many Australians in the field about the longevity of their ‘nation-
building’ efforts. In the course of Gutaale’s trial, he also witnessed how ‘many felt
that without the presence of the Australians during the proceedings, this outcome
might not have been achieved.’171 He was probably correct, but the trial and execu-
tion were a culmination of the Australian contingent’s bold efforts, especially in their
wearing down the power of the warlords. 
The relative order in the Bay region and the institutions created proved not to be
as short lived as some Australians feared. The official US Army After Action Report
noted how, despite the escalation of violence in Mogadishu, progress continued to
be made in some of the provinces in the summer of 1993. Most of the examples
used were from the Bay region. When the French took over from the Australians in
late May, they found the province functioning relatively well. There was a temporary
increase in banditry, but the weapons confiscation and registration program contin-
ued to go well. In August, UNOSOM II reported on the recovery of businesses and
the ‘booming local economy’ in Baidoa. The Moroccans were making headway with
limited police training in Buurhakaba, and issued weapons to the local police in the
area that month.172 According to Kelly, who remained in contact with some Soma-
lis from the region, the administrative and judicial institutions continued to func-
tion with a relative degree of success and some European Union and other foreign
support until 1995.173 Even the Indian contingent taking over from the French later
in 1993 and 1994 had a relatively easy tour in the Bay region with its comparative-
ly well-functioning police force. Meanwhile, the functioning police system established
in Mogadishu collapsed under pressure of renewed factional fighting and political
confrontation.174
The Australian Battalion Group in Somalia not only went further than all the other
contingents in assuming governmental responsibilities in Somalia, their institution-
building efforts would remain unrivalled by any military contingent during peace
operations in the remainder of the 1990s. The Australians had shown in Somalia
what could be done with few means and were clearly Patrick Vercammen’s implicit
point of reference when he told Time Magazine reporter Andrew Purvis in May 1993:
‘The Americans could have done ten times more than they have done. Fifty times.
They thump on their chests, but the biggest part of the job has yet to be done.’
Robert Oakley was not at all pleased with the UN field officer’s comments.175 As the
bulk of US troops withdrew in May, he and other US officials were clearly trying to
steer the erupting debate over success or failure by pointing out that Operations
Restore Hope was never intended to be more than a stop-gap and that it probably
saved hundreds of thousands of Somalis who were on the brink of starvation only
six months earlier. The general tenor of the Time article was exemplary for many
instant evaluations at the time. While acknowledging the accomplishments, it still
called security a ‘very, very relative term’ in southern Somalia, and put forth serious
doubts as to whether the powerful intervention force had performed the other part
of its mission: adequately preparing the ground for the UN force. In the absence of
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a clear political strategy for the intervention in Somalia, the United States had focused
primarily on its military ‘exit strategy.’ 
Measuring the success of the UNITAF phase of the Somali intervention, already
complicated by the great gap between the originally assigned ‘apolitical’ mission and
the actual measures required to impose any real order on the ground, would soon
be dominated by the dramatic events that unfolded soon after the handover of the
mission to the United Nations. The transfer of command immediately displayed the
United Nations’ shortcomings, such as its inability to operate as a strategic head-
quarters – a problem that was already hampering operations in Cambodia and Bosnia.
Although Boutros-Ghali can be charged with failing to balance his ambitions with
the means at his disposal, a substantial share of the blame fell on the member states.
When the UN assumed control of the Somalia operation on May 4, it had only
16,000 troops on the ground and would only reach its planned peak strength of
28,000 in November 1993.176 At the time of the transfer, its military staff was only
25 percent of its authorized strength. Moreover, when they finally arrived over the
coming months, the quantity and quality of UNOSOM’s civilian personnel tasked
with ‘peace building’ still left much to be desired.177
This much smaller and less capable force was given a much broader mandate as
laid down in Security Council Resolution 814. It was also given a larger area of
responsibility. The United States had played a leading role in drafting this new res-
olution that included the reconstruction of a new national government and compre-
hensive and – if need be – coercive disarmament of the militias.178 The United States
supported the force with four thousand logistical personnel and twelve hundred
infantrymen in a Quick Reaction Force. American troops were officially outside the
UN chain of command under direct US control, but as one American military ana-
lyst has argued, ‘American diplomacy in the United Nations had created a US com-
mand and control structure for UNOSOM II in all but name.’179 The special repre-
sentative to the secretary general was a retired US admiral, the force commander a
handpicked Turkish NATO ally, and his deputy was a US general who was also in
control of all US forces in Somalia. 
Only a month after UNITAF’s departure, Aideed’s forces started to launch unpro-
voked attacks on UN personnel. This confirmed earlier concerns that the leading
warlords, whose power had hardly been diluted in the previous months, were just
laying low until the more muscular US-led force withdrew.180 Inflammatory anti-UN
and anti-US propaganda on Aideed’s radio station prompted an action to close it
down – and inspect several of his weapons storage sites. During the action, Aideed’s
militia killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers in an ambush. This in turn triggered the
‘hunt for Aideed,’ mandated by a new Security Council Resolution in which the Unit-
ed States again pushed the United Nations’ hand. 
It would be simplistic to denounce America’s retaliatory action after the deliber-
ate attacks on the UN, but its execution in the coming months was rather blunt and
contrasted sharply with the earlier accommodating stance by American diplomats
and military leaders. An attack by five US helicopter gunships firing guided missiles
on a compound in Mogadishu killed an estimated forty people from Aideed’s clan
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in July in an attempt to deliver a serious blow to his organization. The prominent
Habir Gedir clansmen later turned out to be discussing the possibility of persuad-
ing Aideed to leave the country and strike an accord with the US and the UN. They
had reported on the purpose of their gathering to UNOSOM, but at this time com-
munications between US forces and UN force were extremely poor. According to
Oakley, the result of this raid was that ‘there were no moderates left. Everybody on
the Somali side then began to look not to fight the United Nations but rather began
asking “How can we kill Americans?”181 The American Quick Reaction Force,
strengthened by Army Rangers and Delta Force commandos, undertook increasing-
ly violent operations to catch Aideed, eventually ending in the climatic battle in the
streets of Mogadishu on 3-4 October 1993. The intense fighting left eighteen Amer-
ican troops dead and seventy-eight wounded. Conservative estimates put the num-
ber of Somali dead at 300 to 500, and 700 wounded, including substantial numbers
of women and children who were drawn to the battle and sometimes deliberately
used as human shields by the gunmen. The death of American soldiers during this
raid led to the withdrawal of US troops and caused contributions from other more
powerful member states to dwindle. As a result, most of the country slid back into
chaos in 1994-1995. After having spent more than four billion US dollars, the inter-
vention eventually ended in the embarrassing evacuation of all UN personnel under
fire in March 1995. After the withdrawal of Indian troops from the relatively peace-
ful Bay region, it was overrun by Aideed with an army of six hundred militia and
thirty technicals. In 1999, after four years of relentless oppression, the local popu-
lation was eventually able to liberate themselves through armed resistance by the
newly formed Ethiopian-backed Ranhanweyn Resistance Army (RRA).182
The general perception of the entire mission as a failure triggered a reaction in the
United States, aimed at fending off criticism by arguing that UNITAF was an over-
whelming success. Chester Crocker from Georgetown University, in his introduction
to the book written by Hirsch and Oakley, contrasted the ‘skillfully managed, US-led
UNITAF’ with the ‘overstretched, coercive nation building phase of UNOSOM II.’183
Although this revisionism has been useful in somewhat correcting the lingering idea
that there were no positive experiences in the early phase of the intervention, it has
left the US public and military with a distorted picture of their own achievements
in the early phase. While lives were saved, it blinded them to the political realities
the United States had already created during Operation Restore Hope. It also created
the wrong impression that ‘mission creep’ was to blame for all the wrongs in 1993.
While the inclusion of ‘nation building’ and the deepening involvement of US troops
in combat operations were specific policy decisions reached by the US government
and can therefore be categorized as ‘mission shift,’ both decisions have wrongly been
criticized as ‘mission creep.’184 For a domestic audience, the Clinton administration
was reasonably successful at spinning the story into that of the United States inter-
vening adroitly in a limited humanitarian mission only to have the United Nations
bungle it because it chose to do ‘nation building.’ Bending, as often, under heavy
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pressure from the majority Republican Congress, he even created the false impres-
sion that the UN was to blame for the death of American soldiers in Somalia.185 The
fiction that US troops had died under UN command also further strengthened the
idea never to allow American troops to serve under foreign command. The general
tendency by Republicans to bash the United Nations for all possible wrongs, which
the Clinton Administration chose not to contest, hurt the organization badly.
The tendency to declare UNITAF a success, while deferring all the blame for fail-
ure onto the United Nations, heavily influenced operational and tactical lessons the
US government and military have drawn from the intervention. These lessons would
resonate throughout to 1990s and heavily influence choices made in future opera-
tions such as Bosnia. Most of the learning went into avoiding the mistakes made
after May 1993, while little was done with the earlier hard-learned positive lessons.
Rather than claiming UNITAF ambitions were set too low, the prevailing argument
became that the United Nations’ ambitions were too high. Rather than calling for
more closely integrated civil-military operations, the dominant theme in most of the
short-term ‘lessons learned’ to come out of Somalia amounted to a further limitation
on military mandates in line with the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. All interference
by military forces in the civilian sphere – most of all military involvement in public
security – was to be avoided and discarded as ‘mission creep.’ A ‘zero-casualty’ edict
by the Clinton administration caused force protection measures to be further stepped
up and would seriously hamper US forces in accomplishing their mission in future
operations. Another vague notion to arise in the wake of the Somali intervention was
that peace operations dulled ‘the war-fighter’s edge.’186 While many American offi-
cers learned valuable lessons from Somalia, risk aversion and a general aversion to
any involvement in peace operations further handcuffed innovative military leaders.
The mark on the American military psyche left by Vietnam and Beirut was only deep-
ened in Somalia, and reinforced many of the tendencies already present. 
Driven by failures in Bosnia and Somalia, the heady optimism and dizzy expec-
tations that surrounded UN peace operations in 1992 evaporated in the second half
of 1993. Its most dramatic effect was the failure to intervene forcefully in Rwanda
in 1994, when close to one million people were slaughtered in a premeditated geno-
cidal campaign. The events in Mogadishu also temporarily put an end to Clinton’s
ambitions to play an active role in enforcing the peace in Bosnia, where his Euro-
pean allies were struggling with another vaguely defined humanitarian mission in a
war zone and where the United States and Europe tended to thwart each other’s
efforts instead of working in concert. In most European capitals, the failure of enforce-
ment measures in Somalia led to the questionable conclusion that they were on the
right course by sticking to a neutral position in Bosnia. UN peacekeepers who ever
more frequently came under fire from, or were taken hostage by, Serb forces in the
next two years were expected to turn the other cheek for fear of what UN Comman-
der General Sir Michael Rose called ‘crossing the Mogadishu line’ between neutral
peacekeeping and forceful intervention.187 This image, and the subsequent fixation
on the need to redraw the borders between peacekeeping and peace enforcement,
was instrumental in shaping soldiers’ and politicians’ views of what was within or
outside the military scope. 
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8One Step Forward, Two Steps Back:
Widening the Civil-Military Gap in Bosnia
After the embarrassment suffered by the United Nations in Somalia, Rwanda and
Bosnia, the belief in peace operations as a successful means of intervention in civil
wars plunged to an all-time low in 1995. The Western powers, although carrying
much of the blame for previous failures, decided they would never again allow their
soldiers to become ‘eunuchs at the orgy,’ as UN peacekeepers had been character-
ized in Bosnia. They entrusted their major military operations in the Balkans to
NATO, their own regional security organization. The regionalization of military peace
operations was thus set in motion, and the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia
became the archetype. The painful legacy of previous years combined with IFOR’s
overwhelming military success in the early days of the operation made it the pivotal
mission in the history of modern peace operations. Compared to most other peace
operations, its impact on the Western military establishment was disproportional as
the mission under American leadership restored the military’s thoroughly battered
confidence in its ability to bring civil wars to an end. Although peacekeeping was
often still considered ‘not a job for soldiers,’ the military became convinced they
could succeed as long as they were allowed to do peacekeeping on their own terms,
which meant going in with the capacity to enforce the peace and a clearly defined
objective that was strictly limited to the military sphere. While crucial experiences
from previous years were incorporated into the mission, particularly those related to
the possible use of force, others were consciously ignored. IFOR turned out to be a
giant leap forward in strictly military terms, but it was a big step backward in terms
of civil-military cooperation. Moreover, the clock was turned back on military involve-
ment in public security-related tasks. 
The Dayton Accord
The Dayton Peace Accord, officially known as the General Framework Agreement
for Peace (GFAP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was a triumph of American statecraft
after many years of US aloofness and European dithering during the Balkans wars.1
The Accord, negotiated at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio in
November 1995, brought Europe’s most savage war since 1945 to an end, something
that the members of the European Union had been unable to do in the previous
three-and-a-half years. Between 100,000 and 150,000 people had been killed, and
over two million were displaced by the war.2 The military side of the peace plan –
putting an end to the fighting – corrected virtually all the mistakes made by the hap-
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less United Nations peacekeeping mission in Bosnia up to that time. The key dif-
ference between the two peace operations was the existence of a peace treaty. The
UN Protection Force, UNPROFOR, had performed its ‘peacekeeping mission’ – in
fact primarily a humanitarian support mission – in the absence of a viable treaty. In
a continued war environment it gradually saw its mandate expand into the Safe Area
policy. This additional mission entailed elements of peace enforcement, but failed to
provide the UN force with adequate military means and a proper command struc-
ture to exercise its mandate, and eventually led to the tragedy that culminated in
Srebrenica. IFOR was endowed with a mandate and military clout to enforce com-
pliance while essentially limiting its role to that of a traditional peacekeeping mis-
sion – a role reversal if ever there was one.3
The conditions for peace had been brought about by a punitive NATO air cam-
paign against the Bosnian Serbs and a ground offensive by Croats and Muslims that
reversed many of the territorial gains made in the previous years. The dramatic shift
in the balance of power facilitated the October 1995 cease-fire, on which peace was
built. President Tudjman of Croatia, Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and representatives of Bosnia’s three major ethnic groups signed the Dayton Accord
in Paris on 14 December 1995. Nominally Bosnia became a single state for the first
time in history. However, by an arrangement that became informally known as ‘soft
partition,’ the agreement defined Bosnia as consisting of the two entities created dur-
ing the war – Republika Srpska comprising 49 percent and the Muslim-Croat Fed-
eration consisting of 51 percent of Bosnian territory. They were joined together by a
weak central government. With the exception of the central region of Bosnia, most
areas were populated and controlled by a predominant ethnic group as a result of
ethnic cleansing during the war. IFOR’s task was to control and monitor the inter-
entity boundary line, but the hard part – putting the former province back together
as a sovereign state – was not envisioned as a military task. 
The peacekeeping force’s key features were its awesome military power, robust
Rules of Engagement, clear command structure and executive powers under Chap-
ter VII of the UN Charter. IFOR centered on the US Army’s 20,000-strong First
Armored Division and eventually consisted of approximately 60,000 troops. It was
equipped with tanks, artillery and air components, and its troops were authorized to
use their arms if challenged to perform their mission – not merely in self-defense.4
As a result, the mere threat of force was usually sufficient, as IFOR’s authority was
not challenged, at least not by the former military adversaries in uniform. IFOR took
no casualties as a result of enemy fire. The force would operate under authority and
direction of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and was endowed with a single chain
of command under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the Amer-
ican General George Joulwan. US Admiral Leighton Smith became its first force
commander. The force was authorized and legitimized in retrospect under UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1031, but did not operate in any way under the UN.5 The
results for military implementation of the peace agreement were astounding. With
a one-year mandate to ensure the separation of forces, their confinement to cantons
and downsizing, IFOR performed its principal military mission within a mere six
months. 
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Rapid military success, however, was partly obtained at the expense of longer-
term success in overall peace implementation. The fundamental flaw of the Dayton
peace process was its reliance on what the experienced UN administrator and US
Air Force Reserve Major General Jacques Paul Klein would later call ‘tempo-centric
quick fixes,’ which were largely dictated by internal American politics. Already, the
obsession with what were called military exit strategies and exit deadlines in the wake
of the prolonged and inconclusive operations in Somalia and Bosnia had caused the
US military to pull out of Haiti with a job at best half done, before democratic insti-
tutions took hold. Rather than learning from this experience, Dayton fell halfway
between the limited aim of ending the war and a much broader mission aimed at
creating a self-sustaining peace. The choice between these two options, a conscious
decision made in Washington, is captured in the title of Special Envoy Richard Hol-
brooke’s memoirs To End a War. Holbrooke, the Accord’s principle architect, was a
proponent of the ‘maximalist’ option, but prior to the Dayton negotiations the ‘min-
imalist’ option won within the Clinton administration while setting the limits of US
commitment on the drawing board.6
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The American exit strategy was to get in, separate the warring parties along the
ten kilometer wide buffer zone and deter them from further fighting by creating an
armed balance of power between Muslims, Croats and Serbs within Bosnia. The mil-
itary equilibrium within this nominally unified Bosnia was to be created by build-
ing up the Muslim forces with a so-called ‘equip and train’ program, unilaterally pur-
sued by the United States outside the NATO chain of command, while building down
the Bosnian Serb army. Although IFOR’s one-year mandate has been called ‘a polite
fiction’ in order to make the Accord more palatable in the United States, there
appeared to be a genuine belief that this strategy would allow for the withdrawal of
at least US military forces within one year.7 As in previous operations, it hinged on
the idea of a military end-state focused on the creation of conditions in which civil-
ian agencies could redress the causes of conflict, possibly supported by a much small-
er UN peacekeeping force without US participation. This attempted sequential
arrangement, founded in a segregation of military and civilian spheres, had not
proven successful in Cambodia, Somalia or Haiti.
In the haste to ‘get the boys back home,’ peace in Bosnia was obtained at the cost
of a series of compromises and concessions that seriously impeded effective post-
conflict peace building. Examples of concessions and compromises made to the for-
mer warring parties included leaving two opposing armies and two republics in one
country, deals with the autocrats Tudjman and Milosevic – the prime instigators of
the Balkan wars – and recognition of the Republika Srpska despite its appalling
record during the Bosnian war.8 Dayton also left Radovan Karadzic, an indicted war
criminal, in de facto control of the Republika Srpska. Yet, except for the latter blun-
der, these concessions made to the parties were partially excusable in order to impose
a peace that many had considered impossible. 
Unnecessary compromises were made while creating the tools for implementa-
tion of the complex peace agreement, tools that could have mended the dysfunction-
al elements of the Dayton Accord. These concessions were made for internal politi-
cal reasons, due to civil-military strife within the United States and as a result of
trans-Atlantic quarrels. The narrow approach towards peace in Bosnia was embed-
ded in the motives for intervention and largely dictated by the boundaries set by seri-
ous opposition within the United States to an intervention on the ground. Creating
a self-sustaining peace, let alone ‘nation building’ was not the Clinton administra-
tion’s goal in the second half of 1995. The prime motivation for US intervention in
the Bosnia conflict was US foreign policy credibility in the wake of the slaughter in
Srebrenica and the likeliness of continued bloodshed in the Balkans backfiring dur-
ing the upcoming 1996 presidential election campaign. After all, Clinton had pushed
President George H.W. Bush to take action to stop the massive suffering in the Bal-
kans during the 1992 election campaign. Pushing the issue off the agenda was the
fundamental goal in getting involved in Bosnia in the summer of 1995.9 However,
with seventy percent of the American public opposed to sending troops to Bosnia,
there was limited room to maneuver. The Republican-dominated Congress, the major-
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ity of whom were opposed to the operation, would only allow the Clinton adminis-
tration to go forward and fund a military ground operation in Bosnia if it stuck to
a limited objective and a short period of time. Apart from opposition from the US
Congress and public opinion, President Clinton was faced with military leaders who
‘in their hearts’ would have preferred to not send American forces. They resisted
tasking beyond the strictly military side of peacekeeping and envisaged a mission
that strictly adhered to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. 
The second major weakness of the Dayton Accord, closely related to the ‘quick
fix’ approach to the military side of peace implementation, was its failure to create
a potent organization for civil implementation. While the military component was
fixated on ending the war, building a self-sustaining peace fell to the Office of the
High Representative (OHR) that was charged with integrating the three ethnically
based government and public security structures, promoting reconciliation and
rebuilding and restructuring a communist economy devastated by war. For ‘arguably
the most ambitious multidimensional peace operation ever undertaken,’ it was not
given the appropriate mandate and means.10 There was a striking contrast between
the clarity of the military mission in the Dayton Accord and the balance between
responsibilities and authorities assigned to IFOR and the ‘decided lack of either clar-
ity or definition of authority for guaranteeing agreements made in the civil spheres.’11
The former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, the first high representative, was
not answerable to the Security Council, which Washington wanted to keep out of the
loop. Instead, his political guidance came from the ad hoc Peace Implementation
Council.12 This gave him little formal authority over any of the United Nations agen-
cies involved, such as the UNHCR in charge of repatriation of refugees and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and World Bank tasked with economic reconstruction. He
had no authority over the OSCE mission headed by the American Ambassador Robert
Frowick, whose task was to help organize and monitor the election process and other
institution building activities.13 Obviously, he had no control over the hundreds of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in humanitarian aid and recon-
struction. Given these conditions and the short time that the high commissioner had
to plan, it was no great surprise that he stumbled in his mission. Apart from lack-
ing the necessary authority, a coherent plan and clear command structure, the exe-
cution and coordination of all these tasks fell to an understaffed, underfunded ad
hoc organization. When IFOR commander Leighton Smith showed impatience and
a lack of understanding of the complexity of the civilian dimension of peacekeeping,
Bildt said to him: ‘Admiral, you had a year to plan for this operation, a huge staff
and the requisite infrastructure to get you into theater, set up and supported. I start-
ed out with a cell phone in a parking lot a few weeks before we were to begin oper-
ations.’14 Smith acknowledged in retrospect that the high representative had an impos-
sible task that was far more complex than his mission. At the time, however, the
admiral tended to treat his mission and problems as an annoying little sideshow
rather than the organization whose eventual success would facilitate his force’s with-
drawal. 
Bildt blamed the shortcomings of his mandate directly on the US government,
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claiming in his memoirs that ‘the Americans initially stressed purely military aspects
and did not want any cohesive civilian or political authority.’15 Pauline Neville-Jones,
the leader of the British delegation at Dayton, called the ‘unprofitable power plays’
between the Americans and the Europeans the root cause of the impotence of the
Office of the High Representative. The British and the French had played a leading
role in Bosnia in the previous years, but saw their part in Dayton reduced to the
margins. After they insisted on the appointment of a European civilian counterpart
to the American force commander, the US negotiating tactic appeared to Neville-
Jones to be to concede to Bildt ‘as little authority as possible, either over the agen-
cies engaged in civilian implementation or in relation to the military commander.’16
The failure to give Bildt a sufficiently strong mandate was one of the major mis-
takes at Dayton that Holbrooke wholeheartedly acknowledged. He admitted to sev-
eral other mistakes, but Richard Swain, in what is probably the best history of mil-
itary ground operations in Bosnia yet, simplified the historical verdict on Dayton
arguing that ‘[f ]or everything except stopping the war, the General Framework Agree-
ment for Peace was a seriously flawed document.’17
The third and arguably pivotal flaw of Dayton was the failure to create the right
conditions for civil-military ‘unity of effort’ for the implementation of the two sides
of the Accord. Both success and failure during peace operations in Namibia, El Sal-
vador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia and Haiti had made it sufficiently clear that
any level of success in peace building was dependent on parallel, complementary
and preferably integrated military and civilian components. On Dayton’s drawing
board, the structures were drawn out separately, imbalanced and sequentially rather
than in a parallel fashion. Dayton’s drafters purposefully chose to segregate the mil-
itary and civilian components of peace implementation, thereby consciously dismiss-
ing unity of command. The decision not to integrate civil and military implementa-
tion was primarily the result of the legacy of the ‘dual key’ for the use of force dur-
ing UNPROFOR. This mechanism had been devised to lock the UN and NATO
together, but failed with dramatic consequences in cases such as the Bosnian Serb
attack on Srebrenica only several months earlier. ‘We did not want a repeat of the
UNPROFOR experience in which a diplomat could insert himself in the command
chain and block military action,’ said General Wesley Clark, the chief military rep-
resentative within the negotiating team whose prime goal was to create a different
and better mission for IFOR.18 Although the previous missions’ malfunctioning was
embedded in the two conflicting mission concepts – peacekeeping and peace enforc-
ing – rather than an inherent civil-military clash of interest related to the use of force
in peace operations, any significant UN role thereafter came to signify civilian inter-
ference with the military chain of command in the eyes of political and military lead-
ers in the United States. With the memory of UN-US friction in Somalia still fresh,
they basically wanted the UN or any other civilian counterpart out of the way while
the military focused on military implementation. 
Years after Dayton, as its inherent weaknesses became dramatically apparent, it
was argued by some that the Accord tried to segregate what was in fact insepara-
ble.19 Anyone aware of the hard-learned lessons of colonial policing, counterinsur-
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gency operations, military government and civil affairs during the Second World War,
or with experience in the above-mentioned peace-building operations would under-
write the importance of either a unified civil-military command structure or a very
strong coordinating mechanism. Although a single command structure was clearly
the preferable arrangement, future peace operations in Kosovo and East Timor would
show that separated military and civilian commands were not necessarily a recipe
for failure to achieve basic unity of effort. It was the lack of will that prevented a
strong coordinating mechanism between IFOR and the high representative from
being established. The military and civilian structures were encouraged to cooper-
ate, but not required to synchronize their policies. This left the unity of effort on
the operational level up to several factors, including: the will of the commanders on
the ground to cooperate, national military cultures, national instructions to those
commanders, and last but not least, on personal chemistry, which was totally lack-
ing between Smith and Bildt. In his persuasively written memoirs, Holbrooke claims
to have counted on the military to assume a much larger role in overall implemen-
tation of the Dayton Accord. By the time of its writing in 1998, the Accord had
become closely associated with his name, but heavily criticized.20 Holbrooke is prob-
ably correct in suggesting that the weakness of the key civilian players, loosely struc-
tured under the Office of the High Representative, could have been offset to a rea-
sonable degree, had it been bolstered sufficiently by IFOR while attempting to estab-
lish its authority in that crucial initial phase. The ambassador favored stronger author-
ity for the high representative and International Police Task Force (IPTF) and sug-
gested broader military support to several aspects of the civilian implementation,
such as the return of refugees, elections and the arrest of war crimes suspects. Faced
with opposition from both military and political leaders in Washington, Holbrooke
did not get his way. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General John
Shalikashvili, a relatively progressive force within the US military, did offer him a
compromise. The commander on the ground was given the right and authority to
perform additional tasks if the military mission went according to plan, but never
had the obligation to do so. How the force commander would use this authority
would be up to him as the operation unfolded.
Subsequently, Dayton’s drafters inserted what became known as the ‘silver bullet
clause’ in the military annex to Dayton. This granted the peacekeeping force the
authority ‘without interference or permission of any Party, to do all that the Com-
mander judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect
IFOR and to carry out the responsibilities listed…’ Holbrooke credits himself, but
most of all Wesley Clark, with inserting the silver bullet clause.21 Clark, however,
points at Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff and UN Ambassador Madeleine
Albright for suggesting: ‘Why don’t you just give the commander the authority to
use force whenever he feels it’s necessary to do so?’22 Notably, in their memoirs,
Holbrooke and Clark each cite slightly different passages of the military annex of
the Accord when referring to the clause. While the diplomat suggests that it was
aimed at facilitating the disputed ‘additional tasks,’ the general emphasized it as the
ultimate tool in dealing with the warring parties.23
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Although the mandate provided by the Accord could be interpreted broadly, it
remains somewhat unclear why Holbrooke and ostensibly others in the Clinton
administration counted on the military to assume additional responsibilities outside
of what was considered the ‘purely military sphere’ if they were not ordered to do
so. The conditions in 1995 for generous military support to civil implementation
were as poor as they were ever going to be. The US military was performing a job
it disliked in a corner of the world where they and the majority of the American
public did not want to become involved on the ground. American forces finally did
have the sort of narrow mandate and overwhelming force to execute their task. It
was peacekeeping by the Weinberger-Powell rules and it could have been no sur-
prise that ‘Snuffy’ Smith, having obtained what he called a ‘clean military mission,’
did not play along. When Holbrooke visited Bosnia in January 1996, Smith and his
British land commander Lieutenant General Sir Michael Walker made it quite clear
‘that they intended to take a minimalist approach to all aspects of implementation
other than force protection.’24 At the outset of the operation, this attitude may have
seemed justifiable. Controlling the warring parties required IFOR’s attention and
there was a genuine, albeit exaggerated, fear of violence and heavy casualties during
this process. Moreover, IFOR was not fully deployed until February. Yet, even after
the largest and best-equipped peacekeeping force in history had reached its full
strength and there was no military resistance whatsoever, there was constant talk
and fear of overstretching the troops. It is remarkable that IFOR was almost half the
strength of the ground force used for the much more challenging mission of occu-
pying and stabilizing Iraq in 2003. 
Holbrooke, who left public office in that February, blamed Smith for not utiliz-
ing the authority provided by the silver bullet clause after military implementation
progressed far more rapidly than expected and IFOR encountered virtually no oppo-
sition from the former warring parties. In his defense, the admiral correctly argued
that neither the Clinton administration nor his US and NATO military superiors,
Shalikashvili and Joulwan, ordered him to assume any additional tasks, such as the
protection of refugees and the arrest of war criminals. A US Army civil affairs colonel
involved in bridging the civil-military gap argued, ‘Holbrooke was simply trying to
blame Snuffy Smith for some of the mistakes made at Dayton.’25 However, Joulwan
later implicitly called the admiral unimaginative in his approach to the gap between
the military and civilian components.26
Much of the weakness of Dayton can be ascribed to the preoccupation of its Amer-
ican initiators with creating the mightiest possible military peacekeeping force with
the narrowest short-term mission, while leaving the massive long-term responsibil-
ities to its weak civilian sidekick. The huge gap between the military mandate and
capabilities and those of the civilian organizations were at the core of Bosnia’s slow
recovery and the failure to re-integrate the ethnically divided former province. How-
ever, the method of bringing about peace in Bosnia also dictated many of the lim-
its to peace implementation. Although NATO’s bombing campaign had been crucial
in softening up the Bosnian Serbs – the strongest and therefore most obstruction-
ist party – at the negotiating table, peace was in the end attained through negotia-
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tion, not capitulation of any of the warring parties. Thus the international commu-
nity could not impose anything like an international trusteeship and reform Bosnia
to its liking, even if US policymakers had felt the desire to do so – which they clear-
ly did not. NATO and its civilian counterparts therefore had to rely primarily on the
old communist leaders, newly incarnated under the guise of ethnic nationalism and
chiefly responsible for the war itself, to implement a peace accord that propagated
multi-ethnicity, democratic reform and economic liberalism.27 In the fall of 1995,
Washington failed to anticipate that, faced with close to 60,000 NATO troops on the
ground, the local forces on all sides opposed to the peace plan – political, military
and paramilitary – would soon move their obstructionist efforts to these often alien
ideals from the military into the civilian sphere. 
The Public Security Gap
Of the parties involved, the Bosnian Serbs had clearly lost the most in recent months
and felt they would lose more by successful implementation of Dayton. In the first
harsh Balkan winter, the despair from recent blows made them stand by in awe while
NATO’s military might was displayed before their eyes. ‘At the outset,’ the command-
er of a US brigade in northern Bosnia recalled, ‘the factions were sufficiently war-
weary that they were accommodating, but that changed as time wore on. All sides
began to foment confrontation by early spring 1996.’28 As they raised their defense
and eventually mounted an offensive against a politically integrated and multi-eth-
nic Bosnia, they were quick to discover the weak spots of the Accord – the gap
between civil and military implementation. The Bosnian Serbs especially, ‘began to
resist on every non-military issue, while remaining careful to avoid provoking IFOR.’29
The center of gravity of their struggle in the pursuit of an ethnically divided coun-
try, which slowly started to resemble an insurgency against the implementation of
the Dayton Accord, was the public security gap. As if Cambodia, Haiti and Somalia
had never occurred, the international community was largely caught off guard, not
prepared for the grey zone between military and police operations.30
The Dayton Accord explicitly stated that the Bosnian signatories – the Federation,
the Republika Srpska and the overarching Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina – were
responsible for the safety and security of all Bosnian citizens. This left many ele-
ments of the Dayton Accord, such as the return of refugees, freedom of movement
and the arrest of indicted war criminals to be implemented by a highly politicized
local police, that saw themselves as Serbs, Croats or Muslim first, and police officers
second. Moreover, during and after the war, the police forces expanded as war-hard-
ened former combatants, clad in fatigues and armed with Kalashnikovs, joined their
ranks. The UN estimated that Bosnia’s police force had grown to 44,750, three times
its pre-war size and over four times the European standard of one police officer for
every 330 citizens. Of the Federation’s police officers, over eighty percent had fewer
than six years’ experience and, usually, a paramilitary background.31 In the Republi-
ka Srpska, a local US commander recalled, ‘power is invested in the police more
than any other government institution. Whoever controls the police dominates the
Republic Srpska.’32
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The International Police Task Force was acting in a traditional UN Civilian Police
(CivPol) role with a peacekeeping mandate.33 The Task Force was to oversee the envi-
sioned transition of the wartime public security institutions to an ethnically integrat-
ed police force. To accomplish this task, it was endowed with a mandate to moni-
tor, observe and train the existing police forces. It was not allowed to create a new
police force, had no law enforcement responsibilities and was unarmed. If one of
the former warring parties failed to cooperate with the international police force, it
would have to seek assistance from the Office of the High Commissioner, under
which it resided. Formally, the IPTF could not turn to IFOR, the only organization
mandated and able to enforce compliance of the parties. Unlike the more potent UN
Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), whose international police force
was to ‘control and supervise’ and not merely ‘monitor and observe,’ Carl Bildt’s
office was not paying the salaries of the local police forces.34
The international police force was not only short of leverage, it also lacked means
and capabilities. Its headquarters were only established in Sarajevo in February and
it initially had no functioning command and control structure and had no logistical
or operational plan in place. Apart from this ‘enforcement gap’ and ‘capability gap’
between the police force and the military force, the IPTF’s effectiveness suffered
from ‘the deployment gap.’ The ad hoc organization had to be mustered from forty
different countries and not until eight months after IFOR’s entry into Bosnia was
the international force of 1,721 police monitors finally fully deployed to 54 field sta-
tions adjoining police stations across Bosnia. When the forces finally arrived in the-
ater, their quality showed the same discrepancy as most previous CivPol missions
such as Cambodia. 
The IPTF’s ineptness – ‘a tragic mistake’ according to Holbrooke – left Carl Bildt’s
Office with no enforcement capacity. As with the overall weakness of the Office of
the High Commissioner, the Americans and Europeans shared responsibility for the
IPTF’s inability to function. According to Holbrooke, he and Wesley Clark were fully
aware of the problem while negotiating the Accord that, according to the General,
left ‘a huge gap in the Bosnia food chain.’35 He blamed himself for not fighting hard-
er for an appropriate policing mandate, but points to the objections against a strong
police force on both sides of the Atlantic – most notably within the Pentagon, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and from the British and French. In the process of finger-point-
ing that typified the aftermath of Dayton, Holbrooke emphasized the Europeans’
insistence on a mandate limited to a monitoring role, which he scathingly called ‘a
favorite Euro-word.’36 He failed to explain that charging the UN with executive polic-
ing under an enforcement mandate would have been unprecedented in CivPol his-
tory and, in any case, it remains vague how he envisaged this role. Since the Unit-
ed States was making the rules at Dayton, a large part of the responsibility seems
to reside in Washington.37 The Pentagon, apart from vigorously opposing a public
security role for IFOR, explicitly rejected giving the IPTF the authority to arrest peo-
ple. American military leaders feared being called upon to back-up the internation-
al police officers when faced with serious opposition. This would constitute ‘the most
dangerous form of mission creep.’38 Moreover, it was feared that such support to the
254 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:06  Pagina 254
international police might incite local groups to take revenge against IFOR. 
The causes for the failure to coordinate military and police operations ran deep-
er than that. Again, the UNPROFOR legacy determined many of the shortcomings
of the police force. In his treatise on the unfortunate international police mission in
Bosnia, Michael Dziedzic wrote:
In addition to the UN’s inherent bureaucratic lethargy, IPTF faced an uphill battle
for resources because of its unfortunate parentage. This CIVPOL mission was a
creature of the US-brokered Dayton Accord, which arose after many in the United
States had heaped condemnation on the United Nations for the demise of UNPRO-
FOR. Yet, when it came to finding a sponsor for the IPTF after the Dayton Accords
had been drawn up, the United Nations was the only viable alternative. It took
time for the IPTF to recover from the animus that had developed between the
United States and the United Nations. Nor was the United Nations blessed with
surplus funds to commit to this unanticipated contingency, a condition the Unit-
ed States certainly had a hand in creating.39
During the Clinton administration’s budget confrontation with the new Republican
Congress, the President refused to ask for sufficient American fund for the police.40
Had the Americans footed enough of the bill, Holbrooke later argued, he could have
written the rules for the police force. A weak IPTF is another one of Dayton’s major
flaws the ambassador is willing to acknowledge. 
A more potent international police force would have filled part of the gap between
the military and the civilian peace implementation mission. However, for the Day-
ton Accord to work, IFOR would have had to come the longest way in order to bridge
its side of the civil-military divide. First of all, by 1996, the deployment gap proved
to be an inevitable occurrence during complex peace operations. Like every previous
UN CivPol mission, the IPTF suffered from long recruitment and organizational
delays, thus leaving the Bosnian police virtually unimpeded to obstruct refugee returns
and even pursue a continued policy of ethnic cleansing during most of that year.
Subsequent UN CivPol operations in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 – post-conflict
situations where no established local police force was hindering peace implementa-
tion – would prove that even for a much larger armed international police force with
full enforcement capabilities, substantial military backup continued to be inevitable.
Post-conflict societies used to the law coming from the barrel of an AK-47 assault
rifle tended not to be easily impressed by a hodgepodge of unarmed international
police officers with whom they could hardly communicate. Yet IFOR barely moved
to fill its side of the gap. 
Opponents of military involvement in public security usually muted any discussion
by arguing ‘we don’t do policing,’ and ‘soldiers don’t make good policemen.’41
Although Dayton allowed IFOR ‘to observe and prevent interference with the move-
ment of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appro-
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priately to deliberate violence to life and person,’ the force commander interpreted
this authority very restrictively. After all, he could engage, but was not required to
perform these tasks. 42 Initially his translation of the mandate into operational orders
did not mention the possibility of IFOR troops acting against or exercising authori-
ty over local police forces, neither alone, nor in cooperation with the international
police force. 
IFOR’s Rules of Engagement ignored the protection of civilians. They excluded
provisions that would allow peacekeepers to prevent a crime likely to result in ‘seri-
ous bodily harm,’ either through the use of ‘minimum force’ or detention, as had
been the case in Somalia and eventually in Haiti.43 A Swedish sergeant who served
in both UNPROFOR and IFOR recalled that he could do more about a serious crime
in progress as a UN soldier with a mandate that left much to interpretation, than
as part of the US-led Multinational Division North in Tuzla the summer of 1996,
despite NATO’s much tougher Rules of Engagement. ‘In fact,’ he realized, ‘I was
allowed to do more as a civilian on the streets of Stockholm to prevent a crime from
taking place than I was as an IFOR soldier on patrol in the Balkans.’44 Only in the
run-up to the first elections in September did Joulwan explicitly instruct the force
commander to allow IFOR troops to use minimum force as the ultimate means to
prevent a serious crime from taking place.45 This rule was formalized in December
to include ‘opening fire against an individual who unlawfully commits, or is about
to commit, an act which endangers life, or is likely to cause serious bodily harm, in
circumstances where there is no other way to prevent the act.’46
While the image raised by those opposing any form of military involvement in
public security was generally that of soldiers arresting civilians, most of the military
involvement in public security in previous peacekeeping operations had in fact been
restricted to a relatively modest, but often very effective supporting role. Peacekeep-
ers proved relatively effective in supporting the UN civilian police, supporting and
monitoring the local police or ‘policing the police’ in cases where they violated a
peace agreement or basic human rights. Cambodia, Somalia and Haiti had demon-
strated the inevitability of a military role in the establishment of a semblance of law
and order, as well as its importance in a force’s credibility. Those units most creative
and active in this field were most successful in accomplishing their mission and
most appreciated by the local population and the international civilian organizations,
while receiving most of the credit in the media. However, in the process of reinvent-
ing peacekeeping in the turbulent mid-1990s, much of the experience and lessons
were lost. 
One would expect the steady parade of peace operations in the early 1990s to
provide constant feedback for the military, but several factors contributed to an unbal-
anced learning process. First of all, the military establishment was still struggling
with its new identity after the end of the Cold War. Continuously confronted with
severe budget cuts, reorganizations and new missions made soldiers forcibly hold
on to their warfighting tradition. Even if such a role was increasingly unlikely for
most European armies, military units generally continued to prepare solely for fight-
ing wars with traditional training methods. Only in the run-up to deployment in
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peace operation did soldiers receive specialized, albeit short, peacekeeping training.
The prevailing tendency within the US military continued to be that warriors did not
make good peacekeepers and that peace missions degraded their warfighting edge –
resulting in a ‘we don’t do peacekeeping’ attitude and calls for specialized units to
conduct peace operations. The Western European military establishment was more
accommodating to their new role and tended to follow the British in their belief that
the best war fighters made the best peacekeepers. In practice, the senior US Army
officers grudgingly came to accept peace operations as a secondary role. Both came
to the similar conclusion that ‘escalation dominance’ was essential in peace opera-
tions, and that combat soldiers therefore could be ‘tuned down’ to do peace opera-
tions, but that specialized peacekeepers could not adapt to combat. However, the
process of preparing soldiers to adjust down to the different conditions of the peace
environment was not pursued with equal vigor on both sides of the Atlantic. Even
though the US Army had started to incorporate lessons from peace operations in its
doctrine, the Army’s military culture and mind-set, averse to most tasks other than
‘to fight and win America’s wars,’ tended to prevail.
Second, the lack of specialized training and education and the limited impact of
new doctrine meant that the military had to rely primarily on knowledge from expe-
rienced officers or learning as operations progressed.47 This proved sufficiently com-
plex since – not unlike warfare – every new campaign proved fundamentally differ-
ent in character, which made it difficult to distinguish patterns of identical circum-
stances. Even within a national military apparatus, the transfer of knowledge between
different units, was minimal. The extensive and positive experiences gained by the
Royal Netherlands Marine Corps in Cambodia, for instance, including the murky area
between military and public security, as well as the essential role of civil-military coop-
eration, were largely lost to the Royal Netherlands Army, because of the credo that
‘different blood groups don’t mingle.’ Even within an ongoing peace operation there
tended to be little institutional memory as units rapidly replaced each other in the
field. 
Third, the military was very selective in the lessons it distilled and implement-
ed. By the mid-1990s, the traumas from previous failed operations caused the major-
ity of ‘lessons learned’ to be focused on avoiding previous mistakes, rather than learn-
ing from what went right in past operations. The more fruitful lessons coming from
Somalia in early 1993 were all but lost as a result of that mission’s unfortunate con-
clusion. Not surprisingly, the Australians were the exception in this case. Moreover,
the learning process within Western militaries tended to focus on the lessons sol-
diers felt comfortable with, experiences close to their traditional profession. The les-
sons that were ‘liked’ and therefore learned were to be prepared for peace enforce-
ment and even for war, so called ‘escalation dominance,’ while exclusively dealing
with the former military adversaries. Exercising authority outside the military sphere
equaled ‘mission creep.’ After the initial hesitation following the invasion of Haiti
in 1994, US combat troops, military police units and Special Forces had fulfilled a
significant policing function, often in close cooperation with UN CivPol and local
police. Even this relatively positive experience failed to convince US military and pol-
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icy makers of the public security role peacekeepers were fated to perform – one way
or another. It failed to find its way into army doctrine and even Wesley Clark, who
did not share his colleagues’ overall disdain of peace operations, argued while prepar-
ing for Dayton to have learned from Haiti ‘that we should never look at our mili-
tary to do police work.’48 By compartmentalizing civilian and military missions instead
of closely integrating operations with international civilian counterparts and by stay-
ing aloof from the undesirable part in public security, the military attempted to make
their part of the equation simple and straightforward. Military tasks were adaptable
to specific timelines and success was easily measurable. 
Initially, on neither side of the Atlantic, did political leaders raise objections to
the narrow interpretation given to the safe environment the military was to estab-
lish. Presumably they feared accusations of sending the military on yet another ‘mis-
sion impossible.’ There may have been serious disagreement between the White
House, the Pentagon and US Congress as well as quarrels across the Atlantic over
several aspects of the scope of the mandate of both military and civilian branches,
but all parties agreed that IFOR troops were not to become policemen.49 Yet, although
NATO military commanders denied all responsibility in the field of public security
in Bosnia, it was not outside the military scope – even if the silver bullet clause was
disregarded. While the provisions in the military annex to the Dayton Accord that
referred to supporting for civil implementation left room for interpretation, elsewhere
the Accord explicitly authorized IFOR to police the most notorious of all police forces
in Bosnia.50 Apart from regular municipal police, this Ministry of Interior Special
Police (Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova or MUP) was a key element of the public
security force in former Yugoslavia. By the early 1990s, the MUP was nothing less
than a paramilitary unit, armed with heavy machine guns, mortars, rocket-propelled
grenades and anti-tank guns and in possession of armored personnel carriers. All
three factions in Bosnia used these forces extensively during the war in a range of
military and policing roles, which so often became blurred in a war environment.
In the Federation, the IPTF eventually succeeded in restructuring the part of the
MUP units to a certain extent while eliminating others. It proved impossible for the
international police monitors to assert control over the MUP in the Republika Srp-
ska, where Karadzic and his followers continued to use this loyal police force as its
prime weapon against the implementation of the peace agreement. Until the sum-
mer of 1997, the special police continued to carry assault rifles and hand grenades
and was hardly obstructed while it continued ethnic cleansing in Republika Srpska,
hindering freedom of movement of non-Serbs and acting as Karadzic’s local law
enforcement arm. 
Apart from ridding the MUP of its heavy arms, IFOR was allowed to assert con-
trol over MUP personnel, scrutinize their movement and regularly inspect their police
stations. The choice by Admiral Smith not to exert the same powers over the Spe-
cial Police that he was allowed to exercise over Bosnia’s military forces was an out-
right evasion of NATO’s responsibilities and the clearest example of the decision to
avoid any military role related to the public security at all costs. The failure to do so
was soon felt throughout Bosnia, and would be felt by the whole international com-
munity in the years to come. 
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The Bosnian Serb special police were the key executors of Karadzic’s orchestra-
tion of the partially forced abandonment of Serb suburbs of Sarajevo in March 1996.
These areas, situated on the high ground that had been fiercely contested during the
war, were about to be handed back to the central Bosnian government in accordance
with the Dayton Peace agreement in February and March. The transfer was a defin-
ing moment in the military operation, one that the commander failed and refused
to recognize despite ample warnings that radical Bosnian Serbs were not going to
give up without a fight. Tens of thousand of Serbs who preferred to remain in Sara-
jevo were coerced into fleeing their parts of Sarajevo. In Holbrooke’s account, IFOR
troops stood less than 150 meters away, watching buildings burn. The peacekeepers
and the IPTF refused to apprehend the marauding arsonists and IFOR kept its own
firefighting equipment inside their compound. Meanwhile, it coolly rejected protec-
tion of the antiquated firefighting equipment sent in by the Muslims, attacked by
rock-throwing Serb arsonists.51
It was the decisive opportunity for IFOR to clarify what it would and would not
tolerate, but it only deployed a handful of Italian peacekeepers. ‘IFOR,’ a NATO
spokesman said, ‘is not a police force and will not undertake police duties.’ The
IPTF, tasked to monitor the transfer, was faced with its most serious challenge while
it was still in the early stages of assembly and organization. The operation had there-
fore been delayed, which gave the Bosnian Serb authorities the chance to exploit the
situation by preparing a sweeping evacuation of the suburbs. Although an IFOR
team of six civil affairs officers provided some essential specialist planning, manage-
ment and communications support to the IPTF, with fewer than 350 civil police
monitors on the ground, it was not in a position to take charge of the regular local
police forces, who did next to nothing to control the situation.52 Without a substan-
tial presence of IFOR combat troops to back-up the IPTF, those Bosnian Serb resi-
dents inclined to stay were not granted the necessary sense of security that may have
allowed them to defy pressures from their own radical leaders and police forces. Of
the estimated population of 70,000 Serbs in Sarajevo, only 10,000 remained after
the transfer.53 In the process of leaving, the Serbs thoroughly ransacked housing and
other property with the clear intention of leaving little more than a wasteland to the
incoming Muslim and Croat citizens.
IFOR’s inaction enraged Holbrooke. As a result, he wrote, a ‘substantial share of
the vestigial hopes for a multiethnic Bosnia went up in that smoke.’ Admiral Leighton
Smith, Holbrooke commented scathingly, ‘considered the civilian aspects of the task
beneath him.’54 Smith sneeringly riposted that these civilians should stop interpret-
ing his job for him.55 Ivo Daalder, who had been involved in planning for Dayton
on Clinton’s National Security Council, was less emotional, but as forceful, in his
reaction:
There was no requirement for Snuffy Smith to do this. On the other hand, when
Sarajevo burns, when the capital city of the country in which you’re trying to build
peace is burning, and you have the capacity, which you do, and the manpower to
do something about it, and you have that right through the silver bullet paragraph
to do something about it, you probably should have done something.56
one step forward, two steps back 259
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:06  Pagina 259
According to the Dayton Accord, the IFOR commander was the final authority in
theater regarding the interpretation of the military annex, which provided ample
authority to take action. The failure to recognize this defining moment had devas-
tating long-term consequences. ‘When the Implementation Force (IFOR) rolled in,’
an analysis from the US Army Peacekeeping Institute concluded that, ‘the Bosnian
public perceived that IFOR had come to clean the place up. IFOR had legitimacy in
the public’s eye and could have taken a more assertive posture. However, over time
the perception of IFOR/SFOR changed. The local community began to view
IFOR/SFOR as a less sincere, less capable, less robust stabilization force. Many locals
adopted a “wait and see” attitude and lost interest in cooperating.’57
IFOR took an overall minimal approach towards support to civil implementation and
internal security, but there were signs of a slight shift away from this direction from
the spring of 1996. IFOR started to make a modest contribution to the reconstruc-
tion of Bosnia, using its Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) assets. Furthermore, even
though ‘mission creep’ soon became a buzzword used throughout NATO as a result
of close US-European cooperation in Bosnia, not all IFOR contingents were equally
reluctant to engage in the public security sphere. The British were known and praised
for their assertive posture and slightly broader interpretation of the military man-
date. ‘We’re policing the police out here,’ British Lieutenant Dominic Roberts said
sitting on top of his Challenger tank near Sipovo in western Bosnia in the early sum-
mer of 1996, ‘and the police are our biggest problem we’ve got right now.’ Frequent-
ly both the Croatian police and the Serb police crossed the zone of separation and
the tankers ‘chased them off and sorted them out.’ His troops also moved against
the local police when it mounted checkpoints – a wartime habit to intimidate, extort
and block civilians from moving around freely. ‘A lot of police are ex-army and when
they see a main battle tank like this trundling around they just disappear the moment
we turn up.’58 Frequently moving around tracked artillery was another way of intim-
idating the former combatants. Artillery was the ‘weapon of choice’ during the war
and the Bosnians were impressed with NATO’s high-tech howitzers that were oth-
erwise fairly useless in a peacekeeping mission that failed to turn violent, despite
expectations to the contrary.59
As summer approached IFOR lightened up slightly and the British-led Division
moved its headquarters to Banja Luka.60 After the British heavy armor was moved
out of Sipovo, British military police Captain Joanne Mallin ‘seized the opportunity
to let my guys do the patrolling here,’ since policing British troops was ‘pretty low
on my list of priorities.’ They took on the role of ‘social patrolling,’ which became
a euphemism for what she described as ‘community policing in and around the
towns.’ The local UN police unit was desperately short of transport and communi-
cations and its police officers had to find their own housing. For many of their logis-
tical needs they ‘latched onto the military.’ Two British MPs, carrying sidearms only,
would augment two-men UN police patrols. The British were quite willing and able
to support them, ‘but they don’t understand the military so it’s a slow process.’61
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After the degrading UN experience in Bosnia over previous years, the British and
other European contingents were immensely relieved to be operating within the
widened margins for peace operations set by the Americans. Having been granted the
capability to enforce, however, they were generally seen as adapting more easily to a
broader role than their US Army colleagues. For the key to their flexible approach to
different levels of violence and overall more relaxed posture the British often referred
to their experience in Northern Ireland where many of them had served, although a
British infantryman regarded the situation ‘a lot more low key than in Northern Ire-
land.’ In his new role he had to be ‘a bit more friendly, learning how to speak to peo-
ple, to deal with their everyday needs, to look after people. Being in the infantry is
definitely the best job in the Army.’ His platoon commander would take his men on
training missions, ‘which is absolutely brilliant because we’re living in villages, going
on patrols, maintaining an IFOR presence…’ As so often in previous peace operations
there was even involvement by British liaison officers and police in property-related
disputes, since a row between Muslims and Serbs over the ownership of a cow could
easily turn nasty and ‘we are here to stop any trouble happening.’62
US forces operated under a very different regime from the British, who had a
very different perception of the threat they were under and had long since traded
their helmets for berets and carried their rifles loosely on their backs. The Ameri-
cans, obsessed with force protection measures, were generally seen as hunkering
down in large bases and did not disperse as widely as some European contingents.
They continued to wear ‘full battle rattle,’ heavy Kevlar vests and helmets, at all times
and patrolled in large formations or heavily armed convoys that never consisted of
fewer than four vehicles. Condescendingly, the Europeans called their American col-
leagues ‘ninja turtles.’ Corporal and team leader Michael Emory, one of the rare US
soldiers with UN peacekeeping experience under Norwegian command in Macedo-
nia, was frustrated with the limits imposed upon him and his troops by force pro-
tection measures. 
We’re not supposed to have friends… we’re not like the British, French or Swedish
soldiers – we’re not supposed to drink, we’re not supposed to fraternize with any
of the locals whatsoever. But it’s nature, curiosity to do that… That’s what it’s like.
To be an American soldier in Bosnia sucks. It’s a prison camp… They see us walk-
ing with our weapons, we’re not supposed to look threatening or provocative in
any way, but they say we do. Every time we do a patrol debriefing that’s what we
include in there, because that’s what they tell us. As a patrol leader I asked the
police what do the people feel, what’s the general attitude towards IFOR doing
patrols here, and they say. ‘Well, if you people weren’t pointing guns in all direc-
tions, and looking like you were ready to attack at any moment, everything would
be fine.’63
For the Americans, force protection became the primary mission in itself and ‘no
body bags’ the measure of success, all at the expense of the ability of its high-qual-
ity military forces to accomplish the true essence of their mission. Over time, a US
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Army Peacekeeping Institute report concluded that the combination of heavy protec-
tive gear and large convoys had the adverse effect of creating the impression amongst
Bosnians that US forces were ‘more afraid’ of the locals and less capable of protect-
ing the public.64
In central Bosnia, the Dutch IFOR battalion was quite comfortable operating
under a British divisional commander, whose style of operations was much closer
to its own. As the mission subtly began to broaden, the Dutch contingent dispersed
to increase their visible presence. Along the British lines of operation they started
to deploy in small permanent bases, from which sections and platoons would con-
duct their social patrols. From spring onwards, the unit became increasingly involved
in facilitating freedom of movement of the local population and the early attempts
at returning of refugees by the UNHCR, supporting and securing the international
police monitors and even in locating suspected war criminals. The second Dutch
battalion’s energy was primarily geared towards facilitating and supporting the Sep-
tember 1996 elections organized by the OSCE. The elections proved to be IFOR’s
largest success in civil-military cooperation in that first year. In October and Novem-
ber, the Dutch executed operations ‘comet’ and ‘meteor.’ The first involved Dutch
forces gathering evidence to bring to justice arsonists who had attempted to ham-
per the return of refugees to Knesovo in the Republika Srpska. The second opera-
tion consisted of a series of raids on local police stations for unauthorized arms and
ammunition.65
In the spring of 1996, with the primary military mission completed, the United
States and NATO had another chance to expand the relatively short-term and straight-
forward military mission to separate the three warring factions to a broader, longer-
term combined civil and military mission aimed at the reconstruction of Bosnia as
a unified state. The inevitability of broadening the interpretation of the mandate
caught up with many of the tactical units on the ground, even with US units, but
with continued resistance from its operational commander to increased support to
civil implementation, IFOR as a whole continued to ‘lean backward.’ The positive
exceptions to the narrow interpretation of IFOR’s mission were not initiated by the
force commander, but resulted from cautious additional North Atlantic Council direc-
tives. The primary examples were the provision of transportation and communica-
tions support for the Office of the High Representative and priority support to the
election process.66 Fierce opposition back in the United States hampered real progress
in Bosnia. Much of the political debate continued to be cast in the buzzwords ‘nation
building’ and ‘mission creep,’ both of which the minimalists majority wanted to
avoid at all costs. Proponents of a short and narrow mission evoked images of Sre-
brenica or Mogadishu to make their case, thereby effectively killing all initiatives for
a more creative military approach to peace operations. Ensnared in American pres-
idential election politics, Clinton refused to take a political risk by taking a stand.
After his re-election however, the president did make the critical decision in Decem-
ber 1996 to extend the one-year military end-date that had had such a soothing effect
on Bosnia’s hard-line nationalists, much like American pronouncements about exit
dates in Somalia had had on General Aideed three years earlier. The Implementa-
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tion Force became the Stabilization Force (SFOR) with just over half the original
strength and received an eighteen-month mandate. A NATO operational headquar-
ters directly under the supreme allied commander took over from IFOR headquar-
ters, which had been essentially an American operation.
Reinterpreting the Military Mandate
Although Washington had made the crucial decision to stay, the United States and
NATO were still faced with the fundamental problem of how to create a self-sustain-
ing peace. By early 1997 the reconstruction and integration of Bosnia’s institutions
lagged dangerously behind the military effort. The overall effort to promote ethnic
reconciliation had faltered and de facto ethnic partition that critics of the Dayton
Accord had feared late 1995 had all but materialized. Even though comparing the
pace of the civilian effort and that of the military was like comparing the efforts to
that of a sprinter and that of a marathon runner, it became common practice to do
so, most of all in the United States military that tended to underwrite success and
blame the civilians other for failures in Bosnia.67 Joulwan, Smith, Holbrooke and
US Congress were unanimous in accusing Bildt of not using his authority 1996 and
throughout most of 1997.68 European governments were blamed for countering
Washington’s pressure on the high representative to interpret his mission more broad-
ly. Although the former Swedish prime minister could have shown more decisive-
ness and audacity in confronting Bosnia’s intransigent politicians, American critics
failed to clarify how he was supposed enforce the parties’ compliance with the civil
provisions of the Dayton Agreement without sufficient means or military backing.
While the military had the room to interpret its mandate broadly, the high represen-
tative did not, unless it could latch on to NATO. But throughout 1996 and even in
1997, the American government continued to flirt with the idea of partition as a
means of facilitating the quickest possible withdrawal of combat forces.
In the early spring of 1997, the strategy to create a military balance of power
within one country and get out was obviously failing, but no new strategy had been
decided upon. Criticism of NATO’s narrow interpretation of its role was increasing
rapidly as the peacekeepers remained unchallenged. It focused on the failure to pro-
tect Bosnians of all ethnic groups returning to their pre-war homes and its refusal
to arrest war crimes suspects. Between March and May 1997, the new Clinton Admin-
istration reevaluated its Bosnia policy and concluded that there was only one way to
get American soldiers out without losing face. The maximalist view won in the end,
and the goal finally changed from ending the war to building the peace.69 But it
happened much later than Holbrooke would have liked and the Bosnians suffered
dearly, most of all since IFOR failed to capitalize on the momentum created in the
winter of 1995-1996. 
The sudden and dramatic policy change in Washington and its effect on the inter-
national mission as a whole confirmed that Bosnia’s reconstruction was still princi-
pally an American-run show. At a NATO summit in July 1997, all the European
national leaders followed suit, declaring their intention to see SFOR carry out its
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mandate ‘to its fullest.’70 The sudden changes that took place confirmed there had
never been a requirement for the principal mission to change from that set out in
December 1995. Instead of a ‘creeping mission,’ circumstances changed, the overall
US aims changed and the people at the helm changed. Clinton had been re-elected,
the exaggerated fear of casualties in the United States had somewhat diminished
and there were crucial personnel changes. Madeleine Albright, a ‘Balkan-hawk,’ took
over from Warren Christopher and found a powerful new ally in Tony Blair’s new
Labour government with its principled commitment to protecting human rights. His
foreign secretary, Robin Cook, played a key role in providing the new high represen-
tative, former Spanish foreign minister Carlos Westendorp with the authority to
‘essentially rule by decree.’71 An important contributing factor to the actual use of
these powers was the appointment as his deputy of the dynamic ambassador Jacques
Klein. The ambassador had only just left his position as the UN administrator in
Eastern Slavonia, where he had held both civil and military authority with enforce-
ment powers, which made him essentially a military governor of UN-administered
territory.72 His experience and boldness in strong-arming local leaders proved essen-
tial in reinterpreting the civilian side of peace implementation. 
However, a willing military executor on the ground was essential for a new type
of peacekeeping in Bosnia to actually succeed and for creating a semblance of civil-
military unity of effort. After all, obstinacy from the Pentagon and the US military,
on both the strategic and operational levels, had proved formidable in the past. One
of the most crucial personnel changes therefore occurred in July 1997 when Wesley
Clark, the principal author of the military annex to Dayton and expert on Bosnia,
became NATO’s supreme allied commander. Clark was one of the prime examples
of the increased influence of the US military on foreign policy described by Dana
Priest in her book The Mission.73 What made him so successful in this role was that
he did not share many of his colleagues’ mistrust of his civilian taskmasters from
the Democratic Party. Clark steered a course closer to Albright’s State Department
than that of William Cohen, a Republican, at the Pentagon. He also developed excel-
lent relations with NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solana, who told Clark during
their first meeting: 
Wes, you must make the NATO mission in Bosnia successful. It is the only oper-
ation NATO has done, and it must succeed … understand that NATO cannot suc-
ceed with its mission if the international mission as a whole is not successful.
This is not a matter of simply protecting your forces. You must actively help the
civilians succeed. You have to stay within the limits of the military mission you
have been given, but within that mission, you are going to have to do more to
help the overall Dayton implementation succeed.
This change, Clark wrote in his memoirs, ‘struck at the very heart of what some of
the military leaders had been attempting to do, namely, to restrict their involvement
[…] It raised all the flags of mission creep and of involving the military in police
work, which we had labored at Dayton to avoid.’74 Nevertheless, Clark pushed ahead
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vigorously, often in defiance of the preferences of the secretary of defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and another cautious new SFOR commander, General Eric Shinseki.
To achieve his goal, Clark believed ‘he had to be the real COMSFOR.’ He claimed
that his source of inspiration was General Lucius Clay, the post-Second World War
military governor of Germany.75 Other than his historical role model for this partic-
ular mission, Clark was operating within the extremely narrow margins set by the
US-influenced military peacekeeping paradigm of the mid-1990s. To accomplish his
goals, the supreme allied commander would contribute substantially to a broaden-
ing of those margins during his tenure, which lasted until the year 2000 and includ-
ed NATO’s next peace operation in Kosovo. 
The first demonstration of SFOR’s more activist approach followed one day after the
NATO summit, when British Special Air Service (SAS) troops managed to capture
indicted war criminal Milan Kovacevic in the hard-line Serb stronghold Prijedor.76
They killed Simo Drljaca, the indicted former police chief of the municipality of Pri-
jedor, who drew a gun and shot one of the British soldiers in the leg. The arrest of
war crimes suspects, or Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs) as they were
officially called, had become the nexus of the debate over the extent of NATO peace-
keepers’ role and ‘mission creep.’ Dayton left the primary responsibility for their
arrest to the local parties, who formally agreed to ‘cooperate’ with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).77 Cooperation was never defined
to include the obligation to apprehend and turn over indictees. Bosnia’s wartime
leadership, still largely in political control, showed little enthusiasm for handing over
indictees. Large portions of their future constituencies considered them war heroes
or, as in the case of Karadzic, were themselves indicted. The Tribunal was not for-
mally associated with the Dayton Accords, had no way to coerce or enforce the par-
ties’ compliance and had no means or authority to perform arrests itself. Even if the
IPTF had been endowed with a mandate to arrest, it lacked the means and there-
fore the responsibility devolved upon the NATO force that was basically mandated
to do as it pleased to further Dayton. 
Although there had been growing consensus about the devastating effect of leav-
ing the war’s worst elements in positions of power, consecutive NATO commanders
as well as political leaders shunned military action to apprehend them up to that
time. Publicly, Smith as well as Joulwan continued to simplify the problem by repeat-
ing over and over that soldiers do not make good policemen.78 Shalikashvili concen-
trated his argument against action on the likely failure of attempts to detain Karadz-
ic and Mladic. Although fears of casualties and failure were real, it must have been
reassuring to those indicted when Smith had gone as far as claiming he had ‘no
right to arrest anyone’ on Bosnian Serb public television in February 1996, which
was an incorrect representation of his mandate. Just before retiring early that July
the IFOR commander acknowledged his troops would arrest, if he received orders
from political leaders to engage, but he stuck to his position that arrests would be
the mission’s doom. Bill Clinton, whose relations with the US military had always
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been strained, would not yet push the military into performing the task they dread-
ed most.
In early 1996, as IFOR came under heavy criticism for its inaction, NATO pre-
sented its half-hearted interpretation of the mandate. Its troops in Bosnia were not
permitted to actively search for war crime suspects in order to detain them. They
were authorized to detain indictees encountered in the execution of their normally
assigned duties – generally interpreted as their ‘purely’ military duties. In an IFOR
press briefing it was emphasized that NATO forces would not increase patrolling in
areas where war crimes suspects were known to live and work.79 ‘Without being
unduly cynical,’ Louise Arbour, the ICTY’s chief prosecutor said in 1998, ‘there’s no
question that when you have two parties who theoretically may be trying to avoid an
encounter it’s extremely unlikely that it will happen.’80 Numerous encounters between
NATO troops and indicted war criminals justified her cynicism. In February 1996,
the Washington Post ran an article claiming that Karadzic was seen passing through
four consecutive IFOR checkpoints – two manned by US troops – on his way from
Pale to Banja Luka. Smith later claimd the story was highly unlikely, but a study
from the US Army’s own Judge Advocate General’s School argued that the mount-
ing number of allegations that IFOR was consciously looking the other way ‘may
have been justified.’ The study illustrated:
Several Judge Advocates related conversations with personnel conducting missions
at guard posts who, after recognizing Persons Indicated for War Crimes, advised
those PIFWCs to stand fast while the soldiers advised headquarters of a possible
detention. The effect, intended or otherwise, was to provide the PIFWC the oppor-
tunity to leave the area with the soldier unable to use any other than minimal force
to apprehend if he or she even bothered to attempt to do so. 
The American military lawyers called the rule to detain indictees only when acciden-
tally encountered ‘as ambiguous or flexible a statement as the US makes it.’ They
argued:
Prior to the summer of 1997, neither IFOR nor SFOR made any effort to go hunt-
ing for them. In fact they went out of our [sic] way to avoid them. On one occa-
sion, when IFOR forces knew that a war criminal was in a building that they were
going in, they waited a half an hour to go in the building – until they knew he
had left.81
The reason for the failure of political leaders to explicitly give the green light for
arrests was obvious. David Halberstam, in his treatise on the relation between US
military interventions and domestic politics, called it ‘the most valuable lesson for
any leader of America-the-superpower in dealing with so-called teacup wars. If things
worked out, if the most optimistic scenario was reasonably accurate, casualties were
low (or almost non-existent), and there was no damaging media coverage, it would
nonetheless be of little domestic advantage. But there was always the potential for a
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downside, the televised capture of American troops, a repeat of Somalia, and a polit-
ical disaster.’82 Going after Karadzic and Mladic, it was felt, was a repetition of the
hunt for Aideed. In the view of the military it was ‘mission creep’ in its purest form,
or as what General Sir Michael Rose had called, ‘crossing the Mogadishu line’ between
neutral peacekeeping and actively taking sides by moving against one of the parties.
The conventional wisdom held that after one takes this step, a doomsday scenario
would unfold. However, the former British UNPROFOR commander’s ominous pre-
dictions in 1995 of IFOR’s massive casualties had failed to materialize. The general
and many of his fellow officers and policy makers seemed locked in their percep-
tion of the peace operations as another UNPROFOR or UNOSOM. He failed to
appreciate that ‘America’s way of peacekeeping’ had created a much wider playing
field that allowed for a more proactive approach to peace implementation. 
Opinions on SFOR’s role in the apprehension of indicted war criminals differed
substantially within and between the various nations contributing troops. In Wash-
ington, no one but Holbrooke initially appears to have felt any enthusiasm to go
after war crimes suspects. However, after the diplomat left public office, the State
Department would gradually increase its backing of arrests. The British, Nordic coun-
tries and the Netherlands saw it as their obligation to hunt down indicted suspects.
In the United Kingdom – the second largest troop contributor with close to 11,000
men on the ground – political and military leaders were not quite as apprehensive
about involving their troops in arrests. After a discussion with British division com-
mander Lieutenant General Mike Jackson in Bosnia, Member of Parliament Calum
MacDonald encapsulated the British Labour Party stance in Parliament by asking the
critical question, ‘If 60,000 NATO troops cannot arrest them, who will?’ Although
he acknowledged the difficulties associated with arresting Karadzic, Mladic ‘and the
other ethnic cleansing ringleaders,’ he was irritated by the continuous claims of ‘mis-
sion creep.’ He argued that the failure to move forward and expand the military mis-
sion meant moving backwards ‘into mission erosion.’83
It was clearly no coincidence that the first arrests took place in the British sec-
tor and it was no accident that it happened after Blair took office. Even after the fun-
damental change in NATO political guidance, apart from the Nordic countries and
the Netherlands, Britain was the only one of the three major troop contributors that
pursued war criminals with any enthusiasm.84 After the arrests, none of the omi-
nous Mogadishu-style scenarios materialized. A few Bosnian Serbs reacted with minor
acts of violence and threats against international observers and troops. These did not
really intimidate the peacekeeping force. Instead the British actions set a precedent.85
In December 1997, Dutch Special Forces apprehended Vlatko Kupreskic and Anto
Furundzija, two Bosnian Croats wanted by the Tribunal in connection with attacks
on Bosnian Muslim civilians in the Lasva Valley.86 Like the British arrests the Dutch
action was loudly applauded by the international media, that often connected this
newly found assertiveness with the national trauma suffered after the fall of Sre-
brenica.87 The New York-based chapter of the non-governmental organization Human
Rights Watch contrasted the ‘bold arrest action’ of the Dutch with Bill Clinton’s much-
lamented statement in December that peace in Bosnia can be made to work with-
one step forward, two steps back 267
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:06  Pagina 267
out the arrest of Radovan Karadzic. His statement was daring since it had by then
been widely recognized that several of the most notorious war crimes suspects con-
tinued to wield political clout and control over police, while simultaneously remain-
ing at the center of the criminal power structures that were the main obstacle to
peace implementation. Meanwhile, many local Bosnians wondered why they should
respect the law when the international community did not actively enforce it.88
As if reacting to accusations, the Americans first participated actively in a multi-
national arrest in January 1998, apprehending a Serb from Bijeljina. This impres-
sion was false, however, since these snatch-operations often took months of intense
preparation and US intelligence and forces had been involved in supportive roles in
the previous operations. Oddly, in their enthusiasm over SFOR’s assertiveness, the
international press and other commentators failed to take notice of the fact that the
arrests were conducted in a manor incongruent with the force’s official policy.
Although Javier Solana continued to claim that NATO policy was not to actively seek
out war criminals in so-called ‘search and arrest’ operations, it was doing exactly
that, albeit on a very limited scale and with extreme caution. For political purposes
he told the French press in January that NATO was still limiting its role to arrest of
suspects when accidentally encountered by SFOR troops.89 In fact, NATO had become
involved in a highly secret new mission that involved special forces, and complex
intelligence and undercover operations. 
While the Americans were primarily hampered by a fear of casualties, which
would jeopardize US participation in the Balkan mission as a whole, the French were
often charged with ulterior motives. As the contingent responsible for patrolling
Karadzic’s hometown Pale, they were severely criticized for their apparent unwilling-
ness to apprehend suspects, which appeared to be founded in amicable historic ties
between Paris and Belgrade. In December 1997, Louise Arbour went as far as sug-
gesting that the French were sheltering war criminals.90 Even if NATO would select
other Special Forces to execute the action in the French zone, full cooperation from
the local French units was indispensable for making a successful raid. Not only were
they needed to cordon off an area, local military intelligence was also crucial for suc-
cess. The Germans, keen on re-establishing their position as a player in the inter-
national security arena and newcomers to SFOR in 1997, rapidly caught up with the
hesitant Americans and French. Using their brand-new special forces unit Komman-
do Special Kräfte (KSK), they arrested two suspects, in June 1998 and August 1999
respectively.91
By December 1999, seventeen ICTY indictees had been snatched by SFOR, while
two were killed during the actions. Intimidated by NATO’s more assertive arrest pol-
icy, a further sixteen suspects voluntarily surrendered to the UN tribunal. This was
still a minority of the over eighty indicted suspects at the time.92 The bulk of the
arrests continued to take place in the British controlled zone and, in December 1998,
the SAS was the first to apprehend one of the ‘big fish,’ Major-General Radislav
Krstic, commander of the Drina Corps of the Bosnian Serb Army. On 2 August 2001,
the ICTY sentenced Krstic to 46 years’ imprisonment, in what was the courts’ first
genocide conviction for crimes committed in the wake of the 1995 capture of Sre-
brenica by the Corps. However, Karadzic and Mladic remained at large.93
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The second manifestation of SFOR’s new assertiveness was its effort to grind down
the power of the Bosnian special police whom the radical leaders opposed to the
peace process continued to rely on. For this purpose, increased military cooperation
with the international police force was vital, but SFOR and the IPTF were still strug-
gling to fill the public security gap. The debate over what also became known as the
‘law enforcement gap’ or ‘public security gap’ in 1997-1998 was only just gaining
momentum after years in which most of the thought on peace operation had been
focused on peacekeeping versus peace enforcement.94 There were basically three
options: the police would be granted an executive mandate and appropriate size and
armaments, SFOR would engage more fully either with combat troops or with mil-
itary police and paramilitary units, or closer integration of the police had to be forged
with SFOR while maintaining a clear distinction in the mission mandates.95 Faced
with opposition from various quarters, NATO and the UN tried some of all three
possible solutions. 
In December 1996, the IPTF’s mandate had already been enhanced, allowing the
police monitors to investigate allegations of misconduct and human rights abuses
by the local police. Some orthodox UN CivPol specialists already considered this ‘ven-
turing dangerously close to executive policing.’96 However, for the international police
officers to exert any real kind of enforcement powers they had to rely on backup
from armed SFOR troops.97 Although there had been sporadic local joint initiatives
towards the removal of illegal checkpoints, in May 1997 SFOR and international
police finally formalized a policy to govern all police in Bosnia and rid the country
of all police checkpoints.98 Once joint patrols were institutionalized in the course of
1997, the international police force’s effectiveness was greatly enhanced as it start-
ed to ‘borrow’ SFOR’s authority to enforce compliance. ‘A typical joint patrol,’ the
Norwegian diplomat Espen Barth Eide described, ‘consisted of an IPTF vehicle fol-
lowed by three SFOR vehicles, of which at least one is an armored personnel carri-
er. It is still IPTF officers who, for instance, inspect a local police station for illegal
armaments or ask for the removal of a checkpoint, but it is the SFOR people who
represent the enforcement capacity if needed.’99 Previous behavior patterns repeat-
ed themselves as both the US and the French divisional commanders – concerned
with the risk to their forces – raised objections to some of the broad enforcement
measures. These included stripping Bosnian police officers at checkpoint of their
arms and identity cards, which effectively put them out of a job. Typically, the British
commander had no such inhibitions.100
Instead of dealing with the true nature of the public security gap and furthering
structural cooperation between the military and the UN civil police force, NATO con-
tinued to search for ways of freeing combat troops from police-type operations. SFOR
experimented with yet another element in the peacekeeping chain by creating the
Multinational Specialized Units (MSU) in 1998. This 350-strong paramilitary force,
a police force with a military status, was based in Sarajevo from where it could be
dispatched to support either the military or the international police force through-
out Bosnia. Initially the MSU was composed primarily of Italian Carabinieri, but the
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unit was later augmented by paramilitary forces from Argentina, Romania and Slove-
nia. For some time it was hoped that their deployment would bridge the gap, but
unfortunately this was not the case.101 The MSU was no law enforcement agency
with executive policing powers, since this was still officially only the responsibility
of local police. It could fill only certain elements of the public security gap, mainly
in crowd and riot control, for which some military contingents had already created
specialized crowd and riot control platoons in the course of 1997. Although its time-
ly presence could work preventively on smoldering crises, the MSU’s small size,
restrictive Rules of Engagement and deployment on a case-to-case basis made it most-
ly reactive. As a result of its unclear public security role, relations between the IPTF
and the MSU were at times strained. The first time the paramilitary peacekeepers
went into action in October 1998 against a crowd blocking a main road in Mostar,
they had failed to coordinate their actions with the international police force that had
pushed the local police to finally act against the demonstrators. With this type of
units in short supply and with its rather vague mandate, the MSU was, according
to one analyst, ‘oversold and understaffed’ and in the years to come the MSU would
prove unable to bridge the gap.102 Those who most enthusiastically embraced the
concept were the Americans who were eager to cling to the idea of an ‘inner shell’
of security provided by IPTF and an ‘outer shell’ provided by SFOR.103 True integra-
tion of military and international police operations continued to be hampered by this
continued ‘tendency to lump tasks into two piles labeled ‘military’ and ‘police.’104
Although this was not in their original job description, the Italian Carabinieri
within the MSU nevertheless proved to be important in the fight against the rapid
expansion of organized crime networks in Bosnia, problems that tended to spill over
across the Adriatic.105 During the Bosnian war, political structures, military and police
security organizations of each of the ethnic groups had forged an alliance with organ-
ized crime syndicates involved in arms smuggling and ‘war profiteering.’ These net-
works were often still involved in drug trade, and human trafficking and money con-
tinued to be channeled through the local political structures and their police and
intelligence structures. A US Army Peacekeeping study argued that these ‘anti-Day-
ton power structures,’ which flourished as long as a lasting peace faltered in Bosnia,
had found the international community’s weak spot. They relied on insurgency-like
methods, or asymmetric warfare: ‘The enemy will use his strengths – will to resist,
mass, distance and the inherent power of the defensive – directly against US weak-
nesses: our inability to arrive quickly, and insufficient will/staying power. Their aim
is not so much to win, as it is to avoid losing.’ They hoped to wear down the will
of NATO and wait until the military force slowly withdrew without forging a strong,
multi-ethnic and democratic state.106
It was thus not until July 1997 that SFOR fully exploited its mandate and assumed
responsibility for the MUP – ‘the bad apples who had been at the center of the Serb
ethnic cleansing efforts’ – as Wesley Clark called them. ‘Inexplicably,’ the General
wrote rather diplomatically, ‘this had fallen through the cracks during the previous
eighteen months, with the military insisting they were police (and therefore not the
military’s responsibility) and the international civilians insisting it was beyond their
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means to monitor them.’ Having written the mandate, Clark was fully aware of the
root cause of this problem. As soon as he assumed supreme command, he ordered
the SFOR commander to fully execute his mandate, including disarmament and shut-
ting down police units. Taking such direct control of the operation he had to ‘over-
ride the concerns of the force on the ground in Bosnia in order to get things done.’107
On the ground he was faced with a coalition of American military minimalists and
European UNPROFOR veterans, who feared that this new policy – primarily direct-
ed at the Serbs – meant the loss of neutrality and therefore regarded such action
incompatible with a peace operation. A whole generation of military officers had
been brought up with the idea of strict neutrality and fears of ‘crossing the Mogadishu
line’ and failed to appreciate that impartiality had come to replace neutrality in peace
operation. Impartiality could be interpreted as military action against anyone, mili-
tary or civilian, who sought to frustrate the peace agreement they had vowed to imple-
ment. At this particular point in time, Clark decided, it was primarily the Bosnian
Serb radical nationalist leadership that obstructed the peace.108
Controlling and disarming the MUP was the key tactic in Clark’s overall strate-
gy to wrest Karadzic’s hold on the Bosnian Serbs from Pale. In order to have more
moderate forces gain the upper hand in Bosnian Serb politics, SFOR chose sides
with the elected president of the Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavsic, in her political
struggle against Karadzic’s front man Momcilo Krajisnik.109 Plavsic was a rather
dubious choice. Karadzic, himself barred from holding office as a result of his indict-
ment, had handpicked Plavsic as his surrogate in the official capital Banja Luka the
previous year. Many considered her anything but the moderate alternative the West
liked to see in her. She was herself indicted by the ICTY in January 2001.
However, the ‘Iron Lady of the Balkans,’ as she was also known, had abruptly cut
her ties with the de facto leader in June and had played and important role in fir-
ing Mladic in November 1996.110 This made her the West’s best hope for further-
ing Dayton. Clark intended through the ‘use of forces, not force’ to do anything
‘legally and within our authority’ to ‘discredit the Bosnian Serb hard-liners, the most
ardent opponents of the Dayton Agreement, by taking away the instruments of their
power and embarrassing them in front of their own people.’111 The ultimate goal was
to get Plavsic re-elected in the September 1997 elections. 
In the struggle for political control in Banja Luka, SFOR scored a significant suc-
cess in mid-August as British troops took control of five main police facilities and
handed them over to forces aligned with Plavsic. In Clark’s account, British forces
surrounded the MUP station after rumors of a preparation for a coup against Plavsic.
The British ‘surrounded the police station at dawn, with armored vehicles’ cannons
pointing at the building. A lone sergeant major reportedly walked to the door and
announced grandly that the Serb police had thirty minutes to depart the premises.’
The supreme commander was told by SFOR Force Commander Shinseki: ‘they came
streaming out barefoot and in pyjamas.’112
But the true tests of US resolve in furthering Dayton by adopting a proactive
peacekeeping stance came later that month in the strategically important city Brcko.
The Serbs, who had made up 21 percent of its population prior to the war, now con-
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trolled the ethnically cleansed city that sat on the Sava River in the narrow Posavina
Corridor. This corridor joined the eastern and the western half of the Bosnian Serb
Republic, which had now become the territorial dividing line in the power struggle
between Pale and Banja Luka. The crisis erupted as a result of President Plavsic’s
attempt to extend her authority from Banja Luka eastwards as far as Bijeljina in antic-
ipation of the upcoming elections in September.113 On 28 August, the IPTF, heavi-
ly backed by US military police and combat forces, attempted in Brcko and Bijelji-
na to seize police stations run by non-compliant police commanders and allow police
forces loyal to Plavsic to take over.114 Alerted by the recent series of intense com-
bined SFOR-IPTF inspections of police stations, especially the successful British
action in Banja Luka only ten days earlier, Karadzic’s forces were better prepared
this time. Incited by air raid sirens and the Serb Radio and Television Network broad-
casts by to ‘repel the invaders,’ a well-coordinated violent mob of men armed with
rocks, Molotov cocktails and axe handles, and skillfully using women and children
in their ranks, drove off US troops, who had to temporarily evacuate the UN police
to a nearby military base.115 With their unique quality to encapsulate a complicated
problem in a one-liner, catchy phrase or buzzword, the US military dubbed the orches-
trated civil disturbances ‘rent-a-crowd,’ after they gathered proof that the crowds were
being paid up to one hundred deutsche marks.116 Although Pale had scored a tacti-
cal victory, US forces handled the situation reasonably well, demonstrating strict dis-
cipline and the necessary restraint.117 Although two US soldiers were seriously wound-
ed and, in spite of some ugly scenes in the international media, there was no pub-
lic outcry against this type of use of the military in the US The American public
seemed to grow accustomed to this sort of role for their military – and Brcko was
of course no Mogadishu. 
After what developed into a stalemate in Brcko, SFOR pressed on. In close coop-
eration with Jacques Klein, SFOR scored one of its key successes against Karadzic
forces when NATO troops successfully blocked an attempt to disrupt the elections
in early September. In the early morning of September 8, in the run-up to elections,
French scouts near Pale saw large crowds of military-age young men enter what final-
ly amounted to 250 buses and move towards the narrow Brcko corridor for an organ-
ized disruption of a pro-Plavsic rally in Banja Luka. Again, there was fear of a coup
attempt, but unless the Office of the High Representative declared the rally illegal,
there was no way of stopping the instigators. The only measure SFOR could take
was searching the buses for arms when entering Banja Luka. US forces positioned
to hold up the buses, sometimes by moving armored vehicles on the roads at a snail’s
pace, giving the British around the Bosnian Serb capital the chance to mount their
defense. The British showed ingenuity by blowing tires of buses using nails, and
British troops positioned themselves with riot-control gear to support Plavsic’s local
police to block the roads to the city. Just in time, Jacques Klein managed to declare
the rally illegal and SFOR and local police turned the buses around. Clark’s true
moment of triumph came the next morning when Slobodan Milosevic was obliged
to call NATO’s supreme commander and ask for SFOR’s help because Krajisnik and
his lieutenants were unable to leave their hotel in Banja Luka, as they were sur-
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rounded by an angry mob of Bosnian Serb protesters loyal to Plavsic. This was just
the sort of embarrassing scene Clark had hoped for in order to loosen the hard-lin-
ers’ stranglehold over the Republika Srpska. After what became known as the ‘bat-
tle of the buses,’ Clark had asked Secretary of Defense Cohen if he was still within
his intent. ‘Just barely,’ his boss answered.118
Restraining the hard-line media was another key element of SFOR’s effort to fur-
ther compliance with Dayton in the Republika Srpska. Plavsic was seriously handi-
capped in her fight with her hard-line rivals by the relentless barrage of propagan-
da from the Serb Radio Television (SRT) that painted her as a ‘collaborator’ with the
NATO ‘occupation forces.’ Karadzic’s media network persistently incited non-com-
pliance and even violence against the international presence in cases such as Brcko.
After the first arrest of war crimes suspects and the more recent actions against the
police, British SFOR troops in Banja Luka were explicitly shown in combination with
marching Croatian Ustase and Nazi soldiers in Yugoslavia during the Second World
War. After manipulating an interview with ICTY prosecutor Louise Arbour, the high
representative suspended Karadzic’s media network with close support from SFOR.
Clark’s delicate balancing act between pushing the mission forward and the cautious
US military showed when Shinseki explicitly asked for written orders when the
supreme commander told him to take down several television towers at Westendorp’s
request. The mission was a success and helped erode some of Karadzic’s power.
However, Cohen warned Clark he might ‘find himself getting committed that we
can’t or don’t want to do.’119 He still wanted to keep the mission as limited and risk-
free as possible. There were no complaints from European leaders and Solana was
wholly in support of the more risky path taken.
While grinding away at the special police’s power with reasonable success, Bosn-
ian Serbs retaliated with orchestrated mob violence against SFOR and the IPTF.
Increasingly, these confrontations were related to the return of refugees. In fact, all
three sides had used, and continued to use, mob and police violence to frustrate the
UNHCR’s recently stepped-up program of pilot projects for returns, with the long-
term strategic goal of reversing the consequences of several years of ethnic cleans-
ing. In towns controlled by Croatians such as Dvar and Jajce, where they had been
a minority before the war, angry mobs drove off returning Muslim refugees in con-
certed action with the local police. Meanwhile Muslims and Croats trying to return
to Brcko consistently encountered stiff resistance and found their houses booby-
trapped and torched in 1997. Arson was the weapon of choice of all of the parties
in the defense of an ethnically cleansed Bosnia, but the offenders frequently resort-
ed to assault and murder.
Progress in this field was negligible in the early years of NATO’s presence. The
creation of ethnically pure geographical entities had been one of the key war aims
and the parties would not give up their gains without putting up a serious fight. Of
the 2.3 million people displaced by the war only 381,000 had returned home by the
end of 1997, two years after the intervention. These were mostly people returning
to areas where they belonged to the ethnic majority. According to the UNHCR, only
some 22,500 people (13,800 Croats, 5,600 Serbs and 2,900 Muslims) had returned
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to areas outside military control of their own ethnic group.120 The refugee problem
as a whole was exacerbated by the immense physical destruction of homes and infra-
structure caused by the war and the lack of basic services, but the root cause of the
failure of the minority returns was the basic lack of security that persisted even after
1997. Contrary to the aims set forward in the Dayton Accord, the UNHCR started
to organize majority returns even if this meant settling refugees not in their former
communities, but to any area where they would not be in a minority. Many Bosni-
ans and international commentators argued this validated the results of ethnic cleans-
ing and meant giving up on the fundamental aims of reintegration and reconcilia-
tion. Carlos Westendorp would later point to the reluctance of the international com-
munity to push harder for refugee return as the single largest failure in post-Day-
ton Bosnia-Herzegovina. Critics of NATO’s restrictive interpretation of its security
role claimed that if SFOR had ‘taken seriously its mandate to provide freedom of
movement, then both minority as well as majority returns would have been possi-
ble.’121
Compared to early 1996, SFOR had come a long way in broadening its approach to
the creation of a safe and secure environment, but the peacekeeping mission in
Bosnia was still very limited in scope. The integration of SFOR and international
police operations was far from complete and after 1997 commanders remained vig-
ilant to avoid what they considered ‘mission creep.’ The US Army Peacekeeping Insti-
tute advised creating a combined public security organization center and intelligence-
sharing apparatus, as had been done in successful counterinsurgency operations such
as the Malayan campaign. However, this proved unrealistic within the limits set on
military peacekeeping in 1998. Even in 1999, the SFOR commander – not used to
sharing sensitive information with civilians – refused to show crucial intelligence on
illegal funding for radical Bosnian-Croat politicians to international police investiga-
tors trying to indict Croatians on corruption charges and war crimes.122 NATO troops
may have become more ‘forward leaning,’ but the mission had not fundamentally
changed. SFOR was not directly returning refugees and only gradually started to pro-
vide them with close protection by intense area patrolling, since its commanders con-
tinuously feared overstretching the 35,000-strong force as troop reductions were
always near. Even in April 2000, much to Clark’s chagrin, the US Army refused to
open a SFOR substation in Srebrenica, where few NATO patrols ever patrolled the
streets. Serb settlers, refugees from elsewhere in Bosnia, were still making it impos-
sible for Muslims to return almost five years after their expulsion. As in other cities
and villages all over Bosnia, Srebrenica’s Muslim mayor, fearing for his life, refused
to live in his city to which he had been elected by absentee ballot.123 Meanwhile,
NATO continued to take a restricted approach to the arrest of war criminals. Even
though every careful step taken by SFOR towards broadening its role was widely
regarded as a major success, serious opposition remained. With threats to the force
close to nil after several years of peace, the ghost of previous missions in Bosnia
and Somalia, but also Vietnam and Beirut, hovered over every proceeding within
peace operations.
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CIMIC: The Fig Leaf for the Gap
To compensate for the fundamental disjunction between the civil and military com-
ponents, IFOR relied on its civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) capacity. Composed
primarily of US Army Reserve civil affairs personnel, this dedicated staff grew to
some 450 personnel. It was hoped to be what Joulwan called ‘the glue’ to bring
together the civilian and military efforts.124 However, strategic decisions had made
the so-called ‘GFAP gap’ between the two sides too wide for glue to fix. Moreover,
CIMIC as a concept and military function was in an early stage of development. 
As negative critiques of IFOR’s limited role in Bosnia mounted, NATO put increas-
ing emphasis on the role performed by its CIMIC personnel.125 The primary func-
tion of CIMIC staff was to liaise with those international civilian governmental organ-
izations directly related to the Dayton Accord on all levels. On the operational level
in Sarajevo, this coordinating role was performed by liaison officers directly attached
to the Office of the High Representative, the OSCE, the UNHCR and the other key
players. In Divisional Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC) or CIMIC Centers,
the force performed its liaison role to the large humanitarian community, which had
grown to over four hundred NGOs over the previous years. However, this liaison
and coordination role was not the CIMIC task particularly stressed in IFOR’s elab-
orate public information campaign. The liaison role was intangible for the media
and with the fundamental lack of civil-military synchronization there was hardly a
success story to report here. 
IFOR instead publicized its role in the reconstruction of Bosnia’s infrastructure,
even though it had loudly proclaimed several months earlier that it would ‘not become
involved in reconstruction, humanitarian relief, political reform and human rights
efforts.’ No military role in ‘nation building’ remained NATO’s overall policy, but
IFOR now highlighted that its engineers had repaired bridges, railroads and 2,500
kilometers of roads, had reopened the airport in Sarajevo and provided training in
mine clearance.126 Many of these roles were essentially part of traditional NATO
CIMIC activities as practiced during the Cold War: a primarily logistical mission in
direct support of military operations. However, the effort clearly worked both ways
as the local population and civilian organizations often benefited. On the other hand,
CIMIC also had elements aimed at broader mission accomplishment, such as the
earlier mentioned provision of essential planning and support for the fall 1996 nation-
al elections, support to the IPTF prior to and during the transfer of the Sarajevo sub-
urbs and some other logistic and communications support to the police force. Addi-
tionally, the military efforts to expedite the reconstruction of electrical power and
water supplies in Bosnia were categorized under ‘support to the civil environment.’127
IFOR CIMIC and Public Information staff were frustrated with the internation-
al media for initially failing to pick up on these and other CIMIC efforts. Apparent-
ly, they were ‘not interested in good news.’128 Instead, news coverage of the Bosnia
operation in 1996 was overshadowed by incidents such as the ransacking and deser-
tion of the Sarajevo suburbs, the failure to arrest indicted war criminals and the first
disappointing experiences in refugee returns. Although the media widely acknowl-
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edged IFOR’s initial success at stopping the fighting, the force’s emphasis on the
purely military security aspects of Dayton by US forces in particular made it hard
for the media to ignore all the tasks the peacekeepers did not perform. Moreover,
skepticism was fuelled by a CIMIC effort that was certainly was no success story. 
Apart from the structural civil-military gap in Bosnia, many of the causes for the ini-
tially limited success of IFOR CIMIC were embedded in the conceptual framework
of CIMIC and civil affairs in the mid-1990s. During the Cold War, NATO had con-
ceived CIMIC exclusively as having a combat-oriented function. Its two key features
had been logistic support to host nations and alleviating refugee interference with
military operations in the defense of West Germany against a Soviet attack. Despite
the surge in peace operations, little had changed in this respect in the first half of
the 1990s, as neither NATO nor individual European military establishments put
any serious effort or conceptual thought into the development of CIMIC. While peace-
keepers in the field were gathering new experiences, NATO CIMIC continued to be
regarded as a ‘rear area’ activity and not a ‘front line asset’ or an operational func-
tion essential to the accomplishment of the mission. 
American civil affairs doctrine encompassed a far broader set of activities in mil-
itary operations, but made no specific distinction between combat and peace opera-
tions. The 1993 version of Field Manual 41-10 stated that the civil affairs mission
was ‘to support the commander’s relationship with civil authorities and civilian pop-
ulace, promote mission legitimacy and enhance military effectiveness.’129 It distin-
guished between two broad and diverse sets of frequently overlapping issues within
civil affairs operations: civil-military operations (CMO) and support to civil adminis-
tration. The doctrinal difference was that while performing civil-military operations,
civil affairs units directly supported the military commander – presumably in the
conduct of war – even though the local population and civil organizations might ben-
efit from such support. In support to civil administration, civil affairs units directly
supported a local government or international organization, although the military
commander might benefit from that support. In 1994, the first US Army Field Man-
ual for peace operations suggested that civil affairs in peace operations ‘may include
activities and functions normally the responsibility of a local government.’130 This
conceptual distinction between the intended beneficiaries of civil affairs efforts, which
had always been hard to maintain, became even murkier in the 1990s as the mili-
tary commander’s mission steadily drifted into the civilian sphere. It became ever
more apparent that political objectives and not military objectives dominated in mil-
itary operations, but this notion, retired Lieutenant Colonel John T. Fishel conclud-
ed in his study on civil-military operations in 1997, had ‘only been accepted grudg-
ingly, if at all, by the American military.’131
Since the 1950s, military government had slowly faded away from US civil affairs
doctrine and, by the end of the century, virtually all reference to the occupation of
liberated or conquered territory had been dropped. Meanwhile, in the wake of Viet-
nam, military leaders and policymakers had become disillusioned with ‘nation buil-
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ding.’ In 1994, as further US military involvement in peace operations was grudg-
ingly accepted, the military reluctantly began a search for doctrine that would be mil-
itarily effective in failed states while continuing to resist pressures to directly partic-
ipate in anything resembling ‘nation building.’132 However, US civil affairs retained
a vast body of some five thousand Army Reserve personnel ‘with specialists in every
area of government, they can assist a host government meet its people’s needs and
maintain a stable and viable civil administration.’133 In practice, US civil affairs had
essentially the same, albeit wider, focus on combat support as traditional NATO
CIMIC. Even as late as 1999, a Dutch CIMIC officer participating in a US Army
civil affairs course was struck by the exclusive focus of the lectures and scenarios on
conventional warfare. Only one hour out of the six-week course he attended was
spent on peace and humanitarian operations as such, or ‘Military Operations Other
Than War’ (MOOTW), the generic term then preferred by the US Army.134
Apart from its shaky doctrinal foundation for peace operations, the early CIMIC
effort in Bosnia suffered from a combination of overlapping headquarters, national
military strife within the coalition and a fundamental lack of understanding of
CIMIC’s role and value amongst ground commanders. The military command and
control structure placed Smith’s IFOR headquarters above the land component head-
quarters provided by the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) under Walker. This
resulted in a duplication of CIMIC staff cells. Consequently, IFOR headquarters’
Combined Joint CIMIC Task Force became embroiled in a turf battle with the ARRC
headquarters’ CIMIC staff.135 Faced with two headquarters in Sarajevo, the Office of
the High Representative and all other international governmental and non-govern-
mental aid organizations were confused about with whom they were to deal. A CIMIC
Task Force containing most of the personnel and assets to execute the CIMIC mis-
sion was created separately from the tactical command structure to conduct theater-
level CIMIC tasks.
The organizational chaos was exacerbated when the US tactical CIMIC teams
from this CIMIC Task Force started operating throughout Bosnia. They often arrived
unannounced and failed to coordinate their efforts with the division and brigade
CIMIC staffs and reported outside the chain of command straight back to Smith’s
IFOR headquarters. This was not so much a problem in the American-led Multina-
tional Division (MND) North, but French and British commanders on the tactical
level had no way of controlling these CIMIC assets and subsequently rejected the
presence of these US teams in their areas of responsibility. The French were clear-
ly most ardent in their refusal of US interference in their sector, which resulted in
a total lack of coordination of CIMIC activities between IFOR and Multinational Divi-
sion Southeast. The refusal of US civil affairs assets by the French and the British
had an additional effect. The absorption of superfluous personnel by the two CIMIC
headquarters, both operating in Sarajevo, contributed to a further overcrowding and
additional duplication of effort. The one hundred CIMIC personnel in the capital
conducted many reconstruction projects in a city that – with its high profile for the
world media – was already attracting the bulk of the international reconstruction
efforts from civilian organizations. 
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In Bosnia, the Americans had principally introduced the segregated model for
civil affairs, which had become known as the ‘Mediterranean model’ or ‘AMGOT
model’ for civil affairs in Europe during the Second World War. This model, where-
in the military government organization was placed outside the tactical chain of com-
mand, gave the field commanders below the supreme commander hardly any con-
trol over civil affairs teams in their area of operations. As during the conquest of
Italy fifty years earlier, this made tactical commanders in Bosnia suspicious of civil
affairs and CIMIC, whose purpose was hardly explained. It also made the CIMIC
teams beg from the sidelines for resources from regular forces. During the Second
World War, the model had been dropped while preparing for the invasion of Nor-
mandy. ‘We went wrong there,’ Colonel William Phillips would later admit about the
SHAPE CIMIC plans for Bosnia in 1995, to which he had contributed. Although the
task force remained in place, in March 1996 the IFOR land component command-
er General Walker gave his divisional commanders more leeway to determine the
extent and methods of their involvement in civil tasks.136 This satisfied the tactical
commanders, but infringed on the American ideal of a strategically and operational-
ly driven civil affairs or CIMIC effort and a centralized process of surveys and assess-
ments of the required civil-related tasks. It also prevented the most efficient distri-
bution of CIMIC assets to those areas of Bosnia most in need. Divisional, brigade
and battalion commanders improvised in providing different levels of security and
support to Bosnians while rebuilding their lives, their methods according to one
American observer, often ‘depending on their own imaginations and folk wisdom
preserved from other peace operations.’137 They made up their doctrine and tactics
as the operations progressed and learned, overlooking and relearning lessons in the
process.138 The presence of thirty different national contingents with fundamentally
different national military cultures and mindsets made it hard to generalize about
the success of the NATO CIMIC effort in Bosnia. Nevertheless, there were some
behavioral patterns to be distinguished. 
While US civil affairs staff brought their expertise to the mission, its personnel
were seriously hampered by the overall combat-oriented military culture of the US
military. Despite the long civil affairs tradition and recent experience gained in Pana-
ma, Iraq, Somalia and Haiti, American ground commanders were hardly better
informed than their European colleagues about the role and value of civil affairs or
CIMIC. Even though civil affairs seemed to be rising to some prominence, its per-
sonnel still often had to explain to US soldiers in tactical units that they were not
Public Affairs, the Army’s public relations division. The basic lack of understanding
made commanders jump to the conclusion that CIMIC activities automatically con-
tributed to ‘mission creep.’ This resulted in ‘unanticipated constraints being placed
on CIMIC operations until the value became more apparent to commanders.’139
Moreover, despite experiences in Somalia and Haiti, the US Army failed to alleviate
the force protection regime for civil affairs that continued to hamper its personnel
in the execution of their mission. 
A study by the US Department of Defense criticized the functioning of the tac-
tical CIMIC effort within the American-led Multinational Division North. 
278 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:06  Pagina 278
The CIMIC Center is doctrinally the central location for all NGOs to meet with the
military. At MND(N) the CIMIC Center was located inside the gate at Tuzla Main
[military base], whereas most of the NGOs were 20 minutes away in downtown
Tuzla. With access to the base by non-IFOR personnel strictly limited, the effec-
tiveness of the CIMIC Center as a tool for coordinating NGO and military activi-
ty was greatly reduced. Second, force protection regulations hampered CIMIC per-
sonnel’s ability to perform their CIMIC mission effectively. When CIMIC person-
nel were able to muster the needed four vehicles to leave the base, they arrived
at an NGO site with a heavier military presence than some NGOs desired. As a
related issue, the appearance of the need for great security when outside the pro-
tected confines of Tuzla Main worked counter to the efforts of CIMIC personnel
to create an impression among the local population that the internal situation had
improved. Finally, with the inaccessibility of the Tuzla CIMIC to the NGOs and the
restrictive procedures limiting the CIMIC staff’s ability to visit the NGOs, the
requirement to communicate indirectly had increased. Despite this requirement,
MND(N) had only one phone line of ‘dubious reliability’, and had no fax or e-mail
capability. Almost all communication between MND(N) and the NGOs had to be
relayed through intermediaries, generally with a 24-hour turnaround time.140 
This was not to say that the American CIMIC effort in Bosnia was overall ineffec-
tive. Rather, it lacked fundamental conditions for real success. Several of these obsta-
cles were cleared, some in months, others over the years to come. For instance, it
would take until 1999 for the CIMIC Task Force structure within SFOR to become
proficient in the eyes of chief civil affairs planners.141 It also took years for the force
protection regime to be loosened for US troops.
The combined U.S-European Bosnia experience had the positive effect of establish-
ing the need for a dedicated CIMIC capacity and of enhancing familiarity with CIMIC
as a concept. However, the combat-oriented model provided by the Americans in
Bosnia, at the height of US military skepticism over its involvement in peace oper-
ations, was a mixed blessing at best. Within complex peace operations as a whole,
the strict limits on the use of the military enhanced the civil-military compartmen-
talization. Within the military contribution to such operations it had two negative
effects. First, it strengthened the military in their belief it could turn its back on
what should have been recognized as the inevitable public security challenges in all
forms of modern military operations. Second, the prime example provided to the
Europeans was the American military reflex of pushing civil-military operations to
the periphery of military operations, away from the commander and regular military
units. 
Geared toward keeping the military operation ‘clean,’ the US-led IFOR headquar-
ters marginalized civil-military operations by relegating responsibilities with a civil-
ian odor about them to a separate CIMIC Task Force in order to relieve the tactical
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units of such responsibilities. This tendency was exacerbated by the reliance of US
civil affairs on Army Reserves with a specific civilian specialization. Although this
was generally advertised as its key comparative advantage, which it often was, there
was also a reverse side effect. By inserting the reserves with their highly specialized
civilian skills, the military became entangled in operations that drifted ever further
from the mission to establish a secure environment. According to Army Reserve
Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Jacobs, this was caused by their eagerness ‘to get into
the ball game’ and prove their value by exercising their skills in the limited period
of their deployment.142 These civilian proficiencies were after all still largely organ-
ized for the execution or support of civil administration in liberated or occupied ter-
ritory. While serving in Bosnia, Jacobs was struck by the fundamental lack of gen-
eralist civil affairs officers with staff skills. Only four percent of the total civil affairs
force, just over two hundred personnel, consisted of active duty generalist officers.
Meanwhile, specialized civil affairs personnel became involved in the most detailed
support to civil administration by working with the former warring factions to revise
property laws, assisting the World Bank, forming a working group to assess public
health issues and making recommendations for improving the public health infra-
structure. Some civil affairs officers attached to civilian organizations even performed
their duties in civilian clothes. The result was a paradoxical approach to CIMIC. On
the one hand, flags were continuously raised about ‘mission creep’ when combat
units became involved in public security-related tasks, or ‘nation building’ when they
engaged in small development projects. In the margins of the operation, on the other
hand, highly skilled civil affairs personnel were allowed to become involved in the
details of Bosnia’s reconstruction.
What further enhanced the marginalization of CIMIC was the widespread notion
in both American and European military circles that civil support could start after
the completion of the primary military mission, when the military had time on their
hands.143 While the impact and comparative advantage of civil-military operations in
Bosnia was clearly the largest in the early phase of operations, in the virtual absence
of most of the key civilian players in the Dayton process, the progressive emphasis
on civil tasks in the course of 1996 and 1997 provided the opposing model. The
common picture drawn out in charts was of ‘pure’ military operations dominating
the direct aftermath of military deployment, while the emphasis could slowly shift
towards civil-military cooperation as the situation stabilized. There was a certain logic
in these charts from a combat perspective, but it tended to be far removed from the
realities faced in the power vacuum in future stabilization operations in Kosovo and
‘post-war’ Iraq in 2003, where internal security operations and ‘vacuum filling’ and
not the separation of warring parties turned out to be the key military task. 
A third contributing factor to the peripheral approach to CIMIC was its empha-
sis on development projects. In Bosnia, the Europeans and Canadians injected their
specific tendencies into CIMIC. As a result of the controversy over NATO’s role in
the civilian sphere and the organizational confusion within the IFOR CIMIC organ-
ization, they focused on traditional civic action or ‘hearts and minds’ projects, as this
was seemingly the least controversial and certainly most attractive element of civil-
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military cooperation. Although military support to civil implementation was official-
ly limited strictly to extra activities ‘within the limits of its assigned principal tasks
and available resources,’ millions of funds were generated for this purpose. Within
the British Division, with its subordinate Dutch and Canadian battle groups, this
effort was clearly the most elaborate and successful and had started in April, much
earlier than within the US and French sectors. The British, Dutch and later the Cana-
dians all channeled budgets from national development ministries towards the troops
in the field and the British even attached an Overseas Development Agency (ODA)
reconstruction specialist to their Divisional headquarters. The Americans also start-
ed to use USAID funds in August, but US soldiers were not directly involved in
project management. Instead, brigade civil affairs teams reduced their role to coor-
dination and used US private contractors to execute the programs, which led to slow-
er implementation and resulted in less publicity value. The small-scale local com-
munity development projects were designed to have a ‘quick-impact’ on local socie-
ty and especially the British-led division was praised for the rapid turnaround from
proposal to execution. Projects were initiated by CIMIC staff within division, brigade
or battalion headquarters, supported at times by regular forces, mainly engineers,
but preferably executed by the local population or contractors to stimulate the dev-
astated Bosnian economy. Projects had to be closely associated with the military force
and centered on improving essential public utilities such as electrical power and
water supply and public services such as schools and clinics.144
The usual benefits from civic action were apparent in Bosnia. First of all, ‘win-
ning the hearts and minds,’ improving relations with the local population, was large-
ly successful where civic action was undertaken. The effort was clearly directed at
this aim. In the British sector for instance, more money was spent on projects in
the Republic Srpska than in more benign Federation territory in the early phase to
raise the level of acceptance of the force. CIMIC was often presented as a means of
‘force protection.’ As had become apparent in other operations, not only the Bosn-
ian hearts had to be won. By providing ‘good news,’ projects had the much-sought-
after effect of pleasing the taxpayer in the troop-contributing nations and therefore
also parliamentarians and ministers. Apart from pleasing politicians, these images
were welcomed and stimulated by Europe’s military leaders, who became more aware
of their use as the new line of defense against the next round of military budget-
cuts that was always near. They also helped improve troop morale, by providing the
forces with a feeling of accomplishment by making a tangible contribution to the
reconstruction of Bosnian society.
Not all effects of the increased emphasis on projects were equally positive. Through
the use of CIMIC, the military plunged itself as yet another player into what was an
already crowded humanitarian playing field. It was questionable if the overall recon-
struction effort in Bosnia was really in need of yet another actor that absorbed funds
otherwise directed to Bosnia via other channels, most likely NGOs. Increasingly, the
NGO community came to regard these military efforts as competition and feared
that the ‘humanitarian sphere’ was becoming increasingly politicized and militarized.
Meanwhile, although all three divisions had some success, ‘IFOR elements pursued
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many projects that were unlikely to have a lasting effect and did not necessarily sup-
port long-term, post-war reconstruction efforts.’145 What the reconstruction effort
needed most of all was coordination. Kevin Mannion, a European Commission coor-
dinator for development funds, gave a revealing account of what he witnessed in
Sarajevo in 1998. 
You have all these different actors, SFOR, IPTF, OSCE, OHR, UNHCR and all the
other organizations, all playing their part. They are all pieces of a jigsaw puzzle
[…], but nobody has the picture of the finished jigsaw. So we don’t actually know
what we are supposed to put together. So we are just trying to move the pieces
around all the time. […] What we have done is, we have given birth to a baby,
which is Bosnia Herzegovina, which has probably about a hundred different par-
ents, all with their own ideas on how to bring up the baby. So therefore you have
a very confused, underdeveloped baby, called Bosnia Herzegovina, which we maybe
all will walk away from and leave to fend for itself. 146
Civic action was a proven method of facilitating military operations, and much good
work was done by the military. However, in Bosnia the largely uncoordinated ‘heart
and minds’ campaign had the pretension of providing structural solutions in mili-
tary circles – even though funds spent by the military were minuscule compared to
the many billions of dollars channeled through EU, World Bank and other civilian
organizations over the years. Several years of peace, and a massive, but uncoordinat-
ed international effort brought only slight political advances while economic progress
was negligible with unemployment still at sixty percent. 
More damaging for the concept of CIMIC was that in Bosnia the acronym almost
became synonymous for ‘projects.’ Voices in the development community were often
raised, wondering why SFOR – instead of experimenting extensively with develop-
ment tasks so alien to its primary function – did not interpret its security role more
broadly. The focus on projects diverted attention from the much more essential civil-
military coordination and support relationship between soldiers and the key partners
in the creation of a lasting peace. These were first and foremost the international
police force and international civil administrators monitoring and reforming the local
institutions, much as the foundation of successful counterinsurgency operations was
the triangular relationship between army, police and administration.147
While the practical emphasis of civil-military cooperation in Bosnia was on proj-
ect development, the emergence of a CIMIC capacity within NATO pointed in anoth-
er direction. US predominance in the field had prompted its European partners to
fill the capability gap by creating a dedicated CIMIC capacity within NATO, although
skepticism remained among many military leaders over the need to take civil-mili-
tary cooperation beyond its narrow Cold War perimeters. The Americans, whose civil
affairs reserve forces came under increased pressure from prolonged deployment,
were the main driving force behind the creation of such an organization within the
Alliance.148 NATO’s ‘Bosnia Lessons Learned’ was firmly of the view that future large-
scale military operations needed a centralized, theater-level CIMIC command with a
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specialized CIMIC Task Force in order to deal with the civil government and coor-
dinate and support the primary international civil organizations. However, the need
was also recognized for special staff elements at each level of command in order to
better coordinate the Task Force’s efforts with the tactical commander’s wishes.149
In 1997 the NATO’s defense ministers directed SHAPE to create a plan for the
development of an operational CIMIC capacity.150 The concept launched by SHAPE
in 1999, called ‘CIMIC 2000,’ set out to tackle the issue in the fields of training
and education, the development of doctrine, and the actual creation of a specialized
force structure within NATO.151 In NATO’s doctrine, CIMIC was defined in 1998 as
‘[t]he resources and arrangements which support the relationship between NATO
commanders and the national authorities, civil and military, and civil populations in
an area where NATO military forces are or plan to be employed.’ This definition was
roughly the same as that of CIMIC during the Cold War years. To update it to fit
the new operational environment, the doctrine added that such arrangements could
include ‘cooperation with non-governmental or international agencies, organizations
and authorities.’152
It initially foresaw the creation of three CIMIC Groups centered on the Dutch,
Italians and British within ARRC, which came under General Mike Jackson’s com-
mand from January 1997. The only group that seriously got underway was the one
chaired by the Dutch, eventually in close cooperation with the Germans. While Danes,
Norwegians, Poles and Czechs joined this group, the other two lead nations wavered.
The Italians, tasked to create a CIMIC group in southern Europe, were slow in get-
ting an organization off the ground. The British, uncomfortable with the model pre-
sented by the Americans, decided on a different course than the one initiated by the
Americans. 
What later became known as CIMIC Group North focused on bureaucratic con-
cerns with regard to the composition of large, sustainable CIMIC units. In the long
run, hundreds of reserves specialized to perform a wide array of civil functions, were
to be deployable for longer periods of time. Although somewhat more modest in
size, it was largely modeled after the elaborate US civil affairs army reserve struc-
ture with its civil affairs commands, brigades and battalions. The ambitions expressed
in the NATO-CIMIC model were tremendous. CIMIC Group North prepared to deploy
CIMIC reserve officers to provide ‘functional expertise, advice and assistance in iden-
tifying and assessing’ in the areas of civil administration, civil infrastructure, econ-
omy and commerce, humanitarian aid and assistance and cultural affairs. Tasks fore-
seen in the administrative field encompassed – among others – advice on econom-
ic policy, public finance, legal assistance in rewriting existing laws and legal systems,
spatial and environmental policy, educational and cultural policy, social policy, move-
ment and transport policy, public health policy, security policy, media and commu-
nications policy and agricultural policy.153 Meanwhile most European NATO mem-
bers were hardly able to deploy fully trained CIMIC generalist staff officers in Bosnia
or Kosovo in the late 1990s. More time was spent on CIMIC reserve force genera-
tion and composition than on the general dilemma of how dedicated CIMIC forces
were to be employed. 
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The elaborateness of the NATO CIMIC scheme was inversely proportional to the
degree of responsibility its officers were supposed to assume in future failed states.
Most notably, NATO doctrine avoided all reference to executive administrative pow-
ers for the military. In other publications, even ‘support’ to civil organizations was
often supplanted by ‘advice and assistance.’154
While the Dutch and Germans diligently began developing their elaborate CIMIC
framework, the British steered a different course. Although the British Army had
lost its large civil affairs capability in the aftermath of the Second World War, a strong
civil-military component had always been an integral part of British counterinsur-
gency doctrine and operations. The importance of handling relations with the local
population, police and administration was recognized in Palestine, Malaya, Cyprus
and Northern Ireland, but had not been translated into the creation of a specific civil
affairs ‘sub-profession’ or a large specialized force structure to manage the civil-mil-
itary interface. In the second half of the 1990s they continued to resist this US Army
model with its strong emphasis on a separate civil affairs organization with large
number of specialist functions. While acknowledging the need for a small pool of
generalist civil affairs officers, a British officer involved in the creation of this Civil
Affairs Group discarded the efforts by NATO’s CIMIC Group North and the exist-
ing US civil affairs community by claiming with a hint of arrogance that seemed to
annoy the Americans, ‘we don’t need that, we are already used to doing it in North-
ern Ireland.’155
The British emphasized the ease with which regular military personnel, most
notably engineers and military police, but also regular staff and tactical units and
the soldiers on the ground, could be used to bridge the gap, if only they were employed
in the right manner and trained with the right attitude. In short, the British were
arguing that their military tradition, with its more flexible interpretation of the mil-
itary profession, made their soldiers better adapted to the civil-military interface in
peace operations than the Americans. Overall, this proved to be the case, but the
British leaned heavily on the theory of police and civil supremacy its officers had
grown accustomed to in Northern Ireland as well as their colonial history. This ascen-
dant theory was based on the assumption that a military force could support a func-
tioning police and administrative structure that was working towards a common goal
– the defeat of subversion or an insurgency. In Bosnia, local authorities were often
uncooperative. In future operations in Kosovo, East Timor and Iraq in 2003, local
authorities would initially be absent altogether and only slowly emerging. Neverthe-
less, the British approach seemed to be well suited to the integration of civil-mili-
tary operations into military operations. As the British were bound to take the lead
in NATO’s next peace operation Kosovo, this would prove instrumental. 
Conclusion
Bogdan Denitch, the writer of Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia,
called Dayton ‘a terrible peace to end a terrible war.’156 To mend some of its incon-
gruities the authority of the initially hapless Office of the High Commissioner and
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its subsidiary organizations was steadily expanded, but there was little doubt that the
key to redressing the mistakes made at Dayton lay in the hands of the military.
NATO’s experience in Bosnia in 1996 pointed in two directions. One route was to
stick to the minimalist option and prepare for a swift retreat, much like during pre-
vious military operations in Somalia and Haiti. The other route was to accept the
failure of this exit strategy and swing IFOR’s full weight behind civilian implemen-
tation. In retrospect, the choice would seem obvious, especially after IFOR’s initial-
ly astounding military success. At the time, however, bogged down by fear of ‘mis-
sion creep’ and a deeply rooted aversion to military involvement in ‘nation building,’
the US administration – with the Europeans following suit – wavered until the spring
of 1997 to make this choice. Hesitation would cost them dearly in the long run.
Between March 1996 and the summer of 1997, a substantial share of ‘mission ero-
sion’ occurred as NATO forces lost the initiative by failing to acknowledge that the
military mission had to move forward into the civilian sphere – first and foremost
into the field of public security. This was the consequence of the persistent effort to
simplify what was the inherently murky dividing line between soldiering and polic-
ing in a post-conflict setting. 
It took until the summer 1997 before NATO forces embraced a more vigorous
stance by exercising – in concert with the key civilian players – authority outside the
military sphere. Despite General Clark’s incentives, SFOR still did so half-heartedly
and with the so-called ‘anti-Dayton power structures’ firmly entrenched in Bosnian
society, it often seemed too little, too late. Peacekeeping had been reinvented in Bosnia
to fit the narrow parameters of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine rather than to suit
the peace process as a whole. Meanwhile, the ability of IFOR to flexibly respond in
a proactive rather than reactive manner was impeded by the influential term ‘mis-
sion creep’ that had also been making headway in the European military establish-
ment. Although not driven by the same inhibitions towards peace operations as such,
European soldiers were on the whole comfortable with the leadership provided by
the Americans. While no great strides were made towards lasting success in Bosnia,
at least nothing went dramatically wrong. This counted for much after their previ-
ous experiences. The failure to exploit the possibilities presented by the power vest-
ed in the peacekeeping force, especially in that crucial first year, had dramatic long-
term effects for the goal of recreating a multi-ethnic Bosnia. Cynics continued to
wonder, however, if that goal had ever been attainable in former Yugoslavia.157 The
next ethnic conflict that had since long been smoldering, but was now fully erupt-
ing right next door in Kosovo, added fuel to their argument.
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PART IV
Kosovo
Military Government by Default
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9The Kosovo Force:
Entering the Wasteland
Three years separated NATO’s first peace operation in Bosnia from the Alliance’s
first war over the fate of Kosovo in the spring of 1999. After the protracted bomb-
ing campaign forced Milosevic’s security forces to leave the Albanian-dominated
Yugoslav province, NATO inserted a large ground force that was to keep the peace,
but found itself exercising de facto military governance in the ensuing power vacu-
um. Just as NATO officially never called it a war, however, it would not refer to the
takeover as an occupation. Its Kosovo Force (KFOR) was mostly planned, perceived
and referred to as a peacekeeping force. After all, by separating and controlling Serb
security forces and the Albanian insurgents, soldiers were to create the military con-
ditions for the parallel civilian mission, the UN interim administration for Kosovo.
Just as previous civilian missions, however, it would take many months before the
civilian mission was able to execute the civilian side of the UN mandate for Koso-
vo, which was the most ambitious project of truly international administration in the
history of the United Nations. 
NATO’s peace operation in Bosnia was the primary point of reference for KFOR,
but for the troops on the ground, such as a Dutch artillery battalion, the initial
months of the operation bore closer resemblance to the anarchy found by the Amer-
ican-led force in Somalia. Apart from avoiding military entanglement in such a sit-
uation altogether, few lessons had been learned in America and Europe from this
early experience of ad hoc vacuum filling. While focusing on the journey of the Dutch
battalion in the provincial town of Orahovac in the second half of 1999, the follow-
ing chapters explore why NATO failed to prepare for the power vacuum, how its
forces improvised, and how they eventually performed in the fields of public secu-
rity and civil administration by substituting and supporting civilians.1 In many
respects the municipality of Orahovac resembled a scale model of the ethnic conflict
raging in Kosovo and the challenges facing NATO and the UN. 
Stepping into the Void 
By 12 June 1999, D-Day as it was inevitably called, a substantial NATO force of
infantry, tanks and artillery was assembled on the Macedonian border with Kosovo.
Among the troops was a Dutch field artillery battery attached to a German Panzer
Brigade for which it would provide fire support. Together with four other multina-
tional brigades under British, American, French and Italian command, they made
up KFOR that was to deploy in Kosovo with the capacity to enforce the peace. Before
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crossing the Macedonian border into Kosovo, the gunners had already gotten a taste
of what the Allied liberators must have felt like in some European towns forty-five
years earlier. From a nearby refugee camp harboring 40,000 Kosovar Albanian
refugees, which the soldiers had helped to build in the previous months, crowds of
people gathered by the road, cheering ‘NAH-TOE! NAH-TOE!,’’ and waving as the
troops passed by. Their tracked artillery pieces rumbled towards Kosovo in what seemed
an endless column of troops and armour. When the troops crossed the Kosovar-Mace-
donian border they were dazzled by the lamps of TV cameras and floodlights from
the international press, but then the road turned pitch-dark. Electricity and other infra-
structure in former Yugoslavia’s poorest province was badly damaged after more than
a year of civil war, followed by almost four months of NATO bombing.
While rattling and shaking badly behind the turret machine guns of their noisy
M-109 howitzers, 36 hours in total, the soldiers witnessed the chaos and destruction
in the war-torn province. Entering a potentially hostile situation was at first a thrilling
experience for the troops. It was everything that being a soldier was about, but the
harsh realities of war soon sunk in. As the soldiers pushed into Kosovo, they spot-
ted large numbers of civilian cars standing about on the side of the road with opened
suitcases and clothes lying around. They had been abandoned at gunpoint by the
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A Kosovar Albanian refugee in Macedonia cheers as NATO artillery moves into Kosovo on 11 June
1999.
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thousands of refugees during the preceding weeks. A few Albanians came out of
hiding to applaud the troops, but the soldiers soon found out that war was still close
by. In their headlights a body appeared on the road, part of its head missing. The
victim, it later turned out, was a German journalist who had taken the risk of advanc-
ing into Kosovo ahead of KFOR. When the column shortly halted, an anti-tank shell
flew right overhead and exploded nearby. 
As the Dutch and Germans advanced on the town of Suva Reka at dawn, they
saw the first Yugoslav troops casually standing around in the tree line. They were
not nearly the demoralized soldiers NATO troops had expected after listening to their
own propaganda over the previous weeks. There were clear signs of recent heavy
fighting around Suva Reka and the Albanian population was obviously still terrified.
Some people briefly lifted their curtains in order to wave, but of the few people that
had stayed behind, no one came out to greet the KFOR troops. It soon became clear
why. Just around the next corner the Dutch troops encountered the dreaded MUP
casually standing around their armored vehicles. The Yugoslav special police were
armed to the teeth and one of the policemen casually made a throat-slitting gesture
to the KFOR soldiers as they drove by.2
In many ways, the tragic Yugoslav disintegration began and temporarily seemed to
have ended in Kosovo. Close to two million Kosovar Albanians, Muslims by faith,
made up almost ninety percent of the province’s population and wished for greater
autonomy from the Serb-dominated remainder of Yugoslavia. In 1989, Slobodan
Milosevic had rudely revoked the autonomous status granted to the Kosovar Albani-
ans by Marshall Tito in 1974. After disbanding its institutions of local government
and police, direct control from Belgrade was imposed and the Albanian language
was banned from schools and for other official purposes. Milosevic was clearly unwill-
ing to yield on the province that, with its approximately 250,000-strong Serb minor-
ity, had been central to the radical nationalism that brought him to power in the late
1980s. In the eyes of Serb nationalists, Kosovo had historic significance as the cra-
dle of Serb civilization. This belief went back to the medieval struggle between the
Ottoman Turks and the Serbs over Kosovo that culminated in the infamous battle of
Kosovo Polje on 28 June 1389. The battle was lost by the Serbia, and this was fol-
lowed by five centuries of Ottoman rule over the area. The Albanians argued that
they had been present long before Serbs arrived in the region in the seventh centu-
ry. It had been the 600-year anniversary of the battle on 28 June 1989 that Milose-
vic had used to take center stage and promise to an estimated crowd of one million
Serbs ‘never again will they defeat you.’ Within that same year Kosovo’s autonomy
was stripped.3
During most of the 1990s, the Albanians in Kosovo practiced an impressive form
of passive resistance. Serbs formally ruled over Kosovo and held almost all positions
as mayors, judges and police, but the Albanians organized their own elections and
created parallel administrative structures, schools, universities and medical clinics.
As traders and migrant workers in Western Europe, the Albanians quite often fared
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economically better than most Serbs, who were on civil-servant wages from Belgrade.
But after years of non-violent resistance to this form of apartheid, the moderates
under the elected Albanian leader, a modest academic named Ibrahim Rugova, lost
out to more extreme nationalist forces. An increasing part of the Albanian popula-
tion supported an armed insurgency by the Kosovo Liberation Army, or Ushtria Çlir-
imtare e Kosovës (UÇK), a group that had emerged in 1997. The following year the
world witnessed a rapidly escalating armed conflict between this guerrilla force and
the Yugoslav Army, the Ministry of Interior Special Police (Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih
Poslova, or MUP) and Serb paramilitaries that Milosevic deployed in increasing num-
bers. Prior to the summer of 1998, Milosevic was never seriously challenged by the
Western powers for the brutality of his regime in Kosovo and neither NATO nor the
UN addressed the legitimate fears of the Serb minority in Kosovo. In February that
year, Robert Gelbard, the American special envoy to the Balkans, had actually con-
tinued to praise the Serb leader for his support of the Dayton accords in Bosnia and
denounced the UÇK as ‘without any question a terrorist organization.’4
The methods used to suppress the revolt were reminiscent of those previously
used in Croatia and Bosnia. Albanian fighters were guilty of kidnappings, mostly of
Serb civilians or others they considered collaborators, and attacked Serb police sta-
tions. Serb security forces burned down entire villages suspected of supporting the
UÇK. As the news of atrocities in yet another Balkan civil war flooded Western TV
screens and the front pages of newspapers, the call to do something about the human
suffering again grew louder. In the second half of 1998, tens of thousands of Alba-
nians were driven from their villages into the hills. NATO stepped up the pressure
on Belgrade as the number of internally displaced persons and refugees reached
200,000. There were lingering regrets that the province had not been brought into
the Dayton process in 1995. Richard Holbrooke, quite understandably at the time,
thought this would unnecessarily complicate the negotiations with Milosevic who
held the key to ending the war in Bosnia. Clinton’s heavyweight diplomat was again
called upon to broker a peace and with the threat of NATO air strikes against Milo-
sevic to back up his diplomatic efforts, he succeeded in the fall of 1998. However,
the armistice Holbrooke mediated failed to hold and the conflict continued under
the eyes of 1,500 OSCE monitors from the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). 
The escalating ethnic conflict raised concerns amongst Western politicians that
the conflict would spread to Macedonia and possibly even engulf Greece and Turkey.
Following the murder of 45 Albanian inhabitants in the village of Raçak, in response
to the slaying of four Serb policemen by the UÇK in January 1999, the internation-
al community headed by the United States made a last attempt to solve the conflict.
NATO’s credibility was felt to be at stake. In February 1999, the parties were ordered
back to the negotiating table in the French town of Rambouillet. A cease-fire agree-
ment and the withdrawal of Serb forces were to go hand in hand with the deploy-
ment of an international peacekeeping force under NATO leadership. The options
for a ground force in Kosovo had already been under consideration at SHAPE, NATO’s
military headquarters, since the summer of 1998, but planning was accelerated in
the lead-up to the negotiations at Rambouillet. However, Operation Joint Guardian,
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as the mission became known, appeared to be short-lived. It was shelved as NATO’s
dominant role in the peacekeeping force proved unacceptable to Milosevic in Ram-
bouillet. The Serb delegation’s fatal decision not to sign up to the agreement was at
the time primarily ascribed to their attempts to emasculate the proposed peacekeep-
ing force. However, some well-informed sources have since claimed that an annex
to the Rambouillet Accord – which provided for unrestricted freedom of movement
for NATO troops throughout the territory of Yugoslavia and not just Kosovo – was
inserted by Western negotiators to provoke a rejection by Belgrade. ‘I think the terms
put to Milosevic at Rambouillet were absolutely intolerable,’ British Defence Minis-
ter of State, Lord Gilbert, later conceded. ‘How could he possibly accept them? It
was quite deliberate.’5
Some political leaders within the Atlantic Alliance had grown increasingly deter-
mined to bring its force to bear for the sake of the latest breakaway mini-state on
the Balkans – although those favoring armed intervention were not sure what the
next step would be. Champions of a more interventionist policy, such as Madeleine
Albright and Tony Blair, seemed quite eager to draw a line in the sand with Milose-
vic, who was again seen as a thoroughly destabilizing factor in the Balkans. They
found their military exponent at SHAPE. ‘Kosovo was simply an extension of Bosnia
in the mind of Wesley Clark,’ Holbrooke said. ‘For Clark, Kosovo was the logical
next step in his liberal interventionist attitude toward the use of force.’6 The diplo-
mat seems to have concurred. In the preceding years, the defensive Alliance had
sought and found a new purpose and began to transform into an organization will-
ing to project power across its boundaries and intervene to promote regional stabil-
ity. Geopolitical motives, newfound confidence and a new sense of purpose certain-
ly made NATO’s reaction swifter and far more decisive than it had been in the first
half of the 1990s. 
After Milosevic refused to bow to Western pressure, NATO began a bombing
campaign on 24 March 1999. Russia and China had blocked a resolution in the
Security Council and therefore the Alliance went to war without UN approval.7 NATO
never called it a war. Instead the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ was often used to
emphasize the official aim of intervening within the borders of a sovereign state in
order to end widespread and grave violations of fundamental human rights. Hopes
were vested in a limited punitive air campaign similar to the one against the Bosn-
ian Serbs in the fall of 1995. Instead, the bombing campaign against this more for-
midable opponent drew on for weeks, then months, and caused much friction between
NATO members over the scope of the offensive and even the specific targets select-
ed for destruction.8 It could even be argued that the air-offensive was counterpro-
ductive, since Milosevic used it as a pretext to expel some 863,000 Albanians from
Kosovo. Several hundred thousand more had already been internally displaced in the
previous year.9
The endless stream of refugees from Kosovo flooded neighboring Albania and
Macedonia and it was feared that it would destabilize the ethnically diverse region
as a whole. When the refugee crises in April and May surprised and overwhelmed
the UNHCR and Western governments, NATO military forces played a humanitari-
the kosovo force 293
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:06  Pagina 293
an support role unequalled in size and scope since the end of the Second World
War. Several thousand troops assembled in Macedonia under the Allied Rapid Reac-
tion Corps (ARRC), commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Mike Jackson. By late
May, this force had grown to approximately 10,000 troops. By then its primary mis-
sion had changed from preparing for the possible extraction of OSCE monitors to
preparing for deployment into Kosovo as a peacekeeping force to possibly enforce
the Rambouillet Accord. The force had not yet received an official name but was ten-
tatively called the Kosovo Force.10 During the bombing campaign, General Jackson
and his staff had spent a long time planning and preparing for the unknown. The
force commander had five brigade commanders under his authority and sufficient
logistical units, ‘but what we didn’t have was anybody much to do the fighting.’ On
one occasion, Mike Venables, Jackson’s political advisor, drew out a roots-and-branch-
es diagram that suggested seven possible outcomes to the conflict. ‘We all reckoned
that the actual outcome would be the eighth that he hadn’t spotted,’ Jackson recalled.
He tried to plan for each of these different outcomes. ‘It was a period of great uncer-
tainty which highlighted that uncertainty is absolutely a part of a soldier’s job’. He
clearly addressed a generation of officers that often still longed for the certainties of
the Cold War years, when he added: ‘not only should we not resent it but we should
learn to embrace it.’11
Another NATO force called AFOR assembled in Albania. Its primary and official
mission was to support the local Albanian authorities and the UNHCR in manag-
ing the refugee crises by providing security, logistical means and manpower.12 When
the air-war failed to render any result, the assembly of more troops on Kosovo’s bor-
der was also a prelude to, and pretext for, preparations for a larger ground force in
order to increase the pressure on Belgrade. However, the ground attack option was
a card that NATO initially played poorly in its dealings with Milosevic, primarily
because the Clinton administration had already publicly ruled out this possibility for
domestic political reasons. There was still little enthusiasm for Clinton’s interven-
tionist, multilateral foreign policy within the Republican-dominated Congress. William
Cohen, also a Republican and conservative in his view of the role of the US mili-
tary, was still at the helm in the Pentagon. 
Early June 1999, a combination of factors convinced Milosevic to concede to
NATO’s demands.13 The prolonged and gradually escalating air-campaign, although
insufficient to win the war alone, had certainly been taking its toll on Serbia prop-
er. According to Wesley Clark, the signs of preparations for a ground attack played
an important role in convincing the Serbian autocrat to bow, even though such an
effort would have taken many more months to organize.14 In the end, however, his
capitulation would have been difficult without Russian-backed diplomacy during May
and pressure by Moscow on the leaders in Belgrade. At that point, the sudden quick
ending to the conflict actually came somewhat unexpectedly, since NATO had been
bracing itself for the long haul. The Dutch NATO Ambassador Niek Biegman called
the diplomatic accord forged by Finnish former President Marti Ahtisaari and Vic-
tor Tsjerdomyrdin, the Russian special envoy for the Balkans, almost ‘too good to be
true.’15 Under NATO pressure, Belgrade had agreed to withdraw all its security forces
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from Kosovo. The signing of the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) by Jackson
and Serb military leaders on 9 June prepared the way for a coordinated Serb with-
drawal and KFOR’s deployment in its wake.16 It would be a relief in place. 
The Mandate
The next day, the Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which endorsed the sit-
uation NATO had created by means of force. Temporarily, the Security Council de
facto suspended Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo and authorized a military force
and civilian mission to deploy in Kosovo and assume these sovereign rights for an
indefinite period of time. When KFOR troops entered Kosovo, there was no politi-
cal settlement. The final status of Kosovo was left undecided and the NATO powers
would not back the overwhelming desire amongst Kosovar Albanians to become an
independent republic. An independent Kosovo, it was feared, would set a poor exam-
ple for the dysfunctional multi-ethnic government of neighboring Bosnia. Moreover,
there were serious concerns that an independent Kosovo would have a destabilizing
effect on Macedonia with its large Albanian minority.
The assembly of military forces on Kosovo’s borders prior to June enabled KFOR
to enter the province swiftly. Rather than the usual months for the deployment of
peacekeeping forces, the first 20,000 troops were inside Kosovo in two weeks. Nev-
ertheless, the initial force entering Kosovo consisted of no more than nine battal-
ions, four of which were British, and they were very thin on the ground for the wide
array of tasks they were to perform. KFOR initially had no more than forty tanks,
while the Yugoslav armed forces had survived the air campaign with the vast major-
ity of their heavy equipment still intact – including four hundred tanks, according
to Jackson.17 Eventually KFOR would comprise some 45,000 troops, almost twice
the size estimated in the Rambouillet plan and two-thirds of NATO’s initial force in
Bosnia three years earlier. The British were dominant in KFOR, especially during
the early stage when, for a short time, they provided two full brigades, one armored
and one airmobile, to assume control of the capital Pristina and its surroundings.
With Jackson’s ARRC in charge, KFOR took on a British hue, just as NATO opera-
tions in Bosnia in 1996 had been American-dominated. After having taken the lead
in Bosnia and in previous months during the air campaign, the American govern-
ment wished to minimize its own role and maximize European responsibility for
both military operations on the ground and for Kosovo’s reconstruction and proposed
democratization.
On the military side, KFOR’s primary mission was to deploy in Kosovo with the
capability to enforce the peace and to deter renewed hostilities.18 Thus, its first task
was to secure the withdrawal of Yugoslav military, paramilitary and police forces and
prevent them from further presenting a threat to the Kosovar population. The sec-
ond part of this main military task was to demilitarize the UÇK, the details of which
were left to be agreed upon at a later stage. It would not be until 21 June that an
agreement with the UÇK was reached on its disarmament. Negotiations on its trans-
formation into something other than a military force dragged on until August. Secur-
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ing the withdrawal of the Serbs and demilitarizing the UÇK were KFOR’s two strict-
ly military tasks and can be seen as the first two layers of a complex security mis-
sion that was threefold. They were performed in order to ‘establish a secure envi-
ronment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the
international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be estab-
lished, and humanitarian aid can be delivered.’ These military tasks were thus defined
as creating a framework of military security for the population and international civil-
ian organizations to live and operate. 
Subsequently, KFOR’s mandate moved into the civilian sphere within that frame-
work and inevitably became more vague. For the first time in history, the UN mili-
tary mandate officially included the establishment of a secure environment ‘ensur-
ing public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsi-
bility for this task.’ Public safety, the third layer of security for which KFOR bore
responsibility – temporarily but for an unspecified period of time – soon proved to
be KFOR’s biggest challenge.
Civil implementation of the military peace agreement and UN Resolution 1244
were to be performed by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), headed
by the secretary general’s special representative. This role was temporarily performed
by Sergio Vieira de Mello, a United Nations veteran from Brazil. UNMIK had pow-
ers never before vested in a UN body. The special representative had full executive
and legislative authority, with no representative body to control him. His powers
included the administration of the judiciary, and the special representative was fur-
ther empowered to appoint or remove any person within the civil administration,
including judges.19 UNMIK’s powers were, however, inversely opposed to the means
initially at its disposal, and thus its ability to achieve them. In early July, UNMIK
was composed of just thirty officials, the majority of whom were based in the capi-
tal Pristina.20 They were by no means able to assert any control in the districts and
municipalities. As in previous missions with less ambitious mandates, such as in
Cambodia and Bosnia, the deployment of civilian components turned out to be an
arduous and time-consuming process. Given the short time that UNMIK had to plan
for the establishment of nothing less than full trusteeship over a province with no
governmental infrastructure, it was not too surprising that it took months to raise
personnel that – other than the military – had to be recruited on an individual basis. 
The civil component’s organizational structure was like a classic Greek structure.
UNMIK was the tympanum supported by four columns representing four major
international organizations. The UN Secretariat was put in charge of the civil admin-
istrative component. This pillar included the essential international police force that
eventually was to comprise 3,100 constables with unprecedented executive policing
authority. For the next two of its pillars, UNMIK could build on local European organ-
izations. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) took on
institution building and democratization while the European Union (EU) took charge
of economic reconstruction. As in previous peace building operations, the UNHCR
took responsibility for coordinating the humanitarian effort in Kosovo. This fourth
pillar was in charge of the return of hundreds of thousands of Kosovar-Albanian
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refugees. While profiting from the extended infrastructure and expertise of these
three subcontracted organizations, UNMIK as an interim government would also
suffer from their large bureaucracies. 
Compared to previous UN military mandates, Resolution 1244 on Kosovo was
relatively generous in ascribing military support for the civilian component. Lessons
had been learned from Bosnia, but the mandate was hardly specific on this point.
Soldiers were to support ‘as appropriate’ the international humanitarian effort and
coordinate and backup the international civil presence under UN leadership. The
meaning of ‘as appropriate’ would be determined by the military commanders on
the ground and the usual caveats ‘within means and capabilities’ and ‘on a case-to-
case basis’ were emphasized in military orders. Apart from the public security clause,
that specifically tasked KFOR to temporarily substitute the UN civilian police force
that was eventually to deploy, there was no mention of the military force substitut-
ing UNMIK in other fields of administration. Anything resembling military govern-
ment was officially ruled out. The degree of support was largely left to the command-
ers on the ground to determine. The force commander would react to instructions
and more informal signals he received from his political and military masters in
NATO and national military and political lines of authority. His subordinate brigade
and battalion commanders from different nations would do the same, reporting to
their capitals and national military headquarters as well as to the force commander.
As in all previous peace operations, the levels of military support to the civil power
would therefore vary substantially between different national contingents. Support to
the civilian side of the operation or substitution thereof, however, was hardly promi-
nent in the minds of the first NATO forces entering a potentially hostile environ-
ment. 
Task Force Orahovac 
A small advance party of the Dutch artillery battalion had been among the first troops
to enter Kosovo on D-Day, 12 June. They entered Kosovo’s second largest city Prizren
early the next morning with the first elements of the German brigade. Prizren would
be the center of operations for the southern zone assigned to Multinational Brigade
South. The Dutch had planned to establish their main fire base on a small airfield
north of Prizren near the town Suva Reka in order to cover the German deployment
while the Serb forces retreated. The other four brigades under British, American,
French and Italian command fanned out in all directions in close coordination with
the withdrawing Serbian forces.
Upon entering Prizren, KFOR’s vanguard was confronted with the joy and the
anarchy of what was a liberation to most and an occupation to some. In a momen-
tous occasion in post-Second World War German history, its soldiers were welcomed
with flowers and cheering by crowds of Albanians. However, confrontations between
the oppressed and their former oppressors were inevitable. The few available NATO
soldiers faced heavily armed and frustrated Serbs wanting to leave town and an Alban-
ian population in a buzz of emotion and alcohol. Some were involved in looting and
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rampaging. In the process, German troops killed two Serbian soldiers who had opened
fire. In Pristina, two armed Albanians were shot dead in their moving car when
British soldiers mistook their celebratory fire for a threat to KFOR. Overall, the Ser-
bian security forces complied with the military agreement and despite several inci-
dents, the UÇK refrained from harassing retreating Serb security forces, as prom-
ised to NATO. The most pressing problem would turn out to be imminent confronta-
tion between the Albanians and the Serb civilians, some of whom left and some of
whom stayed behind in fright.
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Brigadier General Fritz von Korff flew in from Macedonia to join the vanguard
of his units and set up brigade headquarters. Dutch battalion commander Lieutenant
Colonel Anton van Loon accompanied him on this flight and functioned as his ‘advi-
sor and witness.’21 For a number of reasons, the German commander had engaged
the Dutch commander intensively in the planning for operations in Kosovo. He liked
to highlight the multinational character of his operation, but at this stage the Dutch
were the only non-German element in the brigade. Van Loon had been head of the
Operations Division of the combined German-Dutch Army Corps in Münster in 1995
and had spent a year attending the British Army Staff College in 1993. This gave
him added value for Von Korff, whose staff was less familiar with the English lan-
guage and the distinct manners at the British-dominated KFOR headquarters where
Van Loon knew people personally.22
In February, the Dutch government had pledged to provide Van Loon’s artillery
battalion to supplement the German armored brigade, which lacked artillery support.
Since the Dutch were involved in the planning for the mission quite early, there was
a relatively large number of Dutch staff officers at the German brigade headquar-
ters. In April, the Germans asked if the Dutch were willing to take on an addition-
al role and assume responsibility for an area within their sector in an infantry-type
role. The Dutch government agreed to play this part and engaged their gunners in
extra infantry drills. Patrolling and manning checkpoints were therefore part of the
mission-oriented training that also included various scenarios played out to prepare
them for possible situations in Kosovo. Von Korff needed the Dutch gunners to per-
form this role of a ‘maneuver battalion’ because his brigade was initially seriously
under strength. Upon entry it consisted of no more than one reinforced scout bat-
talion and one reinforced mechanized battalion. He pledged to strengthen Van Loon’s
unit with one of his own infantry companies, since an artillery battalion was only
five hundred strong rather than the seven to eight hundred personnel in an infantry
battalion. In the following months, the Multinational Brigade South would gradual-
ly be enlarged with a German airborne battalion and with two reinforced engineer
battalions, one German and one Dutch. Later that summer a Turkish battalion, two
Russian battalions, an Austrian battalion and a one-hundred-strong German CIMIC
company would raise its total strength to some 8,000 personnel.23
For the time being, however, Von Korff was lucky if he could field one thousand
men. Upon his arrival in Prizren he immediately made himself available to local
representatives of all ethnic groups, but was overwhelmed by those airing their con-
cerns such as the local abbot, the prefect. He placed static guards at the cathedral
and at the Christian Orthodox monastery, where a large amount of Serbs had sought
refuge, and concentrated the few available troops in areas where minorities lived,
but often he could do no more than promise to do his best. Already, the speed of
events was much faster than he and Van Loon had anticipated in Macedonia. For
the Dutch, events took an even swifter and more surprising turn as Van Loon recalled: 
Amidst the haze of people that approached Von Korff with requests for support
and protection appeared the local MUP commander with a couple of his officers
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in uniform. He declared that in accordance with the MTA he was ready to with-
draw his convoy of armored vehicles, trucks and buses, some of which were known
to be packed with looted goods. His unit was positioned on the ‘wrong’ side of
town, the Albanian side, and he made clear that he would drive straight through
the city center. Von Korff suggested that he drive his column around the city under
German armored escort, but the MUP commander bluntly said ‘no, can’t do that;
if you cannot provide adequate escort I will fight my way through.’ After some seri-
ous discussion he suddenly gave an opening by demanding that, in return for an
organized withdrawal around the city, KFOR send troops to the provincial town of
Orahovac that very day. He was concerned about the large Serb minority there and
the high concentration of UÇK forces around the city. Von Korff did not have much
choice and said: ‘OK, I will send troops to Orahovac today.’24
For Van Loon, this pledge had serious implications. Orahovac, twenty kilometers
north of Prizren, was in the Dutch area of responsibility, but his force had not
planned to deploy and assume area control for another two weeks. Until late June,
they were to concentrate primarily on their fire-support role from nearby Suva Reka.
Van Loon said he would go, but wondered with what troops. The first Dutch pla-
toon had not even crossed the border and was not due to arrive until the next morn-
ing, while the battalion would not be complete for another nine days.25 Von Korff
therefore gave him a small force of predominantly German troops with some armored
vehicles and two Leopard II tanks. It would prove the beginning of a successful
Dutch-German integrated operation in what became known as Task Force Oraho-
vac.26
Intelligence gathering prior to deployment in Kosovo had been poor and approached
primarily from a military perspective. It was of course quite natural that the troops
awaiting deployment in an uncertain and potentially hostile environment concentrat-
ed on the military aspects of things to come, but even from a traditional military
perspective, intelligence gathering prior to entry into Kosovo was difficult. In Bosnia,
with the UN on the ground, substantial transfer of knowledge had taken place between
UNPROFOR and NATO troops in December 1995. As they entered Kosovo in June
1999, soldiers faced the unknown. The operational environment had been conceived
in a traditional military way, emphasizing the terrain, infrastructure, weather and
friendly and enemy forces. However, even this sort of military information was scanty. 
The only form of ‘human intelligence’ – information from people actually on the
ground – was provided by a lieutenant from the German Navy, who had served as
an OSCE monitor in Orahovac in the previous year. With his first-hand knowledge
of the area he proved invaluable as a scout. Quite a few of the OSCE monitors had
been military officers in civilian guise. Both Jackson and the German brigade com-
mander used them extensively. Most of the up-to-date military intelligence would
have been provided by several German unmanned aerial vehicles, or ‘drones,’ that
had photographed and filmed the area. Although there was almost certainly some
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extra information available from talks with UNHCR workers, recently arrived refugees
and special forces operating behind enemy lines, NATO intelligence failed to warn
the Task Force of the presence of a full combat-ready Serb tank-battalion around Ora-
hovac. This was what Van Loon and his men ran into that first evening as they
arrived on the airstrip where they had planned to deploy. If they had known, they
would probably not have gone. They would certainly not have arrived in the dark
with only two tanks, because in a possible confrontation they would not have stood
a chance against the twelve Yugoslav-built T-72 tanks they, to their surprise, encoun-
tered. However, the Serbs turned out to be quite helpful and were very well aware
of one of the NATO force’s biggest fears. They constantly said ‘neme mine, neme
mine’ (no mines), as they showed the Dutch and Germans around the little airfield.27
The airstrip was surrounded by wineries and had previously been used by crop-dust-
ing airplanes in the local wine industry. 
The nature of the looming power vacuum was conceived as a matter of troop
deployment and KFOR spent little time considering the implications of being the
sole authority in an unruly province. The two weeks the Dutch had expected to spend
in Kosovo prior to assuming control of Orahovac would have allowed them to do
some of their own reconnaissance. They had no such luck. As far as information on
local society was concerned, such as the composition of the population, the Dutch
relied on some preparatory lectures on local culture back in the Netherlands. The
commander further explored some general information from open sources. Having
read the excellent short history Kosovo: The Postponed War by the Belgian historian
Raymond Detrez ‘a number of times,’ Van Loon is likely to have been relatively
informed on the complexities of Kosovar society and politics as far as the sources of
conflict were concerned.28 Nevertheless, the overall information about the sector was
almost as scanty as that of the Dutch marines entering Cambodia seven years before
in the early days of modern peace operations. More information was made available
about the sort of animals the Dutch soldiers were likely to encounter in the hills
around Orahovac than about the community leaders and the distribution of power
and influence in the region they were tasked to secure and control.29
Soldiers were not warned about the corpses they would find around every street
corner as they approached Orahovac. One Dutch soldier advancing from Prizren to
Orahovac on June 13 described the road as the most dirty, foul-smelling place he had
ever traveled.30 The ferocity with which the civil war had struck this particular area
soon became apparent. Driving through the destroyed village of Velika Krusa, he was
confronted with the penetrating stench of death for the first time in his life. Decay-
ing cadavers were everywhere. The area of operations assigned to Multinational
Brigade South had been the scene of some of the conflict’s most violent clashes
between Serb security forces and the UÇK. Within the southern sector, Orahovac was
the municipality with the highest concentration of mass graves. While they knew
they would be assuming control over an area with a substantial Serb minority, there
was little indication that the Dutch – either at the Ministry of Defense in The Hague
or at various levels of military command – considered the explosive nature of the
area and its ethnic composition. Both within NATO and in The Hague, planners had
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been preoccupied with the Serb security forces and the humanitarian aspects of
returning hundreds of thousands of Albanians. 
The municipality of Orahovac, with its 65,000 inhabitants, was roughly divided
along the same ethnic lines as that of the whole of Kosovo. Before the war, the city
of Orahovac was populated by 25,000 Albanians, 3,500 Serbs and 800 other minori-
ties, mostly Roma. This latter group had always been discriminated against in Koso-
vo, but they were now accused by the Albanians of collaborating with the Serbs and
looting their property. Another 1,500 Serbs had lived in a nearby village called Veli-
ka Hoca. Over the first two weeks, as the returning Albanian refugees found the
majority of the municipality’s thirty villages burned to the ground, the population
concentrated in the city would rise to 60,000, which certainly added to the tension.31
The number of inhabitants and the quantity of refugees made the town comparable
to Baidoa during the Australian operations in 1993 and to Sisophon during the
UNTAC operations. However, the provinces the Australians and Dutch Marines had
to control were much larger. The city of Orahovac was largely unscathed, like the
province’s larger cities except the western city Peç, which was systematically demol-
ished and burned. The total number of Serbs in the area had dropped to approxi-
mately 4,000 during the civil war. They were concentrated primarily in one quarter
in the higher part of the city and Velika Hoca. Outside the northern areas of the
province bordering the Serb Republic, where the vast majority of the Serbs were con-
centrated, this was still one of the larger concentrations of Serbs.
Upon their arrival in Orahovac, Dutch and German troops faced a tense situa-
tion. Serbian military and police forces left the zone under escort on 15 June, which
meant one less worry. It also meant, however, that KFOR was the only internal secu-
rity force present. Intense patrolling, both on foot and mounted, was crucial to con-
vince the locals that the force was in control. At times this meant seventeen-hour
working days, since it took nine days for the battalion to be complete. Task Force
Orahovac relied heavily on the German company under its control. Getting in touch
with the locals was important in showing that KFOR was there to protect both Alba-
nians and Serbs. One of KFOR’s most important missions at this point was protect-
ing the Serbs and keeping them from fleeing the province – a 180-degree reversal
from the original mission. Compared to other parts of Kosovo it was relatively quiet
around Orahovac those very first days. Murder, assault, looting and arson were flar-
ing up all around the country as tens of thousands of refugees crossed the border
into Kosovo every day. With the majority of the population of Orahovac still absent,
it was obviously the lull before the storm. 
Taming the Kosovo Liberation Army
KFOR was an immediate success as far as performing its first, purely military task
was concerned. The Serbs were supposed to withdraw their 40,000 security forces
and six hundred pieces of heavy equipment and numerous other vehicles within
eleven days. They impressed NATO commanders by achieving this in good order
and with about eight hours to spare. KFOR had prepared a contingency plan for the
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conventional defense of Kosovo, but renewed hostilities between the formerly war-
ring parties were unlikely to occur in Kosovo.32 Deploying with sufficient force and
with the appropriate means and military mandate deterred renewed hostilities, as it
had been more than three years earlier in Bosnia. Nevertheless, Jackson admitted
that this was not just due to his or his force’s excellent planning and execution.
While evaluating the operation some months later, he emphasized, ‘This operation
took place in an uncertain but largely benign situation. Our potential adversaries
were largely compliant and took no particular action to frustrate our plans.’ After
IFOR and KFOR, he was afraid that NATO would produce a generation of command-
ers, staff and, crucially, also political leaders who expected everything to go right.
This would leave them mentally unprepared for the sort of reverses that ‘can so eas-
ily befall those involved in military operations.’33
Although Serb security forces were for the most part compliant, the other former
warring party would cause more difficulties. Taming the UÇK – NATO’s erstwhile
informal ally – became Jackson’s primary challenge. While plans for the Serb with-
drawal had been carefully drawn out, plans for this second part of the military secu-
rity task had only just reached the drawing board. For the UÇK, the peace agree-
ment contained two rather distasteful elements. It called on them to disarm and to
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accept autonomy rather than their stated goal – independence for Kosovo. It would
prove hard for the freedom fighters to give up their position of power – and the
guns by which they tried to secure this position. From the perspective of many Koso-
vo Albanian fighters, their war was won and the victors should enjoy the spoils of
victory as an army, police force or administration. However, with a multi-ethnic and
democratic Kosovo as the proclaimed goal for armed intervention and the underpin-
ning of Resolution 1244, there was little place for a vengeful guerrilla organization
at the helm.
As German troops followed where Serb forces withdrew, several hundred UÇK
fighters descended from the mountains into the urban Prizren. There, they fanned
out into the streets, reminding NATO troops that they were bent on asserting a role
in a new Kosovo. German troops in armored vehicles occasionally passed through a
checkpoint that had been set up by the UÇK. They obviously had no intention of
stopping and instead high-fives and salutes were exchanged good naturedly. For the
time being, the newly installed UÇK headquarters in various cities around Kosovo
were left alone.34 It was not deemed opportune to remove the national heroes from
the improvised local headquarters in schools and police stations – at least not yet. 
Several days into the operation, with their two principal battalions on the ground,
the Germans felt strong enough to start showing who was in charge in Prizren. How-
ever, clear instructions from Jackson on how to deal with the UÇK were still lack-
ing as the general was still in the process of reaching a formal agreement with its
political leader, Hashim Thaci. Von Korff was complaining that the oral instructions
he had received were unclear and were not confirmed in writing. The general mes-
sage up to then was not to confront the Albanian fighters too harshly.35 Von Korff
issued his own orders not to cooperate with the UÇK in the streets. Checkpoints set
up by the Albanian fighters were to be disbanded and the arms of those manning
them would be confiscated. Buildings occupied by the guerrillas, such as police sta-
tions and a border station, were to be taken over and foot patrols on the streets of
Prizren were ordered for day and night.36 It was vital to show the Albanians as well
as the Serbs and other minorities that NATO took a much broader approach towards
the establishment of a secure environment than the IFOR had done in Bosnia. The
reports of harassment and murder of Serbian civilians started to pour in from dif-
ferent corners of the province, but a shortage of military manpower would remain
a serious problem in the next month. In Prizren, this led the Germans to use air
defense personnel to man checkpoints. Even cooks and mechanics were used for
infantry support.37
As in Prizren, UÇK fighters left the hills and entered Orahovac soon after the
Serbs withdrew. They staged a festive entrance into town on 15 June, with celebra-
tory firing into the air and the planting of the Kosovo Albanian flag, the black eagle
on a red surface, on the local police station. A number of armed fighters took up
positions on various street corners and tension soon rose as part of the Albanian
force concentrated around the Serb quarter of town.38 In the absence of an official
agreement between KFOR and the UÇK, the situation had to be defused by means
of ad hoc arrangements that were left to the commander in the field to decide. Ini-
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tially, the insurgents were told to point their weapons to the ground at all times.
Thereafter, ahead of an official commitment to disarmament, the Dutch command-
er ordered the local UÇK commander, Skender Hoxhaj, to withdraw the bulk of his
fighters behind the road between Malisevo and Suva Reka, clear of the city of Ora-
hovac and the neighboring towns with their Serb minorities. Anyone openly carry-
ing arms north of that line would be disarmed and arrested.39 British paratroopers
on the streets of Pristina and US Marines in Gnjilane took similar interim meas-
ures and confiscated weapons prior to an official agreement on disarmament. A broad
interpretation of the rules of engagement allowed such measures, but not all con-
tingents did so equally.40 The French and the Italian, still short of troops and fear-
ful of lacking backup in case of emergency, took a more standoffish posture in those
crucial first weeks.41 While the general ban on openly carrying arms in the Dutch
area of operations was more or less enforceable in town, this proved impossible in
the countryside at this point in time. Task Force Orahovac was not yet fully deployed
and still heavily outnumbered by some nine hundred local UÇK fighters in the area.
On top of that, it was officially not only in charge of Orahovac, but also temporari-
ly in charge of the neighboring municipality of Malisevo pending the arrival of Russ-
ian KFOR troops there. 
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A German KFOR soldier watches in the background as Kosovar Albanian insurgents celebrate the
withdrawal of Serb security forces from the Prizren region.
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Obviously, the ad hoc measures towards disarmament taken by local KFOR com-
manders had to be formalized quickly. Talks towards this end between NATO and
the Kosovar Albanians had already begun in Albania, prior to the entry into Koso-
vo, but Jackson had no policy and no direction as to how to treat the UÇK at that
point.42 It could be argued that demilitarization of UÇK should have been agreed
upon before NATO took over. However, as long as the air campaign was ineffectu-
al, propping up the local fighters for a possible ground offensive instead of disarm-
ing them had been at the top of NATO’s agenda. Alienating the UÇK at that point
was clearly not an option. Moreover, having witnessed the quick and disciplined Ser-
bian withdrawal, the UÇK leadership was likely to have been far more complaisant
than in a possible disarmament deal before KFOR’s successful deployment. 
On the night of June 21, an agreement was reached between Jackson and UÇK
leader Hashim Thaci. This day, which became known as ‘K-Day,’ marked the begin-
ning of the demilitarization. It had taken a combination of pressure and persuasion
to the get the UÇK to surrender its arms and disband. It was made clear to Thaci
that this was not to be considered an agreement between two equal entities, but a
vow to NATO, listing a series of measures linked to a timetable that the UÇK com-
mitted to or ‘undertook’ to carry out. The document, entitled ‘The Undertaking,’ fore-
saw this as both the demilitarization of the UÇK and its transformation into a civil-
ian organization. Disarmament was to be a process lasting ninety days, ending on
19 September. Within a week after K-Day, units were to report and register in assem-
bly areas and thereafter only a limited group of officers and guards were allowed to
carry arms and wear uniforms openly outside the secure weapon storage sites guard-
ed by KFOR. 
It would take until August 30 before the second vow of the Undertaking – the
transformation of the UÇK – was agreed upon in detail by Jackson and the UÇK
leaders. Although NATO had estimated the insurgents’ effective war strength at
10,000, the force now numbered 17,000 registered fighters. In the agreement the
UÇK pledged to reorganize into the 3,600-strong Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC or
TMK). The TMK would be under the direction of KFOR and nominally agreed to a
mission limited to dealing with civil emergencies. It was to have no military or polic-
ing role. The civil defense force was supposed to be become multi-ethnic in compo-
sition, with ten percent of the posts reserved for minorities. However, no Serb would
ever serve in it. There was substantial criticism from international observers and
Serbs that the TMK resembled a military or paramilitary organization with a mili-
tary command structure, as well as green-grey uniforms and insignia that bore close
resemblance to that of the UÇK. As for the former guerrillas as well as the majori-
ty of the Albanian population, there was little doubt about the expectations, or hopes.
The TMK was to become the core of a future national militia or army of an inde-
pendent Kosovo. The cigarette lighters, bumper stickers and red and black ‘TMK-
UÇK’ shawls sold in the streets of Pristina in the following years were a silent wit-
ness to such vestigial hopes.43
As KFOR was soon to find out, the formally demilitarized UÇK was still a force
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to reckon with. The political wing led by Hashim Thaci was in an ambiguous posi-
tion after demilitarization. Its military commanders were still regarded as national
leaders by a substantial part of the population. Despite their commitment to a grad-
ual handing in of weapons, guns would still be readily available to those who sought
to use them in this part of the world. 
By late June, all efforts were concentrated on getting the guns off the streets. The
temporary measures implemented by the Dutch in Orahovac were not revoked pend-
ing K+7. Ismet Tara, the local UÇK commander with whom Van Loon and his men
had to deal from late June, was relatively cooperative. Tara had been commander of
the 124th UÇK brigade since November 1998, when both his commanding officer
and deputy commander were killed in a firefight with Serb armed forces. He was
born and raised in Orahovac, which made him more considerate of the interest of
the local population. Skender Hoxhaj, whose 125th brigade had been operating in
roughly the same area as Tara’s, was from elsewhere in Kosovo and had spent many
years abroad in Switzerland. It was Hoxhaj who had been the first to enter the city
after NATO forced the Serbs to withdraw. He claimed to be speaking for the popu-
lation of Orahovac, but had in fact no popular support and was acting purely in his
own interest and that of Thaci’s UÇK. No one seemed to regret the redeployment
of his unit to neighboring Suva Reka, where Dutch forces would run into him later
in the operation. Although Tara had lost both his parents in the war, he had a less
vengeful attitude than many other commanders.44 Overall, it would prove hard to
generalize about the cooperativeness of the UÇK. A large part of the force was made
up of local farmers and laborers, who were glad to return to a more regular life.
However, throughout Kosovo, there was a body of UÇK hard-liners operating out-
side their own environment. Getting this mixture of toughened guerrillas, soldiers
of fortune and common criminals to give up their arms – and thus their positions
of power – proved much more difficult. Their aim was to hold on to their military
status and as many arms as possible.
The Task Force’s resolve was tested on 24 June, at the KFOR checkpoint just out-
side the newly established Dutch main base in the vineyards of Orahovac. Tahir
Sinani, the UÇK commander of the southern region that matched the German and
Dutch area of responsibility, caused quite a scene. Driving with his bodyguards on
the main road between Prizren and Malisevo, he should have been aware that assault
rifles were banned on all main routes according to the Undertaking that had been
signed only three days earlier. At the checkpoint he refused to give up the firearms
and hand grenades that he and his men were carrying. Having been faced with an
UÇK soldier pulling out the pin of a hand grenade several days earlier, the KFOR
soldiers closed the barbed wire around the car and made it clear that disarmament
was non-negotiable. As the Albanian commander started to rant and rave and still
refused to give up his arms, back up was called in. Eventually a Dutch major, backed
by a Leopard II tank that had pulled up and taken direct aim, convinced the men
to hand in their weapons.45
By early August, General Jackson feared the ‘honeymoon period’ that followed
KFOR’s entry into Kosovo was coming to an end.46 That month, as the ‘K+60’ dead-
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line for handing in sixty percent of all the UÇK’s small arms was imminent, there
was a serious concern at KFOR headquarters of at least some elements of the UÇK
refusing to disarm and ‘going into the hills’ and possibly start guerrilla-type activi-
ties. Operational analysts attached to Jackson’s staff witnessed how UÇK non-com-
pliance increased sharply as the deadline to disarm drew nearer.47 KFOR’s robust-
ness, Jackson explained to his brigade commanders, had been ‘a necessary and effec-
tive hallmark to success, allowing us to impose our will on a divided and irrational
population.’ However, the force commander warned his subordinate commanders
and explained his overall intent:
[o]ur robust stance is beginning to be seen as indicative of an occupation army,
particularly by the UÇK, and I believe that we would be foolish to ignore this. To
be successful KFOR must retain popular support, and this implies that we must
show a greater degree of co-operation and courtesy than has previously been desir-
able, or necessary. This is particularly true in case of the UÇK.’ 
Jackson continued to explain how the former guerrillas ‘rightly or wrongly’ perceived
themselves to be the victorious party. Although lawlessness, intimidation and crim-
inal activity would not be accepted by KFOR, they had to be treated – like all sides
of the community – ‘with the respect that they believe is deserved.’48
Jackson had reasons to spare the UÇK. The deal he and De Mello’s successor as
UN special representative, the Frenchman Bernard Kouchner, had the UÇK military
leaders agree to in August had moved a very long way from the Albanians’ original
proposals. While the UÇK would disappear as a military organization within ninety
days, the Undertaking explicitly stated that the international community gave ‘due
consideration’ to its aspirations to form a significant part of the future Kosovar police
and civil administration, and to form ‘in due course’ an organization along the lines
of the US National Guard.49 Few of the Albanians’ aspirations were met. For police
and administrative functions, special consideration was given to UÇK members, but
they still had to qualify on individual merit. As far as military aspirations were con-
cerned, the UÇK’s successor, the TMK, would become nothing near a US National
Guard. The TMK’s tasks were officially limited to disaster response, search and res-
cue missions, reconstruction duties, assistance to KFOR and UNMIK on request and
the performance of ceremonial duties. The Corps was prohibited from playing a role
in law enforcement, riot control, counter-terrorism or any other task involved in the
maintenance of law and order. Most painful to the former Balkan warriors was the
strictly limited amount of small arms to be carried by some staff officers and guards,
which, according to the KFOR commander was the absolute minimum since an
organization without any weapons ‘would be viewed as sterile by the UÇK.’ Never-
theless, Jackson credited them for being ‘very clever in the way that they got into
the Undertaking the transformation of their irregular army into something which
would bridge from where they were to where they want to be, which is of course
the army of an independent Kosovo.’50
Although Task Force Orahovac was lucky to be facing a relatively cooperative UÇK
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commander, there were obvious signs of non-compliance that called for a substan-
tial show of force. To maintain credibility in the eyes of his commanders and part
of the population, UÇK brigade commander Ismet Tara had to assert himself as a
credible leader. As KFOR’s grip over the city was increasing and the Dutch kept a
close watch on his headquarters in the city, he moved part of his activities to a build-
ing known as ‘the white house’ outside of town. The UÇK commander was inclined
to hold on to a military posture by erecting roadblocks on all the roads leading up
to this somewhat remote and barren makeshift command post in the woods. Although
it concerned merely dirt roads leading up to a distant location in the woods, the
Dutch commander decided not to tolerate ‘such rubbish’ from the UÇK, which
amounted to an impediment to freedom of movement. A couple of Leopard tanks
moved in on the white house while an armored engineer bulldozer shoveled aside
the roadblocks. Tara could continue to use the building, but he had to abandon the
pretence of running a military base. 
A similar show of force was needed in Suva Reka in November towards the end
of the tour of the first Dutch battalion. As the Task Force took control of the neigh-
boring town they ran into an old acquaintance, commander Skender Hoxhaj. Although
‘commander Skender’ expressed his admiration for the ‘successes’ of the Dutch con-
tingent in Orahovac, he had clearly seized the opportunity presented by KFOR’s much
looser grip on Suva Reka to assert himself as the local warlord.51 In his new position
as commander of the local TMK branch, he had turned his headquarters, the build-
ing of the former Environmental and Chemical School, into a fortress fenced off by
barbed wire and with armed guards on the pavement in front of it. After several warn-
ings to remove the guards and barricades, the Dutch commander had his troops move
in on the building backed by an M-109 tracked howitzer, which according to Van Loon
was almost like doing him a favor. Showing up with a bigger gun made it far less
embarrassing for a soldier in the Balkans, raised in a culture of arms, to hand in his
weapon.52 In 1999, the M-109 carried the largest gun in Kosovo.
The UÇK was gradually disarming, but substantial arms caches were still found
under dubious circumstances. In August, Dutch troops in Orahovac stopped a mini-
van that appeared on the verge of collapsing under its payload of 120 AK-47s. On
14 September, only several days before that same deadline, Tara was confronted with
KFOR intelligence – an UÇK document on which he had signed for the transfer of
some heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and explosives from the region-
al commander to his unit. Embarrassed by the evidence presented, Tara handed in
the weapons without protest.53 The closer the former guerrilla army came to the
ninety-day deadline for its formal disbanding as a military organization, the harder
it became to control them. Colonel Van den Aker, a Dutch deputy brigade command-
er at Von Korff’s headquarters, felt that it was mostly the lack of any prospect of a
credible position of power and influence after September – either as an army, police-
force or as a civil administration – that was causing frustration, non-compliance and
was a potential source of conflict. As an additional source of frustration within the
UÇK, he pointed at the increasing stigmatization by international officials as well as
the international media as a criminal organization, while the UÇK obviously still
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liked to be regarded as a liberation army.54 Just prior to K+90, the UÇK staged sev-
eral parades and demonstrations in Pristina and elsewhere as a last show of force.55
The always-judicious International Crisis Group, with its vast experience in monitor-
ing the performance of military peacekeepers and their civilian counterparts around
the world, called the demilitarization of the UÇK ‘a major accomplishment,’ which
it was.56 Despite the critique of KFOR’s dealings with what many considered a bunch
of thugs, the institutionalization of the force prevented the guerrillas from going
underground. Although nobody believed that the UÇK, now TMK, had completely
disarmed, over 11,000 weapons and five million rounds of ammunition were turned
in by November. Jackson admitted quite frankly that he had no idea how many
weapons were undeclared, adding, ‘The UÇK probably doesn’t either. There are lots.’57
The number of weapons in circulation in the Balkans would remain massive, and
seizing them was therefore not even the most essential part of demilitarizing the
former guerrillas. They would always have quick and easy access to new arsenals.
Controlling the former guerrilla organization by giving it a formal status and ban-
ning weapons from the streets would prove more important in controlling the UÇK
as a military organization. 
Although the UÇK would gradually and grudgingly accept the inevitability of its
military demise, rather than disappearing, it redirected its efforts towards other activ-
ities. As in Bosnia, NATO had raised the barriers sufficiently high with its credible
military intervention force, causing the former belligerents not to pursue their goals
by military means. The core of the UÇK, like ultranationalist ‘spoilers’ in Bosnia,
would redirect its efforts into the policing and administrative sphere, while these
activities tended to become entwined with organized crime that was already partly
financing the insurgency in the Balkans. In order to stop the UÇK from attaining
its strategic goal – an independent Kosovo ruled exclusively by Albanians – KFOR
had to prevent the former insurgents from policing and asserting administrative
authority over Kosovo. To accomplish this it had to move into the civilian sphere,
supporting and even replacing the UNMIK administration and its police while it was
being created and slowly deployed over the following year. First it had to do so by
becoming a police force.
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The Kosovar Constabulary:
The Race between Order and Disorder
After Serb security forces left Kosovo in relative good order following NATO’s entry,
renewed hostilities between the warring parties were unlikely. KFOR appeared to be
an immediate success as far as performing its primary military task was concerned.
By intervening with force on humanitarian grounds, NATO had secured the well
being of the Albanian majority of Kosovo. However, it was now up to KFOR to show
the world that, on its watch, it would not allow reverse ethnic cleansing. Controlling
the UÇK became the key to creating a secure environment for all Kosovars, Alban-
ian and Serb. Not only was the UÇK to be disarmed, it had to be kept from becom-
ing an internal security force in a civilian guise beyond NATO or UN control. The
only way of doing so was for KFOR to assume the policing task that soldiers were
officially not qualified to perform. 
In the previous two years, NATO operations in Bosnia had finally triggered debate
about the fundamental problem of the ‘public security gap’ between UN Civilian
Police and military peacekeepers, and the dilemmas involved in cooperating with
local police forces. The term ‘public security gap’ was first coined in a conference
co-organized by Robert Oakley at the US National Defense University in 1998.1 The
former US Envoy to Somalia was one of those recognizing the gap to be a chronic
problem in peace operations, while political and military leaders generally preferred
to regard it as an aberration in their desire to segregate the two trades. Even those
analysts who seriously addressed the public security gap hardly contemplated sol-
diers operating in a complete law and order vacuum similar to that facing UNITAF
soldiers in Somalia six years earlier. During the conference held at the National
Defense University, Michael Kelly, who had started publishing on the Australian expe-
rience in Somalia, was alone in arguing with foresight that the laws of occupation,
or at least a temporary military takeover of certain law and order functions, was like-
ly to be inevitable during peace operations.2 However, this was an unwelcome idea.
The lack of prior consideration and military planning for public security left KFOR
woefully unprepared for a task it was eager to avoid and hoping to transfer to the
UN Civilian Police force at the earliest possible date. 
‘Anarchy, or Something Not Far from It’ 
Around the time Serb security forces left Orahovac on 15 June, the Dutch reported
on a quiet but tense situation in and around the town.3 Tension rapidly rose, how-
ever, after the UÇK entered Orahovac and posted armed fighters around the town.
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Meanwhile, Albanian refugees started to return from Albania and Macedonia in mas-
sive numbers, spilling back into Kosovo at a rate of close to 50,000 a day, mostly
on their own initiative. A spokesperson for the UNHCR called the influx of refugees
one of the largest spontaneous returns in the organization’s existence.4 Some 300,000
people had returned by June 25, still leaving more than half a million outside Koso-
vo. When these returning refugees were confronted with evidence of war crimes and
the destruction of their property, a wave of vengeance and score settling erupted
throughout the province. In other cases, common criminals seized the opportunity
provided by the law and order vacuum. In both Orahovac and Prizren, Serb and
other minorities looked towards NATO to live up to its promise to protect all Koso-
vars. In all, approximately 20,000 Kosovar Serbs – some 350 from Orahovac – had
already left with the retreating Yugoslav security forces. The majority awaited what
Kosovo under KFOR and the UN interim rule would bring them, but with their most
essential possessions packed, they were ready to leave the province. 
Dutch and German troops were posted around the Serb areas, but just as the
Dutch battalion reached full strength, houses started to go up in flames all over Ora-
hovac and Zociste, a small neighboring village with a mixed Albanian and Serb pop-
ulation. The houses burning in the city were those the Serbs had left behind in the
predominantly Albanian lower part of town after leaving for Serbia or after taking
refuge in the upper Serbian-dominated part. In the now-deserted Serb village of
Zociste, not only houses, but also an age-old Christian Orthodox monastery burned
to the ground. 
Catching arsonists proved almost impossible for KFOR troops, particularly at
night, when they were most active. The mostly young local males were swift and
clearly at home in the streets and alleyways that felt so alien to the Dutch and Ger-
man soldiers who, still in kevlar vests and helmets at this point, were pursuing them.
In the rare cases when they were spotted they would just as easily disappear, most
likely in houses of family and friends where KFOR would not usually follow them.
The Dutch had not been issued night –vision goggles by the Dutch Army, since these
were not among the basic equipment of an artillery unit. However, even the night
vision equipment used by American soldiers under similar circumstances in their
area of operations around the eastern city Gnjilane did not help the GIs much in
preventing large scale arson. Their Apache attack helicopters proved of little value
when hovering over the urban areas. Using what they had, the Dutch gunners shot
illumination rounds from their howitzers ‘in order to show that, if necessary, those
pieces of metal could actually fire.’ In addition, one of the German tanks fired warn-
ing shots for the sheer purpose of intimidation.5 But for the moment, neither high-
tech infantry equipment nor muscle flexing proved a match for a group of frustrat-
ed Albanians determined to intimidate and expel a minority population from among
their midst. 
The failure to protect Kosovo’s minorities and their property has often been
ascribed to KFOR’s reluctance to step into the void. KFOR’s poor preparations and
some national contingents’ hesitance in reacting to public disorder can be partly
blamed, but a closer look at the difficulties faced by those contingents that reacted
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to the best of their abilities showed the limits of what soldiers could do in those
early weeks. It was frustrating for KFOR to have such a powerful military force at
its disposal while unable to do much about the anarchy that was unfolding. In Ora-
hovac, only four persons were arrested and detained for arson during those first
weeks. Several other local Albanians were caught in the act, but they mostly had to
be released because there was no place to lock them up. Additionally, the troops
often lacked concrete evidence to justify an arrest. The Dutch hastily called a local
fire brigade into being, but operating just one old fire truck it hardly proved effec-
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tive in those crucial first few weeks. When Serbian-owned houses burned, the Alban-
ian firemen were either drunk, coincidentally in the process of repairing their truck,
or supposedly incapable of finding the fire. When an Albanian’s house burned there
was to no such delay.6
In Prizren houses went up in flames at an even higher rate. By 7 July, arson had
become so common that the Germans reported: ‘Today was a very quiet day. Loot-
ings and burning of houses are still going on, especially in northern part of Prizren.’7
Two days later, just five minutes after one of the frequent electrical power failures,
several more houses belonging to Serbs and other minorities started to burn. The
Prizren fire brigade also proved quite ineffective and the German brigade’s own fire-
fighters constantly had to roll out to extinguish the fires.8 Looting went hand in hand
with arson, and more dramatically, reports of murder and kidnappings started to
pour in from all corners of Kosovo. Starting on 28 June, Von Korff imposed a 10
p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew in order to curb the burning and lawlessness. No such meas-
ures had been planned beforehand. The American brigade also introduced a curfew
starting at 8 p.m. in Gnjilane and Vitina, but KFOR did not introduce the curfew
Kosovo-wide. 9 To reduce the arson and murder rates in Prizren, the Germans also
came up with a rather original crime-fighting measure. On the city’s central square,
they raised an open-air cinema to provide some distraction for the local population
before the curfew. At least during these nights some houses and maybe some lives
were saved by what became know as ‘film-aid.’10
The Dutch battalion in Orahovac found no proof of an organized effort by the
UÇK to burn houses or evict Serb inhabitants. Human Rights Watch also reported
in 2001 that, while the vast majority of the violence was politically motivated, ‘name-
ly, the removal from Kosovo of non-ethnic Albanians in order to better justify an
independent state’ there was no evidence of a coordinated policy of terror and vio-
lence against minorities by the UÇK’s political or military leadership.11 There proved
to be little need for incitement of Albanian civilians by politicians and military lead-
ers. Nevertheless, as in the rest of Kosovo, there were clear indications that some
UÇK individuals and units were responsible for violence against minorities. On the
night of 30 June, a group of UÇK fighters led by a battalion commander was arrest-
ed in Orahovac for carrying arms while driving a car from the direction of one of
the burning houses. Tara was summoned to the KFOR base and given a lecture on
responsibility for the troops in his brigade by the Dutch commander. As a result of
lack of definite evidence, the men were released the next evening by the two Ger-
man Feldjäger, military police officers that had been attached to the Dutch-led task
force.12
Powerlessness to stop the violence either caused apathy or triggered frustrated
behavior among the KFOR troops on the ground. The Dutch gunners who arrested
the UÇK members at their checkpoint in the above-mentioned incident had been
told over their radio that the men coming towards them in the dark had been seen
carrying a jerry can. This was the sort of evidence that could make a case for offi-
cial arrest and transfer to the prison in Prizren. However, their search of the car
soon proved fruitless. In their anger they nevertheless persisted in their heavy-hand-
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ed quest, ripping the interior of the car beyond all recognition in the process.13 In
Gnjilane, US Army Major Glenn Tolle displayed similar behavior when a house was
set on fire under his very own eyes. He had not been able to spot the arsonist in
the large crowd. While the house burned the major ran into the courtyard where he
found an elderly Serb couple whom he tried to help in the battle against the fire.
They had already lost and soon the roof of the house collapsed with a roar. Tolle was
pushed over the brink by laughter and cheering from the Albanian crowd outside.
He dashed out in the street and pushed his M-16 assault rifle up to the first Alban-
ian man he caught smiling from ear to ear, shouting: ‘You think this is funny? What
if this was your house.’ He momentarily forgot that this was in fact the condition
in which many Albanians had recently found their houses.14
Policing without Instructions 
Different from three-and-a-half years earlier, when IFOR soldiers watched as Saraje-
vo’s suburbs burned, most of KFOR’s contingents at least made an effort to stop the
anarchy.15 Running after elusive arsonists may not have produced the desired results,
and KFOR’s firefighters were hardly able to save most of the burning houses, but
their effort was an important signal to the Serbs, the returning Albanians and the
world outside. Jackson’s troops were certainly not equipped or prepared to conduct
wide-scale policing with a force package and orders similar to the mission in Bosnia.
It lacked sufficient military personnel with specialized skills such as military police
forces, military lawyers and civil affairs units. Lieutenant General John Sanderson,
who had led his peacekeepers into Cambodia seven years earlier, watched fascinat-
ed when Australian television showed two young British soldiers patrolling the streets
of Pristina explaining how they were attempting to come to terms with their new
role in Kosovo. Sanderson had retired from the Army and was now governor of the
province of Western Australia. ‘We’re supposed to be responsible for law and order,’
one of the British soldiers said, ‘but we don’t know which law we are supposed to
be following, so we are applying British law.’ Seven years earlier, Sanderson had tried
to keep his thinly spread UN troops from being sucked into the public security gap
in Cambodia. However, after thirty years of continuous internal security operations
in Northern Ireland, the General considered professional soldiers of the British Army
to be familiar with the issues involved in applying force under emergency legisla-
tion. He was worried about soldiers from other nations lacking that sort of experi-
ence when confronted with the complex task of law enforcement.16
Van Loon recalled that when he entered Orahovac he had only one clear refer-
ence to civil law and order. The Security Council assigned to him ‘ensuring public
safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this
task.’ The explicit reference to public safety in conjunction with the more common
and broader but military-style mission ‘the establishment of a secure environment’
was unique. While soldiers had become more or less involved in public security tasks
by default in previous peace operations such as Somalia, Haiti and, to a lesser extent,
Cambodia and Bosnia, no earlier UN Resolution had directly assigned executive
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responsibility for law and order to a military force. Other than that, however, KFOR
troops awaiting deployment in Kosovo were largely left in the dark as to how the
problem of law enforcement was to be addressed. 
KFOR’s poor preparations for the law and order vacuum resulted from a num-
ber of factors. Given that any plan is only as good as the assumptions that underlie
it, KFOR’s planning effort had the wrong point of departure. Most of the early plan-
ning effort within NATO for a peacekeeping scenario was based on the Rambouil-
let Agreement that never was. This document was the only political guidance for
planners, but was based on the assumption that Serb civil authorities would stay in
place until relieved or reformed, while the army and the special police would be
gradually reduced and withdrawn. This would have created a situation more similar
to that faced in Bosnia in 1996. The Bosnia scenario already prevailed in the minds
of policymakers, military leaders, tactical commanders and troops as they prepared
for deployment in Kosovo. The post-war environment in Kosovo was therefore seri-
ously underestimated and, as a result, SHAPE had defined its plan for Operation
Joint Guardian in almost exclusively military terms in the months before NATO troops
crossed into Kosovo. Maybe the Bosnia scenario prevailed because the alternative –
316 soldiers and civil power
Kosovar Albanians pass a Dutch checkpoint near Orahovac in the early days of the operation. Dutch
and other KFOR troops received almost no training for public security tasks and initially had no
instructions for their policing role in Kosovo.
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military involvement in filling the law and order vacuum – was considered undesir-
able. If the assumption that the Serb civil police would stay after Serb military forces
had withdrawn was really underlying NATO planning, the post-war environment and
the civilian dimension of the mission were dramatically underestimated. Focused on
the primarily military mission with its many uncertainties, Jackson’s ARRC complet-
ed military planning and preparations in considerable isolation from the civilian
aspects the mission was likely to entail and from the civilian organizations with
whom soldiers would have to cooperate. 
Nevertheless, there are some indications that NATO considered a breakdown of
law and order. One of KFOR’s legal advisors remembered how NATO’s planning
orders prior to the bombing campaign in March ‘already mentioned law and order
as a possible responsibility for KFOR.’ His and his colleague legal advisors’ first reac-
tion was: ‘Sure, give us a thousand extra lawyers. But we had no idea what this would
imply. We had to fill a vacuum, but we had no idea how.’17 Especially toward the
second half of May 1999, the looming power vacuum started to be considered. It
became more unlikely that Serb authorities would be able to remain temporarily in
place after the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Albanians during the war with
NATO. By May, NATO spokesman Jamie Shae mentioned the ‘law and order vacu-
um’ KFOR was going to face and the need for a ‘heavy force to deter any further
breakdown in law and order.’18 Wesley Clark was clearly no novice in the field of
peace operations and he predicted before entry that with any form of government
lacking in Kosovo, the mission was going to be very challenging.19 Nevertheless, the
vacuum was primarily approached as a matter of troop deployment, not as a ques-
tion of authority. KFOR’s preoccupations with separating the retreating Serbs and
vengeful irregular UÇK fighters left little time for KFOR staff to contemplate what
would soon become the most critical part of the mission. 
The gap between the UN public security mandate on the one hand, and the mil-
itary plans and orders on the other, was partly the result of the myopic assumption
that the civilian ‘others’ would soon pick up these tasks. This assumption went hand
in hand with the prevailing notion in the NATO planning circles that taking on civil-
ian responsibilities would only lead to civilian dependency on the military compo-
nent, the so-called ‘dependency reflex.’ In an interview, General Jackson predicted
that the key to success in Kosovo would be the UN police force.20 During his first
conference with De Mello’s UN military liaison officer in Pristina, the General imme-
diately asked when the UN civilian police force would arrive.21 As a former division-
al commander in the first British IFOR contingent, an experienced soldier and peace-
keeper such as Mike Jackson was well aware that such police forces always deployed
at a snail’s pace. As a British paratrooper with experience in dealing with emergency
law and military support to the local police in Northern Ireland, Jackson was not the
man to shun support to civilian tasks or picking up public security himself on the
dogmatic grounds that prevailed in the US military.22 Nevertheless, it would be only
after entry that he had his legal staff prepared a directive on law and order tasks.
Although ‘preventing a power vacuum to emerge’ was frequently heard within KFOR
in May, emergency legislation or martial law were never considered, or even men-
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tioned prior to entry. It is important to bear in mind that openly mentioning law
and order tasks for NATO soldiers during the force generation process may have
almost certainly had a stifling effect on the offers of troops for KFOR during the
force generation process.23
The underestimation of, or the blind eye turned to, the law and order vacuum at
the strategic level, caused commanders such as Van Loon and Von Korff to believe
that the UN would take over ‘soon.’ The Dutch commander recalled how he and the
Brigadier ‘had the simplistic notion that after our physical presence had been estab-
lished everything would be tip-top. Then those guys from the UN would show up.’
A time-schedule was never articulated, but he and his fellow field commanders inter-
preted ‘soon’ as two or three weeks rather than months.24 In his memoirs of the
Kosovo war, Clark says he established as one of the ‘measures of merit’ for KFOR
troops prior to entry to prevent anarchy: ‘get all Serb forces out, stop any crimes of
revenge or Serb ethnic cleansing.’25 If this was the case, such concerns for the law
and order vacuum were hardly translated into military instructions. 
The operational plan for Kosovo failed to address public security in any detail,
and the Rules of Engagement for Operation Joint Guardian addressed the issue of
detention in very broad terms, similar to those provided to UNITAF troops in Soma-
lia. Although the formal power of ‘arrest,’ with its legal implications, was not men-
tioned as a formal course of action, detention was allowed in several cases. KFOR
could detain members of the warring parties as well as civilians for self-protection
and for the protection of those explicitly defined in its mission: UNMIK officials and
other international workers in NGOs, for instance. As in Somalia, and in Bosnia
after the Rules of Engagement were broadened in September 1996, the only direct
and practical directive referring to the protection of the local population concerned
the possibility that peacekeepers caught someone in the act of committing a ‘seri-
ous crime’, or if they could prevent murder, rape or serious assault. They could even
use ‘deadly force’ to prevent such serious crimes, as long as the provisions for ‘min-
imum use of force’ were taken into consideration. According to the Rules of Engage-
ment, peacekeepers had the right to detain murderers, rapists or assailants, whether
they were a member of one of the warring parties or a local civilian, but officially
they had to be caught in the act before KFOR soldiers could act. Property-related
crimes, such as theft and arson, were not included in the rules prior to entry.26
Detention as a military measure did not appear on KFOR’s pocket-sized Rules of
Engagement cards issued to the troops on the ground.27
Follow-up procedures for detainees were hardly considered. Those apprehended
for committing a serious crime in the presence of the force were to be transferred to
‘an appropriate civilian agency.’ This would have to be UNMIK, since there was no
other administration present. If no such interim authority was present – which was
not the case throughout most of the summer of 1999 – the nearest KFOR military
police unit would somehow have to deal with the problem of handling a detainee,
which would most likely result in treatment along the lines of prisoners of war.28
Despite a much broader mandate than that of the military forces entering the power
vacuum in Somalia, NATO troops had come almost as poorly prepared as far as guide-
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lines and procedures were concerned. The operational directive and Rules of Engage-
ment provided in mid-June to the Dutch troops by the Chief of the Defense Staff in
The Hague were even more meager and confusing on the issue of public security.29
Basic public security policy guidelines and instructions for KFOR gradually emerged
on the tactical level and found their way through the operational level to the strate-
gic decision-makers as the operation unfolded. Interestingly, the German brigade
beat the force commander to it by issuing a law-and-order directive several days ahead
of KFOR headquarters. Already, Von Korff had been irritated by the lack of instruc-
tions on how to deal with the UÇK. Ten days after encountering Prizren in anarchy,
the Germans, known within NATO for their preference for operating by the book,
came forward with concise instructions on basic police work. Aside from some well-
known clichés on Germans’ national characteristics, the most likely reason for the
German’s timely reaction was a visit of the German minister of defense, Rudolf
Sharping, and his Army chief of staff to the troops in the field. The Minister’s visit
to a recently uncovered mass grave in the village Velika Krusa near Orahovac was
most likely an attempt to accentuate the humanitarian motives of the military inter-
vention that had been controversial in Germany. However, for German and Dutch
troops in southern Kosovo, the most immediate result of their presence was a swift
approval and introduction of ‘Directive No. 8’ on law and order.30
What set the German public security directive apart from previous instructions
was that it first mentioned and put emphasis on the need to arrest and detain a per-
son suspected of criminal activity. Apart from moving beyond merely catching offend-
ers in the act, the directive allowed soldiers to act in more than just the cases of
‘serious crime’ mentioned in the KFOR Rules of Engagement. The directive allowed
soldiers to act on genocide, murder, manslaughter, rape and deportation, but also on
cases of arson, intimidation, looting, assault and armed robbery. Directive No. 8 also
set forward procedures for handling detainees. Although the German directive was
quickly followed by instructions from Jackson’s headquarters, it remained the pri-
mary reference for German and Dutch troops.
Even though there was little enthusiasm in The Hague for soldiers arresting civil-
ians, the German directive on public security, while relatively broad in scope, was
accepted without reservations by the Dutch Ministry of Defense. Two Dutch officers
at key positions had put their weight behind acceptance of the directive. The high-
est-ranking Dutch officer in Kosovo was Brigadier Herman Bokhoven. As the nation-
al contingent commander of all Dutch forces in Kosovo, which soon included a rein-
forced engineer battalion, he was outside the KFOR chain of command. He report-
ed instead to the Dutch chief of the defense staff and the minister of defense. His
role, like that of contingent commanders in IFOR and SFOR, was primarily that of
the Defense Ministry’s watchdog. He was to see that Dutch tactical commanders
acted in line with national instructions – and not just as part of the KFOR chain of
command. The contingent commander’s interference in daily affairs in Kosovo was
reduced by his stationing on KFOR’s primary support base in distant Macedonia.
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Nevertheless, he had substantial influence over the daily affairs of the battalion –
not always to the liking of the troops who usually felt their primary allegiance was
to the force commander.31 In this sense much had changed since the days when
Dutch marines operated in Cambodia. While the Marines in 1992-1993 could oper-
ate virtually unimpeded by the Ministry of Defense, the disastrous situation in which
Dutch troops found themselves in Srebrenica in 1995 had made the Ministry tight-
en its grip over its soldiers in the field. This development in the relationship between
governments and their military contingents in peace operations occurred in most
NATO member states during the 1990s. 
In recommending that the minister accept the German directive, Bokhoven fol-
lowed the advice of Colonel Peter van den Aker, the senior Dutch officer and deputy
brigade commander at Multinational Brigade South. Van den Aker knew the instruc-
tions on public security were important to the Germans and seemed to anticipate
resistance from The Hague to the broad German interpretation of the public securi-
ty clause of UN Resolution 1244.32 Bokhoven therefore cast his argument in a larger
context. Along with Van den Aker, he argued that the Dutch troops might lose their
area of responsibility – and with it their influence in the brigade and thus in KFOR
– if they would put national restraints on the use of their troops in enforcing law and
order in Orahovac. This was the sort of incentive to which policy makers reacted. 
About a week after entry, Jackson had his legal advisors work on an amendment
to his original operational order, which was finally issued on 25 June. His directive
was more detailed and broader in scope than its German equivalent, since it tried
to address the fundamental but thorny issue of what law KFOR was actually to apply.
Since Kosovo officially still remained part of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, its
laws formally applied in Kosovo. He therefore advised to follow this law as far as
practically possible. However, since there were obviously no lawyers within KFOR
with any knowledge of Yugoslav penal codes, Jackson advised the various contingents
to broadly follow the procedures of their own national legal codes. Clearly, this did
not solve the problem of what law actually applied. Nevertheless, the new orders
firmly established the right to perform basic police functions, such as stop and search,
and arrest and detention of suspected criminals. Details on detention, criminal inves-
tigations and the role of KFOR military police were also addressed more extensive-
ly.33 The emphasis remained on catching a perpetrator in the act, but arresting civil-
ians on the basis of mere suspicion was allowed. Dutch Major Bart Haverman, who
was involved in drafting the directive as a legal advisor at KFOR headquarters, recalled:
‘We intended not to become entangled in especially complicated police work, since
we were not equipped and prepared for that task. Arresting someone merely on the
basis of suspicion was allowed, but only if witness accounts or other evidence were
overwhelming and we could not get around arresting someone.’34
To complete the reverse chain of command, the political leadership of NATO, the
North Atlantic Council (NAC) deemed the time ripe to address the public security
vacuum. They did so several days after the force commander had issued his orders.
In Brussels, after a short discussion the national representatives reaffirmed that under
the three-week-old UN resolution KFOR troops had full authority to perform police
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tasks. During lunch on 29 June, the NATO ambassadors agreed that Secretary Gen-
eral Javier Solana had to give Wesley Clark instructions on this issue. The Supreme
Commander was to order general Jackson to issue orders to his brigade command-
ers to arrest ‘looters and arsonists.’ Emphasis was to be put on consistency in the
implementation of the public security task across all five brigade sectors.35 Luckily,
Jackson had already done so. However, harmonizing KFOR policy toward law enforce-
ment proved difficult.
The international press castigated NATO for its inability to stop the anarchy. When
asked in early July why KFOR troops could not do more to stop the violence, Wes-
ley Clark defended his forces on the ground by explaining: 
There are hundreds of thousands of people coming back. There have been some
terrible things done in that country. There are all kinds of emotions running ram-
pant. And there are Serbs still there, some of whom may have participated in that,
others who are just afraid they’re going to be taken for guilty because of their eth-
nicity. There are gypsies who are also being discriminated against. And so there’s
some legitimate efforts to get property back, there’s some revenge-taking, there’s
some score-settling. One doesn’t really know, but it’s a very difficult time. Our
troops are there. We’re doing everything we can, but of course we’re not police
[…] no matter how well-trained, organized, equipped and led our troops are, there’s
simply not a substitute for local police in terms of knowing the neighborhoods,
knowing the patterns of activity, knowing the people, knowing how to stop indi-
vidual events. And so they’re doing the best they can, going to where the intelli-
gence-tippers indicate there might be trouble. We’ve put curfews in place in some
cities. We’re stopping people that are armed, we’re enforcing the demilitarization
of the KLA, for example, and this afternoon we picked up some Serb soldiers who
had wandered into the area without an invitation to do so. And so we’re out there.
There’s probably an awful lot that we’re preventing from happening that you’ll
never know about, but it’s a big place, despite the fact that it’s only the size of
Connecticut. And you’re dealing with a million and a half people.36
Clark again pointed to the extremely rapid pace of political events in late May and
early June, which he admitted had somewhat surprised NATO at the time. Howev-
er, the supreme commander was asked no further questions as to why KFOR was
so ill prepared for its role as vacuum filler. If he had answered truthfully, the gen-
eral would have had to admit that NATO had underestimated the situation and was
simply caught off guard. 
Controlling the Streets of Orahovac 
In the past, the mixed population in Orahovac had probably lived a more integrat-
ed life than in any other part of Kosovo, but it was now entirely segregated. By the
end of June, the violence had forced the entire Serb minority of Orahovac and refugees
from the nearby village Zociste, about 2,500 in total, to concentrate in the Serb quar-
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ter in the upper part of town. An additional one thousand Serbs in the village of
Velika Hoca would stay put. Both communities were now guarded around the clock
by KFOR, even though the Serb communities were themselves still heavily armed.
The German reports from Prizren on the ‘quiet days’ in late June with looting and
burning houses all over town seemed awkward, but can be explained by similar
Dutch experiences in Orahovac. While the nights in and around the Serb and Roma
areas were extremely tense, with KFOR soldiers chasing after arsonists in the nar-
row streets, for most Albanians a semblance of normal life and safety was return-
ing that they had not experienced in previous years. Shops were restocking, cafés
were opening and there seemed to be a positive determination to regenerate the
country and, as KFOR headquarters reported, ‘enjoy the freedom presented by NATO.’ 
While a substantial part of the local UÇK brigade was looking forward to return-
ing to civilian life, the group of predominantly young fighters from other parts of
Kosovo had little to return to. Clinging to their position of power and prestige was
obviously more appealing to them than an almost certain return to unemployment.
It was particularly this group of ‘hot-heads’ within the local UÇK that started to
appear all over Kosovo as Policia Ushtarake (PU). During the war, this UÇK military
police force had been created for internal UÇK policing, but in the course of July,
the PU transformed itself into a self-styled police force under the direction of the
UÇK Ministry of the Interior in Pristina. Its personnel were dressed in black uni-
forms with ‘PU’ on their armbands and displayed a passion for chromium-plated
pistols. The swelling of its ranks was hard to monitor for KFOR. While in mid-June
all UÇK fighters had been dressed in the hodgepodge of uniforms generally associ-
ated with an irregular force, it now emerged in more regular fatigues with the mil-
itary police recognizable in black. The Dutch were under the impression that the
number of those posing as UÇK was actually swelling as the refugees returned. Its
new members were often teenagers, ‘snot-nosed little bastards’ as Van Loon called
them, who had never seen combat, but were determined to put on a uniform and
hoping to carry a Kalashnikov.37
Ismet Tara argued that he and his men were forced to fill the void as long as the
promised UN police force was unable to assume responsibility for policing on the
streets of Kosovo. The argument that the UÇK was the only credible police force was
heard throughout Kosovo. Tara was frustrated that KFOR tried to prevent his men
from patrolling the streets and conducting criminal investigations. While he gener-
ally respected NATO’s ‘liberation forces,’ and Van Loon and his men in particular,
he considered his military police to have far more local knowledge than the Dutch
and German soldiers. To no avail, he even offered to cooperate with the Task Force
in public security and complained to the Dutch commander that in other Kosovar
municipalities KFOR was far more lenient towards UÇK involvement in policing.38
However, it was fear of exactly this UÇK attitude and the need to curtail its initia-
tives that drove Dutch and German KFOR troops in Orahovac to extend their polic-
ing effort. Having the responsibility for the beleaguered Serb and Roma minorities
made it impossible to take on the more passive attitude adopted by some KFOR con-
tingents.39 As long as there was no functioning UN police in Orahovac, Van Loon
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tried to assert KFOR’s monopoly on the use of force in Orahovac – traditionally con-
sidered the prerogative of the state. 
The Task Force’s main effort was concentrated on preventing and combating seri-
ous crime such as murder, rape, assault, arson and looting. However, the Dutch also
had to act on lesser offensives. For instance, Tara was eager to solve reported cases
of theft, especially when it concerned cars and tractors stolen from Albanians by
Serbs. Obviously, this had the potential of escalating into inter-ethnic conflict, so the
UÇK was blocked from assuming this function, to Tara’s dismay. Consequently, the
Dutch ended up returning stolen cars to their former owners.40 Another, less seri-
ous, problem was illegal logging when the winter approached. In an area that was
economically dependent on its vineyards, logging had always been strictly regulated
to prevent erosion of the steep slopes. The UÇK was quick to spot this opportunity
to execute authority by planning for the supervision of logging and the imposition
of sanctions. To thwart their efforts at asserting their authority, KFOR was therefore
forced to temporarily supervise woodcutting.41 Little energy could be devoted to such
menial police work, but it was clear that the boundaries of KFOR policing in Ora-
hovac were primarily determined by the need to curtail these UÇK policing initia-
tives.
During July and August, the Task Force’s resolve in preventing the UÇK from
dominating the streets was severely tested. On 15 July, four uniformed UÇK with PU
armbands were seen patrolling the streets of the Serb quarter. They were told to
remove their armbands, but the Dutch patrol commander refrained from apprehend-
ing them. Instead, they were merely threatened with arrest for non-compliance if
caught policing again. Tara was summoned to the base and told that this was seen
as a direct provocation. He was told that any more such actions would be treated as
non-compliance with the Undertaking, followed by his detention at the German
brigade’s prison facility in Prizren.42 Van Loon considered punishment by detention
counter-productive at this point. It would undoubtedly lead to a serious disruption
of relations with the local UÇK and, while the Task Force’s relations with the Alban-
ian majority were excellent at this point, it would have seriously stressed communi-
ty relations. Tara was from Orahovac and a more reasonable commander than many
of his colleagues, so his replacement was likely to be of a worse kind. This turned
out to be a valid judgment, for the UÇK was not caught policing in the Serb quar-
ter again.43 Nonetheless, this did not mean that the PU activity in the Albanian areas
of Orahovac ceased. Initially, UÇK patrols in their own communities in the city and
surrounding villages were warned and registered rather than directly arrested. For
the most part they were unarmed when in sight of KFOR patrols.44 Altogether, the
Task Force made eighteen arrests on charges of unauthorized policing during those
crucial early months. Before the UNMIK police force officially took the over the lead
in policing in November, twenty persons were formally arrested and detained for ille-
gally carrying weapons.45
Relations between the Task Force and the UÇK deteriorated in the course of the
summer as the former insurgents continued to try to see how far they could go.
Meanwhile Van Loon was organizing his troops for more vigorous policing.46 In
the kosovar constabulary 323
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:06  Pagina 323
order to settle scores from the war, the local UÇK started its own investigations into
war crimes and looked for easy prey. The Roma population was accused of collabo-
rating with the Serbs during the war and several men were rounded up or sum-
moned to the UÇK headquarters for questioning – allegedly about their participa-
tion in atrocities during the war or their knowledge thereof. Roma were an easy tar-
get for intimidation and retaliation since their numbers were small. Moreover, they
had no access to firearms, which the Serbs still owned in large quantities. On sev-
eral occasions, the Dutch reacted to reports and found men held for questioning, or
what the UÇK called ‘informative talks.’ At one point, a Dutch major walked straight
into the UÇK headquarters after being tipped off by a family member. He found sev-
eral Roma men, one of whom had clearly been beaten, and immediately sent them
home under KFOR escort. Subsequently, the Albanian officer present was informed
that these actions would be interpreted as non-compliance. Again, Tara was sum-
moned to the base and given a lecture, but no formal action was taken.47
Despite the fact that the Dutch had posted guards around the Serb quarter around
the clock, there were constant reports of Serbs disappearing, allegedly after being
abducted by Albanians from what publicly became known as ‘the Serb ghetto.’ Accord-
ing to an OSCE report on human rights in Kosovo, an estimated fifteen kidnappings
occurred in Orahovac in mid-June and possibly thereafter. From early July, however,
these reported kidnappings proved impossible to verify, despite the fact that the Task
Force acted dozens of times on such allegations by searching Albanian-owned prem-
ises. 
The Dutch started to look for motives behind the recent conduct of the UÇK.
During talks with Albanian officers, it became clear they felt they had the right to
police the Kosovar population for whose liberty they had fought. Their decreasing
physical presence on the streets and disarmament as a result of the demilitarization
agreement with KFOR prompted them to assert their authority by other means in
the civilian sphere. Investigating atrocities committed during the war was important
for the local UÇK commanders’ prestige among the local Albanians.48 Although he
was more cooperative than many of his colleagues, Tara was not without his own
needs and goals. In the coming months, the UÇK would try to assert authority in
various ways, as his position in a future Kosovo was becoming increasingly uncer-
tain. Again, the only effective way for Task Force Orahovac to counter these initia-
tives was for the intervention force to assume them, but this would prove problem-
atic as it stretched the mandate beyond its vaguely defined parameters. Moreover, an
artillery battalion organized and trained primarily to put 155-millimeter shells on tar-
get was hardly organized for policing. 
Makeshift Police
Putting soldiers on the streets was obviously not enough to fill the public security
gap. Nonetheless, numbers alone were a serious problem for KFOR with only half
the force, 23,000 troops in all, deployed in early July. Only by mid-August did the
force reach 40,000 soldiers. What the makeshift police force lacked even more than
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sheer numbers was the adequate organization and specialist support to fill the law
and order vacuum, since there was nothing in Kosovo with which to work. The vac-
uum encountered by NATO forces in Kosovo in 1999 was very different from the
situation faced by Allied troops in Western Europe in 1944-1945. Even in most of
Germany, a more or less functioning police, court system and local administrations
were found in the wake of the military advance. With the passing of the front, the
existing institutions were often temporarily disrupted, but the institutional infrastruc-
ture was mostly still there. In post-war Japan, the government and its institutions
were found completely intact and largely left to function by the Americans. In Koso-
vo, there was nothing. As Serb authorities, police, administration and judges with-
drew, they took anything they could carry with them and destroyed much of the rest.
‘Court buildings looked like a plague of heavily armed locusts had swept through’
one commentator wrote, ‘scouring the ground for anything valuable and leaving bro-
ken windows and ripped out electric sockets in their wake.’49 There was nothing
resembling the Allied civil affairs organization of an earlier time to replace the col-
lapsed institutions. 
What KFOR missed the most in those first days – apart from a plan and clear
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Dutch soldiers detain Kosovar Albanian teenagers caught looting during ethnic tensions in Kosovo.
The emphasis gradually shifted to a support role, but in many parts of Kosovo soldiers would con-
tinue to substitute for the UN police until late 2000.
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instructions – were public safety officers. These civil affairs officers, often former
police in military uniform, had played a crucial role within the British and Ameri-
can civil affairs detachments in occupied Germany, either as overseers of the selec-
tively cleansed German police, or as vacuum fillers in cooperation with the military
police and tactical troops in direct post-combat situations. Although the challenges
faced in post-war Germany were colossal, the German population was homogenous
and almost quiescent after five years of war. The Kosovars were fired up by a short
civil war; they were ethnically and culturally divided while NATO had propagated a
multiethnic society as its strategic goal in Kosovo. However, half of Kosovo’s Serbs
already appeared to have fled the province, some not even awaiting the return of the
Albanians, and some fleeing the violence after KFOR failed to protect them. 
Military police units were the best NATO had to offer to fill the void, even though
they were for the most part not trained to do community policing in their various
countries of origin. MPs were also in short supply, while insufficient planning caused
them not to be activated until rather late. Task Force Orahovac dramatically lacked
expertise on police matters. During the first six weeks in Orahovac no more than
two German military police officers were available to provide some form of profes-
sional police support.50 Although a maximum of forty-two Dutch military police per-
sonnel were deployed in Kosovo and Macedonia in the second half of 1999, the
Dutch Ministry of Defense had not envisaged the Koninklijke Marechausee in a pub-
lic security role. Twenty of the MPs were ‘blue’ Marechausee, trained for the tradi-
tional MP role of policing the national military force. These were not controlled by
the tactical commander, but under the Contingent Commander. The remaining twen-
ty-three MP’s ‘green’ Marechaussee were part of KFOR, but were to be employed pri-
marily for traffic tasks, such as convoy escort, and for static guard tasks around mil-
itary objects.51 The MP contingent was supposed to perform these two roles in sup-
port of all two thousand Dutch troops in theatre, and not just the approximately six
hundred Dutch troops in Task Force Orahovac. No more than twelve ‘blue’ MP’s,
trained in criminal investigations, were at any one time deployed in Orahovac. 
The Task Force had nevertheless already established what started to resemble a
police station in a centrally located building used by the OSCE mission in 1998.
This had clearly not been a predetermined plan. Several days after entry, two expe-
rienced non-commissioned officers were put in charge of what was initially known
as the ‘complaints bureau,’ but became widely known as ‘NATO building’ to the
locals.52 The idea was to divert the locals who frequently came up to KFOR patrols
to a central point, where the scarce interpreter capacity could be used efficiently. The
Dutch had arrived in Kosovo without translators and would have to work with local-
ly recruited personnel throughout the mission. At this improvised police desk, the
angry and frustrated returning population could sit down and file their complaints.
Hundreds of testimonies were taken in those first weeks. The issues discussed var-
ied from theft and arson from that very day, to rape, assault and mass murder com-
mitted during the war. All information was typed into laptop computers. Informa-
tion also started to pour in from patrol commanders, during other regular contacts
with the local population, and from the locally recruited interpreters. Initially, the
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Dutch had to rely predominantly on oral sources, but an increasing amount of doc-
umentation was found, confiscated or delivered to KFOR by locals.53
The ‘complaints bureau’ turned out to be one of the most fruitful initiatives of
the operation. Not only did it provide acknowledgment of the serious need for recog-
nition of the harm that had been done in the previous months, it also resulted in
an enormous information database, which proved to be one of the most vital sources,
if not the most vital source of intelligence during the remainder of the operation.
The database contained information on local leaders, their political affiliation, their
position in, for instance, the UÇK or the MUP, or their ties to those organizations.
It would prove useful for combating common crime, ethnic violence, and also proved
to be important in the pursuit of war criminals. The database was shared with the
UN police and the ICTY once they became operational in the area.54 However, while
important to a population that desperately needed to blow off steam, by providing
that outlet, the Dutch would also raise expectations for future action.
Local Dutch initiatives soon needed a more structured approach in line with the
brigade. In order to find out how the Germans were addressing the public security
gap in Prizren, the Dutch military police commander and the Dutch contingent’s
legal advisor, also attached to the national contingent commander, visited the Ger-
man military police in Prizren two weeks into the operation. They were particularly
interested in how the German Directive No. 8 was executed and how the German
military police was deployed.55 The key to public security in Prizren in the early days
was a Feldjäger company. Dressed in army fatigues but distinguishable by their bright-
red berets, the German MPs were extensively used for street patrolling and crimi-
nal investigations. German brigade headquarters was located in a factory complex
just outside the city center. Large groups of people initially flocked to its main gate
and formed long queues in order to file their complaints. This had prompted the
Germans to establish in the city center what was first called ‘KFOR-office,’ but soon
became a makeshift police station or ‘Feldjäger station.’ As in Orahovac, this became
a busy place in those chaotic first weeks and here too, reports on war crimes poured
in.56 The German and Dutch initiatives to form makeshift police stations, however
similar, were not part of a coordinated, planned effort or as a result of instructions
from KFOR headquarters. In both cities, the police stations grew out of necessity
and susceptibility to pragmatic solutions in post-war chaos.
Whereas the Dutch only used their police station to collect information, the Ger-
mans directed police operations from their Feldjäger station. It was from here that
the decision was made on the size and composition of the unit that was to perform
an arrest. A force could be dispatched depending on the seriousness of an offence,
the possible risks involved, and of course, the availability of troops. When arrested,
suspects were detained in the local prison, registered and medically examined if the
necessary staff was available. The MP major in command of the military police unit
was also in charge of the local detention facility. On top of that, he acted as a dele-
gated judge and decided – broadly in line with German law –  whether a suspect
was to be held in custody or not. In case of doubt, he would turn to the brigade’s
legal advisors.57 Van Loon also had access to the German legal advisors, whom he
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used at times but whom he found to be very cautious in providing legal guidance
and not always practical in their approach. His request to The Hague for his own
legal expert was turned down.58
In late June there were still only twelve Feldjäger available for the public securi-
ty task in Prizren. They played a central role in helping to establish some form of
public order and their number would steadily increase during in the course of sum-
mer. Tasks such as taking testimonies from the local population were extremely time
consuming. Not surprisingly, problems occurred as regular soldiers, lacking any form
of training in the maintenance of law and order, performed the vast majority of the
arrests. While reporting an apprehension, they tended to be inaccurate in describ-
ing the circumstances and often handled evidence clumsily, making it hard to draw
up a legal record. Another problem facing KFOR troops – a problem similar to every
peace operation in the previous ten years that involved a high degree of interaction
with local civilians – was the lack of translators, and, in some cases, their reliabili-
ty. The local translators used by the Dutch were young Kosovars who had learned
English or German in their unofficial Albanian schools in the previous years, or as
immigrant workers, but most of all from satellite TV. 
Overwhelmed by crime of all sorts, KFOR was accused by various sides of not
living up to its promise to create a secure environment for all ethnic groups. Most
harmful to NATO were the accusations coming from Belgrade. German troops cer-
tainly lacked no dedication when it came to making arrests. Their efforts caused the
MPs at the police station to be overwhelmed by relatively light offences such as theft.
This left little time for the more serious cases of murder, rape, arson and large-scale
plunder.59 Kosovars praised German KFOR for quickly establishing some semblance
of order in and around Prizren. The Germans even became renowned throughout
Kosovo for installing one-way traffic in the anarchic and congested old city streets
of downtown Prizren. But while they were doing pretty much all they could to stop
the violence, even the ‘hands-on’ approach of the Germans did not help to protect
the Serbs and large Turkish minority or stop the intimidation, extortion, and protec-
tion rackets often run by ex-UÇK officials.60 Virtually all Serbs left the Prizren area
between June and October, leaving Orahovac as the only place in the south with a
substantial Serb minority.
Close German-Dutch cooperation resulted in an overall consistent operational
approach to the public security vacuum in those early weeks, when they were the
only two national contingents making up Multinational Brigade South. Von Korff
and Van Loon continued to cooperate smoothly as they had done while preparing
for deployment in Macedonia and during the entry phase. The Brigadier gave the
Dutch battalion commander much leeway and without too much formal coordina-
tion the commanders seemed to come up with similar measures and agreed on solu-
tions.61 Few units could have been operating in a more integrated fashion, or ‘com-
bined’ in military jargon. However, even within the close-knit German-Dutch oper-
ation in southern Kosovo, there obviously remained differences in the measures
taken, their overall bearing, and the way troops were employed. One difference was
caused by the arbitrary nature of some of the orders from KFOR headquarters in
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Pristina. The Germans, like the British, had started to remove the UÇK from the
police stations they often selected as local headquarters. Oddly, in the Undertaking,
KFOR had designated the former MUP station in Orahovac as a local UÇK assem-
bly area.62
The most notable difference between Dutch and German troops for the local pop-
ulation was their overall posture towards the local population. The Dutch soldiers
had an overall good-natured and relaxed attitude and were often seen joking with
most of the population as they patrolled the streets, which tended to charm the Alban-
ian majority. While highly regarding the Germans, the Albanians had difficulty under-
standing their serious and sometimes surly demeanor. Although the Dutch started
off on a good footing with the Serbs, their relations with this besieged and increas-
ingly desperate community became strained in the course of the operations.63 It has
to be taken into consideration that on the whole, the Serbs were torn between the
images of KFOR as the enemy in the wake of the NATO bombing campaign and
KFOR as their protector against the vengeful Albanians. In retrospect, the Serbs in
Orahovac tended to regard the Germans as more even-handed – probably because
of their overall rigid posture. They had an easier time winning over the Serbs when
they took over from the Dutch in the mid-2000. However, Serb appreciation for the
Germans and negative memories of the Dutch were also related to the changing cir-
cumstances. Whereas the Dutch were associated with the times when their houses
were burning and war crimes suspects were being arrested by KFOR from within
their midst, the Germans took over in the relatively tranquil times. The fact that the
Dutch were heavily leaning on German troops and operating under German com-
mand had by then faded from public memory.64
Another difference between the Dutch and Germans was their use of, and acces-
sibility to, military police support. Whereas the Germans – like most major troop
contributors – allowed their commander to employ national military police person-
nel in a law-and-order role by actively patrolling the streets, arresting and investigat-
ing crime, the Dutch Ministry of Defense restrained the use of its Marechaussee unit
in Orahovac, which only gradually grew to twelve MPs. The Task Force had quickly
started using the two Dutch MPs that were initially available for collecting and pro-
cessing data on crime in support of the two non-commissioned officers who were
diligently taking testimonies in the ‘NATO building.’65 While they continued to aid
in criminal investigations, taking testimonies from the public and advising the reg-
ular troops while arresting and detaining, the Dutch MPs role would officially be
limited to ‘advising and assisting’ the tactical units.66 The operational staff of the
Koninklijke Marechaussee in The Hague – a separate military service in the Nether-
lands – recommended that the Ministry of Defense not give the Dutch MPs in Ora-
hovac clearance to use their investigative authority and power of arrest. Officially
they were only to act on German requests for support. The lack of flexibility in The
Hague angered Bokhoven who considered it ‘too mad for words’ that while the high-
est political authority in NATO, the North Atlantic Council, had reconfirmed that
KFOR would assume police tasks, gunners were allowed to do the arrest while the
ministry was restraining the use of its military police.67 While KFOR seemed to be
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faltering in its assigned mission to ensure public safety and order under the watch-
ful eye of the world media, the ministry emphasized that policing the Dutch contin-
gent would remain their absolute priority for its MPs in theater. 
Consequently, other than in Prizren, where the German military police major had
been put in charge of specific public security functions in Prizren, Van Loon assigned
his intelligence staff officer, Captain Chris Brouns, to coordinate the Dutch and Ger-
man policing effort in Orahovac.68 Together, the commander and Brouns decided
whether a case was serious enough to be transferred to the Germans in Prizren.
Otherwise the suspect was to be released after filing a report and a brief detention
in the improvised prison at the Dutch base – a sea container with a window and
bars cut out. Apart from formal detainees that were sent to Prizren, some offenders
were locked up overnight to ‘cool down’ after having committed misdemeanors.69
Other people were only taken in for questioning. The Dutch made it a habit to give
all these people a ride home who were taken in only for questioning or those who
proved clearly innocent after further investigations. The odd drunk taken in for beat-
ing up his wife would have to walk home the next morning after spending the night
in jail. UÇK commander Tara said he expected nothing less from KFOR. According
to Van Loon, the population agreed with these measures and accepted them as com-
pletely normal. Even a drunk who had gotten into a brawl would regard this ‘an
appropriate punishment.’70
In addition to the police organization, the battalion’s only two CIMIC officers
played an important role in overall relations with the local community. Captain Wim
Speth was the eyes and ears of the battalion on the streets of Orahovac and felt like
a beat cop. He was the most frequently seen Dutch officer in town, visiting people
in their homes and monitoring the general mood among the Albanian population.
Major Arno Schouwenaars, the other CIMIC officer, had the less rewarding task of
liaising with the Serb community in Orahovac and Velika Hoca. Since his name was
unpronounceable for the local population, he soon became know as Shevernadze,
while Speth was called Spethi, ‘fast’ in Albanian, for to them he seemed to be every-
where at the same time. Their names, together with that of ‘Colonel Valion’ were
well remembered in Orahovac several years later.71
During the second half of July and early August, as the offensive to maneuver
the UÇK out of policing reached its climax, the need for more military police became
critical. Although the ‘blue’ MPs could be employed as criminal intelligence gather-
ers, the Ministry of Defense continued to curtail the use of its MPs. Van Loon there-
fore turned to the Germans for more police support, since the Germans MP’s could
be used more freely for executive civil policing. Von Korff was very much aware that
the situation in Orahovac was potentially explosive and promised to send a platoon
of German Feldjäger. However, the twenty promised Germans MPs were unlikely to
arrive soon since the Germans themselves were short of police specialists in Prizren,
where organized crime and intimidation was on the rise. The situation irritated Cap-
tain Brouns since, paradoxically, the approximately thirty ‘green’ MPs attached to the
Dutch engineer battalion, were supporting the German Feldjäger on the streets of
Prizren. Initially, their task was to be limited to taking testimonies, but soon they
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were also actively patrolling, where they ended up dealing with serious crime. ‘I
expected to go to Kosovo to direct traffic,’ one MP said, ‘but our task is much broad-
er. We are doing real police work, from kidnapping to rape, from theft to shoot-
ings.’72 To match the armament of their German MP colleagues, they were equipped
with assault rifles, not just the sidearm they would normally carry. This made them
‘feel better’ on the violent streets of Prizren.73 After all, for the Kosovar population,
the size of a gun still often determined who was to be taken seriously and who could
be ignored. When reported by a newspaper in the Netherlands, the use of these
‘green’ MPs to act as beat cops on the streets of Prizren with the Germans caused
a row since they were not fully trained for such civil policing responsibilities.74 Again,
regular KFOR soldiers were still performing most of the ‘police patrols’ and arrests,
but this seemed to escape most of the Dutch media.
The policing effort in Orahovac was substantially professionalized when the Ger-
man police platoon finally arrived on 30 July. Led by a military police captain, the
platoon soon reached its full strength of approximately 25 men. It worked from the
NATO building, taking over and formalizing the unofficial police station. The Ger-
man MPs reached a good working relationship with their Dutch MP colleagues who
were officially still only allowed to ‘advice and assist’ in police work and concentrat-
ed on criminal investigations in Orahovac.75
There was a scramble for extra military police support throughout the brigades.
Some had come better prepared than others. The British quickly deployed a contin-
gent of 140 royal military police, including thirteen detectives from its Special Inves-
tigation Branch. The International Crisis Group reported in August on the excellent
work done by these specialist crime-detection units in KFOR, but regarded their
numbers as too few to handle the scale of the law and order problem.76 The French
deployed 150 gendarmes and the Americans eventually deployed a battalion of their
heavily armed MPs.77 In July, KFOR planned to have some nine hundred military
police personnel deployed in Kosovo over the following two months. Overall, the
heavy units that made up most of KFOR were far from ideal for the main task NATO
faced in Kosovo. KFOR needed light infantry and far more military police units.78
However, the number of military police was not the primary indicator of how the
public security gap was addressed by each contingent. Tactical commanders had rel-
ative autonomy in their approach to the problems they faced and their national gov-
ernments had much influence in determining how their forces were to be employed.
Different Approaches
A British brigadier serving at KFOR headquarters noticed how the line between polic-
ing and military activity in peace operations was seen very differently by different
nations. While some units undertook public security as an ongoing part of their own
mission, others shunned it as an unwelcome civilian task.79 Different approaches to
the public security gap resulted from injecting a large number of national contin-
gents with very different institutional attitudes in a law and order vacuum with a
mission that was full of ambiguity. Forty years of combined operations within NATO
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had produced standardized procedures and equipment for fighting wars, but con-
fronted with the public security gap, these differences became highlighted by a mix-
ture of military cultures and political directives from each of the contingents’ nation-
al authorities. Moreover, unity of command had always been considered a problem
particularly relevant to UN peace operations, but in NATO the force commander had
no more command authority over his units.80 ‘One of the most important things I
learned in Kosovo’ Jackson’s successor German General Klaus Reinhardt complained
bitterly, ‘is that the man who is KFOR commander, in fact doesn’t have anything to
command.’81 Jackson would have agreed. The force commander’s directives to the
various national contingents were constantly referred back to their governments for
approval.82
Accepting the limits of his command and the inability to prescribe methods, Jack-
son put little weight behind the formal standardization of policing practice. Instead,
on 20 July he laid down his ‘commander’s intent’ in broad brush strokes for his
subordinates down to company commanders. He told them he was not looking for
centralized command, but for unity of effort by sticking to his intent. Jackson pri-
oritized the public security mission and emphasized the need to arrest and detain
those suspected of crimes. Support for UNMIK, ‘including core civil functions,’ was
of the utmost importance, even if this put an extra strain on resources on short-term
requirements for a secure environment. For this ‘subtle and complex’ mission he
called on his subordinates to move among the people and be highly visible by engag-
ing in foot patrols rather than mounted patrols in order to counter fear and insecu-
rity and diffuse incidents before they occurred. Jackson wrote:
‘I seek a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign at low level, creating trust and mutual under-
standing. As relationships build, so will the flow of information allowing KFOR to
pre-empt conflict. […] It is an operation amongst the people, whose perception is
the Center of Gravity: that all inhabitants of Kosovo are better off with UNMIK /
KFOR than without, that we jointly offer a better future.’83
Although he may not have had much choice in the matter, the force commander
apparently decided that giving the necessary latitude to his subordinate national com-
manders would produce the best results in vacuum filling. His ideas and assump-
tions of how the brigades would fill in their broad mission seem to have been shaped
by what he knew would be the British brigade’s approach to the gap – which was
to adapt flexibly to the challenges as they emerged in the field and accept emergency
law enforcement as part of their ongoing mission. ‘This is what we do well,’ said
the British commander of Multinational Brigade Central in January 2001. ‘What
Americans do well is provide a guarantee of overwhelming force. This [situation]
plays to our strengths in ways that do not necessarily play to American strengths.’84
They were widely lauded for their robust, but overall restrained, approach that was,
as always, explained by referring to their operational experience in Northern Ire-
land.85 However, Alice Hills of the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College
argued that, while British soldiers may have been familiar with supporting the Royal
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Ulster Police and local administration, police primacy remained a fundamental tenet
for the British Army. British soldiers had no experience or training as an executive
policing force. Arresting and detaining offenders, let alone investigating crime, were
never among their powers in Northern Ireland. In Kosovo there was no set of emer-
gency legislation in place as in British counterinsurgency operations and there was
no civil authority to support.86
Nevertheless, an American civil affairs lieutenant colonel attached to KFOR head-
quarters in 2000 was amazed by the way the British went about their business. ‘Pres-
ence patrolling is conducted almost entirely dismounted, especially in built-up areas,
and through the same villages and neighborhoods by the same soldiers, much like
beat cops, with an emphasis on direct contact with local civilians.’87 When Jackson
defended KFOR for doing as much as it could, he referred to the example of British
soldiers living in Serb apartments where they were isolated – something no other
KFOR unit would ever do. ‘We even escort little old ladies to the bread shop to buy
their bread,’ the general recalled. He added, however, that such intense efforts to
convince the Serbs to stay would just as easily be offset when on the way to the shop
a Kosovar Albanian teenager would give the sign of throat-slitting to her face.88 The
British were renowned for operating close to the population regarding good relations
and the resulting flow of information as the best form of force protection. This is
not to say that they were always subtle in their methods. In Pristina, a Serb family
was repeatedly threatened by Albanian men over a property-related dispute. The
British went on a stakeout and when they caught them ‘they really beat the shit out
of them,’ an American NGO worker recalled. Their argument was that with the lack
of a functioning justice system, the Albanians would be out on the streets in no time
to terrorize the Serbs. They needed to be taught a lesson.89
On the other end of the spectrum were the Italians who were widely seen as pas-
sive, especially in the early months of the operation. While the soldiers in different
brigades were generally too busy to pay much attention to their neighbors, the over-
all impression the Italians left on the Dutch forces in the adjoining sector was that
of a force unprepared to leave its armored vehicles. Initially they did not consider
detaining people part of their job.90 When Ismet Tara was complaining to Van Loon
that other KFOR units took a far more lenient approach towards UÇK-policing, he
was clearly referring to the Italians. The main challenge in the Italian sector was the
UÇK, which had traditionally been strong in the area and were granted the oppor-
tunity to rapidly entrench themselves in the summer of 1999. Humanitarian work-
ers and administrators wanted to see the Italian troops on the streets to give the peo-
ple a sense of security and thus provide a viable alternative to the UÇK police. One
UNHCR worker who worked in both the Italian and German sectors recalled: 
In Djakovica we [the UNHCR] were the ones to inform Italian KFOR that the Roma
quarter was on fire, or that a Roma was beaten up, kidnapped or killed. We had
to push and beg them to come out and if they decided to come – often only after
an official written request – they came in armored personnel carriers and just stood
by, doing nothing but sticking their heads out of their vehicles showing off their
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sunglasses. We found ourselves on several occasions driving past their military
vehicles into a burning area of town, trying to prevent further arson, looting or
attacks from happening. The Italians would simply refuse to come out, claiming
that it was too dangerous, and stand by like wax dolls. The perpetrators could
have just passed behind them. The Italians never did foot patrols and apart from
two CIMIC officers, one of whom hardly spoke English, had no contact with the
local population.91
Although ‘some good old Italian flirting by the troops went on from behind car win-
dows’ the female UNHCR field officer found their higher-ranking officers hard to
approach, their pride closing them off from any suggestions or criticism from the
civilian organizations with whom they were to cooperate. 
Like the Italians, the French were relatively passive and hesitant in arresting civil-
ians in the initial weeks. Even after Jackson had given his instructions on public safe-
ty, they refused to actively engage in apprehending offenders. The French brigade com-
mander claimed that arrests in foreign territories by French soldiers were only possi-
ble under French law in the presence of a certain national official. Jackson flew into
a rage, ordered his French subordinates to put this official on a plane that very same
day and start arresting.92 The French were not as aggressive as some other contin-
gents in disarming the Albanian and the Serbs and were blamed for ignoring and
denying the fact that Serbs, including paramilitaries, were vigorously policing north-
ern Mitrovica. They lost the momentum early in the mission when armed Serbs blocked
the only remaining bridge across the Iber River and effectively cut off the northern
part of Mitrovica from the Albanian-dominated south. Their reluctance ‘to exert author-
ity in the remaining Serb-controlled areas led to the entrenchment of informal sys-
tems of law enforcement, such as the ‘bridge-watchers’ in northern Mitrovica.’93
KFOR’s failure to effectively control northern Mitrovica was a severe blow to the
Albanian population and to UNMIK, since the North held the city’s main facilities,
such as the hospital, food warehouses and the university. The separation of the city
and lack of control over its northern part would remain NATO’s and the UN’s most
serious operational failure and a source of serious embarrassment in the years to
come. Already on 24 June 1999, General Wesley Clark expressed the fear that Mitro-
vica would become a divided city like Berlin during the Cold War. The analogy with
another closer and more recent trouble spot in NATO’s history would have been
more appropriate. In NATO’s presence, the Bosnian city of Mostar had effectively
become divided between Croats and Muslims. Its beautiful, delicately built centuries-
old bridge that united both sides had been deliberately destroyed by artillery shells
and had become a symbol of the civil war in Bosnia. Mitrovica’s was nothing like
its equivalent in Mostar. What the large bridge lacked in aesthetics, it more than
made up for in concrete. However, with continued ethnic strife in Kosovo it would
gain the same symbolic value. While all NATO troops were aware that the French
had probably ended up with the toughest assignment in one of Kosovo’s most explo-
sive regions, the French were severely criticized for letting the situation get out of
hand by losing control over the population.94
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The US contingent displayed much of the same behavioral patterns of earlier
missions, partly as a reflex, and partly in reaction to policy guidance from Washing-
ton with its usual emphasis on force protection. The Americans were criticized by
Kosovars of all ethnicities for hardly venturing beyond the gate of their vast, 775-
acre, $32 million new Camp Bondsteel, thereby failing to establish the visible pres-
ence necessary to make people feel more secure. Within this virtually impregnable
fortress, the US military was creating ‘a little piece of home,’ complete with two
gymnasiums, two dining halls, a library, a chapel, a Burger King and a pizza parlor.
The camp housed roughly five thousand soldiers, three-quarters of the American
troops in Kosovo.95 The Washington Post reported: 
The base, about a mile east of Urosevac, seems to do justice to the American mil-
itary’s reputation for going in heavy and making a large footprint. It is already
attracting gibes from officers in European brigades also deployed here as part of
the NATO-led peacekeeping force. They have dubbed the base ‘Disneyland’ and
suggest the concentration of so many soldiers in a single, isolated location will
hinder their ability to perform peacekeeping tasks.
One senior British officer was reported saying that although it was ‘an obvious sign
that the Americans are making a major commitment to the Balkan region and plan
to stay, their desire to drive the risk of casualties to an absolute zero can be a major
distraction.’96 There was the usual emphasis within American units on mounted
patrols in relatively large convoys, and lack of flexibility in always wearing kevlar
vests and helmets. In Kosovo, as in earlier operations, the constant display of weapons
put a substantial distance between American troops and the population, which they
intentionally seemed to keep at arms’ length. According to one American legal offi-
cer, ‘their appearance as such often intimidated as much as reassured the local pop-
ulace.’97 Nevertheless, the American’s took an overall robust stance on disarmament
and showed more flexibility to the public security gap than during previous opera-
tion in the 1990s. Like most contingents, their MPs and combat soldiers would
become essentially the police force in Kosovo.98
In the course of the summer there was more coherence in the detention policy,
but there would remain substantial differences in the amount of arrests between the
contingents, which can be partly explained by the different levels of chaos in the five
sectors. With the extremely high number of prisoners released without any form of
process and with reliable statistics hard to come by, structurally comparing the num-
bers of arrest in different sectors is difficult. NATO was not exactly boasting about
the numbers of arrests its soldiers made, probably because this would raise many
questions in the different parliaments of its member states. However, there are some
figures that give an indication of the different approaches. During the first three
weeks the different interpretations of the mission by each multinational brigade were
clearly revealed in the number of arrests made. By 7 July, the German-led brigade
topped the chart with ninety-six arrests. The British had taken a similar active approach
to law and order, which had resulted in fifty arrests. American troops brought in fif-
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teen looters and arsonists, while the Italians and the French closed the chart with
five arrests and one official arrest, respectively.99 By the end of that month, KFOR
was holding some two hundred Albanian detainees, which was about all its impro-
vised prison facilities could hold at the time.100 In total, KFOR military police han-
dled 1400 criminal cases in the month of July.101 The Prizren detention facility
processed 1487 ‘guests’ for the entire Multinational Brigade South between June and
early November, when UNMIKPOL took over the primary responsibility for policing
from the Germans with 325 police officers.102 In the course of the first year in Koso-
vo the Americans handled 1,800 detainees at their detention facility at Camp Bond-
steel.103 The total amount of official arrests made by Task Force Orahovac until late
October was 75. Additionally, an estimated two dozen detainees were released after
one night at the base prison instead of being sent to Prizren. Around that time,
Klaus Reinhardt had taken over as force commander from Jackson. The German
general was shocked when the UNMIK police director, his compatriot Uwe Schweifer,
informed him that of the four hundred Kosovars arrested by the UN police until
then, ninety percent had been released without a court procedure. Until then not a
single case had appeared before a court.104
The Justice Triangle 
Soldiers arresting people was clearly not enough to restore basic order to Kosovo.
The lack of a judicial system and civil police in the streets had enabled lawlessness
to thrive and organized crime to flourish. The complete justice triangle of police, a
judiciary and prisons had to be restored and – last but not least – agreement had
to be reached on what legal code applied in Kosovo. There was still no agreement
between UNMIK and UN lawyers in New York on what legislation to apply. Jackson
had instructed his troops to stick to Yugoslav law ‘as far as practically possible,’ but
the Albanians were vehemently opposed to having the law of their former oppres-
sor imposed on them once again. To them, it was like asking Nelson Mandela to
reintroduce Apartheid laws in the new South Africa. Their alternative was the old
Kosovar law that had been in place before 1989. However, since this would serious-
ly infringe on Yugoslav sovereignty in Kosovo, and since Yugoslav law was far more
modern and practical, NATO and the UN were initially not willing to yield on this
point.105
In the early months of KFOR operations, the whole discussion on what law to
apply was rather academic, since there was hardly any appropriate legal expertise
within KFOR and there were insufficient English-language versions of the Yugoslav
Code. In order to approach the Yugoslav law, Jackson ordered his troops to stick to
their own national criminal legislation as a basic guideline for arrest and detention.
This seemed the most pragmatic solution at the time as it appealed to the basic feel-
ing of justice harbored by officers and men and gave military legal advisors some-
thing familiar with which to work. However, different national interpretations of law
enforcement in different military sectors did not enhance consistency in the imple-
mentation of the public security task, which had been set as a goal by the North
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Atlantic Council. 
In the course of summer, KFOR started to provide haphazard support to all aspects
of public order and the judicial process. The public security directive issued by KFOR
headquarters underlined that a detainee was to be handed over to a civilian agency
as soon as practicable, but in the absence of indigenous institutions and the UN
interim administration, KFOR had to temporarily execute some of these functions.
No military courts had been envisaged, but with no functioning local courts and no
international judges in place, KFOR legal staff would at least have to review whether
there was sufficient basis for holding civilians in detention. During these first months,
Jackson’s legal advisors were fully consumed with these probable cause hearings and
other matters related to emergency law and order, such as Rules of Engagement,
coordination with UNMIK legal staff and the brigades. There were two British legal
officers and one Dutch legal officer attached to KFOR headquarters, while one US
Marine Corps judge advocate from the American brigade unofficially supported them.
They were of course too few and they delegated as much responsibility as possible
to the legal advisors in each of the five brigades.106 Legal staff would, to the best of
their ability, review each case and wait for courts and lawyers to emerge in order to
put them on trial. Initially detainees could be held only up to twelve hours without
a hearing, but in the late summer legal procedures were put in place to allowed sus-
pects to be held up to forty-eight hours and later even seventy-two hours before a
military lawyer reviewed their case.107
In July, the UN special representative appointed what became known as ‘the trav-
eling circus of judges,’ consisting of Albanian judges and prosecutors, most of whom
had been active prior to 1989. The problem was that by the late 1990s, of a total of
756 judges and prosecutors in Kosovo, only thirty Albanians were left.108 Kosovo’s
Serb judges had all fled the province. Judicial structures under UNMIK supervision
would only slowly emerge in the course of 1999 and 2000. One of the newly cre-
ated teams of judges and prosecutors was based in Prizren and another two, con-
sisting of several judges, prosecutors and the accompanying defense council, start-
ed to make their five-day rounds through Kosovo, visiting the different temporary
KFOR detention centers to provide follow up detention hearings. Jackson ordered
his brigades to provide full logistical support to these teams. Starting on 6 August
1999, UNMIK finally had access to sufficient funds to pay the Kosovar legal person-
nel, as well as hospital staff and custom officials.
Of all the tasks KFOR performed in order to substitute for and support the jus-
tice triangle, it was least willing to run prisons. Both Jackson and Reinhardt made
this very clear to UNMIK.109 While most KFOR contingents eventually accepted basic
police tasks, the job of prison warden was often regarded as beneath them. Never-
theless, each brigade ended up running a prison facility and KFOR’s regular soldiers
and MPs performed the job of wardens. In Prizren’s jail, dozens of prisoners were
held at any one time and Dutch airmobile infantry from a company attached to the
Dutch engineers temporarily supported the Germans while performing this task. The
American contingent initially had its engineers build a small temporary detainment
facility with a capacity to hold forty-eight detainees, as they believed that the UN
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would take over quickly. When this miscalculation was realized, a larger facility for
130 detainees was built.110 In spite of these improvised measures, the combined
capacity of the detention facilities operated by KFOR of some 250 detainees proved
woefully inadequate. Lack of detention space thus continued to force KFOR to refrain
from arresting offenders –  even if they were caught red-handed – or let known
criminals walk free after their arrest. Releasing suspects had a disastrous effect on
KFOR and UN credibility, especially among the Serbs, who saw it as a confirmation
that NATO or the UN were hardly interested in protecting them. The International
Crisis Group in its many critiques of the handing of the situation wondered why
those suspected of arson and violent attacks against Serbs and other minorities could
not be held in even more basic temporary facilities. If refugees could live in tents,
one UN official later reasoned, so could criminals.111
Once the situation got out of hand in the summer of 1999, martial law as a pos-
sible solution for the security vacuum was brought up in meetings between UNMIK
leaders and KFOR headquarters ‘on a number of occasions.’ It was eventually dropped
since neither leadership liked it. For UNMIK, handing all civil powers to the mili-
tary would be an admission of its failure at time when the UN was trying to regain
some of the ground it had lost in the international arena. Meanwhile, NATO was
not willing to assume the formal responsibility for exercising the civil powers it
entailed. This would after all have amounted to military government over Kosovo.112
In retrospect, Bernard Kouchner much regretted the approach taken in the early
days. ‘We were arrogant to apply a modern judiciary system, with detailed consider-
ation of human rights and so on’ he said. ‘We should have kept it simple by rapid-
ly creating a very basic interim justice system.’113 In his pre-departure press confer-
ence on 17 December 2000, Bernard Kouchner said the primary lesson of Kosovo
was that ‘peacekeeping missions need to arrive with a law-and-order kit composed
of trained police, judges and prosecutors and a set of security laws. This is the only
way to stop criminal behavior from flourishing in the post-war vacuum of authori-
ty.’114 By the year 2000, calls became more frequent for readily deployable ‘law and
order packages’ comprised of civilian police and mobile courts with a skeleton staff
of lawyers and judges. This was basically what the Australian lawyer Mark Plunkett
had called for after his pioneering, but ill-fated, assignment as the UNTAC prosecu-
tor in charge of addressing major human rights violations in Cambodia in 1993.115
Even after 1999, little progress was made in this field in terms of rapidly deployable
civilian capacity.
Exaggerated hopes had been vested in a UN police force during the planning phase
leading up to KFOR’s entry. Both NATO and the UN were responsible for raising
expectations that three thousand international police officers could rapidly fill the
void. The military alliance was seeking to avoid as much responsibility for law and
order as possible, while the UN had its own motives. It has been argued that the
problems encountered in the early phase of the police mission resulted from the
overambitious attempt by the UN to relaunch itself after the marginal role it played
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during the Kosovo war.116 The UN’s aspirations also resulted from a more general
marginalization of its role in military peacekeeping in the latter half of the 1990s,
when the bigger missions – inevitably those where Western interests were at stake
– were increasingly taken over by ‘coalitions of the willing,’ rather than UN forces. 
The UN civilian police branch, which had accompanied peace-building missions
in the last decade, reinvented itself in Kosovo. From its ill-fated monitoring role in
Cambodia, after a somewhat better equipped but still unarmed monitoring task in
Haiti, Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia, the international police force took on executive
policing for the first time in history. Although international police missions had made
excursions into executive policing before, traditional UN civilian police missions had
officially been limited to supporting, monitoring, reconstructing and training of local
police forces. The fundamental change of concept took place rather haphazardly.
Another factor raising the demands on the UN civilian police was that the short-
comings of the IFOR and SFOR, with their narrow interpretation of the military
mandate, had exposed the ‘public security gap,’ a topic that rose to some prominence
from 1998 in think tanks and academic institutes with an interest in peacekeeping.
With ‘mission creep’ still considered a soldier’s worst enemy in peace operations,
and with this influential but ill-defined term regarded as synonymous for military
involvement in public security, the common wisdom had been to strengthen UN
Civilian Police, thus allowing the military to ignore the problem of the security gap. 
Jackson briefed NATO diplomats in early July and painted a gloomy picture of
the possibility of the transfer of police responsibility. He expected that it would take
a full six months before the UN would be able to take over the police task complete-
ly.117 Meanwhile, in August, UN as well as NATO officials in New York and Brus-
sels were publicly exaggerating the figures of police officers already deployed. They
pledged that the envisioned complete strength of 3,000 police would be reached by
late October and that, with some continued KFOR support, the UN would be able
to take over responsibility for maintaining law and order in two months.118 In real-
ity, even Jackson’s gloomy estimate proved overly optimistic. Not just its lack of per-
sonnel and resources hampered the UN civilian police mission. As in previous mis-
sions, the UN Civilian Police would have a serious image problem. Driving around
in their shiny red-and-white Toyota police jeeps, the Kosovar population soon dubbed
them ‘Coca Cola Cops’ or simply ‘Coca Colas.’ As always, it was a colorful display
of the world’s police forces in a wide array of national uniforms. The national con-
tributions varied from tough but retired and sometimes cynical cops who had been
fighting crime in the streets of America’s cities to Indian police chiefs who lacked
any experience walking a beat. All were lured by the exuberant UN wages. Particu-
larly in the central streets of Pristina, around UN police headquarters, the red-and-
white jeeps started to make a large contribution to the already severe traffic conges-
tion. By November, the center of the capital was buzzing with many friendly inter-
national policemen at all hours of the day. However, many of the police officers ini-
tially failed to gain respect for their performance. A Pristina resident wondered why
Kosovars were not employed directing traffic. She figured that they had to be the
most expensive traffic cops in the world. Especially beyond the capital the build-up
of international police remained slow.119
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After the UN police had assumed formal police primacy from KFOR in Pristina
in August, the Prizren region was UNMIK’s second priority for the deployment. By
November, Task Force Orahovac was in the lucky position to be formally relieved of
its official responsibility for policing by a contingent of UN civilian police officers,
initially all from the United States. It had taken until early September for the first
‘Coca Colas’ to reach Orahovac, but they were well led by Albert League, a burly
retired police chief from New York City, who praised cooperation with Dutch and
German KFOR troops in the sector.120 Also the OSCE called the work of the police
in Orahovac effective and lauded the cooperation between the police and Dutch and
German troops.121 By late August, Van Loon reported that regular crime was a rela-
tively small problem in Orahovac.122 By autumn 1999, the Task Force had success-
fully blocked the UÇK from overtly policing and the former guerrillas seemed to be
losing their grip on the local Albanian population. This had been accomplished most
of all by providing the Kosovar Albanian population of Orahovac with a sense of
security, thereby enabling them to put their trust in the KFOR with the internation-
al police in its wake. 
In most of Kosovo, the military was still substituting for rather than supporting
UN police in law enforcement during the winter. Both Jackson and Reinhardt regu-
larly emphasized that it was time for the UN police to take over from soldiers
untrained for the job, and both Generals called on the member states to contribute
more personnel to the police force. However, in December 1999, with a combina-
tion of increased ethnic violence and a surge in organized crime, General Reinhardt
was compelled to send his troops out in force to back up the 1,800-member UN
police force that was simply not able to cope.123 In most areas, it was only after a
year that the emphasis of KFOR’s work shifted from executive policing to support-
ing the UNMIK police.124 As the international community failed to provide the num-
ber of police personnel, the UN police by then had no more that 3,626 officers out
of its authorized strength, which had been raised to 4,718 police officers.125
Just as it was hard to generalize about any aspect of KFOR operations because
of the differing political and tactical situations in each area, so was cooperation
between soldiers and police uneven, depending on the resources, capabilities, but
also very much on personalities and the cultural backgrounds of the troops and police
officers involved. Joint operations rooms for KFOR and police were starting to be
created in the summer of 2000 in order to direct and coordinate public security
tasks from one place, but the process of integrating military and police responses to
incidents was only slowly spreading throughout the province.126 In addition, trans-
fer of responsibility over Kosovo’s prison facilities to UNMIK was a lengthy process.
In Pristina, the British were able to make the transfer in August 1999, and by the
end of the year two other detention facilities were run by the UN, but the other two
remaining prisons were still operated by KFOR in 2001.127
After the UN police gradually assumed police primacy, the next step on the way
towards the end goal in the field in public security was the build-up of a local Koso-
var police force. The Kosovo Police Service (KPS) was recruited and trained under
the auspices of the OSCE. With initial KFOR support, UNMIK took a patient and
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thorough approach compared to the hastier job done during operations in Somalia
and Haiti in the early 1990s. The process was slow and suffered from insufficient
resources, but in the late summer of 2000, some 1,400 Kosovar police officers were
patrolling the streets. By September 2002, their number passed the projected 4,000
with another 1,500 police cadet graduates ready to graduate by the end of that year.128
The thorough approach seemed to pay off as the KPS had a good reputation, even
though much of the patrolling by the KPS in 2002 was still done jointly with UN
police.129 The whole security structure was likely to collapse without KFOR keeping
the former insurgents at bay, since the TMK undermined the position of the KPS
as the only legitimate law enforcement agency in Kosovo.130 Nevertheless, the effort
to construct an indigenous police force was a major accomplishment, mostly because
the Kosovar Police Service was the only multi-ethnic success. It was the only insti-
tution in Kosovo that was truly ethnically diverse with seventeen percent of the police
academy graduates being from minority groups. Nineteen percent of the police offi-
cers were women.131 General Joseph Ralston, Clark’s successor at SHAPE in April
2000, said that the newly formed police force in Kosovo operated so professionally
by late 2001 that he would like to see it replicated in Bosnia, where the local police
force was troubled by inefficiency and corruption.132 Starting from scratch in a com-
plete vacuum had a few advantages, but KFOR and the UN had come close to los-
ing their credibility among the Kosovar population. Most Serbs in Kosovo had lost
their faith in the international civil-military presence in the summer of 1999 and
showed this by leaving the province. Since Orahovac still harbored a substantial Serb
minority, the Dutch found themselves at the forefront of the struggle to avoid reverse
ethnic cleansing. 
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11
Peacekeepers in Pursuit of Justice:
Protecting and Prosecuting Serbs in Orahovac
The multi-ethnic ideal propagated by NATO and the UN for the Balkans was sore-
ly tested in Kosovo. Like most sizable military interventions in the 1990s, both the
military and civilian components fell victim to the law of unintended consequences.
Officially replacing Serb with international rule, but failing to effectively establish
interim authority in the short term allowed the former victims to become perpetra-
tors, and the dominant elite to become victims. 
The prime concern was to prevent Kosovo from being emptied of all minorities
in the summer of 1999. This scenario, which became more likely with every act of
ethnic violence, would represent an outright political failure of KFOR and UNMIK.
Protecting the Serbs and other minorities therefore became the military force’s pri-
mary mission. However, the accountability of Serbs for war crimes was regarded as
one of the key contributing factors to long-term interethnic reconciliation in Koso-
vo. Apprehending suspected war criminals was a civilian responsibility, but as with
almost every element of civil implementation, the military would play a substantial
role. The Dutch-led Task Force Orahovac became more actively involved in the mat-
ter of crimes committed during the war than any other contingent by actively con-
tributing to the investigation of war crimes and the arrest of lower-level war crimes
suspects. Different interpretations of the poorly defined mandate for the arrests would
result in controversy over this particular military role.
Russians
As previously stated, Orahovac resembled a microcosm of Kosovo’s problems and
KFOR’s challenges in 1999, with its proportional Serb minority, the rapid emergence
of an ethnically segregated enclave and the dilemma of the Serbs as both victims
and perpetrators. However, there was one unique factor, the impending takeover of
the area by Russian KFOR troops, which requires elaboration before addressing the
protection of the Serbs and the military role in the pursuit of war criminals. The
Russian deployment was, after all, the dominant theme throughout the presence of
the first Dutch artillery battalion and permeated every other element of its mission.
The battalion’s attention should have been fully directed at consolidating KFOR and
UNMIK control over local society, but the crisis and the resulting media attention
continued to drain energy from the commander and his men.
However hard KFOR and the emerging branches of UNMIK would try, Oraho-
vac would not return to anything resembling normalcy as long as the Albanian pop-
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ulation was preoccupied with the Russians coming to take control of their munici-
pality and city. The Albanian population was vehemently opposed to their presence
in the area and could not address any subject without bringing up ‘the Russians,’
who they perceived as allies of the Serbs on the basics of their historic, ethnic and
religious ties. They also claimed that Russian fighters had been involved in war
crimes in the war of 1998 and 1999. These rumors were partly based in fact, but
the Albanians were clearly not ready to distinguish between these mercenaries and
regular Russian troops.1
At the international summit in Helsinki held between 16 and 18 June, US Sec-
retary of Defense William Cohen and his Russian colleague Igor Sergejev had agreed
on the details of Russian participation in KFOR. The Russians sought to be deployed
in Serb-dominated territory near the Serbian border, but in order to avoid the emer-
gence of a Serb enclave under Russian protection, it was agreed that the Russian
troops would disperse over more centrally located regions in three out of the five
existing multinational brigades. Two Russian battalions were scheduled to deploy in
the German zone. The controversy over their deployment in Orahovac was primari-
ly the result of the use of outdated maps in Helsinki. This had led the Russian nego-
tiators to believe their area of responsibility would include not just Malisevo but also
Orahovac which, with its substantial Serb minority, was an important prize for the
Russians, who liked to see themselves as the protectors of the Slavs. However, the
municipal boundaries had been redrawn ten years earlier and Orahovac and Malise-
vo had become separate administrative entities. Nevertheless, the Russians were with-
in their rights claiming Orahovac and the Allies knew it. 
As the Albanian population of Orahovac became aware of the agreement reached
in Helsinki, it staged daily demonstrations in the city and even marched to the
entrance of the Task Force’s main compound in the nearby vineyards. Here they
started applauding the Dutch troops while waving red flags with the Albanian dou-
ble-headed eagle. When General Wesley Clark came to inspect the situation in July
he was given twenty thousand signatures collected against the arrival of Russian
troops by the ‘Coordinating Committee of the Protests,’ led by former Albanian mayor
and director of the local wine factory, Agim Hasku. The smoldering crisis came to
a full confrontation in the course of August. On 23 August, as the replacement of
Dutch troops by a Russian unit was imminent, the population moved tractors, trucks
and other vehicles onto all roads into town. At the main roadblock, about fifty pro-
testers who had spent the night behind barbed wire barricades, held banners in
Albanian and English saying ‘NATO yes, Russians no,’ ‘We don’t like Russians’ and
‘Russians are criminals.’2 A local inhabitant who appreciated the political importance
of Russian participation in KFOR asked the press why they were not sent to a place
like Gnjilane, in the US sector, claiming ‘only three people died there during the
war.’3
If the will had been there and – Van Loon later argued – if the deployment had
proceeded earlier, more gradually and without making too much fuss, the Russians
could have settled down just as easily as they had done in neighboring Malisevo in
late July.4 Serious fighting had occurred in this city during the war, but the Russians
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deployed there mid-July after initial protests from the local population and some
obstinacy by the UÇK. Together with Dutch and German troops they had started
joint patrols and ran joint checkpoints. The problem in Orahovac was not only a
well-organized and motivated population, but also the rather undiplomatic moves of
the Russians, NATO officials and the Dutch government. The tactless posture of the
Russians was certainly unhelpful in solving the crisis. Russian armored vehicles often
appeared in the city unannounced and the many Russian generals involved in nego-
tiations seemed determined to treat the local Albanian representatives in an icy and
haughty manner, refusing the coffee offered to them and hardly looking the Alba-
nians in the eye.5
The Dutch government was certainly not amused by the whole episode. During
his visit to Kosovo, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozias van Aartsen, turned con-
trol over Orahovac into a matter of national prestige – as the Russian had already
done – by telling Jackson that ‘the Netherlands may not become the NATO’s door-
mat,’ and rather undiplomatically ruled out any form of shared Dutch-Russian respon-
sibility.6 The Dutch government and its armed forces, both still in the process of
overcoming their trauma over Srebrenica, were very content with their operation in
Kosovo. Its large contribution of over two thousand military personnel was highly
publicized and the riskiest part of the operation seemed to be over. The Dutch min-
isters of defense and foreign affairs did not want their party spoiled by the Russians.
Most of all, however, NATO lacked the will to accommodate the Russians in Ora-
hovac. This tendency was apparent from the soldiers on the ground to the highest
NATO circles in Brussels. The Dutch battalion was not at all eager to leave the munic-
ipality and its population, with whom they had come to identify to a certain extent.
Higher echelons within the NATO hierarchy also lacked a sense of urgency to let
the Russians take over the disputed zone.7 In July, General Clark had reassured Niek
Biegman, the Dutch ambassador to NATO, that he clearly preferred a Dutch pres-
ence in Orahovac to Russian control, which was expected to have a destabilizing
effect on the region and possibly on Kosovo as a whole.8 The supreme commander’s
political advisor, Michael Durkee, even told the Dutch ambassador that the Dutch
should not be ‘so damn cooperative.’ Instead, he advised the Dutch to stall and to
coordinate this dilatory effort with the Germans, whose NATO ambassador Joachim
Bitterlich appeared most willing to cooperate in delaying the Russian deployment.9
Although General Jackson is unlikely to have been eager to please the Russians after
the stunt they pulled deploying at Pristina airport ahead of his British paratroopers
in June, the general was probably more genuine in his acceptance of a Russian
takeover than Brussels. After all, having the population of a provincial town effec-
tively blocking freedom of movement of a particular KFOR contingent was a blatant
case of non-compliance and obstruction of KFOR in performing its mission. He also
wanted to solve the crisis swiftly, for as long as the Albanians were allowed to block
Russian movement, he could not act against the Serb blockades in Mitrovica.10
NATO’s top officials chose to be largely passive throughout the crisis in Oraho-
vac. Although the contested troop deployment resulted from an international politi-
cal agreement at the highest political level, Solana, Clarke and Jackson left the mat-
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ter to be solved by the Dutch and German tactical commanders, hoping the dust
would eventually settle.11 Reinhardt would blame Jackson for failing to deal with the
blockades when he took over in October, but soon found the problem to be tougher
than he had expected. In the end, however, the blockade crisis was indeed solved
primarily because the Russians simply lost interest. The local generals had long since
lost enthusiasm to assume control over the recalcitrant Albanians, and Moscow
became preoccupied with the second Chechen war. The Albanians in Orahovac lift-
ed the blockade in November after they received some assurances from KFOR that
the Russians would not deploy ‘without a proper dialogue.’ The threat of the with-
drawal of international aid organizations and the desire to get the people off the very
cold mountainside had helped persuade the protesters, but in the end they won
because after November it was very unlikely that the Russians would ever come.12
The Beleaguered Serbs
The Dutch were clearly driven by a desire to stay in charge of what they had come
to consider ‘their’ town, but there was a genuine concern for the safety of the Serbs.
Throughout Kosovo, providing security for the Serbs was KFOR’s biggest challenge
and arguably its biggest failure. NATO had vowed to protect all ethnic groups in
Kosovo, but despite an overwhelming international military presence in Kosovo, it
could not stop civil war from raging on by other means. The fact that NATO’s appear-
ance on the ground turned the tables on the Serb minority did of course not come
out of the blue, but both the magnitude of the Serb exodus and the scope of the
ethnic violence surprised senior KFOR and civilian officials. ‘We knew the hatreds
ran deep,’ the UNHCR wrote, ‘but we did not believe that the refugees and the vic-
tims UNHCR had helped in exile would soon become the oppressors, employing
many of the same disgusting tactics that had once been directed at them.’13 Although
the level of violence would steadily drop, the ethnic conflict continued in the follow-
ing years. Since NATO’s strategic goal in the Balkans was not to allow warring par-
ties to redraw the region’s borders along ethnic lines by force, this meant that after
its tactical victory – protecting the Albanian population from being crushed by Milo-
sevic – the Alliance could still be heading for a strategic defeat. The Serb leader
could after all rightfully claim that NATO was not living up to its promise to pro-
tect all ethnic groups and demand the return of his own forces since NATO was not
complying with the United Nations resolution.
The number of Serbs leaving Kosovo was the most tangible indicator of KFOR’s
success or failure. Estimating the remaining Serbs therefore became an important
tool in the propaganda battle, or ‘the numbers game,’ raging between NATO and
Belgrade. NATO seemed to be losing the battle when a UNHCR spokesperson claimed
that no more than 30,000 Serbs were left in Kosovo and that they were ‘mostly old,
poor or weak men and women.’ This figure became widely used in both the Serbian
and Western media.14 With nearly 35,000 NATO troops on the ground it was par-
ticularly embarrassing since it allowed the Yugoslav government to claim that there
was at least one soldier for every remaining Serb in Kosovo. This left no other expla-
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nation than that the Alliance was tacitly supporting ethnic cleansing. KFOR coun-
tered with its own more accurate estimate of 97,000 remaining Serbs, an estimate
later confirmed by the UNHCR, but the Alliance had to acknowledge that over
100,000 persons had already left for Serbia and Montenegro.15 Other figures used
by Kouchner and Jackson in their joint media briefings to contradict claims that they
were failing to perform their assigned task showed a dramatic drop in murder rates.
The number of murders was now below the statistical level of that in Washington,
DC and the South African capital Pretoria, and similar to that of Moscow.16 These
statements were echoed in the media, but it took little time for the pessimists to
point out that the declining crime rates were primarily the result of a dramatic drop
in potential targets for ethnic crime, most notably Serbs and Roma. Serbs, by now
only constituting six percent of the population, were twenty times more likely to
become victims of a murder attempt than an Albanian. 
Orahovac was one of those enclaves where Serbs lived dangerously close to their
hostile Albanian neighbors. Although the city’s different ethnic groups had lived
more integrated lives than in most other parts of the province, the war had left lit-
tle tolerance between them. Soon after KFOR’s entry, the Serbs were faced with the
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The Dutch commander of Task Force Orahovac tries to reassure residents of the ‘Serb quarter’ on
18 June 1999. Fearing reprisals by the Albanian majority in Kosovo, many Serbs were anxious to
leave the province.
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question of whether to stay or leave the Serb quarter and Velika Hoca, were they
had concentrated in the second half of June. The houses left behind by those who
lived outside these areas were almost instantly looted and burned despite the Task
Force’s early efforts to put an end to this. 
It will come as no surprise that convincing the Serbs to stay in Kosovo – a task
of strategic importance to NATO – was a difficult and unrewarding job. This effort
was complicated by a steady stream of misinformation about the living conditions
of the remaining Serbs in the city and Velika Hoca. Although their precarious situ-
ation hardly needed exaggeration, hyperbolic claims of mass-starvation, massive
abductions by the UÇK, demonstrations, denial of medical treatment and the lack
of water, electricity and garbage disposal services kept appearing in the press. Most
frustrating for the Task Force was that KFOR headquarters and UNMIK in Pristina
often took these rumors seriously. Although the food and general supply situation
for the Serbs was at times somewhat worse, Albanians in Orahovac were often suf-
fering from the same shortages while KFOR and various civilian organizations were
clearly trying their very best to relieve the situation. The Serbian humanitarian com-
mittee in Orahovac, in charge of coordinating all humanitarian efforts and requests
for evacuations and escorts, was reported to have told the Dutch there was overall
enough food, and confirmed their suspicion that a few radical Serbs gave false state-
ments to enhance chances for UNHCR evacuation. The committee also considered
the humanitarian convoys from Belgrade no longer welcome since their personnel
was creating unrest amongst the resident Serbs.17
Many of the grievances were spontaneously aired by the local population, but
some of the rumors were clearly being instigated by Belgrade in an attempt to incrim-
inate NATO. The Dutch had a lucky break in their effort to counter the orchestrat-
ed stream of disinformation when in July an Italian electronic warfare unit tipped
them off to the presence in Orahovac and Velika Hoca of two radio transmitters
spreading propaganda messages. After several days of investigations a German
infantry platoon – better trained for this sort of mission – raided the first house in
the upper part of the city. Backed up by Dutch gunners, they arrested six persons,
who turned out to be MUP officers. Orahovac, Pristina and Mitrovica were the last
three regions where the MUP was still suspected of being active.18 The radio station
was in fact a small operational headquarters and was apparently still receiving instruc-
tions from Belgrade. Several arms, a computer, files and the transmitter were con-
fiscated and the special police officers were expelled to Serbia for non-compliance.
Three days later a similar move was made on a house in Velika Hoca in a night-
time raid. In their enthusiasm German engineers placed a somewhat oversized explo-
sive charge to blast the door, enabling the troops at the main base five kilometers
away to hear the raid taking place. Obviously, such actions left an unfavorable impres-
sion on the general Serb population. A similar facility was discovered, but this time
the operators had already left. While the Albanians were very pleased to see the
remains of control from Belgrade removed by KFOR, these actions caused much
anxiety amongst the Serbs.19
Radical Serb elements continued to orchestrate a slanderous campaign, even after
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the radio transmitter was taken off the air. Most of the complaints, however, were
spontaneously reported by the local population that simply wanted to draw attention
to their perilous position. Within the Serb community it was mostly the displaced
persons who made their case for rapid evacuation to Serbia by painting an ever-
gloomier picture about the humanitarian and security situation in the upper part of
Orahovac. The most serious of all charges concerned murder, abductions and disap-
pearances at the hand of Albanians in general and the UÇK in particular. This threat
was very real and traumatic for the Serbs, as kidnapping and murder were taking
place all over Kosovo. However, inter-ethnic crime did not take place at the rate
claimed by many Serbs. During the lawless first week following KFOR’s entry there
were four verified cases of kidnapping and murder in Orahovac. A ‘drive-by shoot-
ing’ by Albanians at a bar left one elderly man dead and two wounded in August.
The angry Serb population became very aggressive when a Dutch officer came to
pay his respects the next day. There was also an example of a Serb shooting anoth-
er Serb and a Serb shooting two Albanians. The constant stream of reports on abduc-
tions and the claim that KFOR was doing nothing about them continued through-
out the first months, but was contradicted by the UNHCR, whose local officer claimed
that ‘the fact that so few security incidents have happened’ in Orahovac was proof
of their ‘military professionalism.’ Additionally, her boss, Deputy Special Represen-
tative for Humanitarian Affairs Dennis McNamara, found all the international organ-
izations he encountered during a visit very positive about the Task Force’s protec-
tion role.20 Dozens of times, the troops pulled out to check Serbs’ claims of Serb
men being held in buildings around the city, but after June, when one person abduct-
ed by the UÇK was recovered by German troops in the village of Mala Krusa, none
of the claims could be confirmed. The problem was that the Serbs gave KFOR crim-
inal investigators little to go on in these cases, while their claims were often highly
exaggerated. Claims made to the press about missing husbands and sons were often
presented as recent incidents, while they had most often occurred in the previous
year. ‘This was the main problem we faced’ Van Loon recalled, ‘there was always a
nucleus of truth in their stories, but they had a strong tendency to exaggerate. If one
person had been killed they had to make it ten, otherwise they feared they might
not be taken seriously.’21
Although the claims of Serb transgressions that were filed by the Albanians were
also often hard to verify and at times implausible, the trust they displayed in KFOR
allowed Dutch and German MPs to conduct serious investigations into their allega-
tions. An attempt was made to create a mechanism for the Serbs to officially file
their complaints with KFOR at a desk in the Serb quarter, but so soon after the
NATO bombardments and occupation that upset their lives so dramatically, there
was a lack of trust in KFOR. ‘We were after all still the enemy,’ Van Loon acknowl-
edged.22 He therefore asked Astrid van Genderen-Stort, a Dutch UNHCR field offi-
cer responsible for the area, to open a bureau for Serb complaints and collect testi-
monies. She also had to acknowledge, however, that the Serbs presented little veri-
fiable or concrete evidence and little was to come out of the initiative until the fol-
lowing year, when Serb trust in KFOR and UNMIK was growing locally.23
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Dutch operations were complicated by the problem of being viewed as partisan
by the Serbs. ‘The sooner the Dutch leave Orahovac, the better. They’re worse than
the Germans,’ said Mirjana. ‘The soldiers are not so bad,’ another woman from Ora-
hovac argued, ‘but the officers are terrible.’ In both Orahovac and Velika Hoca, Serbs
offered the troops coffee and, despite some outbursts of animosity after incidents,
the soldiers were mostly engaging in friendly conversation with the population. The
officers, however, were often seen as taking unpopular measures and were continu-
ously countering or nuancing the claims made by Serbs to the world press. Dobri-
la Vitosevic, who later worked for the OSCE, remembered many friendly Dutch sol-
diers. She found them mostly sympathetic, often very young and nervous at times
when patrolling the narrow streets of the Serb quarter at night. Three months into
the operation she perceived the Dutch as overall more neutral.24 But it was the arrest
of alleged war criminals that left the most negative impression of the Dutch amongst
the Serbs. 
An icon of the stream of negative publicity against KFOR in Orahovac in those
early months was Milka, an elderly woman notorious for her wild claims to the press
corps. As cameras flocked to the Serbian quarter of Orahovac during the visit of UN
Special Representative De Mello in late June, she told the assembled journalists that
her husband had been kidnapped by the UÇK from her house the previous night.
When the Dutch commander, already familiar with her wild allegations, heard her
make these claims he demanded to be immediately shown the room from which her
husband had been taken. Milka was suddenly less eager and was only willing to do
so after the Dutch officer repeatedly insisted they get to the bottom of this. Upon
entering the alleged crime scene, cameras present, the room turned out to be full
of spiderwebs and covered in a thick layer of dust, with no footprints or other sign
of recent activity. Several weeks thereafter, a CNN reporter approached Van Loon to
show video footage of a Serb man who was allegedly mistreated by local Albanians.
‘This man had definitely had one hell of a beating’ the commander recalled, ‘no
doubt about it.’ The American reporter then asked for a direct reaction from Van
Loon, confronted him with his claim to be doing all he could to protect the Serbs.
She left the video tape running in the background and on the screen appeared Milka,
claiming that this was her husband. The previous day, however, Milka had claimed
to another journalist that her husband had been murdered. Confronted with the
miraculous resurrection of Milka’s spouse, CNN destroyed the tape. 
A very real problem was the lack of freedom of movement for the Serbs. Although
they were protected rather than interned by NATO forces, there was no denying that
they were living in a ghetto. The Serb press particularly liked to draw a parallel
between the Serb quarter in Orahovac and the ‘Warsaw Ghetto.’ The Yugoslav gov-
ernment website called it ‘the first ghetto since the Second World War.’25 The Serbs
had apparently learned, most likely from the well-known pictures of Bosnian Mus-
lim ‘concentration camp’ victims in Trnopolje in 1992, that evoking memories of the
Second World War was still a very effective way of making one’s case vis-à-vis the
Western powers. The media quickly picked up the historically charged term, which
was also used for other Serb enclaves such as Kosovo Polje.26 Even Van Loon open-
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ly used the term ghetto, but he argued there simply was no other way of guarding
the vulnerable minorities. Serbian media subsequently gave a spin to this remark,
making it sound as if ‘the ghetto’ was created by KFOR and considered ‘a good thing’
by the Dutch commander.27
The problem of the protection of Serbs and other minorities was similar else-
where in Kosovo. ‘We tried everything we could to avert revenge attacks, but we just
did not always succeed,’ Van Loon acknowledged.28 As long as they stayed inside
the cordon provided by KFOR, the soldiers could protect the Serbs reasonably well,
but once they left the secluded zones, they immediately became targets. This became
dramatically clear when fourteen Serb farmers were brutally murdered as they tried
to work their fields in Kosovo Polje in the central British zone of Kosovo. For the
British, it was particularly painful that this atrocity took place in their sector, as they
were generally lauded for the close protection they provided to the Serbs and other
minorities. Unlike some other contingents they seemed to let the mission – the cre-
ation of a secure environment – prevail over force protection measures. The depart-
ing Force Commander Mike Jackson felt his troops had reached the limit of what
they could do. Upon his return to Britain in November 1999, the general was sat-
isfied with many of the aspects of the mission his force had accomplished under
extremely harsh circumstances, but public security remained the most worrying task.
‘As I left, it was the only thing I felt we had not yet got to full grips with,’ the gen-
eral admitted, but he did not regard this the result of a lack of effort on the part of
his troops. He used the example of British soldiers living in Serb apartments where
they were isolated to underline that he felt that KFOR had reached the limits of what
a military force could do, since soldiers could not change ‘attitudes, cultures and
people’s perceptions.’29
In Orahovac, a substantial part of the Serb population was eager to leave, but
Serbs could not possibly march to the Serbian or Montenegrin border safely. A group
of four men who tried to run the gauntlet went missing on their way to Montene-
gro in the Italian KFOR zone near Peç. Escorted convoys therefore had to be organ-
ized. In this process, neither KFOR nor the UNHCR, in charge of the evacuation of
refugees and displaced persons, could do much right in the eyes of the Serbs. ‘We
don’t escort individual Serbs out of Kosovo,’ Major Roy Abels told the press. ‘We
don’t want to be seen deporting Serbs. They must leave on a flagged UN convoy.’
In Orahovac, Van Genderen-Stort was faced with the daunting task of managing the
UN refugee agency’s evacuation list. Belgrade accused the agency of helping to ‘eth-
nically cleanse’ Kosovo of Serbs, while Albanians were suspicious that she was help-
ing alleged Serb war criminals to escape.30 Although the vast majority of those Serbs
who had been involved in war crimes had left Kosovo prior to KFOR’s entry, a num-
ber of suspects remained at large in the province. And while the Serbs complained
about a lack of sufficient protection and a lack of freedom of movement, the Alba-
nians blamed KFOR for not doing enough to bring these Serb war criminals to jus-
tice.31 These two problems, the protection of Serbs and the Albanians’ preoccupa-
tion with the criminals among them, were closely entwined and formed the tricki-
est part of an already delicate balancing act performed by NATO troops in Oraho-
vac.
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War Crimes 
The legacy of war crimes in Kosovo was a highly politicized issue in the direct after-
math of the war. The Dutch military found themselves smack in the middle of the
controversy over the role that NATO soldiers were to perform in the pursuit of jus-
tice. Their intense involvement in the investigations of the atrocities and in the more
divisive role in the apprehension of indicted war criminals resulted from the con-
vergence of incentives on the political-strategic level and on the tactical level. The
subsequent controversy over this military task was the result of a serious underesti-
mation of the implications of the unprecedented public security mandate bestowed
on a military force.
On the political-strategic level the first motive for the relatively active policy in
pursuit of war crimes suspect was the view – generally accepted in western policy
circles by 1999 – that without justice chances of reconciliation and peace between
the formerly warring parties and ethnic groups were slim in a post-war society. Inter-
vening forces had been hesitant in bringing the perpetrators to trial in places such
as Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia. NATO forces in Bosnia, mainly as a result of fear
of ‘mission creep,’ the loss of neutrality, escalation and reprisals against troops, had
only slowly and grudgingly accepted its role in the arrests of suspected war crimi-
nals. Many would claim this was one of the key factors contributing to the faltering
long-term peace process in Bosnia. 
In Kosovo, there was a second force at work on the political level. NATO’s cred-
ibility in the aftermath of the war drove Western powers to become more eager in
the pursuit of justice than before. The bombing campaign had been – and contin-
ued to be – the subject of heated debate amongst diplomats, politicians, internation-
al lawyers and academics, with some claiming it was illegal because it was not explic-
itly authorized by the UN Security Council and others arguing that it was legal under
the evolving body of international humanitarian law.32 Western governments back-
ing the intervention and other adherents of the latter view were eager to show the
world that Serb atrocities in the previous two years at least legitimized NATO’s
‘humanitarian intervention’ in Kosovo. Moreover, late May 1999, the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia had indicted Slobodan Milosevic and four other
Yugoslav top government officials for war crimes committed in Kosovo. The timing
of the indictment – at the height of the ever-more controversial bombing campaign
– was clearly no coincidence, particularly since it preceded his indictment for war
crimes committed years earlier in Croatia and Bosnia. 
On the tactical level soldiers, were not particularly interested in justifying the
bombing campaign. It was the way the region’s recent history affected their daily
work that drove the Dutch to become heavily involved in the issue of war crimes.
The municipality over which the Dutch-led Task Force exercised temporary authori-
ty had been particularly hard hit by the Milosevic regime in its indiscriminate efforts
to eradicate the UÇK in the previous two years. It was also amongst the first to be
ethnically cleansed after NATO had started the bombing campaign in late March.
Serb security forces had left the municipality with one of the highest concentrations
of war crime sites in Kosovo, which were primarily located in the triangle between
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Orahovac, Zrze and Mala Krusa.33 Although the ‘intense emotional anger’ that one
UNHCR worker found in Orahovac was perhaps even stronger than elsewhere, this
still did not make Orahovac unique. What created this specific problem in Oraho-
vac was the unforeseen consequence of the rapid advance – ahead of the officially
agreed schedule in the Military Technical Agreement – by Dutch and German troops
on the area on 14 June and the subsequent withdrawal of the Serb security forces.
This caught many Serbs who had considered escaping the area by surprise, includ-
ing some of the small minority of those directly involved in some of the atrocities,
who were now locked up in the upper part of town and in Velika Hoca.34
On the very first day the Dutch entered the area, they were confronted with the
legacy of war crimes. The local UÇK commander agreed not to interfere with the
withdrawing Serb troops and special police, but on the condition that as soon as
Serbs had left the area, the Dutch commander would visit Velika Krusa, a request
to which Van Loon agreed. After the uninterrupted withdrawal of the Serb forces,
he and his intelligence officer, Captain Chris Brouns, followed Ismet Tara to the vil-
lage ten kilometers south of Orahovac, where they approached a little barn adjoin-
ing a house. As they closed in on the building an unbearable smell of rotting flesh
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made it almost impossible for them to breathe. What they subsequently witnessed
there undoubtedly influenced their future actions. Upon entering the barn, they had
to be careful not to step on decaying, half-burned corpses that filled the hallway. ‘On
your birthday,’ one of the officers wrote to his wife, ‘instead of decently calling you,
I visited my first mass grave. By now, I seem to have grown accustomed to such
scenes, but the first forty-five burned corpses is something I will never forget.’35 Veli-
ka Krusa’s crime site was the first to be uncovered in Kosovo after the war and,
together with the killings in nearby Bela Crkva, the atrocity was among the six inci-
dents listed in the ICTY’s initial indictment of Milosevic.
Three weeks later, Chief Superintendent John Bunn of New Scotland Yard, the
British detective the ICTY put in charge of uncovering and investigating the first
graves at Bela Crkva, summed up his findings of the crime in a matter-of-fact way.
‘There were sixty bodies, all shot,’ he whispered to a reporter as they stood quietly
to the rear of an emotional reburial ceremony. ‘There were seven children under
twelve, including a four-year-old. There were three women, one over sixty. They were
killed in individual little groups along the river. It was all quite deliberate.’ Four oth-
ers were killed elsewhere.36 More crime scenes were soon uncovered in the area,
amongst them the burial site of the more than one hundred men summarily exe-
cuted in Pusto Selo. In April, this site had become widely noted in the Western press
after NATO had released imagery taken by an aerial reconnaissance flight of two
long parallel lines, each made up of several dozen mounds of dirt. This evidence
had become disputed after the Dutch daily newspaper Algemeen Dagblad and Agence
France Presse ran a story casting doubt on NATO claims of a gravesite.37 The Alliance
turned out to be right this time. 
KFOR was obliged to fully cooperate with the tribunal, but the two ICTY teams
were still pleasantly surprised by the generosity of the Task Force and the nearby
Dutch engineer battalion.38 ‘We could not have operated effectively without the assis-
tance of others, particularly the Dutch army’ Bunn wrote to Van Loon after finish-
ing his assignment. The support provided to the forensic teams ranged from around
the clock protection of mass graves, de-mining and extensive logistical help. In a let-
ter to General Jackson, the ICTY chief of investigations in The Hague, John Ralston,
thanked the battalion for doing ‘virtually everything we have asked of them in a
prompt and efficient manner.’39 The support of the investigations went far beyond
what was expected and included investigations by Dutch and German MPs of crime
sites with less than five victims, which were outside the scope of the ICTY’s respon-
sibility at that point.
This brings us to the second reason for the Task Force’s intense involvement –
or in this case entanglement – in the war crimes issue. The Dutch partly brought
the intensity of its involvement in the pursuit of war criminals upon on itself by
their proactive stance taken directly after entry. The ‘complaints bureau,’ the initia-
tive that gave the local population the opportunity to air their grievances at the
makeshift KFOR police station, was initially aimed at relieving some of the emotion-
al pressure in Orahovac. However, it soon posed the commander with a dilemma.
While lecturing to young cadets at the Royal Military Academy in Breda two years
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later, he confronted them with – what was to him – a rhetorical question: ‘do I real-
ly want to know all this, for if I know, I will have to do something.’40 Clearly, the
initiative entailed the danger of raising the expectations among the Albanian popu-
lation that KFOR would take the next step and start arresting. In the early weeks,
the commander repeatedly informed the Dutch Ministry of Defense that KFOR would
have to move on war crimes suspects at some point and these intentions even made
the headlines of a local newspaper in The Hague.41
As the battalion’s staff officers grew increasingly confident of the reliability of the
criminal investigations conducted by the MPs and intelligence section, they became
eager to move on the suspects, or at least to not let them escape to safety on UN-
flagged convoys under KFOR protection. The pieces of the puzzle started to fall in
place as a substantial number of the eyewitness accounts were corroborated by doc-
umentary evidence. Early in July, the UÇK handed over to the Task Force’s intelli-
gence section the remains of a MUP archive it had seized from the police station
after the Serb withdrawal. This archive included personal files with pictures of all
adult inhabitants of Orahovac and names of units, their commanders and the areas
for which they had been responsible. In nearby factories, lists of reserve police and
their working schedules were found while pictures of paramilitary units and lists of
weapons distributed to army reservists were discovered in houses in which they were
billeted during the war.42 The Task Force’s steadily expanding intelligence database
included over two thousand names of Serbs war crimes suspects, their families, wit-
nesses, as well as information on UÇK members and their political affiliations.43
Van Loon’s confidence in his men’s investigations showed when, during the sec-
ond inter-ethnic encounter in Orahovac, an UÇK representative started questioning
the records of the Serb delegates in the past massacres. The commander boldly inter-
vened, claiming, in the words of the UNMIK representative present, ‘he had made
enough investigations and had sojourned sufficiently long in the area to know who
was a war criminal and who was not.’44 By temporarily taking the chair of the judge,
the commander may have stepped out of line, but his defense of the Serb delegates
appeared effective in silencing the representative whose sole aim was to obstruct
inter-ethnic rapprochement. ICTY investigators acknowledged the quality of the Dutch
military investigations, calling it ‘solid investigative information’ and the ‘very pro-
fessional reports’ were transferred and used by the International Tribunal in The
Hague.45
The third and, from the local commander’s perspective, decisive motive for active-
ly seeking out suspects was its pivotal role in the accomplishment of the primary
mission. Bringing perpetrators to justice and thereby preventing the UÇK from under-
mining KFOR’s temporary monopoly on the use of force touched upon the very heart
of ‘creating a secure environment.’ Paradoxically, the most unpopular measure
amongst Serbs – singling out war crimes suspects from their midst – was the most
important measure to protect the Serb community that was harboring them. The
presence of these suspects was one of the key contributing factors to the radicaliza-
tion of the Albanian population and therefore one of the prime motives for violence
throughout Kosovo.46 Obviously, this argument would fail to appease the Serbs, as
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they were often in denial of much of the atrocities that had taken place during the
war, but especially now that the UÇK was in the process of losing its grip over Koso-
var society, it was feared that former guerrillas would move on Serbs and Roma indi-
viduals they suspected in order to assert their authority. The UÇK was angry for
being controlled, disarmed and curtailed in their actions, while they felt that Serb
war criminals were let off the hook and allowed to remain in control of large stash-
es of arms.47 Taking a proactive stance by arresting thus became a way of telling
Ismet Tara and his men to back off, to refrain from taking the law into their own
hands and to leave the issue to KFOR and UNMIK to solve.48 In addition to assert-
ing KFOR’s authority and maintaining credibility toward the UÇK, the Dutch deputy
brigade commander in Prizren, Colonel van den Aker, argued to the Dutch chief of
the defense staff that arrests were likely to eventually contribute to an amelioration
of inter-ethnic relations, since most suspects were influential men in Serb society.49
Arrests
The Task Force was ready to take the next step and arrest when the opportunity
arose, but Bernard Kouchner and KFOR headquarters initiated the first action.50 Both
UNMIK and KFOR were eager to show the world – and the UÇK – that their poli-
cy towards war criminals would be different from that in Bosnia. In pursuing their
goals, both organizations temporarily ignored two legal obstacles. KFOR’s mandate
did not allow troops to actively seek out war crimes suspects. The Rules of Engage-
ment allowed KFOR to arrest ICTY indictees only when encountered in the course
of ‘normal activities’ and nobody but Milosevic and his top officials had been indict-
ed for crimes committed in Kosovo.51 However, there was a precedent that made it
very likely that no more than a few eyebrows would be raised over such creative
interpretation of the rules. Acting without an official indictment or warrant, British
troops had arrested the first war crimes suspect in late June in the village of Slov-
inje near Pristina. To the delight of local Albanians, they actively sought out Serb
militiaman Dragisa Peica and held him under provisions of British military law. The
British acted on three eyewitness accounts from the returning local Albanian popu-
lation, who accused him of involvement in the murder of 43 village residents two
months earlier.52 Although this was clearly not the preferred method, a lynching
party was likely to have been averted, and the protests of a few local Serbs were
unlikely to be heard amidst the avalanche of news coming out of Kosovo. 
Despite the absence of any formal indictments and a clear policy for search and
arrest operations UNMIK and KFOR decided to push ahead in Orahovac, where the
best opportunity for arrests presented itself. In the course of July, both headquarters
had become aware of the Task Force’s elaborate criminal investigations into the
actions and in some cases whereabouts of possible war criminals.53 Moreover, the
German brigade headquarters had proven its willingness to engage in arrest by giv-
ing an overall broad interpretation to the public security mandate. Orahovac there-
fore seemed the right place to start. With the expected arrival of the Russians in Ora-
hovac in the second half of July, both KFOR and UNMIK in Pristina were becom-
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ing restless.54 Substantial support from the local unit was necessary to execute such
actions successfully and apparently, KFOR expected no such cooperation from the
Russians. Primarily from evidence gathered by the Dutch investigations, KFOR and
UNMIK legal staff drew up a list of sixteen suspects. The majority of them were
from Velika Hoca, a traditional stronghold of radical Serbs which, as well as produc-
ing some of the worst offenders, had also been a prime target of UÇK attacks and
atrocities during the war.55
On 25 July, KFOR headquarters ordered the German brigade commander to arrest
these sixteen Serb suspects within a week.56 Although he was offered British Spe-
cial Air Service (SAS) and US Special Forces to perform the job, it would prove total-
ly unrealistic to capture this many people in so little time. In Bosnia, months of
preparation usually preceded any such operation. In Kosovo, Van Loon came to under-
stand why NATO had such difficulty arresting people like Karadzjic and Mladic as
long as they were moving around in their own community. Of the majority of the
sixteen persons, he reported back that – if they were indeed still in the area – they
had simply not yet been traced.57 The Dutch themselves were particularly keen on
one man on whose actions their MPs had collected horrendous witness accounts.
However, even though his wife was still living at home in Velika Hoca and while he
was expected to be moving around the area, the Task Force never tracked him down.
Finding such a person would have taken several months of intense observations and
search operations and once found, the Dutch expected him to put up a fight, if given
the chance.58
Over the next few weeks, KFOR gradually scaled down its ambitions from its
original list of sixteen persons. In that process, the targets were selected on the basis
of the feasibility of their arrest – the certainty of their whereabouts and risk involved
– rather than the severity of the charges against them. The commander of the unit
of German Special Forces, the Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK), whom the German
brigade commander had flown in for the mission, made the final selection of three
persons.59 Weeks of intense preparations and observation in the area preceded what
became known as ‘Operation K-3.’ The German commandos inconspicuously joined
the regular KFOR patrols to perform reconnaissance in the area and to assess the
risks involved.60 The Dutch minister of defense agreed to the mission, but made it
very clear that its own Special Forces in Kosovo, the Korps Commando Troepen (KCT),
were not to be used for this or any other arrests and were to stick to their original
assignment that – undoubtedly much to the commandos’ frustration – was strictly
limited to force protection and reconnaissance.61 The actual operation was swift and
highly successful. The three men brought in were the former mayor Andjelko
Kolasinac, the doctor Vakoslav Simic and the local bar owner Stanko Levic. They
were rapidly handed over to UNMIK police and transferred to Prizren, where a hear-
ing was held that same day at the newly created district court. Although it had been
KFOR investigations and KFOR forces performing the action, UNMIK – with KFOR’s
silent approval – tried to make the operation sound like a UN show in their joint
press statement.62
The Albanian population was delighted, while the Serbs were angry. Representa-
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tives of both groups offered sharply contrasting accounts of what occurred that morn-
ing. From hearsay, a resident of the Serb quarter recalled a dangerous and violent
operation, that involved shooting, while little children were in the streets. An Alban-
ian interpreter present at the scene was most of all impressed by the swiftness and
professionalism of the operation, which according to him involved little or no vio-
lence.63 Serb frustration over the arrests was understandable. To the extent that the
Serbs were willing to acknowledge the crimes committed the previous years – and
as far as they were aware of what had taken place – they argued that the real crim-
inals had already fled from amongst their midst prior to the arrival of KFOR.64 Their
anger was fuelled by the apparent lack of willingness on the part of KFOR and
UNMIK to arrest UÇK leaders involved in war crimes committed against them dur-
ing the civil war. In Orahovac alone, they claimed there were some forty cases of
missing Serbs since the war started a year earlier. Although the new ICTY prosecu-
tor, Carla del Ponte, proclaimed that her office would investigate civilian and mili-
tary leaders of ‘whichever party to the conflict’ who were suspected of committing
crimes during the conflict, KFOR was letting UÇK leaders to hold on to influential
positions in the newly formed TMK, at least for the moment.65 KFOR and the UN
police would arrest several former UÇK members on charges of war crimes after
December 2001, but in 1999 the prosecution of NATO’s erstwhile allies, whose coop-
eration was indispensable at this point, was low on the list of priorities of the West-
ern powers.66
The impact of the arrests on the Serbs became apparent in the days that followed.
Having wielded its authority and feeling strong and confident, the Task Force exploit-
ed the shock-effect in an attempt to seize their substantial arsenal of small arms.
Troops on patrol put up posters calling upon the Serb population to turn in their
weapons voluntarily on the next Saturday in the little square in the Serb quarter. The
threat of house-to-house searches and the possibility of arrest for illegal possession
of arms after the deadline made the result nothing less than spectacular. That Sat-
urday, people were standing in line until midnight for their turn, handing in hun-
dreds of weapons. They even came to the collection point with wheelbarrows loaded
with guns and ammunition. Most of the weapons were high-quality Kalashnikovs,
but the Serbs also handed in machine guns and a vast amount of ammunition. The
most interesting catch of the total of 461 arms handed in was ten sniper rifles – the
exact number the battalion’s intelligence section expected to be in Serb hands.67
From the archives they had seized, the Dutch got a pretty good idea of the number
of weapons held in the Serbs areas. The action was repeated in Velika Hoca and
resulted in 96 similar weapons. Although a substantial number for a village of approx-
imately one thousand people, this was unlikely to have been anything near their total
arsenal. The Serbs of Orahovac and Velika Hoca had been sitting on enough small
arms to equip an army battalion or almost enough to arm all men of military age.
The weapons seizure was an important step in curtailing the UÇK by preventing
Ismet Tara from using their presence as an argument for obstinacy. 
After the action on 20 August, KFOR stopped search-and-arrest operations in the
area. Apparently reminded of the complexities of such operations, KFOR headquar-
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ters refrained from pushing for the arrest of the ‘list of sixteen.’ There also seemed
to be less hurry, since the blockades were effectively keeping the Russians out of the
area. Instead, the Dutch were left to pursue their own policy of arrest, which relied
on the opportunities provided by the encirclement of the two Serb enclaves by hos-
tile Albanians. War crimes suspects were amongst those most desperate to leave the
enclaves and avoid prosecution by seeking sanctuary in Serbia proper. However, since
the Albanians were on the prowl, they were left with no other option than to join
the UNHCR-organized convoys, or stay. The escort provided by KFOR to these con-
voys allowed the soldiers to screen the evacuation list, thereby enabling them to close
the net around the city and Velika Hoca. This method was far less risky, but required
patience and a certain freedom of action, since the Dutch and Germans had to act
swiftly as opportunities for arrest arose during the screening at a roadblock. Anoth-
er possibility for arrest was for KFOR troops to spot a suspect when on a regular
patrol. 
By acting on opportunities for arrest as they presented themselves in the field,
Task Force Orahovac chose not to merely wait for the UNMIK prosecutor to formal-
ly seek KFOR assistance on a case-to-case basis. Although acting on formal indict-
ments by the prosecutor was the preferred and often followed procedure, his office
was not sufficiently organized during those first months, and continued to function
poorly for some time. KFOR was at this point UNMIK’s primary source of informa-
tion, since the military was the only institution capable of conducting criminal inves-
tigations. In seizing the initiative, the peacekeepers entered uncharted legal waters,
but Van Loon was confident he had sufficient KFOR and UNMIK backing for this
policy. He was supported by his German brigade commander and was working under
the Dutch translation of the German public security directive that clearly allowed
arrest in cases of suspicion of genocide, murder, manslaughter, rape, deportation as
well as common crimes, even in the absence of a court order.68 Moreover, in late
June he had reached an understanding with the first UN special representative, Vieira
Sergio de Mello, his German legal advisor Hansjörg Strohmeyer and the local ICTY
representative, all of whom had become aware of the potentially explosive situation
during their visit to Orahovac. Under this agreement with UNMIK, the Task Force
was allowed to initiate arrests on the basis of its own investigations and intelligence
while handling cases according to Dutch and German legal practice.69 Local KFOR
troops would only arrest while performing their normal duties and not actively seek
out suspects in their homes. At the earliest possible time detainees were to be trans-
ferred to UNMIK, whose prosecutor was to review those not yet indicted within 24
hours. In all cases, the arrests performed by KFOR were confirmed by formal indict-
ments. Meanwhile, the ICTY and UNMIK agreed in July on a basic distribution of
labor for Kosovo as a whole. The prosecution of ‘smaller fish,’ the local henchmen,
was left to local UN-organized courts, enabling the court in The Hague to aim for
the ‘big fish,’ the political leaders and military commanders who were believed to
have ordered these crimes. The ICTY would review its own role in the prosecution
of the smaller cases at a later stage.70
Having soldiers progress from catching offenders in the act to arrest and deten-
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tion on the basis of investigations of crimes committed several months earlier was
like entering a legal minefield. However, UNMIK’s fear of suspects escaping prose-
cution clearly surpassed worries about delegating its powers of arrest to KFOR troops,
who could be making procedural mistakes. Without this policy based on criminal
investigations performed by the military, most suspects would after all have easily
slipped through the judicial net, which was still under construction and far from
complete. 
It was not long before the fourth Serb war crimes suspect from Orahovac, Nenad
Matic, was arrested by the Task Force. In early September, shortly after the UNMIK
court issued his arrest warrant, Matic was found trying to leave the enclave on a
medical convoy of 130 persons. Four other Serb men had been denied access to this
convoy on the grounds of ongoing investigations against them.71 Matic’s arrest caused
relatively little excitement amongst the Serbs. The controversy would only start in
late September as another four suspects on a UNHCR convoy were arrested during
a thoroughly prepared operation at a KFOR checkpoint, which had been strength-
ened for the occasion by two armored vehicles and German MPs. The Dutch sus-
pected all four of participation in mass killings, but UNMIK had issued an arrest
warrant for only one of the four, Danilo Misic. The other three, his brother Radosav
Misic, Cedomir Jovanovic and Novica Krstic, were indicted after their transfer to
UNMIK. These arrests caused quite some anxiety among the Serbs and some short-
lived hostility, which was felt by the officers who went to the Serb quarter to explain
the action, but no physical violence ensued. The Dutch noticed how ‘the people
stopped greeting us and stopped talking German.’ Foot patrols were initially sus-
pended in the Serb area, but resumed the next day when the situation appeared rel-
atively calm.72
UNMIK did not actively participate in the arrest on 24 September, but the Dutch
Ministry of Defense nevertheless emphasized the role of the UN police. KFOR still
had the primary responsibility for policing and performing the arrests and the action
was led by a Dutch officer.73 The next suspect, Arsenije Vitoshevic, was arrested on
7 October. He was arrested during a ‘routine patrol,’ but his arrest warrant, issued
by UNMIK several days earlier, is likely to have made his neighborhood a popular
destination for KFOR patrols.74 Later that month, four Serb men reported themselves
to KFOR after having been denied access to a planned UNHCR-convoy on the basis
of ongoing investigations. After a conference with the UN prosecutor in Prizren, two
of the men were cleared of charges. The other two, Nenad Misic and Miograd Gji-
novic, turned out to be indicted and were subsequently arrested by Dutch and Ger-
man MPs in the presence of UNMIK police. The international police were prepar-
ing to take over the lead in public security and already contributed to investigations,
but had no official jurisdiction at this point.75
Controversy
The Serb war crimes suspects in Orahovac were arrested with relative ease and KFOR
encountered fairly limited hostility from the population after the initial shock and
360 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf1-12  14-11-2005  16:06  Pagina 360
indignation. This begs the question as to why the Dutch Minister of Defense Frank
de Grave and his principal military advisor the Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS)
Lieutenant Admiral Luuk Kroon were eager to restrain their troops in the pursuit of
what appeared to be a successful policy. None of the actions involved any shooting
and no serious resistance was encountered during any of the actions. Moreover, the
German brigade commander, UNMIK, UNHCR, OSCE and visiting representatives
from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs had all expressed their support for the
active policy of local Dutch troops. The Dutch ministers of defense and foreign affairs
had also pledged in parliament ‘to interpret the mandate to support ICTY in the
broadest possible way.’76 Quite remarkably, attention from the Dutch media for the
actions was almost nil, which meant that no thorny questions were being put for-
ward in parliament.77
However, similar to his colleagues in most troop-contributing nations, the Dutch
minister of defense was not enthusiastic about peacekeepers sticking their necks out
further than he considered necessary. The Dutch-led Task Force was clearly more
active than others in the pursuit of war criminals, arresting in a mere four months
eleven of a total of approximately forty suspects apprehended by KFOR and UNMIK
police between June 1999 and August 2000.78 At the Ministry of Defense there ini-
tially had been little awareness of the implications of the policing authority it had
allowed its troops to assume in Kosovo. Alarm bells only started to go off at the chief
of defense staff’s operational center, the Defensie Crisis Beheersings Centrum (DCBC)
after the arrest of the four Serbs in late September triggered criticism in Serb cir-
cles.79 Van Loon was called upon to explain his policy and procedures for arrest and
detention. His elaboration on the joint local ICTY, UNMIK and KFOR policy was
apparently news on the home front.80 He emphasized the coordinated civil-military
effort, the absence of violence or any serious risk to his troops, and the essential
role played by these arrests in keeping the Albanians from taking the law in their
own hands. However, his arguments failed to sooth his national taskmasters. Rude-
ly awakened to the implications of the broad interpretation given to the mandate by
its troops in the field, the Dutch Ministry of Defense stepped on the brakes. By early
October it instructed its troops to act only on specific requests for support by UNMIK,
which first had to be forwarded to the chief of the defense staff in writing – prefer-
ably but not necessarily prior to action. Despite worries over the lack of policing
skills among regular troops, the instructions emphasized again that the Dutch MPs
in Orahovac were not to assist in any arrests since they were a national asset and
officially not part of KFOR.81
Although no arrests followed after 8 October, serious trouble started three two
weeks later when the UNHCR complained to KFOR headquarters that by the con-
tinued screening of convoys for war crimes suspects, the peacekeepers were ham-
pering the flow of Serb refugees from Orahovac, who ‘could regard it as de facto
detention.’82 To Van Loon this critique came as a surprise since cooperation with
the local UNHCR branch had been good. Moreover, only one month earlier the chief
of UNHCR in Kosovo, Deputy Special Representative Dennis McNamara, had visit-
ed Orahovac and emphasized the importance of the early arrest of war crimes sus-
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pects in decreasing ethnic tension. He specifically allowed evacuation only after ‘prior
clearance by ICTY and resident KFOR contingent’ and to that end he called for the
evacuation of those Serbs eager to leave to be phased over a number of weeks.83 In
refuting the UNHCR’s critique, the Task Force commander was strongly backed by
the new German commander Brigadier Sauer, who dismissed the charges that KFOR
was restricting freedom of movement and engaged in ‘collective punishment.’84 Sauer
explained to the Force Commander Klaus Reinhardt: ‘I don’t like to explain why a
suspected war criminal with the assistance of KFOR was able to leave Kosovo and
avoid trial. Therefore I encourage further all soldiers under my command to contin-
ue to detain suspected war criminals.’85 Reinhardt was generally supportive of an
active policy of arrest, later claiming, ‘these war criminals by their very existence
make us toothless tigers. Everybody sees them there, still running around and show-
ing that you are weak.’86 Also his predecessor General Jackson, dwelling on his
Bosnia experience, was clear about the need for the military to apprehend war crim-
inals. ‘They are a force for bad, as long as they remain at large, even if they’re no
longer in any official appointment. Their influence is like that of Rasputin: it per-
vades, it sits there in the back.’87
In The Hague, such consideration – however crucial to the long-term success of
the mission in Kosovo – seemed to have lost out to concerns over the risks and polit-
ical implications of an active arrest policy. Dutch troops had received negative atten-
tion, more of which followed shortly when a UNHCR convoy escorted by Dutch and
German KFOR troops was attacked on its way to Montenegro by an angry Albanian
mob in the streets of Pec. Moreover, anxiety in The Hague over the unresolved block-
ade crisis persisted. As soon as ‘police primacy’ was transferred to UN Police on
paper on 27 October 1999, the Dutch Ministry of Defense sought to strip its forces
of any remaining law and order responsibilities. Although KFOR was no longer final-
ly responsible for police matters in the Prizren region, the transfer of police prima-
cy did not limit KFOR’s right to enforce criminal codes, conduct investigations or
make arrests.88 It merely transferred the lead to UN police and was interpreted as
such by the Germans in Prizren and the British, who had transferred police prima-
cy in Pristina two months earlier. Both contingents were still heavily involved in
policing and would continue to be so for the time to come. Giving the lead to UNMIK
should have been sufficient guarantee to put an end to what The Hague feared most,
the Task Force’s ‘own policy of arrest.’ The commander had already acquiesced to
acting only on official UNMIK arrest warrants. After all, since November his intel-
ligence officer and the Dutch and German MPs were cooperating closely with the
UN Police in Orahovac and sharing the criminal investigations and an intelligence
database. The fear of suspects slipping through the cracks was therefore substantial-
ly reduced. The Task Force wanted to keep the possibility of instantly acting on the
opportunity to arrest while executing their regular task or react immediately on a
call for support from UNMIK, which required freedom from prior clearance of indi-
vidual cases with The Hague.
On 12 November, the Ministry of Defense instructed Van Loon to stop arresting
any further war crimes suspects, even if UNMIK requested support for the appre-
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hension of indictees.89 This would lead to a rather awkward situation. Under their
KFOR mandate and the German public security directive, Dutch troops would be
allowed to arrest a common murderer, or to assist UN police in the arrest of per-
sons involved in an ordinary bar-fight, as had happened in the Serb quarter the pre-
vious day, yet national directives would prevent them from arresting or even assist-
ing in the arrest of someone involved in multiple murders of innocent civilians. Van
Loon protested, regarding it as unjustifiable to sit back and do nothing. He was sup-
ported by the new Dutch Deputy Brigade Commander Colonel P.K. Smit and, after
a conference with NATO headquarters, the national directive was quickly modified.
It now allowed support to arrests by UNMIK, but on the sole condition that the local
prosecutor submit a written request for support prior to action, to be reviewed and
approved by the chief of the defense staff in The Hague.90 Apart from assuming a
rather inappropriate legal role, he thus continued to involve himself in microman-
agement of the worst kind that would be unworkable for an officer on the ground
in charge of a checkpoint or foot patrol directly confronted with a suspect or with
an immediate request for support from UN police. 
Although founded in a healthy democratic aversion to military involvement in
law enforcement, the prime argument used by the chief of defense staff for restrain-
ing Dutch troops was risk aversion.91 Apart from worries about the lack of the nec-
essary skills among soldiers and fear of violent reprisals by the Serbs, there was an
understandable fear of procedural mistakes and resulting legal complications. Appar-
ently, there was a lack of confidence in the judgments of the German and Dutch
commanders on the ground, who regarded these risks as at best small, and at worst
acceptable for the accomplishment of the mission, which did allow for a continued
role in law enforcement until the civilian police were fully up to the job. In retro-
spect, Van Loon argued that arrests were the best force protection measure: 
If the Albanians would have taken revenge and started shooting each other with
Kalashnikovs – and I am one hundred percent sure that this would have happened
if we would have sat back and done nothing – me and my men would have been
caught in the middle, which would have inevitably resulted in dead and wounded
soldiers.92
A wide gap thus existed between the commander on the ground and The Hague in
their appreciation of the operational risks and the scope of the actual mission. How-
ever, further friction was averted when it became clear that the North Atlantic Coun-
cil in Brussels was preparing new guidelines for KFOR’s role in the arrest of war
crime suspects. The confusion over the powers of arrest was after all the result of
projecting soldiers into a law-and-order vacuum with an unclear mandate, consist-
ing of a hodgepodge of Rules of Engagement, orders and national instructions that
– all combined – left much room for interpretation. 
There were three related causes for the ineptitude of KFOR’s mandate for arrests.
First, although there had been no fundamental argument over KFOR’s involvement
as there had been in Bosnia, the persistent tendency of troop contributors to curtail
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the role of the military was a recipe for an unclear policy. Dutch political and mili-
tary leaders were certainly not alone in their fear of getting soldiers in over their
heads, and they followed a policy on war criminals in Kosovo that seemed in line
with that adopted by the Americans. While NATO’s political and military leaders may
have been eager to show the world the mass graves over which it had said to have
gone to war, and keen on seeing to it that those responsible faced trial, this did not
imply that they wanted to put their own troops and possibly their own careers on
the line. This tendency was the least strong with the British and the Germans, who
had proved willing to arrest in Bosnia and who had been amongst the staunchest
supporters of the war on Milosevic. It was strongest amongst the French and the
Italians, who had been inactive in Bosnia and who were hesitant in the arrest of
common criminals in Kosovo. When Javier Solana proposed by mid-June to stretch
the Rules of Engagement on arrest of suspected war criminals, the French and Ital-
ians were joined by the Greeks in their attempt to block a broader mandate for KFOR.
The Italian ambassador to NATO made it clear that Italian troops were far too busy
to support the ICTY in the pursuit of war criminals. The Greeks strongly opposed
any form of ‘search and arrest’ operations, while the French went as far as oppos-
ing a strong liaison between KFOR and the ICTY in Kosovo. Support from the Cana-
dian, Norwegian, Danish and Dutch ambassadors to a broader mandate envisaged
by the secretary general had resulted in a well-intentioned but murky compromise
in late June, calling for a strong liaison between KFOR and the ICTY and instruct-
ing KFOR to take ‘a proactive stand within means and capabilities.’93 This meant
that KFOR was stuck with the original Rules of Engagement that only allowed the
arrest of persons who were indicted by the ICTY or UNMIK encountered by KFOR
troops ‘while performing their assigned task.’94 This rule had been directly copied
from SFOR Rules of Engagement. 
Second, as was so often in the case Kosovo, there was a downside to the assumed
applicability of the experiences in Bosnia. In Bosnia, the ICTY and the military had
gradually grown accustomed to each other’s missions and to working together, which
did much for NATO’s acceptance of a role in the pursuit of post-war justice. Yet,
despite the different situation and mission in Kosovo, the narrowly defined role played
by SFOR prevailed in the perception of the peacekeepers role in both Brussels and
national capitals such as The Hague. To complicate matters, the execution of this
role in Bosnia was actually inconsistent with SFOR Rules of Engagement. Although
arresting ‘in the course of their normal military operations’ was the rule, SFOR troops
did nothing of the sort. Instead, it had become common practice in Bosnia that, after
a formal ICTY indictment – usually of a ‘big fish’ – and a request for support to
NATO, SFOR would mount a secret search-and-arrest operation. After months of
preparation, Special Forces were flown in from outside SFOR, who would deliver a
detainee directly to an ICTY-team in the area. For a local contingent there was no
other role than securing the outer ring of such an operation. The Dutch government
wholeheartedly supported this type of operation, as it was initiated by a fully opera-
tional international tribunal, ordered by NATO and performed by specialists, and
therefore entailed no direct responsibility or little political risk.
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The third source of confusion over KFOR’s mandate was that in Bosnia, this type
of arrest operation was perceived and performed as an operation on the margin of
the mission – like all other SFOR responsibilities outside the direct military scope.
Also in Kosovo, arrests by KFOR or support arrests by UN police continued to be
regarded by political and military leaders above the operational level as a role out-
side the ongoing military mission to provide a secure environment. This followed
from the lingering notion that peacekeepers were only there to provide an umbrel-
la of safety by separating and restraining the warring parties without having to go
into the messy business of exercising civil authority themselves. However, as the
arrests in Orahovac proved, KFOR’s mission, that of UN Police and the just-emerg-
ing and barely functional UNMIK judiciary were fully integrated into the chaotic
post-war situation. An UNMIK warrant by a district court – mostly against lower-
level war crimes suspects – was issued based on investigations by a KFOR battalion
and sometimes acted upon by the unit as the opportunity arose within a matter of
days, either with or without the local UN Police. Even though KFOR legal guidelines
on arrest and the German Brigade public security directive made apprehending on
the basis of suspicion of war crimes an integral part of the policing authority bestowed
in KFOR brigades and battalions, there was a prevailing tendency to view KFOR’s
large role in Kosovo’s interregnum as an aberration, which had to be corrected and
forgotten as soon as possible. This partially explains how, after a new mandate on
arrest was formulated by the North Atlantic Council on 17 November, the Dutch
DCBC seemed in denial of the preceding episode, claiming in an internal report that
‘as of now, assisting UNMIK in the arrest of persons is also part of KFOR’s mis-
sion.’95 It may come as no surprise that the Dutch planned to unilaterally change
its translation of the broad German directive on arrest and detention, thereby steer-
ing a different course from the Germans under which their troops were operating.
The new NATO directive was no great improvement. It rightfully put the prime
responsibility for arrest with UNMIK, now that there was a semblance of a UN police
and judiciary, but it failed to provide KFOR with the necessary flexibility on the tac-
tical level to successfully and swiftly support the police. Instead, it created addition-
al procedures that sought to limit rather than streamline KFOR support to UNMIK.
Before any action by KFOR, the North Atlantic Council required UN Police to for-
mally show its incapability to handle an arrest alone. An UNMIK request, preferably
written, was to precede any KFOR action and KFOR troops were only allowed to sup-
port and not to take over the arrest. As if there were not sufficient obstacles to oper-
ational freedom in this policy, the Dutch chief of the defense staff incorporated in
his national adaptation of the directive the prerogative to review and accept or decline
a compulsory written request for support beforehand. He further tried to limit involve-
ment of Dutch troops by adding the contradictory demand that, after his approval,
Dutch troops were only to arrest when confronted with an indictee during the exe-
cution of their ‘assigned tasks.’96 In practice this meant that, if the new procedures
were strictly followed, a Dutch military role in an arrest was only possible if troops
happened to be patrolling or manning a checkpoint with UN Police when they acci-
dentally ran into a war criminal after UNMIK had reported itself to be incapable of
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handling the arrest itself to Brussels, and only after the Dutch chief of defense staff
had agreed upon the Task Force’s support role. The same procedure was to be applied
to other serious crimes, unless the Dutch caught an offender in the act.97
The rules hardly lived up to the reality on the ground, but the Dutch artillery bat-
talion approached the end of its tour and the matter was left to rest. The second
combined Dutch-German Task Force in Orahovac took over in early December and
continued to arrest both regular crime suspects and alleged war criminals, although
not as frequently as Van Loon’s men. In late December, Dutch soldiers arrested Sava
Matic on charges of abduction and intimidation.98 In January 2000, during a rou-
tine identity check just outside Velika Hoca, two Serbs were arrested by Dutch KFOR
– again not in a support role – on UNMIK charges relating to crimes committed
during the civil war. Flexible interpretation of the rules allowed successful coopera-
tion between UN Police and KFOR to continue in the field. UNMIK and KFOR pre-
sented this as a UN Police action, although it had in fact been Dutch KFOR troops
performing the arrest.99 This was part of their concerted effort to play down KFOR’s
role and highlight that of the UN Police, a tendency that had already become appar-
ent during the arrest of 20 August. 
The largest part of the pursuit of post-war justice took place far outside the scope
of KFOR mandate and capabilities. Before the post-war justice system was able to
function properly, the complete security triad of local police, an independent local
judiciary and a penitentiary system had to be resurrected. Given the magnitude and
complexity of this task, it is not surprising that this effort by UNMIK was hardly a
success story in the short term. The prosecution of war criminals, which was regard-
ed as so vital for long-term hopes of reconciliation, suffered dearly. Out of the approx-
imately forty Serbs accused of war crimes in custody in Kosovo as of August 2000,
the local judiciary had indicted twenty-two people for war crimes and nine for geno-
cide by December that year. There is no exact number available, as some detainees
were released and a large number escaped from custody.100 By 2003, after three-and-
a-half years of international administration, only a handful of suspects had been pros-
ecuted for war crimes against Kosovo Albanians. The subsequent failure of UN Police
and KFOR to arrest and the local UNMIK-organized local courts to prosecute Alba-
nians for war crimes committed was equally damaging to the process of reconcilia-
tion. It took until August 2003 for international judges of the Kosovo judiciary to
finally step in and sentence Albanians convicted of war crimes against non-Albani-
ans.101
Unfortunately, the faltering penal system had made it impossible to test if the major-
ity of the investigations made by Dutch KFOR in those first months were sufficient-
ly solid to hold in a courtroom. Only two of the eleven detainees, Andjelko Kolasinac
and Cedomir Jovanovic, ever faced trial. All the others escaped from custody during
the infamous jailbreak from the Mitrovica prison in September 2000, a blunder for
which UNMIK was not easily forgiven amongst Albanians in Orahovac. Also the first
detainee charged with war crimes, who had been arrested by British troops, escaped
from the medical ward of that same detention facility a month earlier. The cases that
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did face the court were certainly not all textbook examples of fair trials. Sava Matic’s
case was an example of the often sloppy and biased trials by the local UNMIK-
appointed prosecutor and judges. The Dutch had arrested Matic on suspicion of seri-
ous crimes – not war crimes – but the Albanian prosecutor charged him, basing his
case on war crimes anyhow. This mistake was made by many of his fellow Alban-
ian prosecutors in the following years. With local prosecutors and judges often sus-
ceptible to public pressure, an international panel of judges regularly stepped in to
guarantee a fair trial.102 Kolasinac was eventually convicted and sentenced to eight
years’ imprisonment for abetting in Albanians’ deportation and forced labor, but not
on the basis of the war crimes with which he was originally charged.103 Jovanovic,
however, was sentenced as charged for participating in the mass murder of 62 civil-
ians at Bela Crkva as a member of a paramilitary group, ordering deportations and
burning and looting their houses. In November 2001, a majority international panel
reaffirmed the original sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment.104 It is noteworthy
that no court had indicted him when the Dutch arrested Jovanovic on the basis of
their own criminal investigations. KFOR would have escorted him out of Orahovac
to freedom on a UNHCR convoy if it had not been for the Task Force’s risky but
assertive policy of arrest. 
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12
The UÇK’s Silent Coup:
KFOR in the Civil Administrative Vacuum
After UN Security Council Resolution 1244 had practically suspended Yugoslav sov-
ereignty over Kosovo, the distribution of governmental power in Kosovo was a high-
ly complex matter. There were several competitors in the ring. All hopes were vest-
ed in Bernard Kouchner’s United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to rapidly
assume full governmental responsibility, but for reasons similar to those hampering
previous civilian missions, the UN was unable to deliver in the short term. There
was no UN administrator ready to walk into the municipal building in Orahovac and
take up office there, the way that civil affairs Major Joppolo had positioned himself
behind the desk of the Fascist mayor of the Sicilian town Adano in the wake of the
Allied invasion in 1943. In the administrative void that emerged all over Kosovo, two
competing Albanian factions claimed to represent their Kosovar majority, while most
Serbs refused to cooperate with the international community and created their own
structures. The UÇK, clearly the most muscular Albanian player, threatened NATO’s
proclaimed plans for a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo as it was rapidly assum-
ing administrative control over most of the province. In this murky arena of com-
peting and overlapping claimants to power, KFOR was clearly the strongest player
with tens of thousands of heavily armed soldiers on the ground. Haphazardly and
grudgingly, KFOR progressed from the public security vacuum into the wider civil
administrative vacuum, since more than community policing was needed to keep
the UÇK from becoming ‘Kosovo’s next masters’ as New York Times journalist Chris
Hedges had predicted in the magazine Foreign Affairs two months prior to the inter-
national intervention on the ground.1 Early warnings such as these apparently had
little impact on the preparedness of either KFOR or the United Nations for the task
ahead. 
Local Administration
Alexandros Yannis, who arrived in Pristina as Kouchner’s political advisor in July,
called the UN’s potential for keeping the peace and building stability in Kosovo rather
dim that summer. Never had a power vacuum emerged as suddenly as after the
Serbs’ withdrawal from Kosovo and, for a task as massive as the assumption of full
governmental responsibility over a territory by the deployment of an international
administration of colonial proportions, the UN had neither the capacity nor the expe-
rience.2 The only comparably broad administrative mandate followed several months
later in East Timor, where the Australian-led military intervention force (INTERFET)
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faced a power vacuum frightfully similar to that in Kosovo after the Indonesian gov-
ernment agreed to cede this territory in September 1999, after twenty-four years of
occupation and suppression of its people.3 Also here, the UN committed itself to the
interim administration while also assuming control over the military component
from the Australians after five months. The previous administrative roles performed
by the UN in post-war societies such as Cambodia and Bosnia had been limited to
monitoring and sometimes reforming an existing local government during a transi-
tion period.4 Assuming full executive authority in Kosovo and East Timor were mis-
sions of a totally different order. What made the task in Kosovo even more daunt-
ing was that it had been Yugoslavia’s most backward province and was ‘not only
entangled in war and history but also in the legacy of fifty years of communism and
ten years of virtual apartheid.’5 UN Balkans envoy Carl Bildt warned that Europe and
the United States would have to ‘take Kosovo from virtually nothing to practically
everything in the next few years,’ and called it ‘the most complex peace implemen-
tation operation ever undertaken by the international community in modern times.’6
The organizational and logistical problems facing the interim UN government
were indeed massive, and there had been little time to plan for the execution of this
unprecedented mandate. First, there was an acute lack of manpower. International
administrators, like international police officers, were not on standby waiting for a
crisis to erupt like the military and had to be rallied from every corner of the world.
Sergio Vieira de Mello recalled how his mission in Kosovo ‘resembled an under-bud-
geted, high school outing’ when he arrived the day after Mike Jackson’s impressive
military force in Pristina. 
We had to borrow vehicles from a Swedish NGO. We depended for accommoda-
tion on the hospitality of an Albanian family, for food on the generosity of NATO,
for water and fuel on the charity of UNHCR, and for communications on the good
will of the British government’s Foreign Aid Department, DFID. Staffing in both
missions has proved to be slow and unsatisfactory. Few UN staff from Headquar-
ters in New York, Geneva and Vienna are willing to go on missions. Staffs who
do go, receive no reward and miss out on promotion possibilities. A standard
clause in UN contracts allows the Secretary General to send staff wherever he
wishes. Unfortunately this clause is seldom, if ever, enforced. The UN has a large
pool of potential candidates for field missions. Most of them however, are diplo-
mats or generalists, who don’t make the best administrators or managers. The
UN has had great difficulty in finding candidates with the vital skills in public
administration, law and order, power, water, agriculture, finance, procurement, audit,
border-control, tax,  –  the skills actually required to run a country. The UN Sec-
retariat could learn a lot from the military and from some of the UN humanitari-
an agencies, who upgraded their emergency response capacity in response to crit-
icism in the early nineties.7
When Bernard Kouchner relieved De Mello as UN special representative in Pristina
in July, he had no more than thirty people at his disposal. One year into the opera-
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tions, the UN civil administrative component numbered 292 professional personnel
deployed in Kosovo out of its authorized total of 435.8 The Frenchman would end
up competing for personnel with De Mello, who took up the job of special repre-
sentative in East Timor. As usual, when the administrators first started to appear in
the field, the UN had to deploy ‘the best people available, rather than the best peo-
ple imaginable.’ Most of the UN administrators had no experience in running a size-
able town.
9
The civilian mission was also hampered by personnel changes at the
top, such as the sudden disappearance of the original French head of civil adminis-
tration in August. Luckily, Tom Könings, an experienced local administrator from
Frankfurt, was able to take charge on short notice. Lack of funds and logistical means
were the second biggest obstacle to successfully establishing international govern-
mental control over Kosovo. A third problem to emerge as the mission took shape
was the complexity of the combined UN, EU, OSCE and UNHCR structure under
the UNMIK umbrella. ‘Unity of effort’ within the civilian component suffered with
four separate organizations in charge of administration, economic reconstruction,
institution building and humanitarian aid. Each international group had different
management structures, work ethos and accountability to separate bureaucratic
chains, and obviously their priorities diverged. 
Organizational problems were constantly harassing UNMIK while performing its
mission. The fundamental problem facing the international administration – and
therefore also its main supporter KFOR – was its lack of a clear strategy for vacu-
um filling. There were two serious gaps in UN Security Council Resolution 1244
that hampered the international effort to install an interim administration and even-
tually transfer administrative responsibility to the Kosovars. First there was the over-
riding problem of the future status of Kosovo. Despite the many flaws in the Day-
ton agreement, the Bosnian agreement at least provided a clear picture of the polit-
ical future of the former Yugoslav province, or rather, of what it was supposed to
become. Kosovo’s final status had yet to be determined so there was no goal, or what
the military would call ‘end state,’ for the interim administration. Though KFOR
committed itself to supporting the UNMIK to ‘set the conditions for the develop-
ment of a lasting settlement within the Province’ before allowing itself to withdraw,
it was pretty much in the same boat.10
Part of the explanation for the failure to address Kosovo’s final status can be found
in the unexpectedly swift end to hostilities in June and the subsequent haste with
which the Security Council resolution was written. Most of all, however, it had been
a conscious decision by the major powers involved in drafting the resolution at the
G-8 summit in Cologne to leave the issue of sovereignty unaddressed. Clearly, no
peace accord would have been acceptable to Milosevic and the Serbs if even a hint
of genuine independence was given to the Albanians. Belgrade was not even pre-
pared to concede a restoration of the privileges under the autonomy status granted
by Tito – privileges that had been revoked in 1989.11 The UÇK and the Albanians,
on the other hand, would not countenance anything more than de jure sovereignty
by Belgrade for the moment. The compromise was the international protectorate
defended by tens of thousands of NATO troops. 
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There already had been little doubt about the rigidity of the Albanians in their
dismissal of any degree of Serbian rule over Kosovo. Their war had been fought over
independence, not over what form of democratic government should be installed. So
while UNMIK devoted its energy toward interim government and democracy build-
ing, human rights and civil society, the vast majority of the Albanians were only
interested in one thing. This was made abundantly clear when the first contours of
political parties emerged in the fall of 1999. Although there were no less than 24
such parties at the time, it was almost impossible to differentiate between their agen-
das. An UÇK political advisor explained: ‘They all have three key issues: number
one, independence; number two, independence; number three, independence.’ A
Kosovar Albanian human rights monitor added: ‘People need to learn that democ-
racy is a process. One election does not make a democracy. Ninety-nine percent of
the population had no idea what democracy is. People do not understand that they
themselves must be responsible, that human rights are connected to democracy.’12
Concentrating on the shorter-term military role in vacuum filling in the early days
of the peace building effort, this chapter focuses on the second weak spot in the
Security Council resolution. UN Civil Administration was to assume executive admin-
istrative responsibility in order to freeze the situation and create some form of order
from chaos. Its mission was ‘to provide transitional administration while overseeing
the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions.’13 The overar-
ching issue of the political future of Kosovo was only to be addressed after interna-
tional control had been fully established. To that short-term end, however, the UN
resolution failed to address local transitional administration in its own right. Close
reading showed that the mandate gave UNMIK no absolute responsibility to impose
control over the Kosovars on the regional and municipal levels of government. Two
days after the resolution’s approval on 12 June 1999, Secretary General Kofi Annan
presented his first report on the mission, outlining the structure to implement it
and assigning tasks to the four organizations participating in UNMIK. The report
defined the responsibility of the first of the four pillars, UN Civil Administration, as
‘overseeing and, where necessary, conducting a number of civil affairs functions,
such as the civil service and economic and budgetary affairs, as well as supporting
the restoration and provision in the short run of basic public services, such as pub-
lic health, education, utilities, transport and telecommunications.’14 However, the sec-
retary general made no reference to local government. 
The mandate was therefore criticized for only prescribing the outcome, while fail-
ing to address the method of establishing control over local institutions.15 Translat-
ed into a military operation, this may have been the apogee of ‘mission command’
or Auftragstaktik – cherished yet hardly practiced within Western armies – it was
hardly appropriate for a trusteeship-type mission unequalled in complexity since the
occupation and democratic reform of Germany and Japan in the aftermath of the
Second World War. As mentioned earlier, there was one vital difference between
international rule over Kosovo and the mission faced by civil affairs and military gov-
ernment in liberated and occupied territory in Europe and Asia more than fifty years
earlier. While the magnitude of the Allied effort then was of course incomparable,
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the presence of local administrative structures in most liberated and occupied terri-
tory – and therefore the possibility to install indirect rule – made the job of British
and American civil affairs personnel during and after the Second World War easier
in this respect. 
The official responsibility for filling the administrative void clearly rested with UNMIK.
However, NATO’s failure to adequately plan for an interim solution for the civilian
component’s slow deployment seriously complicated the mission of its military com-
manders on the ground. As was the case with preparations for the public security
vacuum, the expectations of a rapidly deployable UN civil administration were raised
to the point where it is likely that the problem was consciously being ignored.16 With
the clarity of hindsight, it is also hard to imagine there was a genuine belief in high-
er military and policy circles that the Serb administrative institutions would remain
in place. It was even more unlikely that these Serb mayors and other government
employees would be able to effectively preside over the vengeful Kosovar Albanian
majority population until relieved by international administrators and police. 
The higher up in the NATO hierarchy, the more conscious the effort to ignore
possible military involvement in governing Kosovo appears to have been. In his oper-
ational orders General Jackson had clearly mentioned avoiding a power vacuum to
emerge. NATO Supreme Commander Wesley Clark also was aware of the challenges
posed by the absence of local government. Predicting ‘a very, very trying period,’ he
conceded in an interview two weeks prior to deployment: ‘There is no government
there, this is going to be very challenging.’17 Although the generals would certainly
not have been enthusiastic about having their broad mandate formally expanded into
the administrative sphere, the strongest desire to avoid reference to anything resem-
bling ‘military government’ came from the Pentagon – although an equal share of
the blame fell on European policymakers. US defense officials went to great lengths
to rule out the establishment of a temporary military government in Kosovo. Never-
theless, The Washington Post predicted on its front page that ‘[f ]rom the minute they
arrive in Kosovo, NATO troops will become the police, town council and public works
department’ and ‘run what will be essentially a military government.’18 If two well-
informed journalists could touch upon the essence of the mission to come, so could
the generals and the responsible policy makers. 
The Pentagon ignored the likely occurrence of a civil administrative vacuum pri-
marily because of its inclination to keep peacekeeping missions as limited and pure-
ly military as possible. It also made it easier to deflect the blame for chaos in a power
vacuum that NATO had forced by waging an air-war on Milosevic. The American
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Senator John W. Warner stated
during Senate hearings on 1 July 1999: 
‘[T]he United Nations in a sense is a partner with KFOR NATO at this time. This
Senator always wants to keep a clear definition of the guidelines of what KFOR
does or NATO and the UN. I never want them to blend too much. I think they
should be independent.’19
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Six weeks after the end of the war, the finger pointing began. While answering for
the breakdown in law and order and the administrative chaos in Kosovo during a
US Senate hearing, Secretary of Defense William Cohen told the senators in July
that ‘[t]he more we do, the less incentive there is for the UN to come in and assume
that burden. This is a mission that doesn’t belong to NATO forces.’ In his effort to
put the blame on the UN, Senator Warner even suggestively asked Cohen if US
forces were being put at risk as a result of the UN’s failure.20 The political leaders
most often forgot to mention that the military mandate expressly assigned to KFOR
the responsibility for public security in Kosovo. 
Struggle for Control
The most harmful effects of the reflexive commitment to limit the military mission
as much as possible was that it left the troops on the ground without proper orders,
instructions and the right force composition to address the problems they faced in
Kosovo. Local administrative matters were low on the list of primary concerns of the
average battalion commander upon entering a potentially hostile environment, but
he and his troops on the ground were the first to face the political vacuum in the
towns and villages they entered in June 1999. Expecting the UN administrations to
arrive ‘soon,’ the Dutch battalion therefore envisioned a liaison function to the UN
in the planning phase.21 However, until mid-July there would hardly be a function-
ing civil administrative presence to support on the central level in Pristina, let alone
in a rural municipality such as Orahovac. The other point of contact the battalion
planned for was the Serb municipal administrator. But other than that, few plans
were made. 
The humanitarian implications of over 800,000 displaced persons returning to
Kosovo overshadowed all other concerns of civilian and military planners for the
immediate post-war chaos in Kosovo. Most of the effort concerning the vaguely
defined concept CIMIC was oriented towards supporting this humanitarian effort.
For the KFOR units assembled in Macedonia and Albania this was a tangible prob-
lem, because the refugee crisis took place under their very noses. According to Van
Loon, he and his brigade commander Von Korff had gone further than most of their
colleagues by contemplating at least some of the administrative implications of those
refugees returning and reclaiming property. Having supported the Kosovar Albani-
ans in the camps in Macedonia, they had witnessed how the refugees were often
bereft of identity papers and other official documents and thus could hardly prove
their existence. To that end, they planned to safeguard archives after entry and even
intended to collect phonebooks for the purpose of dealing with the property claims.22
No direct orders or instructions had been issued by KFOR to prepare for such mat-
ters that were so alien to the concept of military peacekeeping. 
The intensive and closely held negotiations that ended the war had left no time
for combined planning sessions between UN and KFOR officials. Once on the ground
in Kosovo, coordination meetings between Jackson and the UN special representa-
tive were filled with the most immediate concerns of raising central governmental
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institutions and humanitarian matters and failed to touch upon the issue of local
administration. Therefore, ahead of any formal or technical agreement between KFOR
and UNMIK and completely lacking guidelines from within NATO on how to address
the administrative vacuum, some local commanders took the first steps towards
administering Kosovo. As was the case with policing, some contingents would do so
more energetically than others. 
In order to come to terms with the administrative situation in Orahovac, Van
Loon attempted to create some rudimentary form of a multi-ethnic representative
committee in the early days of KFOR’s presence. Approaching leading figures from
the local community as a point of contact had been part of his general training and
education in peacekeeping, which had gradually been added to the military curricu-
lum in the Netherlands. For a brief period he harbored an almost romantic idea of
assembling Albanians, Serbs and Roma at one table with him at the head, working
towards a solution of the most imminent problems facing the community.
23
A com-
mittee of four Serbs, led by the former mayor Andjelko Kolasinac, had already
approached KFOR one day after the Dutch arrived. Van Loon was most satisfied since
this matched his plans and expectations. It soon became apparent, however, that the
mayor would not represent more than the 3,500 remaining Serbs in the city and the
neighboring villages of Velika Hoca and Zociste. As a representative for the Alban-
ian majority there was initially no alternative for Skender Hoxhaj, the local UÇK
commander who had marched into town twenty-four hours after the withdrawal of
Serb troops and police. As a military commander who was not from the area, he
was not exactly the ideal spokesman. 
It soon dawned on the Dutch commander that it had been a delusion to have
Albanians and Serbs sitting at one table and talking reasonably on any subject, at
least at this point in time and certainly with these representatives. During the first
attempt at such a conference, accusations such as ‘you murderer’ flew across the
table, and only the presence of armed troops in the room is likely to have kept the
delegations from attacking each other physically. Some of the accusations may have
approached the truth. Apart from the former Serb mayor who would later be charged
for contributing to the deportation of Albanians, the local bar owner Stanko Levic
was suspected of having been ‘a shooter’ during at least one of the mass killings of
the previous year. Hoxhaj also turned out to be ‘a crook,’ according to Van Loon.
The UÇK was widely known to be guilty of kidnappings and murders of Serbs and
Albanian ‘collaborators.’24 Nevertheless, an Albanian civilian present at the meeting
later joked that despite its failure, Orahovac probably had the distinction of hosting
the first inter-ethnic meeting in Kosovo since the end of the war. During this Serb-
Albanian meeting and the few that followed with other representatives in the com-
ing six months, the Albanian population was always extremely suspicious. There was
always talk in the streets of the Albanian representatives reaching ‘a secret deal with
the Serbs,’ while inside the conference room quite the contrary would be going on
and little to no progress was made in rapprochement.25 Instead, both sides would
wear down the KFOR and UNMIK intermediaries by spending most of their time
and energy making endless speeches on the grave injustice done to their side in the
recent, and more than often, not-so-recent history. 
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It will be recalled that hardly any intelligence had been made available to the bat-
talion that could have helped in selecting the right community leaders in Orahovac.
Apart from the information provided by the German Navy officer who had worked
in the area as an OSCE monitor, Van Loon is likely to have profited most from read-
ing about Kosovo’s history to comprehend what he was confronting. A lack of inter-
preters complicated the early search for reliable representatives in local society. Despite
ample warning time, the Dutch unit had not been provided with any interpreters
prior to entering Kosovo. The Dutch Army had failed to use the many Kosovar immi-
grants in the Netherlands for this purpose, although the Kosovar diaspora did pro-
duce some locals with knowledge of English and German who were used as trans-
lators. The Dutch thus profited from their command of these languages enabling
them to engage in basic conversation with some of the local inhabitants in the streets.
However, only after local interpreters had been hired could a serious attempt be made
to trace and approach those holding leading positions prior to the war and who hope-
fully continued to wield influence in local society. Throughout the mission all trans-
lations were performed in English or German by local interpreters, which is unlike-
ly to have contributed to either the quality or the secrecy of information exchanged.
Both the Dutch and the Albanian translators were mostly no more than adequate in
these languages. 
Further difficulties were created by a cultural environment that was traditionally
very closed to outsiders. Even when working with interpreters, the foreign soldiers
and international policemen everywhere in Kosovo would find it hard to investigate
crime and local internal power struggles, especially when it concerned a crime which
the population felt was ‘theirs’ rather than one ‘against them.’26 The good relations
developed with the Albanian population as a result of the overall honest and trans-
parent manner of operating – and of course the close security they provided – would
seriously enhance the openness and trust displayed by the majority of the local pop-
ulation of Orahovac. 
Two of the key figures the Task Force initially found were the former director of
the local wine factory, Agim Hasku, and the local lawyer, Qazim Qeska. Both had
held the position of mayor prior to 1989, but neither seemed to aspire to that posi-
tion now that the Serbs had gone. Both initially seemed wary of the UÇK. After being
blocked from formal positions of power by the Serbs in 1989, the former mayors
were active in the underground or ‘parallel’ Albanian government structures and
although they were probably supporting the UÇK in its role as a ‘liberation army,’
neither of them supported its claims to political power.27 After Dutch plans for a
multi-ethnic council were temporarily scrapped, a separate Albanian ‘interim city
council’ came forward, with Qeska as its chief representative. Hoxhaj’s redeployment
to neighboring Suva Reka was likely to have made it easier for non-UÇK notables to
come forward and Van Loon pushed them to get organized.28 At this point, the Dutch
harbored the somewhat exaggerated expectation that this body would be ‘responsi-
ble for governing the area of Orahovac.’29 Qeska, who was generally referred to by
the Dutch as ‘interim mayor,’ took a moderate stance and it was hoped that he could
improve Albanian-Serb relations in the near future. Van Loon was satisfied with the
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situation. He even called on the relatively cooperative new UÇK commander Ismet
Tara – whose unit had replaced Hoxhaj’s  – to join the council for security-related
matters. As a resident of Orahovac in charge of the local UÇK unit, he was after all
still the most powerful local figure. Depending on the subjects addressed during
these meetings that varied from humanitarian problems to improving the water sup-
ply or restarting a factory or school, other locals joined. For the moment, their most
important role was to convey to the local populations directives given by the Dutch
forces while providing KFOR with basic information on the problems facing the
Albanian community. 
Early enthusiasm about the creation of an Albanian representative committee
proved premature. What seemed to be a positive development in Orahovac was sud-
denly disrupted by the nationwide emergence of the UÇK in the guise of the unof-
ficial ‘Provisional Government of Kosovo’ (PGOK). Led by ‘Prime Minister’ Hashim
Thaci, this self-styled government had been established in exile on 2 April 1999,
during the second week of the NATO air campaign. During the fighting it had pre-
pared for its future role as the government of Kosovo on both a central and a local
level, knowing that the municipal government level was the key to de facto control
over Kosovar society. Consequently, it positioned itself to establish these authorities
in the course of June and early July.30 Directed from Pristina, the provisional gov-
ernment emerged in all twenty-seven predominantly Albanian municipalities out of
the total of twenty-nine. On 15 July, a former local UÇK officer, Agim Thaqi, pre-
sented himself to Dutch KFOR as the mayor appointed by the minister of internal
affairs of Hashim Thaci’s provisional government. He simply claimed that there had
been a grave misunderstanding concerning Qeska’s role as interim mayor. At the
time, the sudden ‘change of mayors’ was a mystery to Van Loon, who had been far
too busy keeping Orahovac from descending into anarchy to notice a similar and
even quicker political development in other municipalities throughout Kosovo. There
had been no warnings from KFOR headquarters about this phenomenon and no
orders on how to deal with the self-styled authorities. Nevertheless, Thaqi was imme-
diately told that the provisional government he claimed to represent was not recog-
nized by UNMIK or KFOR and that he was therefore not acceptable as the new
mayor.31
Although UÇK leader Hashim Thaci derived some authority from his role as the
leader of the Albanian delegation at Rambouillet, where Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright had championed him as the Kosovar Albanian representative, he leaned pri-
marily on his popular authority as leader of the armed struggle. His claim to admin-
istrative power ran counter to the international interim administration’s plans for
municipal and national elections. Ballots were to precede any form of Kosovar admin-
istrative body, to enable other political parties to organize. The most important Alban-
ian counterweight to Thaci’s claim to power was ‘President’ Ibrahim Rugova’s gov-
ernment of the Republic of Kosovo, also known as the ‘parallel government.’ The
unofficial elections of the early 1990s gave his Liberal Democrat Party of Kosovo
(LDK) some sort of legitimate claim to represent the Kosovar-Albanian people and
it maintained a residual, yet still substantial, grassroots network developed over a
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decade.32 After fleeing Kosovo to Italy during the war and after an infamous meet-
ing with Milosevic – forced by the Serb leader – Rugova’s position was seriously
weakened. However, the somewhat vague and unpredictable leader still had substan-
tial appeal to many Kosovar Albanians for whom he had been the leader of the peace-
ful resistance movement. For the West, he was the best hope for a multi-ethnic Koso-
vo and for serious opposition to the UÇK. Thaci was aware of this and asked Rugo-
va to join his provisional government in July. Merely wanting to strengthen his ille-
gitimate government, he proved more eager to cooperate than Rugova. The leader
of the LDK clearly saw no reason to play second fiddle to Thaci and refused to join
or recognize the provisional government on any level.33 Rugova is unlikely to have
displayed such confidence if UNMIK and KFOR had not shown the willingness to
at least attempt blocking the UÇK from power. Just as with policing, KFOR turned
out to be the only organized body ready to challenge the UÇK in their attempt to
gain complete administrative control at this point. It would prove an arduous task
to keep Thaci’s organization from assuming control of political and – as it soon
turned out – economic life. 
Meanwhile in Orahovac, the Dutch hastily started gathering information among
the local population on the self-appointed mayor Thaqi. Being an outsider from a
village elsewhere in the municipality, he seemed to have very little popular support
among local Kosovar Albanians. Moreover, many considered him an ‘incapable UÇK
marionette.’ Several days later the Dutch again informed Thaqi that he was not accept-
able as the local mayor. He could join the existing Kosovar Albanian committee if
he wished and if the other representatives had no objection. Since he had already
installed himself in the municipal building, Thaqi was warned that KFOR would
remove him. In the meantime, the Dutch stepped up efforts to bolster the commit-
tee to become something like an interim city council.34 Van Loon pushed Qeska to
assume responsibility as the head of this body, but the lawyer was reluctant to con-
front Thaci’s provisional government in Pristina.35
The situation surrounding the two local mayors remained tense for some three
weeks. On 2 August, the Prizren-based regional administrator visited Orahovac to
conduct talks with Kosovar Albanian and Serb communities to lessen ethnic tensions
in the potentially explosive region. When the Dutch commander asked him if UNMIK
should continue talks with Thaqi, the administrator failed to take a position.36 Sev-
eral days of uncertainty and rumors followed. On 6 August, the Dutch reported that
Thaqi was allegedly removed from office ‘by KFOR.’37 Rumors continued to indicate
that besides lacking popular support, the so-called mayor also had failed to hold on
to UÇK support. Qeska, who clearly remained the candidate preferred by the Dutch,
had supposedly replaced him. Besides having far more popular support in both Ora-
hovac and the surrounding villages, there were indications that he could even count
on some sympathy among Serbs. The overly positive rumors continued to suggest
that even the UÇK considered him the preferable candidate. The Dutch suddenly
had high hopes for an improvement in relations between the parties in the future.
However, Tara would later state that he had never dropped his support for Thaqi.
The connection between the military leader and the civilian UÇK leader was not as
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obvious as it seemed. While officially one of Tara’s battalion commanders, this rank
did not imply that he was a fighter. ‘Tara had been involved in combat, we knew
that, but Thaqi certainly was no warrior,’ Van Loon recalled. Instead, ‘Thaqi was a
bureaucrat, a small-time civil servant.’38 He appeared to fit the picture of the aver-
age provisional government mayor:
The typical mayor has a background in public administration and originally became
active in the mainstream of Kosovar Albanian political, usually within the LDK. He
(they are all men) joined the UÇK late, leaving the LDK after February 1998, and
often worked in the UÇK in an administrative rather than a weapons-bearing capac-
ity. He owes allegiance to the provisional Ministry of Local Government in
Pristinë/Pristina, but has appointed local people with relevant experience to head
the various departments in his administration. The town hall has little or no income,
unless it controls and has managed to re-start former state industries, and offi-
cials are working without salary.39
As a result of Thaqi’s failure to quickly establish effective control over Orahovac and
his inability to collect taxes for his central government, his relationship to the pro-
visional government in Pristina became somewhat strained. In anticipation of Hashim
Thaci’s visit to Orahovac for the celebration of the one-year anniversary of the two-
day ‘liberation’ of the city by the UÇK, Thaqi asked KFOR if he could carry a sidearm.
The Dutch officer that refused him this important symbol of might in Kosovo, noticed
that the self-styled mayor was very nervous about something that day. In front of the
international press-corps, as a large crowd cheered on ‘president’ Thaci that day, it
was military commander Tara who was standing next to him on the balcony. Thaqi
was nowhere in sight. 
It proved hard to concentrate the Task Force’s effort on the problem of the two
mayors at this point. After the Dutch defense minister and foreign minister and two
visits by Wesley Clark in July, the battalion was rolling out the carpet for Mike Jack-
son and the Dutch Army Commander in Chief Schouten. Many ‘VIPs’ would fol-
low. Clearly not every local KFOR unit received this much attention. The primary
reason for the overwhelming attention was the impending Russian deployment and
the Albanian protests that were receiving increasing media attention. Meanwhile, the
Task Force was fighting its battle for control of the streets by keeping the UÇK from
policing Orahovac. In early August, everything seemed to go wrong simultaneously.
Just when the Dutch and German troops and military police seemed to be gaining
the upper hand on the streets, a crisis in inter-ethnic relations erupted. An attack
by Albanians on three Serbs in their quarter left one dead and two wounded, caus-
ing tensions to rise even further in the city. 
These distractions and UNMIK’s weak negotiating position made it possible for
Thaqi to hold on to his position. His reported removal from the municipality build-
ing suddenly proved invalid. Although the Task Force continued to refuse to recog-
nize him and the provisional government of which he appeared to be the choice,
Thaqi came out on top. The UNMIK representative visiting the town accepted the
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committee the Albanians had come forward with under his leadership. It was a com-
promise in a conflict over administrative power the locals obviously wished to avoid.40
Although a majority of the Albanians in Orahovac supported Rugova, in the end it
was clear that they did not want to confront Thaci’s provisional government in Pristi-
na. Officially under UNMIK leadership, Thaqi would become ‘acting mayor’ and
Qeska would assume the position of ‘acting deputy mayor.’41
After UNMIK had reached a deal with the local Kosovar Albanian representatives
in Orahovac and thus endorsed the self-styled administrator, the Task Force ‘seized
its activities to create an integrated council’ with Serb participation. It left the initia-
tive in matters related to administration and institution building to the UN and the
OSCE. The provisional government mayor in Orahovac would not be as influential
as in other municipalities, although with Tara’s support he was a force with which
to reckon. According to Van Loon, he was ‘a little fish.’ He was known to leave town
every day around three in the afternoon, while Qeska was always there for people to
approach him as he resided in the city.42 Furthermore, a very influential local move-
ment in these days was the ‘blockade council’ chaired by Hasku, who was on good
terms with the Dutch officers. This council was outside direct UÇK control. Eventu-
ally Thaqi, Qeska and several other interim delegates ended up working under the
directions of the UNMIK administrator, Kharras Kane.43 However, the UN diplomat
from Mauritania proved to be not a very powerful figure and lacked the necessary
skills of an interim manager. 
UNMIK’s compromise over administrative control in Orahovac was an example of
the inevitable ad hoc policy followed by the UN in Pristina at this point. Character-
ized as ‘pick and choose,’ the approach was to leave the local structures in place as
long as it appeared to be responsible and included a reasonable mix of local inter-
ests. If the local administration was too clearly UÇK dominated, the local UN offi-
cial would push the provisional government to replace some individuals or attempt
to remove the existing structure altogether.44 If the Dutch commander had his way,
Thaqi would have been marginalized immediately and certainly not have become the
chief representative of the Albanian community. The commander did not see the
need to accommodate the weak and unpopular mayor. Obviously annoyed that day,
Van Loon painted a gloomy picture in his daily situation report. With the new inter-
im mayor and the murder of a Serb, he had given up his vestigial hopes of an inte-
grated Serbian-Albanian city council in the near future.45
The Task Force was clearly the strongest player in the municipality, but without
the authority of a military governor, the commander’s powers to influence matters
in the administrative sphere were limited. Even with those powers, the situation
would probably not have been as manageable as Van Loon might have liked. Despite
the lack of a consistent Kosovo-wide KFOR-UNMIK policy towards the self-styled
authorities, however, he and his staff were certainly relieved that UNMIK was offi-
cially taking the lead in the complicated and politically sensitive area of institution
building and administration. In choosing what local representatives to accept and
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work with, the Dutch had relied on common sense rather than training and educa-
tion in such delicate matters while being completely deprived of political guidance
from KFOR headquarters on this matter. There was another reason for welcoming
the official transfer of these responsibilities. Although the commander may have
desired to wield his influence for the sake of a multi-ethnic Orahovac, his political
and military taskmasters would not have been keen on their contingent’s involve-
ment in such highly political decisions. They would certainly not have been enthu-
siastic about having their troops remove illegitimate mayors from town halls in the
Balkans. Although the administrative lead of the UN had the positive effect of reliev-
ing the Dutch commander of such politically sensitive responsibilities, its actual abil-
ity to govern amounted to little in the following two months. A single administra-
tor representing the international interim government was present for merely two
days a week until late September. It would take several more months before UNMIK
in Orahovac would reach its eventual strength of five permanent international staff,
complemented by another five OSCE personnel assigned to institution building and
the organization of municipal elections. The Dutch would thus remain heavily
involved in the day-to-day management of the municipality in the coming months. 
The most important result of KFOR’s relatively assertive posture in Orahovac was
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that it prevented the UÇK and its political wing from entrenching themselves as they
did in several other sectors in Kosovo. By patrolling the area intensively and by act-
ing as a credible police force, the provisional government was unable to assume local
authority backed by armed force the way it did elsewhere in Kosovo. The neighbor-
ing municipality of Suva Reka was an example of how the provisional government
took charge if there were no substantial counterweight in place. Here, the ‘mayor’
had taken office in the municipal building on 17 June and – supported by the UÇK
military police (PU) commander – basically ran the city. In October this resulted in
the hardest line yet taken by UNMIK. The mayor was expelled from his office by
force with the help of UN police, while the UÇK military police division was closed
down by KFOR.46 As in Orahovac, the population was not unequivocally loyal to the
local mayor. The demonstrations that followed in Suva Reka were not so much in
favor of the deposed mayor as against the removal of the Albanian flag from the
municipal building. Eventually, these popular protests led to a strategic retreat by the
UN and eventually resulted in the Albanian double-eagle flying alongside the UN
flag. After several such ‘flag incidents,’ the same compromise was reached in Ora-
hovac and the other municipalities with a predominantly Albanian population. Only
in the capital of Pristina would the UN flag fly alone outside the city hall. 
The confrontational approach taken by the UN in Suva Reka temporarily appeared
successful, but as Dutch troops took over control of Suva Reka in November, the
UÇK still proved more influential than in Orahovac. The city had clearly suffered
from the initial lack of an active KFOR presence to act as a stopgap to UÇK control.
However, an international military presence was by no means a safeguard against
the predominance of self-appointed local structures in this early phase of the oper-
ation. In the Southwest, the Italian brigade was reported to have ‘encouraged’ the
UÇK-led structures to help fill the power vacuum in some villages. In those villages
near Peç, the UÇK had established police forces and even a municipal court. It was
also reported to be running a health clinic, a grain store, a weapons factory and an
agricultural cooperative in the Italian sector.47 Although there is no proof for the
allegations of actual encouragement of the UÇK by the Italians, the Italian brigade’s
aloofness thwarted effective control by KFOR and UNMIK. The result of their gen-
erally passive posture was that of all Kosovar regions, control of the provisional gov-
ernment was strongest in the Peç region. The Mexican regional administrator gave
up his post after nine days, as he was unable to bear the Kosovar Albanian tenden-
cy to ignore his existence.48 The OSCE characterized Djakovica, the second largest
city in the Italian zone, as ‘the most obvious example of the power of the self-styled
authorities and the ability of the [...] UÇK to maintain control of a town.’49 Here,
the local structures went as far as issuing auto license plates. The obvious lack of
KFOR and UNMIK control over Djakovica was only surpassed by the situation in
the Serbian parts of the French sector, where radical nationalist elements seized de
facto control of the northern part of Mitrovica. However, whereas the Italians could
have more easily capitalized on NATO’s heroic status amongst the primarily Alban-
ian population in their sector, the French were facing a large Serb population hos-
tile to KFOR and were reportedly infiltrated by paramilitaries directed from Belgrade. 
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Prizren, too, proved a difficult case in the struggle for administrative power. Other
than the Italians, the German brigade commander Von Korff and his successor Sauer
did not take a laissez faire attitude toward control over the city. However, the speed
with which the provisional government got its act together in this city made it vir-
tually impossible to block the UÇK officials from exerting a very strong influence
over the local administration. Former teacher and UÇK warrior-spokesman Kadri
Kryeziu had been waiting in Albania to assume the job of regional administrator
over Kosovo’s second city on Hashim Thaci’s instructions. In fact, he had been
assigned to this post one year before, his proud secretary told a reporter. A Council
of Europe team of experts visiting the city in June had found the administration
firmly entrenched ‘in a vibrant working city,’ that contrasted with all the other places
the team had visited.50 In Kosovo’s second largest and certainly most beautiful city,
the street cafes were busy, food merchants were offering fresh fruit and every hour
a shop seemed to open its doors. A German journalist concluded that two weeks
after KFOR’s entry in Prizren there was no more trace of a Stunde Null, or ‘zero-
hour’ in Prizren.51 To challenge Kryeziu’s control over the city late June there were
no more than three staff in the UNMIK regional office temporarily headed by the
Canadian Mark Baskin. The deputy regional administrator’s first encounter with
Kryeziu was a fiasco. After the Canadian official rejected the legitimacy of his claim
to administrative power, the Albanian mayor walked straight out of the session.52
Upon his arrival in Kosovo, the Swedish regional administrator Lennart Myhlback,
who took over from Baskin, set out to confront the UÇK mayor over his unautho-
rized exercise of powers. Attempting to dissolve the provisional government struc-
tures in Prizren, he steered a course closer to that in Suva Reka than that by UNMIK
in Orahovac, where a compromise was reached. In August, Myhlback established a
ninety-day provisional municipal council in Prizren with himself at the head. His
scheme soon started to go awry as the local deputy he had envisioned never showed
up. Of the twelve local representatives he attempted to assemble in weekly sessions,
a maximum of six appeared. The German liaison officer who joined these council
meetings as a KFOR representative witnessed many of these somewhat embarrass-
ing sessions, none of which led to any practical results.53 One of the international
administration’s most imminent problems prior to September was the lack of finances
to pay employees who attempted to provide basic services. This left him with little
leverage. In the meantime the six missing municipal council members were else-
where conducting business as usual under the UÇK provisional government Mayor
Kryeziu. According to the OSCE, the critical UNMIK insider, the many functions
being performed under his direction included ‘tax collection, issuing birth certifi-
cates, marriage licenses and certificates, issuing decrees and using a vigorous pub-
lic information campaign to advertise their services and achievements.’54 As a con-
sequence, Myhlback rapidly fell out with Kryeziu and discouraged contacts with him
while trying to empower the UN-organized structure. The Albanian mayor then pub-
licly denounced UNMIK as amik, a fanciful variant of the Albanian word for ‘enemy.’55
Prizren turned out to be a ‘sad case.’ It confronted the UN and KFOR with the
limits of what the international presence could do after the momentum was lost to
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the UÇK and in the absence of a clear policy towards the self-appointed administra-
tors. Neither the UN nor NATO was willing to use the military to enforce interna-
tional rule over a people it had sought to free from oppression. UNMIK did not
repeat its forcible removal by its police of the mayor of Suva Reka and elsewhere.
KFOR was not eager to trade the image of the liberator it had amongst the Kosovar
Albanian majority for that of an occupying force. General Jackson was anxious about
alienating the Kosovar Albanian population as a result of KFOR’s rather harsh treat-
ment of the UÇK military in the demilitarization effort. Maintaining consent of, and
thus military compliance by, the UÇK was far too important for the execution of his
primary military mission to risk a confrontation with Thaci’s provisional government.
There was a firm recognition in both KFOR and UNMIK that the Kosovar Albani-
ans had run parallel systems in the face of a much stronger and more oppressive
government than the UN. The alternative, however, a formal recognition of his gov-
ernment on a Kosovo-wide basis, was out of the question. The ensuing attempt to
selectively sideline the self-styled leadership provided no solution.56 In the absence
of a formal agreement on the status of the different claimants to power, Kosovo
remain practically ungoverned for several months. In October 1999, Bernard Kouch-
ner started negotiations to break the deadlock by creating a consensual interim gov-
ernment acceptable to all parties involved. Since Thaci was clearly sticking to an
obstructionist line, UNMIK and KFOR would have to wear down the influence of
the provisional government over the Kosovar Albanian population. To accomplish
this, the civilian and military components would have to provide the Kosovars with
a viable alternative. 
Public Services
During his time as administrator in Prizren, Mark Baskin came to recognize that
one of the key problems in the political reconstruction of post-war societies was gen-
erally posed by the elaborate ambitions involved. The ‘putatively cosmopolitan val-
ues’ promoted by these international operations – such as multi-ethnicity, political
diversity, economic liberalism or democratic development – were not so deeply root-
ed internationally as the predominantly Western interventionists would have liked to
believe. However, these high-minded goals were the prime motivation for the inter-
national community to deny the UÇK and its provisional government direct access
to power, since it represented the exact opposite of most of these values. For the
time being, UNMIK had to lure the Kosovars to its side by far less elevated means
in order to succeed in elbowing aside the parallel Albanian structures and establish
itself as the only formal governmental authority in Kosovo. Apart from public secu-
rity, the quintessential government function, the battle for political control was fought
over basic public services rendered to a population in need. UN administrators or
the UÇK mayors could hold all the claims to legitimate power they wanted, but con-
trolling Kosovo was all about who the people could rely on and would turn to for
their basic necessities. KFOR would play a crucial role in providing these basic serv-
ices pending the establishment of a working UN administration. 
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By mid-July, British engineers were working with NGOs to restore the local water
supplies in Pristina. British engineers were also responsible for keeping the two main
power stations running in what Jackson called ‘a rather desultory way.’ To support
them in their effort to keep the electricity flowing, the general flew in civilian spe-
cialists straight from Britain. KFOR thus chaired the boards of three electric power
companies (power generation, transmission and distribution) and was refurbishing
the main telecommunications transmitter. Overall, these were unrewarding tasks.
Although more than a year of civil war and the recent attacks with NATO’s preci-
sion-guided munitions had not done the facilities much good, Kosovo’s public serv-
ices had been in a deplorable state long before the bombing campaign. While new
facilities such as a mobile telephone network would be up and running in 2001,
daily power failures were still a common feature throughout Kosovo in 2002. KFOR
temporarily had to operate several other facilities such as the Trepça mines and the
Mitrovica lead factory, which turned out to be ecological disasters. In addition, tech-
nical advice was provided for the water board and the new police academy, run by
the OSCE. Border control duties were temporarily performed by KFOR, but were
limited mainly to checking traffic entering Kosovo for weapons.57 It made no pre-
tense of addressing customs or other economic issues since it was far too busy with
more pressing matters; additionally, legislation in this field was lacking. Of all these
tasks, only the improvement of the Pristina airport and perhaps border control duties
could be clearly linked to KFOR’s own military operation, and were therefore CIMIC
in a classical sense. 
In Prizren, the German brigade was heavily involved in running the southern
part of Kosovo. Apart from the usual aid provided to the returning refugees, the
reconstruction projects such as the winterization program for destroyed housing and
the refurbishment of schools, German and Dutch engineer battalions were working
on road construction, snow clearance during the winter, the organization of garbage
disposal and the augmentation of the insufficient local firefighting capacity. In Prizren,
a military field kitchen company provided more than 600,000 hot meals to refugees
over the first few months, and even livestock such as sheep and chickens were dis-
tributed among farmers. Lack of confidence in UNMIK’s capabilities in the initial
months caused the many Kosovars to approach the German brigade directly for all
sorts of aid. The Germans noticed a change in the behavior of the local population.
The immense gratitude towards KFOR outlived the initial phase of cheering and
flower-throwing crowds. However, Colonel Ulrich Kilch saw the mood gradually
change from ‘can you help us?’ to ‘we need something,’ to ‘you have to.’ Well-inten-
tioned initiatives geared towards mobilizing the local volunteers to clean the intense-
ly dirty streets failed, only to take off after locals were being paid to do the job. Since
UNMIK was unable to pay other public employees, the German brigade even went
as far as paying wages to this local staff using donations from the German govern-
ment. This situation lasted until the middle of September when the UN took over
these financial obligations.58
On the local level, Task Force Orahovac was facing a similar situation. Most of
the city’s public services were either already being run by KFOR, operated in coor-
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dination with international governmental agencies or NGOs, or delegated to local
staff after having been initiated by the Dutch. In order to operate effectively and
assure access to all ethnic groups, basic public services such as the fire department
and the hospital were under military control for the time being. The fire department
had two fire trucks and employed ten people, but was hardly functional unless under
KFOR direction. On the Task Force’s initiative, the hospital, which had been in a
deplorable state, was cleaned and returned to medical service. Thereafter Dutch doc-
tors managed the hospital together with local medical staff under KFOR protection.
With support from the battalion and the organizations Médecins du Monde and the
Johanitter Unfallhilfe, which were also operating in the hospital, medical aid was made
available inside the Serbian quarter and Velika Hoca. The more severe cases would
receive military escort either to the Orahovac hospital or even Prizren or Pristina.
As in every city and town in Kosovo, garbage disposal in Orahovac was problem-
atic that summer, leading to serious fears about the outbreak of disease. It was tack-
led in cooperation with the German governmental technical aid organization Tech-
nisches Hilfwerk (THW), using local Albanian employees, who initially had to be
escorted when working in the Serb quarter. Through its two liaison officers, the Task
Force was coordinating the reconstruction of several other elements of civilian life.
Together with the THW and the UNHCR, a temporary school was established in a
refurbished supermarket in the Serb quarter.59 Through an effort by the battalion’s
non-commissioned officers, learning materials and toys were collected in the Nether-
lands and handed over to elementary schools in Orahovac, while a schoolyard was
refurbished with money provided by the city of Arnhem, the home base of the Dutch
artillery unit. 
The Dutch government had been providing substantial sums of development
money to its units on peacekeeping duties since the Marines had been operating in
Cambodia. However, the artillery battalion in Kosovo received no such funds. The
logic behind this decision was that by sending a thousand-strong engineer battalion
for humanitarian and reconstruction duties to Prizren, the Dutch government was
already doing enough in this field. Since the battalion was heavily involved in run-
ning a municipality, this seemed a rather odd decision. It did, however, result in
making the Dutch troops creative and stimulated cooperation with civilian organiza-
tions, thus ensuring a rapid transfer of responsibilities. Yet again, creativity was not
stimulated by The Hague. During the very first weeks, the Serbs in the area were
faced with the likelihood of serious food shortages. Since initially no humanitarian
organizations were around to perform the job, the Task Force offered a local flour
factory in Zrze the lucrative contract of providing KFOR troops with their daily bread
supply, on the strict condition that it would also deliver bread to the Serbs. To that
end, the Dutch provided ten tons of flour. Deliveries by the Albanians were initial-
ly under military escort. It took the commander some serious haggling to get author-
ization for this initiative from the Ministry of Defense. While providing millions for
reconstruction and aid projects performed by the military in Bosnia – where stabil-
ity had long since been restored – it now feared the ‘dependency reflex’ despite the
acute food crisis amongst Serbs in Orahovac under the noses of its own soldiers. 
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In August 1999, the UN administration started its first payments to the city’s
medical personnel, firefighters and garbage collectors, who had all been operating
under the direction of the peacekeepers. That month, with the increasing amount of
international humanitarian organizations operating in the municipality, people final-
ly stopped approaching the Task Force directly for basic needs such as food, water
and medicine. The Dutch expected, or rather hoped, that the NGOs and IGOs would
succeed in providing most of the necessary humanitarian aid before winter set in.
However, two problems hampered the humanitarian effort. First, there was a lack of
coordination on all levels between the humanitarian organizations, both governmen-
tal and non-governmental. Aware of the mutual dependency of their success, the
Dutch expressed their concern that lack of effective collaboration was damaging to
local confidence on all parties involved, NGOs, UNMIK and KFOR.60 Second, a drop
in humanitarian aid suddenly occurred as the Albanian population erected the block-
ades against the Russians in late August. It was also difficult to estimate if the ‘shel-
ter project,’ a program to improve houses destroyed during the war performed by
UNHCR and several NGOs with KFOR engineer support, would be finished in the
months to come. As winter drew closer, this became an ever-more pressing prob-
lem.61
The Dutch battalion also initiated various projects aimed at restarting the local
economy. An attempt was made to jump-start production in the local wine factory
and the plastic factory by using some of the military’s vast logistical capabilities. The
wine factory in Orahovac was the largest in Kosovo and had been the economic back-
bone of the region. One of the CIMIC officers located missing machine parts and
other items in the main factory to be replaced by those from subsidiary factories in
the neighborhood. While the most obvious goal of such aid was to accelerate the
return to normal life, there was an additional incentive for the Dutch to wield at
least some influence in this field. Thaci’s provisional government made its next move
to gain administrative control over Kosovo in the economic sphere. In order to extend
its influence in Kosovar society and attract the population to its side, his provision-
al government would have to gain control of the financial resources needed to pro-
vide basic community services. At the higher levels of the economy this effort was
clearly orchestrated, but there was also the problem of ordinary crime and extortion
performed by local UÇK members. Some of these forces were clearly outside Thaci’s
control and some of these criminal elements were no more than gangs operating
under the name of the UÇK.62 But while denouncing these practices by renegade
elements, his provisional government issued a directive to have all factories trans-
ferred to a shady holding company established in the Virgin Islands. In Peç the UÇK
was already capitalizing on the local beer brewery.63 In Orahovac, the prime targets
were the wine factory and the plastic factory. 
In order to make clear that these assets certainly did not belong to Thaci’s self-
styled government, the Task Force proclaimed that all state-owned factories were to
be transferred to UNMIK in due time.64 Acting on information and recommenda-
tions provided by the local community in the first weeks, Van Loon had appointed
Agim Hasku to his former position as director. After receiving the letter from Thaci’s
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government, Hasku was seriously worried that his position in charge of the largest
economic asset in the area would put him in danger. He therefore temporarily received
direct protection from the Dutch soldiers.65 It would prove crucial to providing the
population with a sense of protection by addressing public security, thus enabling
them to place their bets on the international interim authority rather than giving
into pressure from the UÇK or non-political criminal elements. As long as they felt
safe doing so, it was simply more profitable for the directors as well as the general
public to turn down the UÇK and count on KFOR. Moreover, the peacekeepers wield-
ed substantial influence through good relations with the some of the NGOs and IOs
that were flocking to the high-profile area of Orahovac to provide economic and
humanitarian aid. 
The Task Force made a relatively successful attempt at thwarting illegal taxation
and extortion by local provisional government and common criminals. People came
directly to KFOR with complaints about local thugs asking people for taxes and try-
ing to make them pay rent for real estate not in their possession.66 In larger cities
such as Urosevac in the American sector, the local mayor was renting out public
property, of which the UN was in fact the legal custodian, while the Germans in
Prizren were faced with UÇK-orchestrated attempts to issue building permits. This
proved a lucrative business in a province that had seen a large proportion of its hous-
ing go up in flames. Shop owners in Orahovac who became victims of ‘protection
rackets’ would also turn to the Task Force. All such information would be entered
into the ever-expanding database, run by the Dutch intelligence officer in charge of
policing, and acted on if possible. At one point, a local Albanian man had even taken
control over the key power switch to the city. He considered it quite normal that
someone had to be paid for such a service and in order to harass the Serbs he
switched off power to the Serbian quarter whenever he had the chance. Although
the Task Force dealt with this situation by taking over control of the power supply,
the battered electrical power system would remain a problem. The water supply in
Orahovac was a similar problem, compelling the Dutch to run water trucks to the
Serbs. The location of the Serb quarter of Orahovac in the highest part of town aggra-
vated the situation because it made the Serbs lose water pressure first. Although
there were frequent complaints, the Task Force found itself incapable of checking all
houses of the Albanians in the lower part of town that were leaving their taps run-
ning in order to harass the Serbs.67 Only in August was the water supply of Velika
Hoca restored to three hours a day, which turned out to be the pre-war level in sum-
mer. 
Organized crime also popped up in the area under Dutch control, although the
problem was nowhere near as problematic as in Kosovo’s larger urban centers. It
mainly spilled over from Albania, but had obvious links to elements within the UÇK.
Most visible were the extravagantly expensive BMWs and Mercedes that suddenly
visited the largely rural area. After reports from elsewhere in Kosovo of kidnappings
of young girls became more frequent, the Task Force started to search the most
expensive cars extensively at KFOR checkpoints. Instructions were given that these
specific searches were to take at least half an hour. ‘That’s harrassment, all true,’
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Van Loon later admitted, ‘but it was surely effective because they soon stopped appear-
ing in our area.’ He further argued: ‘When a society stabilizes at a certain point and
people resume normal forms of interaction, these forces have a much harder time
getting a grip on that society. They were all people that had lived together normally
before hell broke loose and who also now regarded it abnormal that a certain crim-
inal would suddenly tell you that you had to pay.’68 In the early days there were
many who simply wanted to profit from the money that was likely to be made in
the chaos that followed the war and the Serb withdrawal. All such initiatives made
an active posture by KFOR necessary. 
Many of the civil administrative responsibilities were taken on by the military not
upon UNMIK’s specific request but on KFOR’s own initiative at a local level. After
all, when UN administrators were still struggling to find their way in an unknown
society, soldiers had been operating in the civil administrative vacuum for weeks and
sometimes even months. Their motives for stepping in the void were many. In Ora-
hovac, apart from the mandate that prescribed broad support and the soldier’s basic
humanitarian concerns for the Kosovar population, the main driving force behind
many of the ad hoc decisions to assume civilian tasks was the need to thwart local
aspirants to positions of political and economic power. While performing the police
tasks that – other than civil administration – KFOR had officially resigned itself to,
it became clear that public security was often inseparable from other primary gov-
ernment functions. Any mayor of a sizeable town in the world could have told this
to the military commanders. 
Where KFOR would draw the line in the assumption of these responsibilities was
all but clear. As far as support to the civilian presence was concerned, to the mili-
tary’s great relief, the caveat of ‘support within means and capabilities’ ensured that
there was no blank check. However, KFOR was overall forthcoming with support to
UNMIK recognizing, as in Orahovac, that it was in their own interest not to relin-
quish too much influence to the UÇK. After serving his tour as KFOR’s second force
commander, General Klaus Reinhardt stated, ‘we ran the country, not the civilian
organizations. The military were the kings, they make it happen.’ He added that,
although the military needed the civilian organizations, ‘at times I would have pre-
ferred to be a military governor.’69 It would have been interesting to see what would
have happened in the early phase of their mission if KFOR would have occupied
town halls throughout Kosovo – as was hesitantly done with the police stations. Pend-
ing the arrival of UNMIK, this would have been a powerful signal to the UÇK or
other factions that any meddling in the interim government of Kosovo would not be
tolerated. Especially in the predominantly Kosovar Albanian areas, this would
undoubtedly have been accepted and maybe even expected by a population which
had welcomed the troops as liberators. However, the formal responsibilities this would
have entailed were shunned in Western democracies, and the military was hardly
prepared. At the close of the twentieth century, such measures were never serious-
ly considered at the political level. The military and civilian activities were officially
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still neatly segregated at a time when war was conducted under the guise of human-
itarian intervention and a de facto occupation was sold in the Western media as
peacekeeping. Those ventures made by soldiers into the civilian sphere were per-
formed under the name of CIMIC. 
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The Tools at Hand:
Civil-Military Cooperation in Kosovo
General Mike Jackson’s impressive military force, eventually numbering some 45,000
troops, was ill equipped and poorly prepared to deal with a power vacuum in a
province inhabited by almost two million people. With tanks, artillery, and massive
air support, KFOR had ‘escalation dominance’ if anyone chose to challenge it by
force. It was superior on the ground compared to most military expeditions of the
1990s. Battalion commanders such as David Hurley and Patrick Cammaert would
have been jealous of the ratio of forces to the size of the sector at Anton van Loon’s
disposal. What KFOR lacked more than numbers was light infantry and military
police. It could be argued, however, that what KFOR required most of all for a mis-
sion of military government-type proportions was a civil affairs organization similar
to that created during the Second World War. 
For the unprecedented array of civilian responsibilities and coordination tasks,
NATO had to rely on the tools at hand, which was civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).
However, although in transformation from its old, primarily logistical Cold War sup-
port function since 1996, CIMIC as a concept as well as an operational capability
was still in an early phase of development. Since IFOR and SFOR had restored con-
fidence in peacekeeping from its all-time low in 1995, Bosnia was perceived as the
model of future peace operations. But just as the existing peacekeeping model hard-
ly prepared the Alliance for Kosovo, the scope of the new CIMIC concept as it
emerged from operations in Bosnia appeared too narrow and rigid for KFOR. CIMIC
doctrine avoided reference to the possibility of soldiers substituting for civilian actors
such as the police and administration and consciously omitted any reference to mil-
itary government responsibilities or ‘vacuum filling.’ Yet, despite KFOR’s poor prepa-
ration and the vast gap between the CIMIC concept and the reality on the ground,
civil-military cooperation was in many ways what saved the mission in Kosovo from
impending failure. 
Ad Hoc Civil-Military Cooperation
Jackson made a striking decision in the early months of 1999 during the planning
phase for KFOR. As NATO started organizing the deployment of a ground force,
CIMIC planners at SHAPE estimated that KFOR would require a CIMIC Task Force
along the lines of that deployed in Bosnia. A CIMIC assessment by SHAPE was pre-
sented to the British force commander, but the general saw no need for attaching
the approximately two hundred proposed civil-military specialists to his force at that
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point. Faced with the likelihood of massive civil challenges ahead of the military
force, his refusal was daring, to say the least. The experience of IFOR and SFOR in
Bosnia had been the cradle for NATO CIMIC, and was generally expected to be
copied in Kosovo. In Bosnia, NATO troops had operated under a narrowly defined
military mandate in 1996 that was interpreted tightly by the American force com-
mander. Nevertheless, IFOR had deployed an almost 450-strong CIMIC Task Force
to manage the civil-military interface.
Jackson’s motives for rejecting the idea of a separate CIMIC Task Force appear
two-fold. His repudiation was a product of exactly this experience as the command-
er of one of three multinational divisions during the first six months of IFOR.1 In
Bosnia, as a result of unclear command structures, elements of the American-dom-
inated CIMIC Task Force had initially stumbled over each other in Sarajevo while
military commanders in the field were hardly aware of their function or use. In
Bosnia, the Americans had principally followed the segregated model for civil affairs,
known as the ‘Mediterranean Model’ in the Second World War, which gave the field
commanders below the Supreme Commander hardly any control over CIMIC in their
area of operations. As in Italy in 1943, this had made commanders in Bosnia some
fifty years later leery of civil affairs and CIMIC. It also resulted in the CIMIC teams
begging from the sideline for resources from regular forces. Bosnia left a lasting
memory of the failure to combine military and civil efforts. With a clear sense of
understatement, Jackson recalled: 
There were times particularly in the beginning in Bosnia where the relationship
between IFOR – the initial force that went in – and Carl Bildt’s civil administra-
tion was not terribly good. I was determined that this would not happen in Koso-
vo and that UNMIK would deserve from us just everything we could possibly do
[...].2
Jackson dismissed the phrase ‘mission creep,’ which he recalled being ‘bandied
around in Bosnia’ whenever the military mission touched upon the civilian sphere,
thereby moving off track in the eyes of its American commanders. The term had
also started to catch on in European military circles in the late 1990s.
Due to more than just his Bosnia experience, Jackson’s dismissal of a specialized
CIMIC Task Force is likely to have been a product of his upbringing as a British
officer. British and American attitudes toward civil-military interface in military oper-
ations had grown apart since 1945. The American military had shown a tendency to
treat civil affairs and CIMIC as a specialized function performed only by specialized
civil affairs personnel, most of them reservists, in dedicated units and task forces.
The primary intent of their deployment was clearing civilian obstacles for the mili-
tary commander, who was expected to be fighting an all-out conventional battle on
the German plains.3 By maintaining a strict focus on the removal of civilian distrac-
tions, U.S. Army leaders made a deliberate attempt to keep the unwelcome peace-
keeping operations of the 1990s as purely military as possible.4 The strict segrega-
tion of the military and the civilian spheres led U.S. military leaders and policymak-
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ers to strongly resist any military involvement in public security tasks, despite the
repeated indications – most notably during peace operations in Somalia, Haiti and
Bosnia – that the refusal to engage in some form of support to the police, and at
times even executive policing, proved unsustainable. 
Other than most U.S. generals, Jackson was inclined to regard the civilian aspects
as an integral part of the mission, whether dubbed civil-military cooperation, civil
affairs, civil-military operations, civic action, liaison, or support to the civil power.
He was a product of a British military tradition rooted in a long history of colonial
policing, counterinsurgency and the continued involvement of military forces in inter-
nal security operations in Northern Ireland. Any level of success in these hybrid civil-
military efforts had relied heavily on the triangular relationship between civil admin-
istration, civil police and the military. Given the British Army’s proficiency in robust
but overall restrained military operations in low-intensity urban warfare in Northern
Ireland, it is not surprising that his attitude was very different from most of his
American colleagues in both public security matters and support to the civil admin-
istration. Jackson would set the example for civil-military cooperation for his succes-
sors in KFOR, all of whom were European generals.5 He had been quick in assign-
ing engineer support to the faltering electric power system and cooperated swiftly
with UNMIK just after entry into Pristina to seize the archives containing the Koso-
vo’s telephone and electric bills. In a country with hundreds of thousands of dislo-
cated people, this would prove crucial in the long run to settle the property claims
that often underlay ethnic feuding. He would make such decisions swiftly without
bothering with prior clearance with NATO or national headquarters.6 In Kosovo, Jack-
son argued, his troops had to do ‘all sorts of things just to keep the show on the
road.’7
The general’s inclinations may have made him the right commander for a mis-
sion that required much flexibility, but the entire support effort to UNMIK would
remain improvised. Plans for a CIMIC Task Force of up to four hundred CIMIC per-
sonnel were raised again in July, but stranded as a result of KFOR headquarters’
reluctance to create a separate CIMIC organization and the inability of the member
states to provide the necessary staff. This left KFOR headquarters to tackle the coor-
dination of the CIMIC effort with twenty-four temporary staff augmentees in the G-
5 staff section. Instead of an operationally driven effort to deal with the power vac-
uum that was now expected to stay for the foreseeable future, KFOR left most of the
initiative at the tactical level by relying on the CIMIC personnel that the different
contributing nations provided to their own brigades and battalions.8
At the time when Jackson for the second time refused to build a separate CIMIC
organization, he nonetheless stepped up military support to UNMIK. He tried to
arrange the civil-military relationship through technical agreements and protocols.
These would remain in draft for several weeks, partly because Sergio Vieira de Mello
told Jackson quite frankly that he was unable to commit his shadow of an organiza-
tion to any time-lines for the transfer of responsibility for these civilian tasks. Apart
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from arrangements between KFOR and UNMIK, a system of coordination and coop-
eration had to be set up to guarantee ‘unity of effort’ between the civilian and the
military components. As in Bosnia, but unlike in UN operations where a special rep-
resentative and a force commander both reported to the secretary general, there was
no command structure linking military and civil components at the political-strate-
gic level. The relationship between KFOR and UNMIK was therefore arranged through
an elaborate, yet largely improvised system of liaison. 
Starting at the operational level, the key to the combined civil-military effort in
Kosovo was the working relationship between the special representative of the sec-
retary general and the commander of KFOR. Lessons from post-Dayton Bosnia had
resulted in instructions under the Security Council Resolution for the UN special
representative ‘to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure
that both presences operate toward the same goals and in a mutually supportive
manner.’9 Nevertheless, the success of the combined civil-military effort would large-
ly depend on the personal relationship established between civil and military com-
manders in the field.
When Kouchner took over from De Mello in July, Jackson was reassured that the
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High level civil-military cooperation: Sergio Vieira de Mello, Javier Solana, General Wesley Clark
and Lieutenant General Mike Jackson discuss KFOR support to the UN interim administration and
police force in Kosovo.
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Frenchman grasped the limitations of UNMIK and that he was aware of his depend-
ency on the military. From the early days of the operation, the Force Commander
and Kouchner met on a daily basis at the ‘principals meeting’ and soon exchanged
senior liaison officers on higher levels. Jackson gave his German national deputy
responsibility for humanitarian assistance, while his French deputy would take charge
of support to civil administration and reconstruction. KFOR liaison officers were per-
manently stationed in the Office of the Special Representative and his four subsidiary
organizations. Kouchner impressed the general as someone intent on rapid and prag-
matic solutions. These solutions were desperately needed, for Jackson’s brigade com-
manders were becoming increasingly frustrated by the growing number of problems
that required UNMIK input and resolution. All over Kosovo, as in Orahovac, the
dilemma of either blocking or accommodating Thaci’s provisional government was
pressing, but largely left to local commanders to figure out. 
Reinhardt would also develop warm relations with Kouchner. On his first encounter
with the Frenchman and his American deputy Jock Covey, the general brought to
mind his personal experiences. He had witnessed ‘terrible competition’ between the
military and civilian components in UN operations in Somalia, Croatia and during
IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, where he had commanded the German contingents. ‘In
the interest of the Kosovar people,’ he therefore informed Kouchner that, as a mat-
ter of principle, he and his military force would conform to ‘the will and ideas’ of
Kouchner, recognizing the western standards of keeping the military subservient to
civilian rule. The general may have slightly exaggerated his compliant role, but it
was a powerful gesture. He took pride in the fact that he and his civilian counter-
part were called ‘twin brothers’ for their ability to work together in such ‘close har-
mony.’ Also with Kouchner’s deputy of civil administration, Tom Könings, the ‘chem-
istry was right’ from the very first encounter.10
At brigade level, CIMIC Centers were installed to provide additional links to
UNMIK, NGOs and the local population. Meanwhile, UNMIK joined military meet-
ings at KFOR headquarters and at brigade level. Its representatives were also invit-
ed to sit in on military meetings by the Joint Implementation Commission (JIC),
created to coordinate compliance by the formerly warring parties with the Military
Technical Agreement and the Undertaking.11 In contrast to Bosnia, information was
shared quite freely. However, there were more informal channels of civil-military
cooperation. In the evenings, KFOR’s chief legal officers would not mind cement-
ing civil-military relations by hopping over to UNMIK legal staff for the occasional
beer that was denied to them by strict military regulations on alcohol consumption.12
Alexandros Yannis was probably correct in claiming that the problems with enforc-
ing a clear chain of command were in fact bigger within KFOR, between the Force
Commander and the various national contingents, than between UNMIK and KFOR
at the operational level.13 This became painfully clear when the crisis in Mitrovica
exploded and Reinhardt could not dispatch the troops that were supposedly under
his command. Interventions by national governments continued to hamper the abil-
ity of the force commander. However, the same was true for the UN administration
and the unmanageable international organizations with which it had subcontracted,
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the OSCE, EU and the UNHCR. While the two chiefs got along in an exemplary
manner, their respective subordinates were difficult to command and did not auto-
matically follow their example. They therefore often had a harder time synchroniz-
ing their efforts in the field, and it was only in December 1999, after six months of
joint civil-military operations, that Reinhardt assembled all of his generals and Kouch-
ner assembled his deputies for a conference on joint strategy.14 Overall, civil-military
cooperation between KFOR and UN personnel at the operational level was regarded
a success, but cooperation depended too much on the personalities involved rather
than on planning and standard operating procedures. 
Jackson’s dismissal of a task force that prepared for civil-military operations had its
drawbacks, but it is doubtful that such an organization could have created a funda-
mentally different outcome. CIMIC planners at SHAPE argued in the fall of 1999
that the failure to deploy a CIMIC Task Force contributed to the subsequent diffi-
culties for the belatedly deployed UN civilian administration component. They also
partly blamed the mass exodus of Serb civil servants on this shortfall and the sub-
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A British KFOR helicopter delivers communications equipment to the building of the civilian UN
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in June 1999. KFOR was generous in its support and in many ways
substituted for the UN interim government.
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sequent opportunity for the UÇK to occupy the ground.15 A concentrated CIMIC
effort vigorously directed from KFOR headquarters may indeed have been more suc-
cessful in filling the vacuum pending the arrival of UNMIK. A task force with sev-
eral months of preparation time for the mission would at least have been more suc-
cessful at mustering part of the proposed CIMIC personnel and providing them with
a CIMIC crash course. Overall, members of the Alliance had come to appreciate the
need for dedicated CIMIC staff, but they had failed to provide the necessary special-
ized units. It was long before any of the three large NATO CIMIC groups that had
been proposed in 1997 would become operational. CIMIC Group North, in which
the Dutch and Germans took the lead, and CIMIC Group South under Italy’s chair-
manship would only see the light of day in 2002. The British, instead of creating a
multinational CIMIC group within ARRC as initially planned, created a small nation-
al capability for what they called civil affairs. The third group within NATO would
instead be provided by the Americans, who could simply use their existing civil affairs
structures for this purpose. However, in 1999, the Americans would not contribute
the numbers of civil affairs personnel it had deployed in Bosnia, since it had clear-
ly opted to delegate overall responsibility for the ground operations in Kosovo to the
European NATO partners. 
The reiterated CIMIC proposal in July 1999 could hardly have been successful
in regaining the ground lost to the illegal Albanian and Serb administrative struc-
tures in Kosovo. It could only have accomplished something if NATO’s political lead-
ers would have agreed to their soldiers removing local mayors from town halls and
CIMIC personnel filling their posts. This would have amounted to military govern-
ment through direct rule at the most basic administrative level. There are no indi-
cations that either plan called for the required administrative ‘stopgap’ at the munic-
ipal level. Yet, as UNMIK and KFOR temporarily failed to gain control over Koso-
vo’s administration, and UÇK police were roaming the streets of Kosovo, there was
overall agreement that the key to UÇK’s early successes in staging its ‘silent coup’
was civil administrative control on exactly this level of local government. NATO mem-
ber states clearly would not have allowed planning for the substitution of adminis-
trative functions, since anything resembling military government was ruled out. Sol-
diers were supposed to do soldierly tasks and – especially in the mind of Pentagon
officials – stay as far away as possible from ‘nation building.’16
The CIMIC concept that NATO had recently started to adapt could hardly have
prepared its forces for Kosovo. Upon entering Kosovo, the overarching aims of CIMIC
were only vaguely defined in NATO doctrine that was still under draft. A NATO Par-
liamentary Assembly delegation visiting Kosovo in September 1999 cautiously con-
cluded that, while CIMIC was given trial runs in Bosnia and now in Kosovo, the
input required was ‘somewhat ill defined.’17 The general definition of CIMIC agreed
upon at the time of the intervention in Kosovo was still ‘[t]he resources and arrange-
ments which support the relationship between NATO commanders and the nation-
al authorities, civil and military, and civil populations in an area where NATO mili-
tary forces are or plan to be employed.’ Such arrangements were to include ‘cooper-
ation with non-governmental or international agencies, organizations and authori-
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ties.’ By late 2000, NATO had defined CIMIC somewhat more properly as: ‘The
coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO com-
mander and civil populations and local authorities, as well as international, nation-
al and non-governmental organizations and agencies.’18
At the time of the intervention in Kosovo, the CIMIC concept was often still
directly associated with ‘mission creep’ and therefore much emphasis was put on its
role in support of the military objective. The overall perception of the military mis-
sion or objective was the pivotal problem in all thinking related to CIMIC prior to
Kosovo. The military objective was never thought of as substituting for the civil power
in law and order and other administrative tasks, and even support to civil authori-
ties was hardly considered a key mission. The conceptual framework still hinged on
its old Cold War status, while depending heavily on the input provided by the Amer-
icans who were often regarded as more proficient given their long tradition in civil
affairs. As a result, CIMIC had been developed in isolation and considered a mili-
tary function in the margin of military operations, rather than a function integrated
into security operations. 
Specific CIMIC training for officers had only just begun at the NATO School at
Oberammergau. Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Kilch, who was in charge of civil-military
cooperation within the German brigade, concluded that the CIMIC training he went
through prior to his deployment was of no use whatsoever while performing his job
in Prizren. His nine staff members, comprised of Dutch, Austrian and eventually
also Swiss officers, were equally ill prepared for what they encountered in Kosovo.19
Flexibility and a capacity to quickly learn on the job would prove the most indispen-
sable skills during his mission. 
The lack of guidance and coordination from the operational level resulting from
ill-defined doctrine and lack of planning and expertise was felt on the tactical level
within KFOR’s brigades and battalions. In defense of CIMIC staff officers at KFOR
headquarters, it has to be stressed that they were spread thin, only gradually reach-
ing the level of twenty-five personnel.20 Moreover, during the refugee crisis and the
immediate aftermath of the military deployment in Kosovo, CIMIC staff at headquar-
ters had been overwhelmed by the masses of displaced persons moving backward
and forward across the province’s borders. This preoccupation with refugees left lit-
tle time for post-conflict planning. According to Kilch, the only practical order that
brigade CIMIC staff initially followed from KFOR headquarters was the request for
a daily report on civil-military activities, results and intentions. To that end the Ger-
man brigade simply forwarded to KFOR headquarters the information they had
already been sending the Ministry of Defense in Bonn.21 Coordination of the CIMIC
effort in the initial months was limited to weekly meetings of CIMIC staff from all
five brigades in which the officers gave a short briefing on their activities and inten-
tions within their areas of responsibility. While ascribing generous support to the
civilian component, the instructions provided down the chain of command in the
force commanders ‘CIMIC intent’ in July were not much more than a basic order
of priority for the establishment of liaison and the likely recipients of support. The
brigades were instructed to give priority to the four pillars of UNMIK, subsequent-
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ly to the International Committee Red Cross (ICRC) and finally to the group of key
governmental donors such as USAID, DFID, ECHO. Other than this order of pri-
ority and an emphasis on the winterization project, the brigades received no orders
on how to approach the power vacuum.22
A KFOR CIMIC handbook appeared in September, three months into the oper-
ation, as most of the coordinating structures and methods had already emerged in
the field. The handbook intended to provide CIMIC staffs at brigade level with the
overall goals of CIMIC liaison and operations and the structures intended to execute
them. The military end-state was defined as the point when UNMIK was able to
operate without KFOR support. It also outlined the main responsibilities and goals
of UNMIK, and provided CIMIC staff with instructions on how to perform the liai-
son function, on reporting CIMIC activities, and gave basic guidelines for setting up
projects. Much emphasis was put on performing the liaison role, the pivotal CIMIC
function. Subsequently, some clarity was created by distinguishing between direct
support ‘purely in support of the military mission’ and indirect support ‘in support
of an [international organization] or NGO.’23 NATO doctrine had thus far made the
rather vague distinction between ‘CIMIC activities,’ and ‘CIMIC operations’ which
– although attempting to make a similar distinction – tended to puzzle rather than
illuminate views of the soldiers involved.24 Still, there was the usual omission in the
definitions provided in the CIMIC Handbook: there was no mentioning of coopera-
tion with UNMIK police or administration or other civilian organizations as an inte-
gral part of security operations. Moreover, the drafters of the handbook, who were
apparently hoping these tasks would soon wither away with the emergence of more
UNMIK staff, avoided any clear reference to military forces substituting for a civil
authority.25
A ‘KFOR CIMIC Campaign Plan’ covering the longer term was still under draft
in September. When it finally appeared, the plan seemed to have little impact. Many
CIMIC officers were not even aware of its existence, which is also likely to have been
the case with the CIMIC Handbook. Attempts by new KFOR rotations in 2000 to
resurrect the overarching CIMIC campaign plan failed as before because, ‘It did not
receive the appropriate command emphasis, to the point where implementation at
so late a phase became academic,’ a U.S. civil affairs officer concluded.26 In Koso-
vo, CIMIC would remain primarily in the hands of the tactical commanders, who
made up much of their policy as they went along. 
The Complex Civil-Military Playing Field 
During the British campaign in Malaya, arguably the most successful example of
civil-military cooperation during counterinsurgency operations, civil-military cooper-
ation had a relatively easy point of departure. The military forces in Malaya were all
part of a British command structure and the colonial administration and police forces
were all established and reporting to the same colonial government. Moreover, at the
height of the emergency General Gerald Templer was placed in overall command of
both the military and civilian powers. In Kosovo, the sheer complexity of the civil-
the tools at hand 399
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:55  Pagina 399
military playing field made it far more difficult to generalize about the degree of
coordination between civil and military and even more so about its success. By August
1999, Kosovo was host to some twenty different national peacekeeping contingents
that were inclined to follow national guidelines and priorities rather than those of
the force commander, dozens of national and international governmental organiza-
tions and several hundreds of non-governmental organizations. 
The number of national contingents in the coalition, the fact that KFOR headquar-
ters was a coordinating rather than a command headquarters, lack of planning, instruc-
tions and coordination within the loosely organized KFOR CIMIC structure, resulted
in very different approaches taken by each of the five brigades. National contingents
had differing numbers of CIMIC personnel, different levels of funds available, and
had varying perceptions of, and attitudes towards, CIMIC. Each brigade and battalion
therefore reached different levels of coordination with the many civilian actors in their
area. This resulted in varying degrees of combined UNMIK-KFOR administrative con-
trol over sectors and local populations and different levels of reconstruction.
By August, the German brigade had deployed an almost one-hundred-strong
CIMIC company in the field with abundant funds at their disposal. While the French
had mustered some ninety-six personnel, they had little money to spend. This com-
pared to some fifty-eight U.S. civil affairs troops, thirty-five Italians and a mere four-
teen British CIMIC personnel.27 Numbers of dedicated staff alone were not a reli-
able indicator of the degree of interaction and cooperation between the different
brigades and their civil environment. British units, for instance, while low on CIMIC
staff, were generally perceived by both local and international organizations as very
supportive and communicative. Combined with the frequency of the coordinating
meetings held by the different brigades in their CIMIC centers a somewhat more
reliable picture arises. The Germans, British and Americans all held meetings early
in the morning on a daily basis. The Italians held them only twice weekly, while the
French only held civil-military coordination meetings once a week.28
The effectiveness of different national CIMIC personnel was heavily influenced
by their general posture in a civilian environment. The British were generally seen
as integrating civil-military cooperation into operations. Their claim that ‘we are all
civil affairs officers’ was at times ridiculed by American officers who were hardly
impressed with their meager CIMIC organization. It initially numbered just eight
and was co-located with NGOs in Pristina’s sports stadium where they had to bor-
row internet access from one of the humanitarian organizations.29 They were, how-
ever, located in the city and operating side by side with the NGO community, which
not all contingents did. An American civil affairs officer in Kosovo in early 2001 was
surprised by their approach: 
The concept is that CMO [civil-military operations] is integrated into operations
(especially security operations) and that every soldier in a peace operation had a
CMO mission. Hence the small number of dedicated CMO personnel at [Multina-
tional Brigade Central]; a dozen or so CMO officers mainly at G3 (CMO) at Brigade
and battalion HQs.30
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The force protection measures resulting from the U.S. military’s risk-averse men-
tality hampered the American civil affairs teams in moving among the people. A
civil affairs officer who planned on meeting a specific local Kosovar would have to
leave early to reach his destination from the massive U.S. Army base Camp Bond-
steel, which was situated nowhere near the majority of the population centers of
eastern Kosovo. His appearance in town would have been quite intimidating for most
Kosovars due to the force protection requirement for four-person civil affairs teams
in at least two Humvees. The civil affairs officer engaging in a conversation with a
local resident would always be wearing a helmet and body armor and would hardly
be distinguishable from the combat troops who were likely to accompany them. His
British, Dutch and other European colleagues, while exposed to exactly the same risk,
were far more approachable, confident looking and trusting towards the local popu-
lation wearing merely their berets and a side arm. One of the two Dutch CIMIC
officers, Captain Wim Speth, walked about freely with his local translator and pos-
sibly with his driver who was also his guard. He would have his morning coffee in
the local café and interact with the locals and figure out the general mood. For the
battalion, almost all relevant information was garnered from personal contacts with
locals and civilian organizations, and this information enabled the battalion to pre-
empt a crisis. 
American civil affairs officers, although still more professionally trained than most
of their European colleagues and mostly with a relevant civilian background, were
also hampered in their work by the U.S. Army’s fixation on conventional warfare. A
Dutch and a Canadian officer who spent six weeks in the general civil affairs train-
ing course at Fort Bragg were surprised by the Americans’ lack of attention to peace
operations in 1999. The Dutchman reported:
Operations such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement (our core business) are
dealt with in five minutes and are too murky and too dicey to be dealt with in-
depth, despite the interventions of a Canadian officer and myself. They either do
not understand our interventions or consciously ignore the matters we raise. The
foundation of everything remains power (over-power?).
He was also taken aback by what he described as the American military’s compul-
sion to ‘categorize and compartmentalize everything, framing it in a definition, doc-
trine or field manual.’ He witnessed how his class had great difficulty handling the
flexibility and creativity that he thought the subject required:
The lack of a clearly defined procedure, the exact layout and staffing of a Civil Mil-
itary Operations Center [CIMIC Center], for which the changing circumstances in
different operations result in many varieties, causes much confusion and many
questions amongst the participant in the civil affairs course. They need backup
from a book! The CMOC is clearly seen as a military operation in which the pri-
mary concerns are force protection and the U.S. military’s leading role. […] Today
was another one of these days spent by the Americans struggling to squeeze all
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operations other than war into doctrine, definition or procedure. This proved hard-
ly possible with so many exceptions to the rule. 31
One American civil affairs officer would remark after his tour in Kosovo that because
civil-military operations were ‘more an art than a science, it is something its practi-
tioners simply either grasp, or fail to understand.’32
Not all NATO soldiers manning the CIMIC Centers were equally communicative
towards locals and their civilian counterparts in the humanitarian community. This
was the result of both language barriers and the lingering cultural divide between
soldiers and civilians. Cooperation depended on the different nations’ military and,
last but not least, the individuals involved. One of the German CIMIC officers staffing
the CIMIC-center reportedly refused to speak anything other than German, even-
though he could speak some English. The UNHCR in Djakovica had an even hard-
er time dealing with the local KFOR officers, since hardly anyone of them spoke
anything other than Italian.33 According to an aid worker from Oxfam the weekly
coordinating meetings held in the French CIMIC Center were initially no more than
a French officer briefing those present on the general security situation and announc-
ing what the French were going to do. He called their version of civil-military coop-
eration ‘one-way communication.’ His experience was that ‘KFOR follows orders and
they give orders.’ The French were also mocked for trying to win the hearts and
minds of the Kosovars by giving priority to French language education over recon-
struction of housing. Stories such as these would always be buzzing around the
humanitarian community, but gave a distorted picture. Although the French were
known in Kosovo for their ‘stand-offish posture,’ an independent research into NATO’s
role in humanitarian operations concluded that, ‘with the exception of one NGO, the
humanitarian community expressed satisfaction with the support received from
French KFOR.’34
Differences in national approaches towards civil-military cooperation between
national contingents were also influenced by their pursuit of their own national inter-
est. Both civilian governmental and non-governmental organizations complained –
and CIMIC officers in KFOR headquarters readily admitted – that much of the CIMIC
effort, which should have been coordinated and equally distributed throughout Koso-
vo, was dominated by national contingents working towards their own benefit.35 The
Kosovar population was clearly benefiting from these efforts, but many internation-
al officials rightfully wondered whether the resources were spent economically and
equally. The Germans were the most obvious example of a brigade following nation-
al over NATO priorities. The Schröder administration had much invested in a suc-
cessful resolution of the Kosovo crisis. It had been a staunch supporter of the war
against Serbia in defiance of much internal opposition. The Germans were now mak-
ing their biggest contribution ever to a peacekeeping operation by leading an 8,000-
strong multinational brigade, and were soon to provide the second force command-
er. Further chaos in their sector of Kosovo would therefore have to be avoided at all
costs. According to Ulrich Kilch, his brigade commander Sauer and the Ministry of
Defense in Bonn made no secret that they were ‘just following national interest’ by
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providing an engineer battalion, a CIMIC company, an extra field kitchen, money
for projects and eventually even wages for local civil servants.36 The unit had an esti-
mated five million deutschmarks at its disposal from government resources. 
More than other contingents, the Germans tended to deploy their forces, espe-
cially their engineers, in civic action projects and the reconstruction of infrastruc-
ture. Moreover, the German government organization for technical assistance, the
THW, was only active in the south of Kosovo in direct or indirect support of forces
under German commander, and therefore – to their great benefit – also in support
of the Dutch. To policymakers and parliamentarians in Bonn, ‘it seemed eminently
reasonable that German government food aid allocated to the UN World Food Pro-
gram should be channelled to the Kosovo [area of operations] under German com-
mand for use in bakeries operated by German troops to make bread for distribution
to Kosovar civilians who would also be served by German NGOs.’37 The scale of
CIMIC activities in the area by the Germans was unparalleled and, partly as a result,
communications, transportation, and agricultural infrastructures in the Prizren region
were among those in the best condition in Kosovo.38 A KFOR officer from another
contingent described German KFOR as ‘acting like a huge NGO doing projects.’39
He was not alone in asking the crucial question of where the military’s priorities
should lie. The International Crisis Group concluded: 
KFOR has been extremely helpful in facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assis-
tance; however, aid agency officials, from UNHCR to the private volunteer organ-
izations, feel that KFOR would win more hearts and minds by providing the civil-
ian protection that is within its mandate than by furnishing roof kits.40
Overall, the Kosovar population – the intended beneficiary of civil-military coopera-
tion – profited from a set of circumstances that made the intervention in Kosovo a
more concerted effort than most previous combined military, humanitarian and recon-
struction operations. Despite the usual bickering, the cooperation and coordination
emerging in the field between the military, IGOs and NGOs capitalized on many
years of experience in complex peacekeeping. During the 1990s, civilian and mili-
tary actors had grown accustomed to the need to synchronize their efforts to a cer-
tain extent. The relationship between the military and the humanitarian communi-
ty has been described as a ‘marriage of reason’ between what the American Chief
of Staff General John M. Shalikashvili in 1995 had called ‘strange bedfellows’ at a
conference on military efforts in humanitarian crises.41 The main drive behind this
process of rapprochement had been in the recognition of the mutual dependency in
the achievement of common goals. This rapprochement was essentially demand driv-
en.42 Humanitarian organizations tended to welcome military assistance when its
comparative advantages surfaced. These were the military’s ability to provide securi-
ty, airlifts and other logistic capacity, and the ability to get things done through clear
leadership structures and discipline. This dependency, which had more than ever
come to the forefront during the refugee crisis between March and May, helped set
the conditions for cooperation in Kosovo after June. When the hundreds of thou-
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sands of Kosovar Albanian refugees had spilled over the Albanian and Macedonian
borders and overwhelmed the UNHCR and NGOs on the ground in previous months,
the military came to the assistance of these organizations. In April, NATO Secretary
General Solana had approached UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata
with an offer for military assistance to the humanitarian effort for which her organ-
ization was clearly not prepared.43 NATO troops would be placed in support under
civilian leadership in an unprecedented serving role. Despite some criticism from
the humanitarian community, the military were generally praised for supporting the
work of the humanitarian organizations in this phase.44
In the course of the 1990s, there had also been a growing recognition on the
part of the military of the use of humanitarian and other international organizations
in order to facilitate their work and most of all, their eventual withdrawal from a cri-
sis area. In Kosovo, this was clearly echoed in General Jackson’s overall ‘CIMIC-
intent’ that went far beyond directly ‘supporting the military mission.’ Jackson and
his successors put great emphasis on supporting UNMIK in the establishment of
an interim administration and on maximizing the IGO and NGO capability ‘in order
to set the conditions for the development of a lasting settlement within the province
thus allowing for the withdrawal of KFOR/NATO support.’45 In practice, this segre-
gation of intended beneficiaries of CIMIC support – the military commander or the
civil environment – often proved futile in an operation with such a broad and inte-
grated mandate as that in Kosovo. However, the great emphasis put on support to
the civil environment helped to silence the ‘mission creepers’ who saw anything out-
side direct support to the military operation as undesirable. 
Analyzing the evolving civil-military relationship during the 1990s, Charles
Moskos observed an ‘embryonic convergence’ between two parties that had resulted
in ‘a ‘softening’ of the military, if you will, and a ‘hardening’ of the NGOs.’46 This
process of mutual rapprochement undoubtedly improved civil-military cooperation
in Kosovo at the end of the decade. Nevertheless, what could be called an unparal-
leled success in civil-military cooperation may not have appeared as such to a new-
comer in the field of combined civil-military efforts in humanitarian disaster relief
and reconstruction. Kosovo was the scene of the usual bickering and finger point-
ing between the military and civilian personnel. Compared to the improving rela-
tionship between the military and large international governmental organizations,
the cultural divide between NGOs and military forces was still wide.47
One of the continuing sources of frustration on the military side was the lack of
willingness on behalf of the NGOs to coordinate their efforts. Officially, the UNHCR
was responsible for the coordination of the humanitarian effort, but the Dutch act-
ing representative of the UNHCR in Kosovo told Reinhardt that it was easier to herd
a bag of fleas.48 KFOR staff blamed the NGOs for sticking to the main roads and
cities, where the cameras and therefore donors would see them perform their job.
There seemed to be much less attention paid to the more isolated villages, where
some of the military ended up witnessing much hardship while performing some
of their patrols. Although the peacekeepers considered this pursuit of publicity in
order to please donors ‘distasteful,’ many of the national military contingents in
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Bosnia and Kosovo were no strangers to high-profile, quick-impact projects. Provid-
ing the ideal photo opportunities, the reconstruction of schools and playgrounds were
among the most sought-after CIMIC projects. And although ‘winning the hearts and
minds’ of the local population was as legitimate a goal as it had been in counterin-
surgency and other military operations in the past, such as Cambodia, winning the
hearts and minds of the taxpayer back home was often still of equal importance to
defense ministries and army leaders throughout Europe and North America. 
It is not surprising therefore that some of the NGOs came to consider the mili-
tary as competitors in the search for donors and funds. The British governmental
aid agency DFID provided British forces in the Balkans with grants for small proj-
ects, which would otherwise have been channeled to international or local NGOs.
Professional humanitarians tended to regard much of the national development funds
spent through the military as costly and poorly directed. Despite the pride the Ger-
mans took in their initiative, the 8,000 hot meals per day provided by their troops
to the population of Prizren became an often-cited example of ill-spent money. Not
only were the program’s cost-effectiveness and effects questioned, the meals were
also discontinued before the winter began for lack of funds. Numerous other inci-
dents called into question the competence of the military to carry out humanitarian
tasks.
49
During the refugee crises in Macedonia and Albania, for instance, the pos-
itive effects of rapid camp construction by the military were at times undercut by
their design and location in cases where the soldiers failed to consult humanitarian
professionals. Without consulting the UNHCR, U.S. troops constructed a massive
refugee camp in a Macedonian valley, which flooded during the first rainstorm. 
The relationship between KFOR and the international governmental organizations
operating under the UNMIK umbrella, the quintessential civil-military link for the
establishment of international control over Kosovo, was overall better than that between
the military and NGOs. Obviously, there were many complaints from the military
about the slow deployment of UNMIK officers in the field. The military often had lit-
tle appreciation for the difficulty of starting a civilian mission from scratch and for-
got that civilian officials had to leave their regular jobs behind. CIMIC officers also
complained about some of the UNMIK employees being ‘young and inexperienced.’
They ignored that civilian organizations were mostly faced with military staff with lit-
tle or no experience outside the military sphere.50 However, there was no turf-battle
raging between soldiers and civilians over the administrative functions as there was
in the purely humanitarian sphere. While direct military involvement in humanitari-
an aid and project was often controversial, temporary military input in the provisions
of public services and rudimentary institution building was generally welcomed.
The further down the line of command, the fewer guidelines KFOR and UNMIK
received on how they were to coordinate their efforts and towards what political goal.
While cooperation between Kouchner and the force commanders in Pristina may
have been regarded as exemplary, in the regions and municipalities the lack of strat-
egy on how to deal with local Albanian and Serb competitors in the administrative
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void made it hard for their civilian and military officers to create a viable mode of
cooperation. 
By August, the Germans in Prizren had established direct contacts with the
UNHCR while most of the contacts with the NGOs were established in the CIMIC-
Center adjacent to the German military compound. However, the first German CIMIC
officer had neglected to establish direct liaison with the regional UN civil adminis-
trator. When Kilch took over in October, he performed this primary liaison function
himself. In this role, the German CIMIC officer saw himself as ‘a kind of military
advisor to the regional administrator.’ After his arrival, weekly meetings commenced
between the German brigade, UN Civil Administration, the OSCE and the UNHCR.
They were soon known under the telling name ‘cabinet meetings.’51 Here, Prizren’s
most pressing problems were addressed and possible solutions and the distribution
of labor between the organizations were discussed. After the initial problems, Kilch
called overall cooperation ‘quite good.’ 
The lack of coordination on the operational level at KFOR headquarters for plan-
ning and training for CIMIC tasks was also clearly felt one step further down the
chain of command. The battalions were largely kept in the dark on how they were
to address the civilian challenges. Except for the commander’s overall intent, little
guidance ever reached the Dutch troops in Orahovac. The Germans had failed to
inform the Dutch of their plans and intentions concerning CIMIC, in as far as they
themselves had any at that point.52 National guidance was lacking, since the Dutch
government generally believed that by providing a reinforced engineer battalion, pub-
licly called an ‘Engineer Aid Battalion,’ it was doing enough in the field of CIMIC.
No CIMIC handbook or specified orders from KFOR or brigade headquarters reached
the battalions operating in the municipalities in the first months of the operation.
And while Kilch may have been complaining about the limited use of his CIMIC
training in Germany, he had at least a point of reference as to what NATO was try-
ing to accomplish by putting him into the field as a CIMIC officer. Major Arno
Schouwenaars and Captain Wim Speth, the two dedicated CIMIC officers in Oraho-
vac, had received no specific CIMIC training whatsoever. Both were artillery officers,
plucked away from other units in the rush leading up to KFOR’s entry into Kosovo. 
The lack of guidance on the lower levels of operation did not necessarily mean
that civil-military cooperation in the regions and municipalities of Kosovo was worse.
But without it, it left the levels of success to chance and, again, depended on the
personalities involved. In theater, it simply demanded more creativity to establish a
viable civil-military coordinating mechanism. The first challenge was to employ the
soldiers within a unit to suit the largely unforeseen civilian dimension of the mis-
sion. Obviously, it took more than just the two CIMIC officers to manage the civil-
military interface. Therefore the commander and much of his regular staff performed
these aspects of the mission. Since the early days of the operation, Captain Brouns,
the intelligence officer (S-2) had been coordinating the police effort. Although the
local UNMIK Police commander Albert League had officially assumed ‘police prima-
cy’ by November, the Dutch were still heavily involved in policing duties and con-
tinued to cooperate closely with his police force. As the numbers of civilians in the
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field rose sharply in July, many staff officers were given a secondary task of perform-
ing a liaison role. The battalion’s operations officer (S-3), major Marcel van Weerd,
as well as the logistics officer (S-4) and later chief of staff major Roy Abels, were
spending much of their time performing these tasks which could be placed under
the heading of CIMIC tasks. However, the soldiers were hardly bothered by the label
put on the job they performed. The signals officer (S-6) was in charge of support-
ing, with logistical means and armed guards, the ICTY and the various forensic
teams working to find and investigate the many mass graves and war crime sites
around Orahovac. 
Meanwhile, Schouwenaars and Speth were performing the basic liaison task to
the Serb and Albanian population. They and the other double-hatted staff officers
often joined UNMIK personnel to meet with the local population and its represen-
tatives in order to present a common front to the Kosovars who were becoming
increasingly confused by the alphabet-soup of international agencies that had flood-
ed into their war-torn province. CIMIC tasks in Orahovac were not even the exclu-
sive domain of the officer-corps. The extent to which CIMIC became integrated in
the overall operation of the Dutch battalion made the employment of non-commis-
sioned officers necessary. As previously described, the two most senior non-commis-
sioned officers were taking testimonies of the local Albanian population in the
makeshift police station. In some cases, even regular soldiers were used to liaise
with specific NGOs performing humanitarian work in remote villages. 
The Task Force clearly needed a more dedicated CIMIC staff, but the Dutch Min-
istry of Defense and the Dutch Army’s Operational Staff refused to honor the repeat-
ed requests for additional liaison officers and specialists to fill the niches in the oper-
ation when mere improvisation would not suffice.53 Two extra liaison officers and
two specialists were on the battalion’s wish list. The first specialist Van Loon asked
for was a legal advisor to help him deal with complexities involved in matters such
as arrests and detention. The second specialist the battalion could have used was a
civil engineer capable of providing some quick technical advice on the water supply
problems in the early phase of the operation. The specialists were refused and the
liaison problem was ‘a matter of handling the IOs/NGOs creatively,’ the national
contingent commander advised from distant Macedonia. The Dutch Army was mak-
ing a vast contribution of over two thousand troops to the operation, but there was
little appreciation for the complexities of a mission of the artillery battalion that –
to a large extent – had become civil-military in nature.54
The second challenge in establishing successful civil-military cooperation on the
municipal level was the creation of a coordinating mechanism between KFOR and
UNMIK. When the first UNMIK officer appeared in Orahovac in early August, there
had been little evidence of such coordination. The local commander was hardly aware
of UNMIK’s intentions, policy and plans, in as far as there had been any. Mean-
while, the UN administrator had not been informed about the efforts made by Dutch
KFOR to establish an interim council outside UÇK control, with the intention of fur-
thering Serb-Albanian relations. This failure to synchronize their posture and pres-
ent a common front helped UÇK mayor Thaqi to maneuver through the cracks and
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proclaim himself mayor. Nevertheless, after the initial confusion and after the admin-
istrative lead was passed to UN Civil Administration, the organizations involved in
establishing a local trusteeship over Orahovac successfully integrated most of their
efforts. The Task Force successfully kept the UÇK military commander Tara in check
and together they were able to limit the damage that Thaqi could do in his position
as deputy mayor. 
It would nevertheless take until late September before a formal coordination mech-
anism between KFOR and UNMIK was created in Orahovac. It was neither KFOR
nor Kane in his official role as primus enter pares within UNMIK who called for such
a coordinating meeting. Kane’s leadership was not very strong and, with the UN
administration quite often changing its staff, UN Civil Administration was not very
effective.55 The coordinating meeting was initiated instead by the OSCE field officer
Walter Fleischer. These meetings would develop along similar lines as the ‘cabinet
meetings’ held in Prizren. As before, there had been no guidelines from the brigade
on setting up or on how to conduct such meetings, but they gradually emerged in
the field. At the first coordination meeting held on 23 September, with Astrid van
Genderen-Stort from UNHCR and Kane and Fleischer present, Van Loon was still
the dominant figure, addressing many of the civilian issues and responsibilities he
was eager to transfer or share. He was wondering who would manage the hospital
once the Dutch doctors had left, and was concerned about the management of the
wine factory and the other larger enterprises, insisting there would have to be a con-
trol board and some sort of transparent record of where and to whom the future
invested funds would be flowing. Since Van Loon was mostly too busy, his opera-
tions staff officer or CIMIC officers would represent him. When UN police com-
mander Albert League arrived in October, someone apparently forgot to inform him
about the weekly ritual, but in November he would join in.56 The issues addressed
varied from the all-dominating blockades, the problems faced by the Serb and Roma
minorities, Serbs convoys, schools and all other basic services. From the UNHCR’s
perspective, these meetings were useful for information sharing and sometimes for
a proper distribution of tasks, but the separate NGO coordinating meetings and bilat-
eral meetings with KFOR were more useful and efficient. 
Virtually every element of civil-military cooperation in Orahovac was improvised.
Nevertheless, solid relations developed with most of the international organizations
during the initial effort to get essential services running again. Cooperation was
exceptionally good with the local branches of the German THW and the UNHCR.57
In a letter addressed to Van Loon, the local UNHCR representative Astrid van Gen-
deren lauded his troops for their ‘impartial, down-to-earth and efficient’ way of sub-
stituting for United Nations personnel at a time when the main humanitarian organ-
izations were not yet on the ground in Orahovac. Having operated in this troubled
area for several months, she was convinced that ‘no better foundation could have
been laid for our humanitarian work in Orahovac municipality than was done by
your men.’ Rejecting the assertion that national bias influenced her judgment she
described them as ‘straightforward, involved, humane (well, most of them), showing
a willingness to understand the local situation and culture and to recognize the dif-
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ferences between the two groups while trying to help both sides as much as possi-
ble in a constructive way.’ They were ‘not afraid to take drastic measures when need-
ed (arrests, trying to find kidnapped Serbs), they were proactive, and went much fur-
ther than just a peacekeeping role. Foot patrols were no problem for them. The Dutch
were everywhere in and around the Orahovac, including the Serb area, where the
situation was very often insecure.’58 Her boss, Louis Gentile, operating from Djakovi-
ca, even argued that they had ‘clearly received better training than most military per-
sonnel in theater and have a clear idea of how to support humanitarian operations
effectively. Your troops have been first-class humanitarians as well as soldiers and
that has made our work much easier.’59 Interestingly, hurling artillery shells at the
enemy was what they were trained for. 
Unity of Effort
Despite relative successes in civil-military cooperation at the time of Jackson’s depar-
ture from Kosovo in October, the general mood at the time was that its civil admin-
istrative control over Kosovo was lost to the UÇK. Revenge killings against Serb and
other minorities were filling the headlines of the world’s media. With it, hopes for
a multi-ethnic Kosovo had dwindled and the overall success of the joint civil-mili-
tary trusteeship over Kosovo was hanging by a thin thread. The goal of building a
new Kosovo in which all communities could coexist peacefully seemed ‘a battle against
all odds.’60
On top of that, there was a tendency to regard the international intervention as
a failure because of the lack of progress in the reconstruction of Kosovo. As winter
started to set in, there was widespread fear within the international presence and
among the Kosovars that the population was facing a humanitarian disaster. Although
there had been marked progress in the reconstruction of housing – not in the least
as a result of Kosovar resourcefulness and diaspora funds – Kosovo’s two main power
plants were still operated by the British brigade. Its commander brigadier Peter Pear-
son was seriously worried about a complete collapse of the electrical systems as con-
sumption was likely to soar during winter.61 Fear of massive outbreak of disease and
even starvation was widespread and there was even talk of a possible rebellion in
case the population could not hold out.62 The fears of humanitarian disaster and
wide-scale uprisings in many ways resembled those of the Allies in late 1945, head-
ing for what was then called ‘the battle for winter.’ 
By late 1999 Kosovo seemed to be heading for disaster: parallel governments were
competing among each other as well as with the international administration, the
thousands of recently demobilized Kosovar Albanian fighters that had been released
into society were hard to control, and last but not least, the international communi-
ty refused to grant the Albanians in Kosovo the independence they craved. Sergio
Vieira de Mello made an important comparison between the situation in Kosovo,
where he had briefly run the civilian component, and the UN civil-military mission
he headed in East Timor:
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[T]here is a general consensus among staff in both operations that those of us in
East Timor have the easier task. In the midst of Pristina a UN staff member was
shot dead for speaking Serbo-Croat, the language of the former rulers. On Febru-
ary 29, 2000 when Indonesian President Wahid addressed the people of Dili in
the language of those who had illegally occupied East Timor for 24 years - an occu-
pation that led to tens of thousands of dead and culminated in a grim orgy of
destruction and murder – those who had recently been victims chanted, ‘Viva
Indonesia’. In Kosovo the elderly relatives of Serbs who were responsible for some
of the crimes committed against the Albanians are hunted down and killed. In
East Timor, former militia members are for the most part welcomed back into their
communities. Another difference between Kosovo and East Timor is the attitude
of local leaders towards the UN administration. In Kosovo, competing local admin-
istrative structures are in place. The Kosovars built up parallel structures as part
of their resistance to Serb rule. These structures do everything from policing to
registering of births. They can actively undermine the UN administration, which is
seen by many as an impediment to self-rule. In East Timor by contrast, there is
(still…) a general acceptance of the UN’s authority and a collaborative effort to
develop a joint administrative system. Relative peace in East Timor and continued
hatred and violence in Kosovo have reinforced prejudices among observers about
the Balkan mentality and the supposed predilection of its peoples to ethnic intol-
erance, hatred and revenge. But the differences have less to do with mentality than
with the clarity of Security Council mandates and with the issue of sovereignty.63
That same winter, however, there was an undercurrent of developments more favor-
able to UNMIK and KFOR. A Gallup Poll conducted amongst Kosovar Albanians
confirmed that Thaci’s politics of obstruction had made his provisional government
lose ground to the more moderate Rugova. His government had lost much of its
appeal as it was lacking democratic legitimization and as its administrators displayed
little expertise and little results in solving Kosovo’s problems.64 Meanwhile, the UN
administrators in the municipalities finally gained access to an operational budget
in November. With civil-military cooperation working relatively well, with KFOR par-
tially holding the line in its improvised manner, and with financial resources to win
over the population, the power struggle between UNMIK and the local political forces
seemed to tilt somewhat in favor of the international administration. 
In dealing with local aspirants to power, UNMIK relied heavily on the leverage
that KFOR could provide to assert authority.65 Apart from keeping the show on the
road, as Jackson had labeled the broad support provided by the military to UNMIK,
the commander of the now 45,000-strong military force could wield his personal
influence to persuade Kosovar Albanian leaders, particularly those with a military
background in the UÇK, to move into line with UNMIK. Reinhardt backed up Kouch-
ner at a crucial moment that may have made the difference between success and
failure of the combined civil-military effort to establish international administrative
control over Kosovo. For almost half a year, UNMIK had been improvising in its
effort to consolidate a reasonable degree of UN control over the parallel administra-
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tive structures. Initial hopes had been vested in the Kosovar Transitional Structure
(KTC) established in July. The KTC provided a forum for reconciliation and the begin-
ning of cooperation between the two main Kosovo Albanian leaders, Ibrahim Rugo-
va and Hashim Thaci.66 Although the KTC may have contributed to preventing a
civil war between the two competing Kosovar Albanian parties, the council failed to
achieve concrete results toward integrating the competing administrative structures
under UNMIK leadership. Kouchner therefore started negotiations over a new Joint
Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) in October. On 8 December, for the first
time since he initiated the plan, the Special Representative assembled the KTC. In
the previous weeks, the UÇK kept dragging its feet, hoping it could hold on to the
powers it had illegally acquired. When Thaci arrived at the meeting he seemed will-
ing to put an end to cooperation with the international administration. He burst into
the conference room and – without removing his coat – started throwing around
wild accusations at UNMIK and KFOR that they had failed to live up to their prom-
ises. Ranting and raving, he threatened to continue cooperation on the sole condi-
tion that UNMIK accept him as the sole representative of the Kosovar Albanians.
After claiming that further cooperation was only possible under his presidency, Thaci
walked out of the meeting. Reinhardt, who was a witness to the scene made by the
UÇK leader, concluded he had turned into a ‘loose cannon.’67 He would have to
wield his influence as the military commander to get him to stay in line. 
Two days later, as Reinhardt ran into Thaci at an OSCE human rights conference
in Pristina, he took him aside and lectured him, telling him that his behavior was
‘unproductive and intolerable.’ He impressed upon the UÇK leader that if he want-
ed to hold on to political influence he had better change his sulky posture. Rein-
hardt first tried to convince the Kosovar leader by drawing an analogy with the left-
wing ‘generation of ‘68’ in Germany explaining him that ‘you only reach your goals
by joining the appropriate institutions and by submitting your ideas there.’ Thaci
was probably more impressed with the second example closer to home with which
the General attempted to convince him. He could see for himself, Reinhardt argued,
that the Kosovar Serb policy of abstention had brought them absolutely nothing: polit-
ical developments passed them by after they had closed themselves off. In the Gen-
eral’s description of the encounter, Thaci looked at the General pensively and asked
what it was then, that he should do. Reinhardt strongly recommended that he alter
his obstructionist posture toward Kouchner’s offer for cooperation in the Joint Inter-
im Administrative Council. That evening Kouchner told the General that, to his sur-
prise, Thaci had called upon him to announce his cooperation in the JIAS.68 After
the agreement was reached, Reinhardt had lunch with Hashim Thaci. After listen-
ing to some flattery about his trust in KFOR and the General personally, Reinhardt
made it clear that his confidence in Thaci had been thoroughly breached and that –
not out of consideration for his feelings but for the sake of Kosovo – the time had
come to live up to his promises, to cooperate and ‘stop playing cat and mouse with
UNMIK.’69
After approval from the UN in New York, the JIAS was thus finally established
after weeks of negotiation on 15 December 1999. The outcome, primarily the result
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of Kouchner’s strenuous effort, was nothing less than a political breakthrough. It
was a compromise to share administrative and executive responsibility between
UNMIK and the two main local parties, the PGOK headed by Thaci’s PPDK and
Rugova’s LDK. Under the agreement, all parallel structures of an executive, legisla-
tive or judicial nature were required to be dissolved by 31 January 2000. By Febru-
ary 2000, JIAS had officially replaced all previous parallel security and administra-
tive structures. The KFOR commander was included in its meetings as he had been
in the KTC. UNMIK and KFOR established mechanisms to monitor and enforce
compliance, primarily aimed at the former UÇK law enforcement structures. The
integration of parallel administrative bodies into JIAS was relatively smooth. 
In Orahovac, the international administrator Kharras Kane immediately felt the
positive effects of the agreement, as there was a marked increase in the activities
and policies of the UN Civil Administration. In consultations with the local political
parties, the new local structures such as the municipal council and an administra-
tive board were formed on 25 February 2000. The PPDK and the LDK were each
allocated half of the available seats. After the decision by the moderate Serb leader
Bishop Artemije to participate and represent the Serbs in the JIAS, a local Serb rep-
resentative joined the municipal administrative board as one of the three vice pres-
idents in Orahovac. In contrast to certain other municipalities in Kosovo, no acts of
politically motivated intimidation were registered among the political parties.70
Once the UN established full authority over Kosovo through the gradual imple-
mentation of JIAS, the administrative problem reversed itself. As UNMIK established
an ever-closer grip over the local institutions, the primary mission became handing
over self-government to the Kosovars. De facto, all power in Kosovo was still under
UNMIK control, while the rights of elected representatives on the municipal as well
as on the central level administration remained rather symbolic.71 When Bernard
Kouchner started a lecture at Harvard University in June 2001 claiming – in his
Maurice Chevallier English – ‘I have been the dictator of Kosovo for one–and-a-half
years’ he caused much hilarity amongst the assembled audience. However, if the first
six months of his troubled reign were disregarded, he was hardly joking. The spe-
cial representative of the secretary general had full executive authority with no rep-
resentative body to control him.72 In October 2000, democratic elections finally took
place in all thirty municipalities. Somewhat unexpectedly and, to the international
community’s great relief, the elections were a massive victory for Ibrahim Rugova’s
party and marked a further shift in power from the PDK (formerly PPDK) represen-
tatives to the democratically elected LDK in most municipalities, including Oraho-
vac. The next lucky break came as the historic political changes in Belgrade took
place, toppling Milosevic’ regime that very same month. 
In the winter of 1999-2000, the problems for UNMIK and KFOR were still enor-
mous, but after the initial struggle, the joint effort of the civil and the military com-
ponent had enabled them to establish effective control over most of Kosovo. While
civil-military cooperation suffered from a lack of doctrine, strategy and planning, and
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was severely understaffed with often underqualified personnel, Jackson’s emphasis
on civil-military cooperation as a command and operational function rather than
merely a support function seemed to trickle down to most of his force structure.73
Where it did, the integrated civil-military approach had immensely positive results
when compared to previous complex peace operations and is likely to have saved
both the civilian and military mission from faltering at an early stage. It also saved
civil-military cooperation from being marginalized as a set of unwanted civilian or
support tasks to be left to specialists. The designated CIMIC assets were only part
of the mission that had become civil-military in nature. Although there was contin-
uous fear within KFOR headquarters of the dependency reflex of civilians, the exam-
ple by headquarters when it came to short-term vacuum filling was to gear military
means at a unit’s disposal in the most creative way, whether it was military police,
legal officers, engineers or regular staff officers or the soldiers on the ground. The
fear of the dependency reflex seemed to be overshadowed by the awareness of Jack-
son, Reinhardt, but also commanders in the field such as Van Loon, of the paradox-
ical challenge while creating a secure environment: to be able to extract itself from
the performance of civilian tasks, the military had to become more involved. 
Reflecting on his experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo, Jackson’s analogy of the mis-
sion was like a piece of rope, made up of various strands. ‘[T]he rope’s strength
comes from all the strands being woven together […] If one strand breaks, the whole
rope may break. This is as true of the military strand as it is true of the political
strand.’ Addressing an American audience he added: ‘You know, we’re all in this
together, and in my view it is shortsighted for the military to say, we’ll do the bit
with the armed forces but you worry about everything else. I don’t think it’s as sim-
ple as that.’74
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Conclusion
Outside intervention in civil wars in Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo trig-
gered reactions within each of these societies that made the assumptions underly-
ing the military plans invalid at an early stage. In John Hersey’s novel A Bell for
Adano, American civil affairs Major Victor Joppolo disregarded the plans he had
received for administering the Sicilian town Adano in 1943. His detailed instructions
disappeared into the wastebasket after he took office in the town hall. The orders
seemed of little value during the first days of his military reign. Instead, he followed
his inclinations and went to the people of Adano and asked what they needed most.
Although the town suffered from severe shortages, it was not food or water the peo-
ple wanted most. The Sicilian villagers decided that what they needed most of all
was a new bell for the church tower. The old bell, with its warm and comforting
sound, had embodied the spirit of the town, but had been stolen by the retreating
German troops to be melted for the production of ammunition. Joppolo set out to
find a new bell for Adano and, having won the trust of the population, established
Allied control in the wake of the military advance. ‘When plans fall down, impro-
vise,’ had been the most important lesson he had distilled from his training in civil
affairs. 
Operational Shift
After military plans failed in Cambodia, the force’s main goal shifted from demili-
tarization of the local warring factions to supporting and eventually running much
of the elections. In Somalia, the tasks of the soldiers on the ground rapidly shifted
after successfully protecting the delivery of humanitarian aid to improvised internal
security operations, although protection of the people was not the official goal. The
mission in Bosnia slowly changed from separating the warring parties to support-
ing the international civilian effort to reintegrate the divided state. In Kosovo, the
primary goal altered from protecting the Kosovar Albanian population by deploying
a large military force, to the protection of the Serb minority and establishment of
international governmental control. The process of adapting to these altered require-
ments on military forces has been a mixed success during the last decades of the
twentieth century – primarily because it required adaptation to challenges in the civil-
ian rather than the military sphere. 
When reviewing these four missions at the strategic and operational levels, a par-
adox emerges in the relationship between the accomplishment of the primary mili-
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tary mission and the overall political outcome. Whereas the ‘purely’ military mission
as planned in Cambodia was a complete failure, the political outcome of the UN
intervention was a relative success. In the other three missions analyzed in the pre-
ceding chapters, the primary military missions were an overwhelming success. The
strategic outcome, however, varied from dubious to failure. 
Although democracy in Cambodia barely took hold after the quick abandonment
of the country by the UN, it did have a democratically elected constitutional govern-
ment after eighteen months of UNTAC’s presence. Sanderson took on an ever-more
dominant role within the combined civil and military mission. Although wary at
times of overstretching the military component, he drove the relatively few and light-
ly equipped forces at his disposal to assume ever more tasks that were in essence
civilian responsibilities in the months prior to the elections. It is somewhat surpris-
ing therefore that in December 1993 a panel of American specialists at the U.S.
Army Peacekeeping Institute called him ‘the right man at the right time’ for not
allowing ‘mission creep’ to occur.1 While the civil-military mission as a whole stayed
within the original parameters set by the United Nations, Sanderson allowed mili-
tary tasks and objectives to steadily expand beyond the original terms of reference.
For this he received little strategic guidance, but the UN Secretariat allowed him
much latitude to explore the edges of his mandate by employing his military means
creatively. 
The mischaracterization of Sanderson’s qualities can be explained by this verdict
being passed shortly after American forces found themselves in their disastrous bat-
tle in the streets of Mogadishu. The death of eighteen U.S. military personnel rein-
forced all existing fears of shifting missions and the effects of this event resonated
throughout the decade and beyond. UNITAF, the muscular force that had operated
before this fateful event, had entered with the narrowest of mandates. On the basis
of this mandate, some units, particularly the Australian battalion, ended up perform-
ing the widest variety of tasks related to public security and low-level institution build-
ing. To varying degrees, American forces participated in this improvised process.
However, their overall ability to adapt to their environment was severely hampered
by the strategic parameters set on their mission, the force protection requirement
that put a distance between them and the population, and their behavioral reflexes
that originated in the American military’s singular focus on high-intensity combat
operations. 
There have been suggestions in American policy-making and military circles since
1993 that the UN-led mission in Somalia failed because it allowed the mission to
expand, whereas the American-led Unified Taskforce succeeded because it stuck to
its original mission. This was incorrect and had the damaging effect of drawing away
attention from those initiatives that might have held some promise for success in
Somalia. Claiming UNITAF was a success because it rigidly stuck to the original
plan to safeguard the delivery of food evoked memories of the famous story of the
North Vietnamese colonel who acknowledged to an American colonel that the Unit-
ed States had never been defeated on the battlefield. ‘That may be true,’ the Viet-
namese colonel said. ‘It is also irrelevant.’2 Obviously, saving lives in Somalia was
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not irrelevant. However, the long-term effects of the impetuous intervention in Soma-
lia had a stifling effect on the willingness of the Western powers to intervene in seri-
ous humanitarian crises. The people of Rwanda were to suffer most dearly of all.
NATO’s primary mission in Bosnia was a complete success. However, after estab-
lishing the military conditions for peace relatively quickly, IFOR rested on its mili-
tary laurels in Bosnia. This inaction was a consequence of earlier failures in Soma-
lia and Bosnia. As a result of the weakness of the civilian component and the lack
of effective civil-military cooperation, the peace process as a whole stagnated. The
reintegration of Bosnia required the reversal of the ethnic cleansing campaign of the
previous years by returning hundreds of thousands of refugees to their former homes.
It also necessitated limiting the power of the police forces that were hampering this
process, and – it was often argued – required the arrest of war crimes suspects. All
these measures demanded a serious military contribution in order to succeed, but
this sort of military support was not forthcoming. On the whole, IFOR’s reluctance
to move beyond the original mission was strategically driven, primarily from Wash-
ington. However, since strategic guidelines, or the lack thereof, blended perfectly
with the inclinations of the IFOR commander and the timidity of the U.S. and Euro-
pean militaries after their earlier failures in Somalia and Bosnia, initiative by forces
on the ground was seriously impeded. Applied to peace operations, the straitjacket
of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine – with its emphasis on overwhelming force and
narrow missions – may have prevented military failure. Nevertheless, it hampered
long-term success since the new challenges were considered to be outside the mili-
tary scope. IFOR’s successor SFOR redressed some of the previous mistakes and
gradually shifted its efforts from controlling the formerly warring armies to support
to implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreement, but the propitious
immediate post-war moment that might have occasioned the reforms was lost. As a
result, the political outcome of the intervention remained uncertain despite the many
billions of dollars spent on reconstruction and the tens of thousand of troops that
rotated through Bosnia annually in the years that followed. 
In Kosovo, almost within a week, KFOR’s main challenge had shifted from enforc-
ing and monitoring the withdrawal of Serb forces, to the provision of overall public
security. At the end of his tour in November 1999, KFOR Force Commander Lieu-
tenant General Mike Jackson regarded public security, particularly the protection of
Serbs and other minorities, as the only problem with which he had not come to
grips. His primary military mission was indeed an overwhelming success. After the
Serbs security forces withdrew, KFOR faced the more daunting task of disarming
and demilitarizing the UÇK. The accomplishment of this task can be partially ascribed
to Jackson, who combined a forceful stance with much emphasis on the require-
ment not to offend the Kosovar Albanian insurgents who, it was feared, would ‘take
to the mountains’ if confronted too harshly. Despite these successes, with half the
Serb population fleeing on NATO’s watch, the political objective to create a multi-
ethnic Kosovo was in serious peril as Jackson handed over his command. Meanwhile,
the Serbs were running Albanians out of northern Mitrovica and KFOR and the UN
established little control over this newly created Serb enclave. 
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The main threat to NATO’s publicly stated goals in Kosovo came from vengeful
Albanians, both former insurgents and civilians, and the UÇK’s grab for governmen-
tal and policing powers in the absence of an effective international administration
and police force. The British commander’s reluctance to prepare and activate a CIMIC
Task Force arguably contributed to KFOR’s inability to fill the administrative vacu-
um. Such a task force was nevertheless unlikely to have sufficed to stem the tide
during the UÇK’s early grab for power. CIMIC’s lack of deployable capacity was a
significant factor. In addition, its conceptual underpinnings, with its emphasis on
cooperation and support, rather than the substitution of civil authorities, would not
have created the essential tools to fill the administrative and law and order vacuum.
The force commander’s decision was driven by NATO members’ political concern
they not become involved in anything resembling temporary military governance over
Kosovo. Although Jackson, like any other soldier, was never enthusiastic about hav-
ing his troops involved in policing, he did motivate them to engage in public secu-
rity duties to the best of his abilities. He and his successor General Klaus Reinhardt
placed much emphasis on the need to cooperate closely with UNMIK. A reasonable
degree of international governmental control over Kosovo was in the end established
as a result of a relatively smooth civil-military cooperative effort. Nevertheless, there
was still no clarity on the province’s future status, and the surge in ethnic violence
in 2004 reminded the world that Kosovo remained a divided province.
Tactical Flexibility
On the tactical level, a tremendous responsibility devolved on the battalion command-
ers and their junior officers in each of these operations. This was primarily a result
of the gap between the assigned mission and the requirement to establish order on
the ground. Tactical commanders had to tailor much of their operations to the unex-
pected challenges they faced, rather than execute the sort of mission they were tasked,
organized and trained to perform. Each of the battalion commanders whose opera-
tion has been analyzed in the preceding chapters interpreted his mission broadly
and searched for the boundaries of the mandate. 
In Cambodia, both Lieutenant Colonel Herman Dukers and Lieutenant Colonel
Patrick Cammaert drove their troops to operate in highly dispersed small units,
patrolling vigorously, operating and often even living close to the people – almost
‘hugging the population’ – for mutual protection. For the people, the Marines’ pres-
ence often meant protection from bandits and factional violence, while the intelli-
gence provided by the people on the factions and bandits was the prime source of
protection for the Marines. Platoon commanders were encouraged to adopt small-
scale projects to further enhance their relations with the Cambodians. Monitoring
the actions of the four different armed factions, and particularly the task of contain-
ing the Khmer Rouge in their jungle areas, officially remained their primary duty,
but the mission steadily expanded beyond the military scope. ‘Mission command,’
the command system based on delegating high degrees of responsibility for the meth-
ods used to company and platoon commanders on the basis of the commander’s
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overall intent, seems to have worked particularly well for the second battalion that
faced the daunting task of supporting the elections that were held in May 1993. 
Most of the methods and measures applied by the Marines in Cambodia were
made up as the commander and his subordinates went along. Direct protection of
the population was not the military component’s official mission, and disarmament
of soldiers and civilians by the UN ‘on sight’ was not allowed for UNTAC until just
before the elections. Confronted with a set of circumstances that made the Dutch-
controlled sector in northwestern Cambodia rife with violent crime, the Marines were
nevertheless drawn into performing these public-security-related tasks. In order to
reduce the level of crime, they developed their own disarmament policy early in the
mission, which was condoned by the force commander and triggered no questions
from the Dutch Ministry of Defense. More important in the fight against crime was
their cooperation with local civilian and military authorities, even though some of
these were at times part of the problem. For the Marines, the rationale behind engag-
ing in this ambiguous and sometimes troubled relationship was that local authori-
ties had the policing powers to search and arrest – powers that neither the UN mil-
itary nor the UN civilian police possessed. The system of ‘four-faction units’ which
the Marines developed in order to expand some degree of UN control in the areas
where the factions’ authority was fragmented and often disputed, was a particularly
ingenious measure. It relied heavily on the diplomatic skills of the Marines, who
found themselves driving along the jungle roads in a Land Rover and patrolling with
four men from four different armed factions wearing blue armbands. Within UNTAC,
civil-military cooperation reached its height during the elections. The civil-military
relationship had been forged when the election process appeared to go awry as a
result of the surge in violence all over Cambodia. Cooperation with the electoral staff
in charge of organizing the ballot locally – a process that was increasingly driven by
the military headquarters in Phnom Penh – became the essence of UNTAC’s over-
all success.
In order to address the Herculean challenges in Somalia, Lieutenant Colonel David
Hurley’s Australian Army battalion showed a creativeness and flexibility that appears
to have been unrivaled in peace operations during the 1990s. Like the Dutch Marines
in Cambodia, this was made possible to a certain extent by the leeway given to mil-
itary commanders in the early 1990s, before the tragedies in Somalia and Bosnia.
These latter two experiences made national policymakers and national military lead-
ers more wary of possible mistakes committed by the troops than a lack of overall
success of the mission – a fear that often drove them towards micro-management.
The Australians also operated in small units and patrolled their vast sector vigorous-
ly. Their tactical flexibility can be traced to a military tradition founded in counterin-
surgency operations rather than large-scale conventional battle. 
Some of the Australians’ endeavors in premeditated ‘institution building’ have
probably been exaggerated. Claims that they arrived in Somalia with a civil affairs
strategy, built on an application of the international laws of military occupation, were
incorrect. Such arguments were grounded in the urge to explain the Australians’
accomplishments as opposed to the lack of progress elsewhere in Somalia. The impro-
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vised program nevertheless led to the reconstruction of a rudimentary police force
and judiciary. Even though there was a desire to have a more lasting impact and pre-
pare the way for the UN force that would follow, these institution-building activities
were driven by Hurley’s effort to create order on his watch rather than an attempt
at ‘nation building.’ The marginalization of local warlords in Baidoa and the even-
tual arrest of two leaders, one of whom was prosecuted for war crimes after suffi-
cient evidence had been gathered, was a culmination of the Australian efforts. While
some of the accomplishments of the Australians were facilitated by somewhat more
favorable circumstances in the Bay region than in the more violently contested urban
centers such as Mogadishu and Kismayu, on the whole, their ability to stabilize the
Bay region was a result of their acceptance of the belief that protecting the Somalis
from the warlords as well as common bandits – and not just the distribution of
humanitarian aid – was their primary goal. In Somalia, the Australian troops under
Hurley showed what could be done in less than five months to re-establish rudimen-
tary order with few means at their disposal.
The Dutch artillery battalion in Kosovo operated under very different circum-
stances than the battalions in Cambodia and Somalia. Like the Australians in Soma-
lia, they found themselves performing de facto military governance in the absence
of local authorities. Compared to the other two battalion-sized operations, Lieutenant
Colonel Anton van Loon had a vast number of troops and heavy equipment at his
disposal in relation to the relatively small sector that was his responsibility. In mil-
itary terms, this enabled him to control the UÇK with relative ease as long as the
former guerrillas were not driven underground by an overly confrontational demili-
tarization policy. However, unlike Cambodia and Somalia, where public security was
not an officially assigned duty, KFOR had been tasked to perform this role pending
the arrival of UN police. Due to the wave of ethnic violence that followed the return
of Kosovar Albanian refugees and the UÇK’s attempt to seize policing powers, this
placed incredible demands on the Dutch gunners and their German colleagues. With
many of the planning assumptions based on the Bosnia scenario, neither NATO nor
the Dutch national governmental and military authorities had adequately anticipat-
ed what this would entail for soldiers on the ground. Regular soldiers would in any
case have performed the bulk of the community policing tasks as elsewhere during
those first months in Kosovo, but the lack of sufficient Dutch military police in Ora-
hovac and the restraints placed by the national chain of command on the use of
their powers of arrest were unhelpful. The situation was salvaged by creatively employ-
ing regular military staff and the few available Dutch MP’s. Eventually the German
MPs made available by German Brigade were important in filling the public securi-
ty gap. Once the UN civilian police arrived after more than four months, coopera-
tion with these international police officers was quite smooth, with a free exchange
of information and combined patrols. 
Compared to the days when the Marines patrolled the jungles of Cambodia, the
grip of the Dutch Ministry of Defense over the troops on the ground had tightened.
This became apparent when the Dutch battalion commander, backed by his German
Brigade commander, saw the requirement to actively arrest suspected war criminals
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in Orahovac on the basis of criminal investigations that had been conducted prima-
rily by Dutch military police personnel. Van Loon’s prime concern was that UÇK or
Albanian civilians would take the law into their own hands in the absence of a suf-
ficiently capable police force and judiciary system in 1999. The Dutch minister of
defense is likely to have envisaged an arrest policy in cooperation with the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia – a policy similar to the one he
wholeheartedly and actively supported in Bosnia. This would fully involve both the
NATO and national chains of command. However, the ICTY had officially delegat-
ed the responsibility for the pursuit of suspected war criminals to UNMIK. The
UNMIK justice system and police obviously did not have the proper capabilities to
stop war crimes suspects from fleeing Orahovac for Serbia on UNHCR convoys. This
prospect infuriated and radicalized the Albanian population and the UÇK. The bat-
talion commander therefore saw the requirement for Task Force Orahovac to act
swiftly on opportunities for arrest as they presented themselves. 
When asked in retrospect who was running Orahovac in the second half of 1999,
the Albanian population pointed to KFOR. The improvised effort made by the Dutch
battalion to fill the administrative vacuum in Orahovac until the eventual arrival of
UNMIK prevented the former insurgents from gaining the upper hand in the civil-
ian sphere. Even though the UÇK mayor in Orahovac was able to pose as the lead-
ing representative of the Albanian majority, his influence would remain limited. The
Dutch commander and his men had become involved in so many aspects of civil
governance that he could not conceive of how these tasks could be delegated to a
designated CIMIC unit if it were available. Having become the de facto military gov-
ernor of Orahovac, Van Loon concluded in retrospect that CIMIC was ‘too impor-
tant to be left exclusively to specialists.’3 Civilian tasks pervaded every aspect of the
primary mission to provide security to all Kosovars and moved center stage. In Koso-
vo, as before in Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia, civil-military cooperation, support-
ing or substituting the civil power became a purpose of its own and could no longer
be segregated from the ‘purely’ military mission. As in other ‘post-conflict peace
building’ missions such as those in Haiti, Eastern Slavonia and East Timor, after
military forces became involved in internal security operations – instead of merely
separating the warring factions – this central role appeared to have become the pat-
tern rather than an aberration in peace operations.
The Marginalization of CIMIC and Civil Affairs
Throughout the 1990s, however, policymakers and military leaders in the Western
world continued to expect, or hope, to deploy their forces in peace operations that
took place in a primarily military domain. When military forces performed a mis-
sion other than conventional combat – a development that had already encountered
serious resistance in the U.S. military and to a lesser extent amongst the European
military establishments – the proper role of soldiers in peace operations was gener-
ally considered separating and controlling warring parties after a peace agreement
had put an end to war. Such military activity would allow soldiers to interact prima-
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rily with other soldiers or irregular fighters, as had been the case in traditional ‘thin
blue line’ peacekeeping operations. However, operations with a straight military focus
became the exception rather than the rule. Even though military entanglement in
the civilian sphere was not always shunned and support for humanitarian relief and
reconstruction became increasingly accepted, such military activity was expected to
be taken on by soldiers either in support of the military mission, or in support of
the civil environment. Military involvement in civilian tasks – either in support of
civil authorities or by substituting them – was hardly perceived as an integral part
of security operations. 
The tendency to downgrade the military role in civil tasks to the margins of mil-
itary operations clearly manifested itself in the development of policy, doctrine and
planning for a CIMIC capacity within NATO. While recognizing the need to smooth
out the cooperative effort between soldiers and civilians in complex peace operations,
NATO leaders continued to perceive and define CIMIC more narrowly than the sit-
uation most often faced by troops on the ground. Particularly in the initial phase of
interventions on which most of this study has focused, there was a large discrepan-
cy between the official scope of CIMIC and the actual challenges emerging in the
murky area where military and civilian tasks overlapped. This tendency manifested
itself in four forms. First, NATO’s principle CIMIC policy document described the
purpose of CIMIC as establishing and maintaining the full cooperation of the mili-
tary commander and the civilian authorities, organizations, agencies and populations
‘in order to allow him to fulfill his mission.’ The NATO Military Committee added
that this could include direct support to the implementation of a civil plan.4 Still,
such activity was not perceived as part of his principle mission. 
Second, the urge to assign the task of managing the civil-military interface to des-
ignated CIMIC personnel and units – in support of the commander and in order to
allow him to focus on his military mission – was encompassed in the 1997 version
of NATO’s CIMIC definition. Civil-military cooperation was defined as ‘the resources
and arrangements’ which support the relationship between NATO commanders and
the civilian agencies and authorities in his area of operations.5 CIMIC, like its Amer-
ican counterpart civil affairs, was thus predominantly treated as a role and function
for specialized personnel and units executed at a designated CIMIC Center or Civil-
Military Operation Center, rather than a technique or skill applied by soldiers through-
out the ranks as part of their ongoing mission. The peripheral approach to soldiers
interacting with their civil environment as laid down in doctrine bore little resem-
blance to the realities faced by the battalions in Cambodia, Somalia and Kosovo,
where commanders and their subordinates proved that successful civil-military coop-
eration was the result of a certain mind-set and flexible adaptation to the challenges
as they emerged in the field – rather than related to formal arrangements or the
deployment specialized personnel in a separate organization. 
It was only in 2001 that CIMIC was officially redefined as ‘[t]he coordination and
cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO commander and civil
populations and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-govern-
mental organizations and agencies.’6 While this definition placed more emphasis on
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CIMIC as the military commander’s direct responsibility, it still failed to expand the
overall notion of the military entanglement in civilian tasks beyond coordination and
cooperation. Despite the Kosovo experience, substitution or takeover by the military
exercising certain civil responsibilities belonging to a civil authority in the public
security and administrative sphere were still officially not part of the equation. The
official Dutch KFOR evaluation of the Ministry of Defense, while acknowledging that
‘[i]n practice, KFOR performed for a certain period the duties of a military govern-
ment,’ failed to assess in any depth what this entailed for the Dutch battalion on the
ground. The evaluation drew no relevant conclusions. Close scrutiny of the Dutch
CIMIC Handbook published in 2002 shows that it once briefly mentions that in
‘exceptional circumstances’ soldiers can assume tasks that belong to civil authorities,
but this appears to be the only official tangible result of the Kosovo experience in
the conceptual development of CIMIC.7
The third manifestation of NATO’s narrowly focused CIMIC concept was that
during the 1990s and thereafter, CIMIC was perceived first and foremost as an issue
related to the reconstruction of nations affected by war. In most of the publications,
conferences and policy statements on the subject, the sole emphasis was on the
envisaged military role in supporting humanitarian work and reconstruction of infra-
structure, housing and basic services such as schools and hospitals, the support to
or direct provision of humanitarian relief efforts and – last but not least – the exe-
cution of small-scale humanitarian projects. This emphasis on reconstruction and
projects, although important in and of itself, as well as for the facilitation of mili-
tary operations by ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the local population – and thus
for force protection – tended to divert attention from what military peace operations
were most often about – protecting the local population from violence. The reason
was that, whereas soldiers building schools and playgrounds was a tangible mani-
festation of CIMIC, soldiers and relief agencies, civil police and administrators work-
ing towards a common purpose through information sharing and a proper distribu-
tion of labor was not as visible for the public. The increased direct engagement of
soldiers in the humanitarian sphere and the blurring of the dividing lines between
military activity and development aid was watched with suspicion by the relief agen-
cies. This was not only the result of their fear of competition from the military for
development funds. During the 1990s, a much-heard critique within the humani-
tarian community – the envisaged civilian partners for civil-military cooperation –
was that aid workers, rather than seeing the military expand its role into the field of
humanitarian aid and infrastructural projects, preferred to see peacekeepers expand
their notion of the military’s primary mission to provide a secure environment for
civilians in which to live and work. 
The fixation on reconstruction and aid projects and the lack of recognition of the
often-inescapable role of military forces in public-security-related tasks resulted in a
rather inconsistent approach to military ventures into the civilian sphere. Whereas
NATO troops in Bosnia initially gave lackluster support to the international civil
police mission and initially refrained from arresting suspected war criminals, often
arguing that this was a civilian responsibility, SFOR proudly participated in the recon-
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struction of Sarajevo’s public library as part of its CIMIC activities. Whereas uni-
formed Dutch CIMIC specialist officers in the Dutch area of operations in Bosnia
helped to set up small businesses and gave professional advice to a commercial bank
after 2000 – when the country was completely safe for others to perform this work
– the Dutch Ministry of Defense had not allowed its military police officers to exer-
cise their power of arrest in Orahovac in 1999 even though there was no other pro-
fessional policing authority.
This brings us to the fourth symptom of the marginalization of the civil-military
interface: the continued attempts to avoid military entanglement in public security
either in a supportive or executive policing role. Whereas little emphasis was placed
on public security in CIMIC policy and doctrine, the most crucial civil-military rela-
tionship in most peace operations proved to be that between soldiers and policemen,
either from the local police forces or from an international civilian police force. It was
in this area that the dividing lines between the military and the civil spheres most
frequently became blurred. The problems emerging in this grey area, which from
1997 onwards became known as the ‘public security gap,’ permeated every element
of peace operations in the 1990s. Often, if the military barriers were raised sufficient-
ly high by a military intervention force, as in the first months Somalia and during
NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, the obstructionist efforts by those among the
former belligerent parties opposing the peace process or foreign presence would divert
their efforts into the fields of public security and civil administration. However, this
thorny but pivotal issue was mostly considered outside the scope of CIMIC.
The problems emerging in the wake of the intervention in Kosovo turned out to
be a serious eye-opener in this respect. In East Timor as well, the Australian-led
force became involved in emergency law enforcement, running an as hoc judiciary
system and managing detention facilities. While the signs had already been there in
Somalia, Cambodia, Haiti, and Bosnia, these two operations taking place in 1999 in
a complete power vacuum focused attention on the need to temporarily substitute
the justice triangle and restore the local law-and-order system through ‘security sec-
tor reform.’ Many joined Bernard Kouchner in his call for the creation of UN ‘jus-
tice packages’ to fulfill this task.8 Some U.S. military legal officers pointed at Amer-
ican experiences in Somalia, Haiti and Kosovo to emphasize the inescapable role of
the U.S. military in filling the law-and-order vacuum.9 However, while the public
security gap was increasingly recognized by those involved as one of the most impor-
tant dilemma’s in peace operations after 1999, the political will to deal with the con-
sequences – either by substantially expanding UN civil policing and other public
security capacities, or by preparing the military to temporarily fill the vacuum – was
mostly lacking. In 2002, Danish political scientist Peter Viggo Jacobsen wrote: 
The ambivalent position of the United States is telling in this respect. In the lat-
est draft of its forthcoming doctrine for peace operations, the U.S. Army acknowl-
edges that it may have to restore law and order, establish and run temporary con-
finement facilities and assist in the establishment of a workable judicial system in
a failed state situation – the Kosovo experience had in other words found its way
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into doctrine. This stands in direct contrast to the public position that President
Bush and the Pentagon have taken on this issue. This position was succinctly
summed up in a comment by Army General Henry H. Shelton, then chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in November 2000: ‘We can provide a safe and secure
environment, but we don’t do the law enforcement, we don’t do the court sys-
tems.’10
It is important to place Shelton’s remark in the context of the debate that was still
raging in the United States. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was quoted
in a New York Times article entitled, ‘Shelton: Peacekeeping Missions Unavoidable.’
The state of the public and political debate in the United States at the time of the
2000 presidential elections was still concerned with the overall reluctance of the U.S.
military and many Republican politicians to engage in peace operations. The sup-
posedly degrading effect of such experience on a soldier’s capability to aggressively
fight wars was still one of the leading arguments of those opposing tasks that were
considered unbecoming a soldier. It was not until after the turn of the twenty-first
century that this argument came under attack by both soldiers and civilians in the
United States who dared to make the opposite case – contending that field experi-
ence enhanced unit cohesion and prepared junior officers well for command respon-
sibilities in unpredictable and potentially violent environments. 
The lingering aversion in the United States to engage in military operations other
than conventional combat is captured in Condoleeza Rice’s remark in 2000 that
‘[c]arrying out civil administration and police functions is simply going to degrade
the American capability to do the things America has to do.’ The future national
security advisor and secretary of state added: ‘We don’t need to have the 82nd Air-
borne escorting kids to kindergarten.’11 Although a substantial number of senior
American military leaders, among them Anthony Zinni and Wesley Clarke – offi-
cers who rose to top ranks during the Clinton era but who were by now retired –
had come to accept the unavoidable, the Republican message went down well 
with the mainstream American military establishment. Most military leaders pre-
ferred to concentrate on the next generation of technological advances that, it was
hoped, would prepare them for the twenty-first-century battlefield. George W. Bush,
Jr. won over undecided voters in the military by promising them ‘no more nation
building.’ As a result, many of the hard-learned lessons of the 1990s within the
armed forces seem to have gone overboard in the years preceding the invasion of
Iraq. 
The overall marginalization of CIMIC and civil affairs, and the reluctance to have
soldiers in peace operations wield civil authority can primarily be explained by the
fundamental discomfort among troop-contributing nations regarding military forces
exercising any degree of civil power. Western powers themselves had grown accus-
tomed to a strict segregation between the civil and military spheres and the princi-
ple of military subservience to civilian rule at the political level. They also consid-
ered peacekeepers wielding martial law-like powers undesirable in regions where
intervening forces often formed part of an effort to teach democratic values to coun-
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tries accustomed to authoritarian rule. Such regimes tended to be less particular
about this distinction between the civil and the military. 
The second explanation for the peripheral conceptual development of CIMIC with-
in NATO was that this process was predominantly driven by the Bosnian experience.
Not surprisingly, since it was NATO’s first and only operational deployment on the
ground, its military operations in Bosnia after December 1995 were the primary yard-
stick against which peace operations in general and CIMIC in particular were meas-
ured until 1999. It was in this period that the foundation was laid for NATO CIMIC.
The expectation that the next major peace operation would be very much like the
last – a characteristic not uncommon for armies preparing for the next war – stim-
ulated the tendency to relegate the civil aspects to the sidelines of the military oper-
ation.
A third explanation for the peripheral approach to CIMIC was that the American
military took the lead in transforming the old Cold War CIMIC concept and the for-
mation of dedicated units. The strong preference of the U.S. armed forces to focus
on straight military matters and segregate – or at least attempt to separate – the civil
and military spheres and leave the civil-military interface to large numbers of civil
affairs personnel found its way into perceptions, doctrine, the CIMIC organization
and teaching on CIMIC. European as well as Canadian and Australian militaries
tended to be far less suspicious of peace operations and consequently they were often
more flexible in handling the grey area between military and civil responsibilities
and cooperation with civilians during operations. It is therefore somewhat ironic that
European NATO partners had sought advice for the civil-military aspects of peace
operations from the Americans. The mainstream of the U.S. armed forces was averse
to this type of military operation and the U.S. Army was uncertain about the pur-
pose and role of civil affairs. This uncertainty had become manifest during the Viet-
nam War, when civil affairs was almost completely ignored, and persisted in the post-
Cold War world when civil affairs was employed irregularly in military operations.
It is perhaps not surprising that the British, with their long legacy of military
assistance to the civil power and emphasis on civil-military cooperation as part of
their ongoing mission, were the first who diverged from the path taken by NATO.
The emphasis on reserve units destined to serve in large separate CIMIC Task Force
centrally driven from a force headquarters – as had happened in Bosnia – was not
in line with their preferences. General Jackson was often quoted by CIMIC-enthusi-
asts as having said in 1997 that he heartily endorsed the NATO CIMIC proposal,
but eventually he and the British Army, of which he was to become the command-
er, took the narrowest approach in terms of a specialized organization and dedicat-
ed personnel. Whereas the British did not see the need for a large civil affairs or
CIMIC capacity, as a rule they were lauded for their overall cooperation with civil-
ian agencies and approach to the public security gap. Some of the success of the
Dutch Marines in Cambodia as well as during later deployments, and the accom-
plishments of the Australian Army in Somalia and later in East Timor, can be
explained by their traditional orientation to the British style of operations. However,
factors derived from generalizations on the basis of military culture within a nation-
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al military, or specific branch, are rivaled in importance by the effect of having the
right man at the right position at the right time under the right circumstances. The
approaches and reflexes of battalion commanders mentioned in the case studies may
be explained by their personal characteristics and beliefs. Both the influence on the
conduct of operations of military culture and the personal factors (of which especial-
ly the latter has hardly been touched upon in this analysis that focuses primarily on
operations) necessitate further research. However, the rapid rise through the mili-
tary ranks of each of the battalion commanders is perhaps proof of their ability to
adapt to the changing nature of soldiering after the end of the Cold War. 
Operational Primacy
The experiences in military governance over conquered territory during and after the
Second World War and development of counterinsurgency operations in the twenti-
eth century have been presented in the first two chapters primarily to serve as a
frame of reference for military involvement in the civilian sphere as it occurred dur-
ing the 1990s. However, apart from demonstrating a certain continuity and devel-
opment in the challenges faced by soldiers outside conventional combat in the twen-
tieth century, both topics provide the ability to draw some comparisons between oper-
ational primacy of civil affairs and civil-military cooperation. 
The comparison of peace operations in the 1990s with civil affairs and military
government during and after the Second World War points again to the motive behind
the use of the historic citation of General Dwight D. Eisenhower by CIMIC enthu-
siasts. In order to underline the need for the development of a CIMIC capacity with-
in NATO they evoked the memory of the military operations in North Africa in 1942.
Here, the Supreme Allied Commander had wanted to rid himself and his forces of
‘all matters outside the purely military scope’ by delegating full responsibility for
these civil tasks to a dedicated military organization. Such historical comparisons are
always problematic due to the different context, but if history is to be used in order
to prepare military forces for the civil-military interface in post-conflict situations, a
more appropriate comparison would be that between peace operations and civil affairs
in its post-war role. However, the CIMIC enthusiasts paid little attention to the imme-
diate post-war situation in Germany, when civil affairs’ facilitating role for conven-
tional combat operations came to an end. Once the enemy was defeated, the 
combat commanders in Europe and Asia became military governors and the stabi-
lization of occupied territory became a purpose unto itself. In both situations, stabi-
lization, public order, and eventually reform instead of the defeat of the enemy were
the primary purposes. In short, the operational primacy of civil affairs remained both
during and after the war; only the overall operational goal changed from defeating
the enemy to one of internal security. 
The comparison of civil-military operations in the 1990s with civil affairs during
the Second World War in Europe can also provide some explanation for differing
American and British approaches. Although the differences were not strictly deter-
mined along national lines during the war, the British came to prefer the integrat-
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ed model of civil affairs, whereas the Americans leaned towards the creation of a
separate organization for the administration of conquered territory. The former model,
which integrated the civil affairs organization into the tactical chain of command,
came to prevail due to pragmatic considerations, just as three other choices related
to civil affairs and military government were the product of pragmatism rather than
principle. Apart from embedding civil affairs into combat units during the war, the
Allies opted for military rather than civilian rule over conquered territory, chose for
indirect rather than direct rule over the local population, and left most of the local
administration intact after the war even in Germany and Japan. 
The inevitability of some of these four pragmatic choices made during the Sec-
ond World War becomes apparent when unleashing a counterfactual approach to his-
tory on post-war Germany. Occupied territory would probably have been in chaos if
a civilian Allied interim administration segregated from the tactical chain of com-
mand would have engaged in direct governmental control and purged the vast major-
ity of Nazi party members from positions of influence. Part of the American failure
to stabilize Iraq in 2003 after its conquest may be ascribed to a U.S. policy that was
in many ways similar to this counterfactual model. 
When explaining the British approach in peace operations in general, and civil-
military cooperation in particular, the British experience in counterinsurgency oper-
ations is more important than the legacy of the Second World War. While fighting
insurgencies during the wars of decolonization, the methods used to reach lasting
success proved to be the employment of military forces, police and administration
towards a common strategic goal. Apart from employing the minimum necessary
force and the maximum degree of tactical flexibility, cooperation within a civil-mili-
tary committee system with a strong emphasis on gathering and sharing intelligence
proved the key to successfully fighting insurgents. Military support to the civil power
was undertaken not by specialists but as part of a combat commander’s daily oper-
ations. When General Sir Gerald Templer took charge of the counterinsurgency cam-
paign in Malaya, he had insisted that district police commissioners, administrators
and local military commanders meet every day if possible, ‘if only for a whiskey and
soda in the evening.’ The importance of co-locating military headquarters with the
district police, a lesson that Templer had learned when he saw military service dur-
ing the insurgency in Palestine, and that he applied in Malaya, would only slowly be
relearned in places such as Kosovo. Quite a few of the hard-learned lessons of suc-
cessful counterinsurgency campaigns apply to peace operations, even though the
civil-military playing field became infinitely more complex during the 1990s. 
The comparison between counterinsurgency and complex peace operations has
been embraced and denounced by analysts, depending on the point of departure of
the researcher. The problem is that both categories military operations are broad and
vague. Quite understandably, those who drew the conclusion that the comparison is
invalid emphasized the disparity between insurgencies and the nature of the politi-
cal problems underlying contemporary internal wars. The purposes and methods of
insurgents as opposed to those of the warlords of the 1990s are also quite different.
Those emphasizing the most successful principles and methods used to fight an
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insurgency and those needed to stabilize a region as part of a peace operation, quite
correctly reached the opposite conclusion. The principle reason why the comparison
is apt in the context of this study is that in the peace operations analyzed in detail
in this book as well as during successful counterinsurgency operations, civil-military
cooperation moved to center stage, becoming the primary means to reach a com-
bined civil-military goal and establish peace. 
By the year 2000, a clear definition of what peace operations were supposed to
be no longer existed, and probably never had. In the years that followed, the Nether-
lands participated in two new international stabilization operations, one in
Afghanistan and one in Iraq. By this time, the notion of peace operations had come
so far adrift that the Dutch Ministry of Defense was able to present these military
operation as peace operations without any serious questions being raised in the press
or in parliament over the validity of the categorization of this type of military activ-
ity. In both cases, the primary purpose was to support a new civil government try-
ing to establish itself and exert its authority after the United States had toppled the
previous regime by the use of force. In Afghanistan, the Dutch Army helped secure
the Kabul area in order to allow Interim President Hamid Karzai to exert his gov-
ernment’s authority in the capital after the fall of the Taliban regime. In Iraq, Dutch
Marines and later the Dutch Army helped to stabilize the southern region of Iraq
in order to allow the Anglo-American Coalition Provisional Authority – and, from
June 2004, the Iraqi interim government – to establish administrative control over
Iraq. Bolstering the civil power with military forces became the primary aim of the
military presence in both countries, albeit under very different circumstances. In the
course of the 1990s, support and substitution of civil authorities under the guise of
peacekeeping had gradually become so common that this development went largely
unnoticed. 
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Glossary
AMGOT Allied Military Government in Occupied Territory (WWII)
ANZAC Australia New Zealand Army Corps
ARRC Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (NATO)
ASF Auxiliary Security Force (Somalia)
BLDP Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (Cambodia)
CA Civil Affairs
CAD Civil Affairs Division (US military WWII)
CAP Combined Action Platoon (Vietnam)
CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff (WWII)
CDS Chef Defensie Staf (Chief of the Defense Staff, the Nether-
lands)
CENTCOM Central Command (US military)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CIMIC Centre Civil-Military Cooperation Center (NATO)
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO)
CivPol UN Civilian Police
CMO Civil-Military Operations (US military)
CMOC Civil-Military Operations Center (US military)
CMOT Civil Military Operations Teams 
CNAF Cambodian National Armed Forces 
CPP Cambodian People’s Party
DART Disaster Assistance Response Team 
DCBC Defensie Crisis Beheersingscentrum (Defense Crisis Control
Center, Dutch Ministry of Defense)
DPs Displaced Persons
FC Force Commander
Funcinpec Front uni national pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre,
pacifique et coopératif (Cambodia).
GFAP General Framework Agreement for Peace (also known as
‘Dayton Accords,’ Bosnia).
HRS Humanitarian Relief Sector (Somalia)
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(UN) 
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
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IFOR Implementation Force (NATO-led, Bosnia)
INTERFET Intervention Force East Timor (Australian-led)
IPTF International Police Task Force (UN, Bosnia)
IRA Irish Republican Army
JAC Judicial Advisory Council (Kosovo)
JAG Judge Advocate General (US armed forces)
JCS 1067 Joint Chief of Staff Directive No. 1067 (US Occupation 
Policy Germany WWII)
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff (US military)
JIAS Joint Interim Administrative Structure 
K-Day Date KFOR fully deployed in Kosovo (21 June 1999)
K+90 Demilitarization of UÇK (19th September 1999)
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK)
KPNLF Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (Cambodia)
KPS Kosovo Police Service
KSK Kommando Spezial Kräfte (Bunderwher, Germany)
KTC Kosovar Transitional Structure 
KVM Kosovo Verification Mission 
LDK Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike te
Kosovos)
MG Military Government
MMWG Mixed Military Working Group (UNTAC)
MP Military Police
MRLA Malayan Races Liberation Army 
MSF Médecins Sans Frontières
MTA Military Technical Agreement (Kosovo)
MUP Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova (Yugoslav Ministry of the
Interior Special Police)
NAC North Atlantic Council (NATO) 
NADK National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia)
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NMA Netherlands Military Authority (WWII)
OFOF Orders for Opening Fire
OHR Office of the High Representative (Bosnia)
OMGUS Office of Military Government US in Germany (WWII)
OMIK OSCE Mission in Kosovo
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDK Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia)
PIFWCs Persons Indicted for War Crimes (UN, ICTY)
PPDK/PDK Party for Democratic Progress of Kosovo (Paria e Propesit
Demokratike ne Kosovoes), after 1999 known as the PDK
PU Policia Ushtarake (UÇK Military Police, Kosovo)
RCAF Royal Cambodian Armed Forces 
RNLA Royal Netherlands Army
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RNMC Royal Netherlands Marine Corps
ROE Rules of Engagement
Roma Romany-speaking gypsy community
RRA Ranhanweyn Resistance Army (Somalia)
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)
SAS Special Air Service (UK Army)
SDM Somali Democratic Movement (Somalia)
SFOR Stabilization Force (NATO-led, Bosnia)
SHEAF Supreme Headquarters Expeditionary Allied Forces (WWII)
SITREP Situation Report
SJAs Staff Judge Advocates (US military legal advisors)
SLA Somali Liberation Army 
SNA Somali National Alliance
SNC Supreme National Council of Cambodia 
SOC State of Cambodia 
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General of the Unit-
ed Nations
TMK Trupat E Mbrojtjes se Kosoves (Kosovo Protection Corps,
KPS)
UÇK Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army)
UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia 
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITAF United Task Force (Somalia)
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
UNMIKPOL UNMIK Police (Also UNIP, United Nations International
Police)
UNMO United Nations Military Observer 
UNOC United Nations Operation in Congo 
UNOSOM I United Nations Operation in Somalia I (1992)
UNOSOM II United Nations Operation in Somalia II (1993-1995)
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force (Croatia and Bosnia)
UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (WWII)
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
UNTAES United Nations Transitional Authority Eastern Slavonia 
USAID US Agency for International Development
USC United Somali Congress (Somalia)
USFET US Forces European Theater (WWII)
USMC US Marine Corps
VJ Vojske Jugoslavija (Yugoslav Army)
WFP World Food Program (UN)
glossary 451
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:55  Pagina 451
Military Terminology
Battalion Military unit of 300 to 1,000 soldiers. Usually between 700
and 800. Four or five companies make up a battalion,
which is normally commanded by a lieutenant colonel.
Battery An artillery unit the equivalent of a company. 
Brigade Military unit of 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers. Two to five battal-
ions make up a brigade. Normally commanded by a
brigadier-general (Europe) or colonel (US).
Chief of Staff (CoS) The officer who runs a headquarters on a day-to-day basis
and who often acts as a second-in-command.
Company Military unit of 60 to 190 soldiers. Three to five platoons
form a company, which is commanded by a major (Europe)
or captain (US). 
Corps Military unit of 20,000 to 45,000 soldiers. Two to five divi-
sions constitute a corps, which is typically commanded by a
lieutenant general. 
Division Military unit of 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers. Usually consist-
ing of three brigade-sized elements and commanded by a
major general. 
G1/S1 Staff Branch / Section responsible for personnel matters
including manning, and discipline (‘G’ used for divisional
level and higher; ‘S’ for brigade- and battalion-level staff
sections; in KFOR brigades used ‘G’).
G2/S2 Staff Branch / Section responsible for intelligence.
G3/S3 Staff Branch / Section responsible for operations.
G4/S4 Staff Branch / Section responsible for logistics and quarter-
ing.
G5/S5 Staff Branch / Section responsible for Civil Affairs or
CIMIC.
Platoon Military unit of 16 to 44 soldiers. A platoon is led by a lieu-
tenant with an NCO as second in command, and consists
of two to four squads or sections. 
NCO Non-commissioned officer.
Section/Rifle squad Military unit of 9 to 10 soldiers. Typically commanded by a
sergeant or corporal.
Squadron Armored or air cavalry unit the equivalent of a battalion.
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Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) prepared approximately thirty percent of the
other ranks with nine months of languages and area studies. The Navy, that would gov-
ern occupied territories in the Pacific other than Japan, had its own Naval School of Mil-
itary Government and Administration at Columbia University. Janssens, What Future for
Japan?, 155-157; Ziemke, The US Army, 74.
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20 The Provost Marshal General’s Military Government Department, Civil Affairs Studies, Illus-
trative Cases from Military Occupations (Training Packet No. 8, 1944) 6. 
21 Donnison, Civil-Affairs and Military Government in North-Western Europe, 18.
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feeding their forces from imported stocks. They did not hesitate to liquidate Germans
whom they regarded inimical. But […] they saw fit to extend a high degree of cordiality
and favor to those Germans whom they regarded as important to future interest.’ Harold
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Many scholars who participated in the occupation were seriously disillusioned with Army’s
notes to chapter one 457
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:55  Pagina 457
failure to implement the political reforms and the failure of denazification. Some wrote
books and dissertations on the topic in the immediate post-war years. A summary of their
negative views is provided in Edward N. Peterson, ‘The Occupation as Perceived by the
Public, Scholars, and Policy Makers,’ in: Wolfe, Americans as Proconsuls, 418-419; Harold
Zink, American Military Government in Germany (New York 1947); Harold Zink, The Unit-
ed States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton 1957). 
Chapter 2
1 Thomas R. Mockaitis, ‘From Counterinsurgency to Peace Enforcement: New Names for
Old Games?,’ Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1998) 40. 
2 The name ‘small wars’ can be traced back to the writings of British Colonel Charles Call-
well. C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (London 1903; First ed. 1896).
3 ‘Stability operations’ was the term preferred to counterinsurgency in the 1968 version of
the US Army’s capstone warfighting manual FM 100-5. See Donald G. Rose, ‘FM 3-0
Operations: The Effect of Humanitarian Operations on US Army Doctrine,’ Small Wars
and Insurgencies, Vol.13, No.1 (Spring 2002) 72.
4 Mockaitis, ‘From Counterinsurgency to Peace Enforcement,’ 40. Mockaitis published three
books on counterinsurgency in which he focuses on the British experience. Thomas R.
Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960 (Hong Kong 1990); Thomas R. Mockaitis,
British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era (Manchester and New York 1995); Thomas
R. Mockaitis, Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: The Sword or the Olive Branch? (West-
port 1999).
5 Henry Kissinger, ‘The Vietnam Negotiations,’ Foreign Affairs (January 1969) 214. 
6 A series of unofficial pampflets of mixed quality written by officers from the Dutch colo-
nial army preceeded the 1928 Voorschrift voor de Uitoefening van de Politiek-Politionele Taak
van het Leger (VPTL, Guidelines for the Execution of the Politico-Police Tasks of the Army).
Ger Teitler, ‘Voorlopers van het VPTL 1928-1929,’ Militaire Spectator, Vol. 170, No. 5 (2001)
268-274. See also Jaap de Moor, Westerlings Oorlog: Indonesië 1945-1950 (Amsterdam 1999)
45-57.
7 Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 173, 183, 185.
8 Ibid., 180.
9 Rod Thornton, ‘British Army and Its Minimum Force Philosophy,’ Small Wars and Insur-
gencies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring 2004) 87. 
10 Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 66, 188.
11 Thornton, ‘British Army and Its Minimum Force Philosophy,’ 85.
12 Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 90.
13 Ibid., 182-183.
14 In Malaya, the government’s security forces killed or captured fifty to sixty guerillas a
month on average. On average twenty to thirty surrendered each month. Richard Clut-
terbuck, The Long Long War: The Emergency in Malaya, 1948-1960 (London 1967) 55.
15 These are the numbers of troops, police and insurgents as provided by Mockaitis. Clut-
terbuck placed the number lower by emphasizing the number of actual troops used in
the actual fight against the insurgents in the jungle. Those more critical of the British
have placed the number of security forces needed to tie down and defeat an estimated
6,000 insurgents as high as 300,000 by including the total number of members of the
local home guard. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 9; Clutterbuck, The Long War, 43;
Jeremy Black, War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450-2000 (New
Haven and London 1998) 274-276. 
16 Clutterbuck, The Long War, 51-52.
17 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (London 1966) 185; Ian Beckett, ‘Robert
Thompson and the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam, 1961-65,’ Small Wars and
Insurgencies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1997) 41-63.
458 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:55  Pagina 458
18 Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping (London
1971).
19 Mockaitis, ‘From Counterinsurgency to Peace Enforcement,’ 41.
20 Clutterbuck, The Long War, 50-51.
21 Sir Robert Thompson in interview. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 186n18.
22 Clutterbuck, The Long War, 40.
23 John McCuen, The Art of Revolutionary War (Faber and Faber 1966) 72-73. As quoted in
Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 53.
24 Clutterbuck, The Long War, 3; Simon C. Smith, ‘General Templer and Counter-Insurgency
in Malaya: Hearts and Minds, Intelligence, and Propaganda,’ Intelligence and National Secu-
rity, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Autumn 2001) 69.
25 Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 121.
26 Ibid., 116.
27 Paul Mehlsen, ‘The US Marines’ Combined Action Program in Vietnam: The Formula-
tion of Counterinsurgency Tactics within a Strategic Debate,’ Low Intensity Conflict & Law
Enforcement, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2000) 73, 78n69. For the idea that protection of the
population was the central tenet of the Malayan campaign, Mehlson also referred to:
Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 57. Kitson was also very much aware of this
when he fought the Mau Mau in Kenia. See Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 50, 67-71.
28 Ibid, 65. 
29 Clutterbuck, The Long War, 97-100. Rewards were often more than what a Chinese rub-
ber-tapper earned in ten years and therefore sufficient to start a new life with his fami-
ly elsewhere.
30 United States Military Academy, West Point, Department of History, History of Revolution-
ary Warfare, Volume IV: British Experience: ‘Keeping the Peace’ (West Point 1971) 31-32.
31 For the British emphasis on the use of regular infantry, see Mockaitis, British Counterin-
surgency, 145. In his analysis of the use of Dutch special forces in the Netherlands East
Indies in the 1940s, Dutch military historian Jaap de Moor described the tendency of
Dutch as well as the French to rely on special forces in the role of ‘super infantry’ for
dealing with emergency situations. Especially in Algeria, but also in the Netherlands East
Indies the ever-increasing reliance on special forces and the parachute units to fight the
insurgents seriously undermined the confidence and skills of the regular infantry. De
Moor, Westerlings Oorlog, 30-36.
32 Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 187, 163-165.
33 Clutterbuck, The Long War, 112; Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 134.
34 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 199.
35 Ibid., 200.
36 Home Secretary Reginald Maudling in 1971 as cited in Mockaitis, British Counter-Insur-
gency in the Post Imperial Era, 110.
37 Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 56, 139.
38 US Marine Corps, Small Arms Manual (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office,
1940). Reprinted in April 1987 as FMFRP 12-15, Small Wars Manual, USMC (1940 /1987).
Nick Pratt ‘Small Wars: The Past as Prologue, and Alternative Vision of Future Conflict,’
Militaire Spectator, Vol. 171, No. 7/8 (2002) 381.
39 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York
2002). This citation is taken from the photo section.
40 Small Wars Manual, 1-16.
41 Ibid., 10, 12-19. 
42 In the description of what small wars were and how they were supposed to be conduct-
ed, the drafters of the Small Wars Manual allowed for uncertainties in the language used
that would have been impossible American military doctrine after the Second World War.
In the postwar era, all US military doctrine became increasingly descriptive and, as a
notes to chapter two 459
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:55  Pagina 459
result, little room was left for the ‘resourcefulness and ingenuity’ called for in 1940 in
the Small Wars Manual. 
43 In Korea, American military forces were caught totally off guard when the North Kore-
ans invaded in 1950. They were unprepared and largely incapable of conducting all-out
combat operations since the army of occupation had adapted itself to constabulary duties
that required no heavy units. Korea was important in convincing the US Army never to
allow itself to lose combat skills and preparedness for all-out conventional battle by adapt-
ing to constabulary duty.
44 Paul Melshen refers to a host of references on the effectiveness of the CAP program.
Mehlsen, ‘The US Marines’ Combined Action Program,’ 66, 72-75n1. See also: Cassidy,
‘Why Big Powers Fight Small Wars Badly,’ Military Review (September-October 2002) 50. 
45 David. H. Hackworth and Julie Sherman, About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior
(New York etc. 1989) 501. 
46 Donald G. Rose, ‘FM 3-0 Operations: The Effect of Humanitarian Operations on US Army
Doctrine,’ Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 2002) 59. 
47 Cassidy, ‘Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly,’ 48-49; Rose, ‘FM 3-0,’ 59.
48 Dennis C. Barlow, ‘A Planner’s Guide for the Employment of Civil Affairs in Latin Amer-
ica,’ in: John W. de Pauw and George Luz, Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications
of Military Civic Action (New York 1992) 131; David A. Decker, ‘Civil Affairs: A Rebirth or
Stillborn?,’ Military Review (November 1987) 6.
49 It is wrongly believed that Robert Thompson, in his advisory role to the Vietnamese gov-
ernment and American military, conceived the Strategic Hamlet Program that was
announced in 1962. Peter Busch proves this not to be the case. Peter Bush, ‘Killing the
‘Vietcong’: The British Advisory Mission and the Strategic Hamlet Program,’ The Journal
of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 2002). 
50 US General Harold K. Johnson and British Brigadier General W.P.K. Thompson are cited
in: Andrew J. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore and London 1986) 199. As
cited in: Mark S. Martins, ‘Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training,
Not Lawyering,’ Military Law Review, Vol. 143 (Winter 1994) 16. 
51 Boot, Savage Wars, 381. For the number of over eighty percent, Boot refers to: Krepinevich,
The Army and Vietnam, 188; James William Gibson, The Perfect War: Technowar in Viet-
nam (New York 2000) 11. 
52 Robert M. Cassidy, ‘Prophets or Praetorians? The Uptonian Paradox and the Powell Corol-
lary,’ Parameters, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Autumn 2003) 138, 141. Cassidy concluded: ‘Since the US
military ostensibly worship Clausewitz as the principal prophet of war, it should adhere
to the central Clausewitzian dictum that the military is an instrument of policy.’
53 Summers measured and analyzed the Vietnam war primarily by Clausewitzan standards.
Christopher Brassford, one of the leading experts on Von Clausewitz, calls Summers’ use
of Clausewitz’s concepts ‘brilliant,’ but argues that his estimation of the character of the
Vietnam War is ‘debatable.’ Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of
Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945 (New York and Oxford 1994) 203.
54 Colin L. Powell, ‘US Forces: The Challenges Ahead,’ Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992). See
also: Conrad C. Crane, Avoiding Another Vietnam: The US Army’s Response to Defeat in
Southeast Asia (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002).
55 Cassidy, ‘Prophets or Preatorians?,’ 138-140.
56 Martin van Creveld, ‘Through a Glass, Darkly: Some Reflections on the Future of War,’
Naval War College Review (Autumn 2000). 
57 Between 2000 and 2004 the author asked dozens of Dutch draftees who had served as
officers and enlisted men between the 1960s and the early 1990s if, during their train-
ing for war on the German plain, they were ever made aware of the possible presence or
interference of civilian population during military operations. The answer was always ‘no.’ 
460 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:55  Pagina 460
58 Barlow, ‘A Planner’s Guide,’ 134-135. 
59 William R. Swarm, ‘Impact of the Proconsular Experience on Civil Affairs Organization,’
in: Wolfe, Americans as Proconsuls, 412, 532n1.
60 Wally Z. Walters, The Doctrinal Challenges of Winning the Peace against Rogue States: How
Lessons from Post World War II Germany May Inform Operations against Saddam Hussein’
Iraq (USAWC Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks April 2002) 27-28. Walters ana-
lyzes civil affairs doctrine from the 1940s to 2001.
61 In the 1985 version of US Army Field Manual 41-10 civil affairs activities are divided into
four categories of missions: support conventional operations; foreign internal defense;
unconventional warfare; and civil administration. For the purpose of this book, foreign
internal defense and unconventional warfare are described by the generic term ‘low-inten-
sity conflict.’ 
62 Barlow, ‘A Planner’s Guide,’ 134-135.
63 Ibid., 130.
64 Lieutenant General John J. Yeosok quoted in: Conrad C. Crane and Andrew Terrill, Recon-
structing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario (Strate-
gic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 29 January 2003) 25. 
65 Alan James, ‘The Congo Controversies,’ International Peacekeeping, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring
1994) 44-58; Thomas A. Mockaitis, ‘From Counterinsurgency to Peace Enforcement: New
Names for Old Games?,’ Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1998) 43-45. Anoth-
er exception, less radical than UNOC was UNIFIL in Lebanon. 
66 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 57.
Chapter 3
1 Carolien Bais, Het Mijnenveld van een Vredesmacht: Nederlandse Blauwhelmen in Cambodja
(The Hague 1994) 33-34. This excellent short journalistic account by Carlien Bais, based
on extensive interviews with the key players as well as her personal observations in Cam-
bodia, gives a lively picture of the UNTAC mission as a whole and the Dutch battalion
in particular.
2 For a general overview and analysis of the Dutch contribution to peace operations, see
Christ Klep and Richard van Gils, Van Korea tot Kosovo: De Nederlandse Military Deelname
aan Vredesoperaties Sinds 1945 (The Hague 2000).
3 General Sir Peter de la Billiere (Senior British Commander Desert Storm) in interview
for the PBS Frontline Documentary ‘Desert Storm: An In-Depth Analysis of the 1990-
1991 Persian Gulf Crisis,’ PBS, January 1996. (Available online at http://www.pbs.org/-
wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/ oral/billiere/1.html).
4 Silkett, Wayne A., ‘Alliance and Coalition Warfare,’ Parameters (Summer 1993) 74-85.
5 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Jaap Bijsterbosch, (Willemstad, Curaçao), 28 January
2004.
6 In March 1992 the Security Council created the UNPROFOR to put an end to the fight-
ing in Croatia. This force would soon expand into a much larger mission Bosnia.
7 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
keeping (New York, UN Information Service 1992). 
8 See US Army Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations (December 1994) 2; British Army,
Wider Peacekeeping (London, Ministry of Defence 1994); The Royal Netherlands Army,
Landmacht Doctrine Publicatie I: Militaire Doctrine (1996); The Royal Netherlands Army,
Landmacht Doctrine Publicatie III: Vredesoperaties (1999).
9 ‘Unforgettable Pictures of the Year,’ Time Magazine, 28 January 1992. 
10 Agreements on Comprehensive Political Settlements of the Cambodia Conflict, Paris, 23
October 1991 (Published by UN Department of Public Information, DPI/1180, January
notes to chapter three 461
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:55  Pagina 461
1992); Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia:UNTAC’s Civil Mandate (Boulder
1995) 29.
11 Jarat Chopra argued that such an interpretation of the special representative’s role was
‘what the mandate effectively required.’ Chopra, Jarat, Peace-Maintenance: The Evolution of
International Political Authority (London 1999) 47-48. See also Trevor Findlay, Cambodia:
The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, SIPRI Research Report No. 9 (Oxford etc. 1995) 110. 
12 Article 6 of the Paris Peace Agreement concerned UNTAC’s administrative control over
Cambodia. 
13 Sanderson, ‘Preparation for, deployment and conduct of peacekeeping operations: a Cam-
bodia snapshot,’ Paper presented at a conference on UN Peacekeeping at the Crossroads
(Canberra, 21-24 March 1993) 4-5.
14 Sanderson, ‘Command at the Operational Level,’ Presentation to the Australian Command
and Staff College (Queenscliff, 26 June 2000) 8. 
15 Five translated Khmer Rouge documents recovered from the Headquarters NADK 519
Division, Kouk Krabas in September 1993. The documents are from the period May 1992
until August 1992 (hereafter referred to as Khmer Rouge documents May 1992-August
1992), Australian Defence Force Academy Library, Papers of Lieutenant General John
Sanderson, Reference Number MS 359 (hereafter referred to as ADFA, Sanderson Papers),
box 7, folder 15. Regrettably, no Khmer Rouge documents were recovered from the peri-
od between August 1992 and May 1993. See also W.A. Huijssoon, ‘United Nations Tran-
sitional Authority in Cambodja: Een Nabeschouwing van een Grootse VN-Missie (Part II),’
Militaire Spectator, Vol. 164, No. 1 (1995). Huijssoon refers to UNTAC analysts who also
estimated that the Khmer Rouge had decided in early 1992 to implement only the parts
of the Paris Peace Agreement that suited its purposed.
16 Sanderson, ‘Command at the Operational Level’ (Presentation, 26 June 2000).
17 Huijssoon, ‘United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodja (Part II),’ 30.
18 ‘‘Rode Khmer Grimmiger’: Nederlandse Mariniers Moeten Nog Wachten,’ Algemeen Dag-
blad, 1 June 1992.
19 Bais, Het Mijnenveld van een Vredesmacht, 36. See also D.C.L. Schoonoord, De Koninklijke
Marine in Actie voor de Verenigde Naties: Mariniers in Cambodja 1992-1993 (Leeuwarden and
Mechelen 1993) 97.
20 H.F. Dukers, ‘Peace-keeping in Cambodja: Nederlandse Mariniers in UNTAC,’ Mars et
Cathedra, No. 94 (1993) 2849. (Transcription of presentation given on 18 January 1993
for the Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap); Bais, Het Mij-
nenveld van een Vredesmacht, 36. 
21 William Shawcross, Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Con-
flict (New York 2000) 59.
22 ‘Ter Beek stelt vertrek vredesmacht Cambodja uit wegens Rode Khmer,’ Trouw, 1 June
1992; Bais, Het Mijnenveld van een Vredesmacht, 35.
23 Also Michael Doyle suggests that ‘UNTAC could have pushed through Khmer Rouge
lines.’ He also acknowledges, however, that history showed that the mighty Vietnamese
army never succeeded in defeating the Khmer Rouge. Michael W. Doyle, ‘UNTAC –
Sources of Success and Failure,’ in: Hugh Smith (ed.), International Peacekeeping: Build-
ing on the Cambodian Experience (Canberra 1994) 90-91.
24 Quoted in Ben Kiernan, ‘The Failures of the Paris Agreements on Cambodia, 1991-93,’
in: The Challenge of Indochina: An Examination of the US Role, from the Conference Report
of The Congressional Staff Conference, 30 April-2 May 1993 (Aspen Institute Vol. 8, No.
4) 14. 
25 John M. Sanderson, ‘Intervening for Peace: The Question of Standing Forces for the Unit-
ed Nations,’ Paper presented at the Governor’s Forum Government House, Melbourne,
23 March 1995).
26 Khmer Rouge documents May 1992-August 1992, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 7, fol-
der 15.
462 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:55  Pagina 462
27 Bais, Het Mijnenveld van een Vredesmacht, 53. 
28 Ibid., 54.
29 This argument was justified with the traditional Communist line that armed struggle was
necessary to support the diplomatic and political struggle to succees. See: Force Comman-
der to Deputy Force Commander, Subject: Analysis of Document Recovered From HQ
519 Division, 16 September 1993, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 7, folder 35. 
30 Interview with Colonel (retd.) Willem Huijssoon, Amsterdam, 4 May 2004. Huijssoon’s
account was confirmed in conversation with Peter Bartu (Canberra, September 2001).
31 Two of the locations, Sok San and Phum Nimit, were originally planned as platoon loca-
tions, but now harbored a full company. Dukers, ‘Peace-keeping in Cambodja,’ 2850.
32 Verslag bezoek Commandant Korps Mariniers aan het Nederlands Detachement te Cam-
bodja, Bijlage bij Brief CKM nr. 12355/10179, 15 August 1992, Instituut voor Maritieme
Historie, Den Haag, United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (1989-1994) Ref-
erence Number 099 (Hereafter: IMH, UNTAC 099) inv. 30.
33 Force Commander, Subject: Disarmament in the Cantonments (10 June 1992), ADFA,
Sanderson Papers box 31, folder 81.
34 W.A. Huijssoon, ‘United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodja: Een Success, met
Kanttekeningen,’ Marineblad (December 1993) 336. 
35 Dukers, ‘Peace-keeping in Cambodja,’ 2852; Bais, Het Mijnenveld van een Vredesmacht, 55. 
36 Interview with Huijssoon, Amsterdam, 4 May 2004; Sanderson to Akashi, ‘Preliminary
Study of Lessons Learned by the Military Component’ (31 August 1993) 11, ADFA, Sander-
son Papers, box 7, folder 34.
37 Doyle, ‘UNTAC – Sources of Success and Failure,’ 88.
38 Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, 43.
39 Ibid., 35. 
40 Ibid., 43-44.
41 Doyle, ‘UNTAC – Sources of Success and Failure,’ 89. 
42 Findlay, Cambodia, 138; Lyndall McLean, ‘Civil Administration in Transition: Public Infor-
mation and the Neutral Political/Electoral Environment,’ in Smith (ed.), International Peace-
keeping, 55-56.
43 Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, 42. 
44 William Shawcross, ‘Cambodia: The U.N.’s Biggest Gamble,’ Time Magazine, 28 Decem-
ber 1992.
45 HQ Sector 1, Maj C.B.J.E. van den Berg, ‘NLBATCAMB 1: De Wapenolie in de Civiele en
Militaire Component van UNTAC,’ IMH, UNTAC, 099, inv. 62.
46 Speech by Gérard Porcell (Director CivAdmin) at UNTAC force commander Conference,
22 January 1993, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 7, folder 35. 
47 Sanderson, ‘Command at the Operational Level’ (Presentation, 26 June 2000).
48 John M. Sanderson, ‘UNTAC’s Military Component,’ Presentation to International Con-
ference UNTAC: Debriefing and Lessons (Singapore, 3 August 1994).
49 Lieutenant Colonel Rakesh Malik (team leader UNMLO NADK, Indian Army), ‘Do’s and
Don’ts for the Peacekeeper in Cambodia,’ IMH, UNTAC, 099, inv. 31. 
50 CNLBATCAMBD (Dukers) to CinC RNLN (Commander Royal Netherlands Navy), ‘Tussen-
tijdse rapportage UNTAC-operatie Mariniersbataljon Cambodja 1,’ 8 October 1992, (Here-
after cited as Dukers, ‘Tussentijdse Rapportage UNTAC’), IMH, UNTAC, 099, inv. 37. 
51 HQ Sector 1, Maj C.B.J.E. van den Berg, ‘NLBATCAMB 1: De Wapenolie in de Civiele en
Militaire Component van UNTAC,’ IMH, UNTAC, 099, inv. 62.
52 Findlay, Cambodia, 125. Trevor Findley refers to an interview he held with Akashi.
53 Ibid., 109-110; See also Shawcross, Deliver Us from Evil, 54.
54 E-mail correspondence between author and Laura McGrew, 24 April 2004.
55 Bais, Het Mijnenveld van een Vredesmacht, 79-80. 
56 Wim Jansen, ‘Ter Beek: Beslist Geen Gelummel in de Jungle,’ Trouw, 14 September 1992.
notes to chapter three 463
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:55  Pagina 463
57 Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Srebrenica: Een ‘Veilig’ Gebied: Reconstruc-
tie, Achtergronden, Gevolgen en Analyses van de Val van een Safe Area, Deel II (Amsterdam
2002) 649-662. 
58 Ibid, 706.
59 Willebrord Nieuwenhuis, ‘Nederlandse Mariniers doen vooral Sociaal Werk,’ NRC Han-
delsblad, 9 September 1992.
60 Dukers, ‘Peace-keeping in Cambodja,’ 2853. 
61 Information/Education Division Report, Trip Report: Visit to Sector 1 (21-23 September
1992), 8 October 1992, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 14, folder 67.
62 Dukers, ‘Peace-keeping in Cambodja,’ 2854. 
63 Periodieke Rapportage FDS (Field Dressing Station) Dutch Batt UNTAC, 7 aug – 30 sep
1992, Centraal Archievendepot (CAD), Ministerie van Defensie, Archief Tijdelijke Com-
missie Besluitvorming Uitzendingen (TCBU) van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal
(1999-2000), Archiefmateriaal betreffende United Nations Transitional Authority in Cam-
bodia, 1989-1994, box 11, folder 3. (Hereafter cited as CAD, TCBU, Documents UNTAC,
followed by box number and when possible folder number. The box numbers are those
specifically provided to author by the CAD archivist). 
64 Periodieke Rapportage, FDS Dutch Bat UNTAC, 22 January 1993, CAD, TCBU, Docu-
ments UNTAC, box 11.
65 Dukers, ‘Tussentijdse Rapportage UNTAC’ (8 October 1992), IMH, UNTAC, 099, inv. 37.
66 Bais, Het Mijnenveld van een Vredesmacht, 103.
67 Information / Education Report Division, Trip Report: Visit to Sector 1 (21-23 September),
8 October 1992, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 14, folder 67.
68 Shawcross, Deliver Us from Evil, 59.
69 Interview with Huijssoon, Amsterdam, 4 May 2004.
70 William Shawcross, ‘Cambodia: The U.N.’s Biggest Gamble,’ Time Magazine, 28 Decem-
ber 1992.
71 Sanderson had also actively served in Malaysia during 1966. 
72 Robert B. Adolph Jr., ‘U.N. Military Civic Action in Cambodia,’ Special Warfare, Vol. 7
(July 1994) 12-18.
73 J.M. Sanderson, ‘Peacekeeping in Cambodia,’ The Sydney Papers, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Autumn
1994) 58. Michael J. Kelly, ‘Military-Civil Affairs: The Need for Dedicated Military Units,’
in David Horner (ed.), Armies and Nation Building: Past Experience – Future Prospects
(Canberra: Australian Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1995).
74 United States General Accounting Office (GOA), Report to Congressional Requesters,
‘U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Recent Missions’ (December 1993) 49.
75 Sanderson to Akashi, ‘GAO Draft Report – Lessons Learned from the Cambodian Oper-
ation, 10 August 1993, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 3, folder 14.
76 Lieutenant Colonel F. Hoogland, ‘Experiences of a Battalion Commander,’ Lecture at NATO
School’s (SHAPE) third peacekeeping course (19-4-1994), CAD, TCBU, Documents
UNTAC, box 4.
77 Examples taken from Robin Davies, ‘Civic Action in Cambodia: the Role of UNTAC,’
Forced Migration Review (23 January-April 1997).
78 Interview with Jaap Bijsterbosch, Willemstad, 28 January 2004. 
464 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:55  Pagina 464
Chapter 4
1 The adage is ascribed to Helmut von Moltke, the nineteenth-century general who led the
Prussian armies to victory over Austria and France.
2 HQ Sector 1, Maj. C.B.J.E. van den Berg, ‘NLBATCAMB 1: De Wapenolie in de Civiele
en Militaire Component van UNTAC,’ IMH, UNTAC, 099, inv. 62. 
3 Janet E. Heiniger, Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia (New York
1994) 79.
4 John M. Sanderson, ‘UNTAC’s Military Component,’ Presentation to International Con-
ference UNTAC: Debriefing and Lessons (Singapore, 3 August 1994).
5 For an general analysis of UN Civilian Police operations, see Annika S. Hansen, From
Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations (IISS Adelphi Paper No. 343, 2002). 
6 Sanderson, ‘UNTAC’s Military Component’ (Lecture, 3 August 1994).
7 Ibid.
8 Dziedzic, ‘Policing the New World Disorder,’ Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 9, No. 1
(Spring 1998) 138. 
9 Mark Plunkett, ‘The Establishment of the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Peacekeeping,’ in:
Hugh Smith (ed.), International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience (Can-
berra 1994) 69.
10 Klaas Roos would defend his UNTAC CivPol force by pointing at the lack of attention
from the UN and contributing nations to the police monitoring component. See Findley,
Cambodia, 144. See also Yasushi Akashi, ‘The Challenges Faced by UNTAC,’ Japan Review
of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 1993) 189.
11 Findley, Cambodia, 46.
12 Nayan Chanda, ‘Easy Scapegoat: People Blame the UN for All Their Woes,’ Far Eastern
Economic Review (22 October 1992) 18. 
13 Information / Education Report Division, Trip Report: Visit to Sector 1 (21-23 September),
8 October 1992, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 14, folder 67.
14 Sanderson to Akashi, Control of CPAF Activities, 17 March 1993 (Referring to memoran-
dum from UNTAC Police Commissioner Roos), 1 March 1993, ADFA, Sanderson Papers,
box 2, folder 12.
15 CNLBATCAMBD (Dukers) to CinC RNLN (Commander Royal Netherlands Navy), ‘Tussen-
tijdse rapportage UNTAC-operatie Mariniersbataljon Cambodja 1,’ 8 October 1992, (Here-
after cited as Dukers, ‘Tussentijdse Rapportage UNTAC’), IMH, UNTAC, 099, inv. 37. 
16 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep, no. 13, 20-27 February 1993, CAD, TCBU, Docu-
ments UNTAC, box 1. 
17 UN Police Commissioner Klaas Roos to Sanderson, ‘Crime Review,’ 30 September 1992,
ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 3, folder 18. 
18 Information / Education Report Division, Trip Report: Visit to Sector 1 (21-23 September),
8 October 1992, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 14, folder 67; UNTAC Dutchbat C-Coy
version of the presence plan, IMH, UNTAC, 099, inv. 50.
19 Bais, Het Mijnenveld voor een Vredesmacht, 55. 
20 Dutchbat Operation Order 9/92, 12 October 1992, IMH, UNTAC, 099, inv. 52. 
21 Information /Education Report Division, Trip Report: Visit to Sector 1 (21-23 September),
8 October 1992, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 14, folder 67.
22 UNTAC Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs, Section 4 – Use of Force, 76) May 1992,
IMH, UNTAC, 099, inv. 22. 
23 Entries in UNTAC Dutchbat Logbook on 21 August and 26 September 1992, CAD, TCBU,
Documents UNTAC, boxes 52, 65 and 67 (Hereafter cited as ‘UNTAC Dutchbat Logbook,’
followed by date of entry). As the UNTAC Dutchbat Logbook was not encountered in its
entirety at one location, it was recreated by the author from various parts encountered in
the various boxes within the TCBU archive. 
24 Dukers, ‘Tussentijdse Rapportage UNTAC’ (8 October 1992), IMH, UNTAC, 099, inv. 37.
notes to chapter four 465
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:55  Pagina 465
25 ‘Mariniers in Cambodja: Zorgen voor Veilige Verkiezingen,’ Defensiekrant, no. 44, 10
December 1992.
26 Mariniersbataljon Cambodja 1, Operatiebevel no. 008/92, Sisophon, 23 August 1992.
Bataljonsoperaties – Taakstelling Beveiligingspeleton, IMH, UNTAC, 099, inv. 52. The
detailed orders refer to the British Army’s Field Manual Vol. V; Land Opertions Volume III
– Counter Revolutionary Operations. 
27 D.C.L. Schoonoord, De Koninklijke Marine in Actie voor de Verenigde Naties: Mariniers in
Cambodja 1992-1993 (Leeuwarden and Mechelen 1993) 140. 
28 UNTAC Dutchbat Logbook, 2 September 1992.
29 UN Police Commissioner Klaas Roos to Sanderson, ‘Crime Review,’ 30 September 1992,
ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 3, folder 18.
30 Superintendent Herbertson (CivPol Crd SSP Prov) to LtCol Gratzner (DCDR SSP Prov),
‘Training of the special SOC-police ‘Task Force,’ 11 September 1992, IMH, UNTAC, 099,
inv. 55. 
31 UNTAC Dutchbat Logbook, 8 October 1993.
32 Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 17 (21-27 March 1993), CAD, TCBU, Documents UNTAC,
box 1.
33 (dutchbat to Cmdr CivPol (Ltcol Herbertson) on Public Areas of Sisophon, 24 August
1992, IMH, UNTAC, 099, inv. 52
34 Information / Education Report Division, Trip Report: Visit to Sector 1 (21-23 September),
8 October 1992, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 14, folder 67.
35 UNTAC Dutchbat Logbook , 11 November 1992.
36 Heininger, Peacekeeping in Transition, 82.
37 Uitgave Bureau S3, Local Mixed Military Working Group, Sector 1, 30 September 1992.
IMH, UNTAC, 099, inv. 52. 
38 Dukers, ‘Peace-keeping in Cambodja,’ 2860. 
39 Lieutenant Colonel Jaap Bijsterbosch in interview with author (Willemstad, Curaçao, 28
January 2004).
40 Dukers, ‘Tussentijdse Rapportage UNTAC’ (8 October 1992), IMH, UNTAC, 099, inv. 37.
41 Ibid.
42 ‘Operation Order No. 2 for the Joint Milcom of UNTAC,’ 9 December 1992, IMH, UNTAC,
099, inv. 49. The only official way for UN personnel to actively confiscate weapons was
through cooperation with the faction police forces. 
43 Bais, Het Mijnenveld voor een Vredesmacht, 55. Dukers claims not to have been provided
with UNTAC ROEs, so he acted on the Dutch Rules of Engagement (which in Dutch are
more narrowly called geweldsinstructies: instructions for the use of force). After his return
to the Netherlands, Dukers quite frankly said during a lecture: ‘At times we did things
for which we had no orders, such as having civilians handing in their weapons. This hap-
pened without any serious problems, probably because people had a barn full of weapons
at home anyway.’ Dukers, ‘Peace-keeping in Cambodja,’ 2860. 
44 UNTAC Standing Operating Proceduring (May 1992), Section 4 – Use of Force, 76.
45 ‘Draft Directive of UNTAC relating to the possession and carrying of weapons and explo-
sives applicable in Cambodia during the transitional period’ (14 October 1992). ADFA,
Sanderson Papers, box 16, folder 77; Opbevel 9/92, 12 October 1992; Uitgave Bureau S3,
Local Mixed Military Working Group, Sector 1 (30 September 1992) IMH, UNTAC, 099,
inv. 52. Again, Gonzales refers to British counterinsurgency doctrine in this Dutchbat
directive.
46 Dukers, ‘Peace-keeping in Cambodja,’ 2850.
47 Ibid., 2852. It is impossible to reconstruct the exact number of confiscated weapons, since
the Marines did not report in any length on this informal measure and its results. The
estimates number of weapons confiscated in this manner was probably in the high hun-
dreds. In the month of March 1993, for instance, a mere ninety-one weapons and 3647
466 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:55  Pagina 466
pieces of ammunition were confiscated. Twenty of those arms were returned to their own-
ers. UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 13 (21-27 March 1993); UNTAC Dutchbat II,
Weekly Sitrep no. 27 (29 May-5 June 1993), CAD, TCBU, Documents UNTAC, box 1. 
48 Both Cammaert and Huijssoon know of no other battalion initiating this policy prior to
March 1993, but do not exclude that ad hoc disarmament occurred in other sectors. Inter-
view with Major General Patrick Cammaert, New York, 15-16 October 2003; Interview with
Colonel (retd.) Willem Huijssoon, Amsterdam, 4 May 2004.
49 Bais, Het Mijnenveld voor een Vredesmacht, 70.
50 Interview with Cammaert, 15-16 October 2003.
51 Bais, Het Mijnenveld voor een Vredesmacht, 69-70, 72. Dutch members of parliament showed
how estranged they were from the realities on the ground when Sanderson ordered his
forces to create quick reaction forces for emergencies. The representatives considered such
measures ‘not done’ in a peacekeeping operation. It was regarded as too aggressive. Mean-
while, the Marines had created a quick reaction force almost as soon as they had arrived
in Cambodia.
52 Interview with Cammaert, 15-16 October 2003.
53 Interview with Huijssoon, 4 May 2004.
54 Bais, Het Mijnenveld voor een Vredesmacht, 73.
55 Interview with Cammaert, 15-16 October 2003.
56 Bais, Het Mijnenveld voor een Vredesmacht, 55.
57 Interview with Cammaert, 15-16 October 2003.
58 Sanderson, ‘UNTAC’s Military Component,’ (Lecture, 3 August 1994). 
59 ‘This may be the understanding of the authors of the draft report, but unless it is stated
fully and without equivocation there is likely to be considerable confusion and embar-
rassment.’ Sanderson to Gérard Procell, Director Civil Administration, 17 or 18 August
1992 (handwritten note), Sanderson Papers, box 16, folder 77. 
60 W.A. Huijssoon, ‘United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodja: Een Nabeschouwing
van een Grootse VN-Missie (deel 2, slot),’ Militaire Spectator, Vol. 164, No. 1 (1995) 33.
Huijssoon repeated this view in an interview with the author, 4 May 2004.
61 Sanderson, ‘Preparation for, Deployment and Conduct of Peacekeeping Operations: A
Cambodia snapshot,’ Paper presented at at conference on UN peacekeeping at the Cross-
roads, Canberra, 21-24 March 1993, p. 8.
62 Sanderson in interview for Free Choice: UNTAC Electoral Component Newsletter No. 11 (15
January 1993). As cited in James A. Shear, ‘Riding the Tiger: The UN and Cambodia,’ in
William J. Durch (ed.), UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s
(Houndmills etc. 1997) 164. 
63 Interview with Cammaert, 15-16 October 2003.
64 Huijssoon to Sanderson, ‘Visit to Sector 1 (Dutchbatt),’ 20 January 1993, ADFA, Sander-
son Papers, box 26, folder 145. 
65 Interview with Bijsterbosch, 28 January 2004.
66 Interview with Cammaert, 15-16 October 2003.
67 Interview with Bijsterbosch, 28 January 2004.
68 Interview with Cammaert, 15-16 October 2003. 
69 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 4 (19 Dec-26 Dec 1992), CAD, TCBU, Documents
UNTAC, box 1. 
70 Interview with Bijsterbosch, 28 January 2004; UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 4
(19-26 December 1992), ibid. 
71 Schoonoord, Mariniers in Cambodja, 182.
72 BBC Newsnight item on UNTAC, 22 February 1993.
73 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep, no. 12 (13-20 Feb 1993), CAD, TCBU, Documents
UNTAC, box 1.
74 Schoonoord, Mariniers in Cambodja, 182.
notes to chapter four 467
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 467
75 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep, no. 13 (20-27 Feb 1993) CAD, TCBU, Documents
UNTAC, box 1; UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 15, ibid.
76 Interview with Cammaert, 15-16 October 2003. For the overall poor cooperation between
the CivPol and the military component, see Jamer A. Schear and Karl Farris, ‘Policing
Cambodia: The Public Security Dimension of U.N. Peace Operations,’ in: Robert B. Oak-
ley, Michael J. Dziedzic and Eliot M. Goldberg (eds.), Policing the New World Disorder, 90.
77 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep, no. 13, 20-27 Feb 1993, CAD, TCBU, Documents
UNTAC, box 1.
78 Interview with Cammaert, 15-16 October 2003.
79 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 18, 28 March-4 April 1993, CAD, TCBU, Docu-
ments UNTAC, box 1.
80 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 17, 21-27 March 1993, ibid.
81 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 16, 13-20 March 1993, ibid.; UNTAC Dutchbat II,
Weekly Sitrep no 19, 5 April 1993, ibid. 
82 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 20, 10-17 April 1993, ibid.
83 Interview with Bijsterbosch, 28 January 2004.
84 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep No. 15, 6-13 March 1993, CAD, TCBU, Documents
UNTAC, box 1: ‘Problems’ were addressed during anti-banditry meeting on 8 March; inter-
view with Bijsterbosch, 28 January 2004.
85 Under UNTAC Directive 93/4 (17 March 1993), anyone illegally carrying weapons could
be imprisoned for six months to three years.
86 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep, No. 19, 3-10 April 1993, CAD, TCBU, Documents
UNTAC, box 1; UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep, no. 19, 3-10 April 1993, ibid.
87 Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Author-
ity in Cambodia. S/25719, 3 May 1993, 19. 
88 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep 15, 6-13 March 1993, CAD, TCBU, Documents UNTAC,
box 1.
89 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep 13, 21-27 March 1993, ibid.
90 Steve Ayling, ‘UNTAC: The Ambitious Mission,’ in: Hugh Smith (ed.), Peacekeeping Chal-
lenges for the Future (Canberra 1993) 81.
91 Findlay, Cambodia, 140-141.
92 Heininger, Peacekeeping in Transition, 75. As reported by the US General Accounting Office
investigator Tetsuo Miyabara. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Chief of Plans to Force Commander, ‘Visit to Sector 1 (Dutchbatt), 20 January 1993, ADFA,
Sanderson Papers, box 26, folder 145. 
95 Interview with Bijsterbosch, 28 January 2004.
96 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 15, 6-13 March 1993, CAD, TCBU, Documents
UNTAC, box 1. 
97 Interview with Bijsterbosch, 28 January 2004. Later in the mission there were other inci-
dents with much higher levels of violence involving Pakistani and Indian troops. How-
ever, it was the first-known incident where UNTAC used force and did so with restraint.
Interview with Huijssoon. 
98 Sanderson to Akashi, Control of CPAF Activities, 17 March 1993, ADFA, Sanderson Papers,
folder 12.
99 W.B. Kroon en J.B.C. van der Veer, ‘Rules of Engagement: Ervaringen van Nederlandse
Land- en Luchtmachtmilitairen Tijdens UNPROFOR en IFOR,’ Militaire Spectator, Vol.
166, No. 10 (1997) 468.
100 Interview with Cammaert, 15-16 October 2003. See also: UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly
Sitrep No. 16, 13-20 March 1993, CAD, TCBU, Documents UNTAC, box 1. 
468 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 468
Chapter 5
1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 792 (30 November 1992). Published in: Unit-
ed Nations Blue Book Series Vol. II (with an Introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali), Unit-
ed Nations and Cambodia (New York 1995) 26-27. 
2 There was much criticism at the time about the lack of firmness regarding the Khmer
Rouge. For a compilation of, and counterarguments against, such criticism see: Doyle,
UN Peacekeeping, 67; Findlay, Cambodia, 129-130.
3 Steve Heder (Deputy Director Info/Ed – Analysis) to Sanderson, Translation of PDK Doc-
ument, 14 September 1993, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 6, folder 33. 
4 Findlay, Cambodia, 56.
5 HQ UNTAC, Warning order 1 for operation order no. 2, 15 November 1992, IMH, UNTAC,
099, inv. 52; HQ UNTAC, Operation order no. 2, 9 December 1992, ibid., inv. 49; HQ
UNTAC, Operation order nr. 3, March 1993, CAD, TCBU, Documents UNTAC, box 1.
The force commander’s third operational order to his military force was ‘to provide secu-
rity and support to the electoral component throughout all phases of the election process.’
6 Findlay, Cambodia, 54-56.
7 Zhou Mei, Radio UNTAC of Cambodia: Winning the Ears, Hearts and Minds (Bangkok
1994).
8 UNTAC Chronology (p11), ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 7, folder 34.
9 Anatoly Mkrtchyan to Timothy Carney, Distribution of donated radios, 26 April 1993,
ADFA, Sanderson Papers, folder 207; UNTAC Chronology (p8), ADFA, Sanderson Papers,
box 7, folder 34.
10 Shawcross, Deliver Us from Evil, 75. 
11 Findlay, Cambodia, 110. 
12 Sanderson to Akashi, Joint Inspections Teams Report, 3 August 1993, ADFA, Sanderson
Papers, box 3, folder 14. Sanderson aired similar critique on some of the civilian compo-
nents’ staff in: Sanderson, ‘Command at the Operational’ (Presentation, 26 June 2000)
6. Findlay confirms the enormous discrepancy in the quality of civilian staff, which Akashi
dryly noted was ‘not uniformly outstanding.’ Findlay, Cambodia, 147. However, Sanderson
would also admit to Huijssoon that also within his own military staff, a substantial num-
ber of officers was largely ineffective. Interview with Huijssoon, 4 May 2004. 
13 John M. Sanderson, ‘UNTAC’s Military Component,’ Presentation to International Con-
ference UNTAC: Debriefing and Lessons (Singapore, 3 August 1994) 16. See also Sander-
son, ‘UNTAC: Successes and Failures,’ in: Hugh Smith (ed.), International Peacekeeping:
Building on the Cambodian Experience (Canberra 1994).
14 Findlay, Cambodia, 125.
15 Karl Farris, ‘UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On the Balance, a Success,’ Parameters, Vol.
24, No. 1 (1994) 48.
16 Porcell did not provide the ‘other’ viewpoint. Speech by Gérard Porcell at UNTAC Force
Commander Conference, 22 Jan 1993, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 7, folder 35. 
17 Interview with Huijssoon, 4 May 2004. Sanderson’s personal archive from the UNTAC
period, which is held at the ADFA Library, is a clear indicator of the central role played
by the force commander. It is far more than a collection of military documents, and holds
reports and analysis of all components involved. 
18 Shawcross, ‘The UN’s Biggest Gamble,’ 20.
19 James A. Schear and Karl Farris, ‘Policing Cambodia: The Public Security Dimension of
U.N. Peace Operations,’ in: Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic and Eliot M. Goldberg
(eds.), Policing the New World Disorder, 93-94. 
20 Dennis McNamara, UN Peacekeeping and Human Rights in Cambodia: A Critical Evalua-
tion (Paper prepared for a meeting on UN peacekeeping and human rights organized by
the Aspen Institute with support of the Ford Foundation, Geneva 1994) 9-10. See also
John Sanderson, ‘The East Timor Challenge,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 20 September 1999.
Sanderson lauded those courageous Cambodians who were prepared to give evidence.
notes to chapter five 469
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  17:29  Pagina 469
21 Harry Broer and Michael Emery, ‘Civilian Police in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations,’ in:
Oakley, Dziedzic and Goldberg (eds.), Policing the New World Disorder, 369-370. Boer and
Emery refer to an interview with Roos held in July 1997; Chopra, Peace Maintenance, 48.
22 McNamara, ‘UN Peacekeeping and Human Rights in Cambodia’ (Paper, Geneva 1994),
10.
23 ‘Meeting with Core Group,’ 8 February 1993, Sanderson Papers, box 31, folder 174. 
24 Schear and Farris, ‘Policing Cambodia: The Public Security Dimension of U.N. Peace
Operations,’ 94. 
25 Plunkett, ‘Establishment of the Rule of Law,’ in: Smith (ed.), International Peacekeeping,
71.
26 US Department of State, Cambodia Human Rights Practices, 1993. For details on the
detainees, see Jarat Chopra, ‘United Nations Authority in Cambodia,’ Occasional Paper
No. 15, The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies (Providence 1994)
40-42.
27 ‘Sihanouk sluit weer vrede met de VN,’ NRC Handelsblad, 11 January 1993; ‘VN-macht
kondigt maatregelen aan,’ Algemeen Dagblad, 8 January 1993.
28 There are no references to these measures in any of the documents researched by the
author; interview with Cammaert, 15-16 October 2003; for Cammaert’s remark in 1993
on wishing he had the mandate to disarm and arrest, see: Bais, Het Mijnenveld voor een
Vredesmacht, 56.
29 Interview with Cammaert, 15-16 October 2003.
30 W.A. Huijssoon, ‘United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodja: Een Terugblik op
een Grootse VN-Missie ,’ Militaire Spectator, Vol. 163, No. 12 (1994) 533.
31 Findlay, Cambodia, 47.
32 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 18, 28 March-3 April 1993, CAD, TCBU, Docu-
ments UNTAC, box 1. 
33 Findlay, Cambodia, 132-133.
34 Dennis McNamara, ‘UN Peacekeeping and Human Rights in Cambodia: A Critical Eval-
uation’ (Paper prepared for a meeting on UN peacekeeping and human rights organized
by the Aspen Institute with support of the Ford Foundation, Geneva 1994) 8; Doyle, UN
Peacekeeping in Cambodia, 47.
35 Findlay, Cambodia, 48.
36 Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, 86.
37 Stefan Ciacek to Austin, Security of DESs in Kampong Thom Province, 6 April 1993,
ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 16, folder 74. 
38 Schoonoord, Mariniers in Cambodja, 210. 
39 Austin to Akashi, Electoral Staff Security, 10 March 1993, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box
16, folder 74. 
40 Sanderson in interview for Free Choice: UNTAC Electoral Component Newsletter No. 11 (15
January 1993). As cited in James A. Shear, ‘Riding the Tiger: The UN and Cambodia,’ in
William J. Durch (ed.), UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s
(Houndmills etc. 1997) 165. 
41 UNTAC Joint Security Directive No. 1: Inter-Component Coordination in Provision of
Security During the Electoral Process (agreement between Sanderson and CivPol com-
missioner Brig. Gen. Roos, 13 March 1993), ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 2, folder 12;
UNTAC Joint Security Directive no. 2: Supervision of Public Meetings / Political Rallies
(agreement between Sanderson and CivPol commissioner Brig. Gen. Roos, 16 March
1993), Ibid. 
42 Other concerns ventilated by Sanderson were: ‘Who decides which potential targets are
going to be protected and which are not? [...] We must not get sucked into a situation
where we are seen to assume the SOC responsibility.’ Sanderson to Sadry (DSRSG),
Phnom Penh Special Task Force for Security, 4 March 1993. 
470 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  17:29  Pagina 470
43 UNTAC Chief of Plans to SRSG (through the Force Commander), Reinforcement of the
military component (15 April 1993), ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 26, folder 146. 
44 UNTAC Chronology, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, folder 50; Interview with Huijssoon, 4
May 2004.
45 Huijssoon to Defensiestaf, Weekly Sitrep UNTAC (9 May-13 May 1993) CAD, TCBU, Doc-
uments UNTAC, box 1.
46 Letter from DESs Siem Pang to Deputy PEO Stung Treng, Proposed withdrawal from
SiemPang, STUNG TRENG, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 16, folder 74.
47 Chief of Plans to SRSG, Subject: Reinforcement of the Military Component, 15 April 1993,
ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 26, folder 146.
48 Interview with Huijssoon, 4 May 2004.
49 Cheryl M. Lee Kim and Mark Metrikas, ‘Holding a Fragile Peace: The Military and Civil-
ian Components of UNTAC,’ in: Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone and Robert C. Orr,
(ed)., Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cam-
bridge, Mass. 1997) 108. 
50 Interview with Huijssoon, 4 May 2004.
51 Ibid.
52 Findlay, Cambodia, 132-133.
53 Bais, Het Mijnenveld voor een Vredesmacht, 50.
54 Huijssoon to Defensiestaf, Weekly Sitrep UNTAC (17-24 May 1993) CAD, TCBU, Docu-
ments UNTAC, box 1. 
55 Article 11 of the Paris Peace Agreement: ‘The objective of the military arrangements dur-
ing the transitional period shall be to stabilize the security situation and build confidence
among the parties to the conflict, so as to reinforce the purposes of this agreement and
to prevent the risk of a return to warfare.’ 
56 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 18 (27 March-3 April 1993), CAD, TCBU, Docu-
ments UNTAC, box 1.
57 Commanders Assessment, UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 15 (6 March-13 March
1993), CAD, TCBU, Documents UNTAC, box 1; Schoonoord, Mariniers in Cambodja, 208-
210.
58 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 19 (3-10 April 1993), CAD, TCBU, Documents
UNTAC, box 1. 
59 Lt Col Suresh Nair to Col K. Farris, Subject: Sit pre electoral analysis-Sector 1, 19 May
1993, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 14, folder 67; UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep
no. 23 (1-8 May 1993), CAD, TCBU, Documents UNTAC, box 1.
60 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 24 (8-15 May 1993), ibid.
61 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 15 (6-13 March 1993), ibid. 
62 Bais, Het Mijnenveld voor een Vredesmacht, 94.
63 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 24 (8-15 May 1993), CAD, TCBU, Documents
UNTAC, box 1.
64 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 15, 6-13 March 1993, ibid.
65 On summary justice in Funcinpec and KPNLF areas, see John M. Sanderson, ‘The UNTAC
Military Component,’ in Ramesh Thakur (ed.), Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain: The Unit-
ed Nations at Fifty (London 1998) 117.
66 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 15, 6-13 March 1993, CAD, TCBU, Documents
UNTAC, box 1; Schoonoord, Mariniers in Cambodja, 235.
67 Bais, Het Mijnenveld voor een Vredesmacht, 104; Lt Col Suresh Nair to Col K. Farris, Sub-
ject: Sit pre-electoral analysis – Sector 1, 19 May 1993, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 14,
folder 67.
68 Schoonoord, Mariniers in Cambodja, 225.
69 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep No. 23 (1-8 May 1993), CAD, TCBU, Documents
UNTAC, box 1. 
notes to chapter five 471
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  17:29  Pagina 471
70 UNTAC Dutchbat Logbook, 18 May 1993; Schoonoord, Mariniers in Cambodja, 235.
71 Bartu to Sanderson, Military Information, Recent Developments – Military Situation, 15
August 1993, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 15, folder 68.
72 Findlay, Cambodia, 111; Doyle, UN Peacekeeping, 58.
73 Huijsoon to Defensiestaf, Sitrep UNTAC, 9-13 May 1993, CAD, TCBU, Documents
UNTAC, box 1. 
74 T. Noel (PEO Kampong Cham) to Austin, Security, 12 April 1993, ADFA, Sanderson Papers,
box 16, folder 74; Letter from DESs Siem Pang to Deputy PEO Stung Treng, Proposed
withdrawal from SiemPang, STUNG TRENG, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 16, folder
74; Interview with Huijssoon, 4 May 2004.
75 W.A. Huijssoon, ‘United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodja: Een Terugblik op
een Grootse VN-Missie,’ Militaire Spectator, Vol. 163, No 12. (1994) 532.
76 Lt. Col. Suresh Nair to Col K. Farris, Subject: Sit pre-electoral analysis – Sector 1, 19 May
1993, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, Box 14, folder 67.
77 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 24 (8-15 May 1993), CAD, TCBU, Documents
UNTAC, box 1; UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 25 (15-22 May 1993), ibid. 
78 Interview with Cammaert, 15-16 October 2003. 
79 Interview with Huijssoon, 4 May 2004. 
80 Sanderson, ‘Command at the Operational Level’ (Presentation, 26 June 2000); Huijssoon
to Defensiestaf, Sitrep UNTAC (17-24 May), CAD, TCBU, Documents UNTAC, box 1.
81 Info/Edu Division reports by Penny Edwards, Judy Ledgerwood and Jay Jordans on polling
in several districts in the provinces Takeo, Kampong Cham and Battambang. ADFA,
Sanderson Papers, box 17, folder 85. 
82 Doyle, UN Peacekeeping, 57.
83 Info/Edu Division reports by Penny Edwards, Judy Ledgerwood and Jay Jordans on polling
in several districts in the provinces Takeo, Kampong Cham and Battambang. ADFA,
Sanderson Papers, box 17, folder 85. 
84 For instance, in the south of Cambodia, Frenchbat was ‘doing an excellent job’ according
to UNTAC information branch personnel, but the wide dispersal of sites there allowed
them merely visit each of the polling sites. Dutchbat was everywhere performing static
guard duties as the size of their sector and reduced number of polling sites made this
possible.
85 All Dutchbat’s riflemen were in the field and logistical and staff personnel took over the
security of the bases. The battalion’s kitchen staff was tasked to protect fuel convoys.
86 Interview with Cammaert, 15-16 October 2003. 
87 UNTAC Dutchbat, Logbook, 27 May 1993.
88 UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no. 26 (24 May 1993), CAD, TCBU, Documents
UNTAC, box 1. 
89 Confirmed by UN source in Bangkok Post, 27 May 1993, p1.
90 United Nations, ‘United Nations Focus: Cambodia Election Results,’ July 1993.
91 Interview with Cammaert, 15-16 October 2003; UNTAC Dutchbat II, Weekly Sitrep no.
26, CAD, TCBU, Documents UNTAC, box 1. 
92 Raoul M. Jennar, ‘UNTAC: ‘International Triumph’ in Cambodia?,’ Security Dialogue, Vol.
25, No. 2 (1994) 148. Also Karl Farris and Michael Maley give much credit to the UNTAC
military staff for the security plan for enabling successful elections. See Karl Farris, ‘UN
Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On the Balance, a Success,’ Parameters, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1994).
93 Captain Blackhurst estimated the most effective days for the Khmer Rouge to disrupt the
elections would have been the days just prior to the first day at the polls. UNTAC Dutch-
bat II, Weekly Sitrep no.24 (8-15 May 1993), CAD, TCBU, Documents UNTAC, box 1. 
94 Within UNTAC headquarters, Huijssoon and others presumed that the Khmer Rouge esti-
mated the voter turnout would only be between 25 to 30 percent. Interview with Huijs-
soon, 4 May 2004.
472 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  17:29  Pagina 472
95 It is unclear if Sanderson expected Pol Pot to believe these estimates. Sanderson, ‘Com-
mand at the Operational Level’ (Presentation, 26 June 2000).
96 Findlay, Cambodia, 84-85. 
97 Sanderson, ‘Command at the Operational Level’ (Presentation, 26 June 2000).
98 Steve Heder (Deputy Director Info/Ed – Analysis) to Sanderson, Translation of PDK Doc-
ument, 14 September 1993, ADFA, Sanderson Papers, box 6, folder 33. 
99 W.A. Huijssoon, ‘United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodja: Een Nabeschouwing
van een Grootse VN-Missie (deel 2, slot),’ Militaire Spectator, Vol. 164, No. 1 (1995) 28.
Huijssoon refers to analyses by UNTAC staff made in retrospect that confirm the Khmer
Rouge preparations for the post-election offensive that never materialized. 
100 Michael Doyle noticed a common characteristic of the successful parts of the operation.
All these operations were directly run by UNTAC and had required no ‘positive cooper-
ation’ from the factions. However, he fails to take into account the essential military and
police cooperation from the three factions during the elections. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping,
67.
101 UN, Mid-Term Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Military Liaison Team in Cam-
bodia, UN Document S/1994/169, 14 February 1994. As quoted in Findlay, Cambodia,
165.
102 Koninklijke Marine, ‘Evaluatie KM-deelname aan operaties van de United Nations Tran-
sitional Authority Cambodia’ (Date unknown but produced soon after December 1993).
A Dutch parliamentary research report criticized the Royal Navy UNTAC evaluation and
the ‘lessons learned’ process after UNTAC. It specifically lamented this Navy evaluation
of the mission for being solely for internal use. Lessons thus failed to reach other mili-
tary services and presumably also the Ministry of Defense. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Gen-
eraal, Rapport van de Tijdelijke Commissie Besluitvorming Uitzendingen (The Hague 2000)
452. 
103 W.A. Huijssoon, ‘Een Terugblik op UNTAC, Cambodja 1992-1993,’ Presentation at the
Royal Insititute for the Navy (February 1994).
104 Despite the lack of codified learning, a solid history was written by Marine colonel and
historian Dick Schoonoord on the experiences of 2,288 Marines and Navy personnel dur-
ing eighteen months in Cambodia. Although it was written primarily as a commemora-
tive book and chronology for the officers and men involved, it was nevertheless far supe-
rior to anything written in self-analysis by the Dutch Army on its many operations in the
coming years. D.C.L. Schoonoord, De Koninklijke Marine in Actie voor de Verenigde Naties:
Mariniers in Cambodja 1992-1993 (Leeuwarden and Mechelen 1993).
105 Karl Farris, ‘UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On the Balance, a Success,’ Parameters, Vol.
24, No. 1 (1994). Authors such as Trevor Findley and Michael Doyle give an overall pos-
itive judgment on UNTAC, despite its many failings. Jarat Chopra is very critical of UNTAC
and the performance of its military component. For another critique of UNTAC see: Raoul
M. Jennar, ‘UNTAC: ‘International Triumph’ in Cambodia?,’ Security Dialogue, vol. 25, No
2, (1993).
106 UNTAC’s official cost was 1.5 billion dollars, but most observers have estimated that includ-
ing repatriation, rehabilitation and other costs excluded from the UN budget, the costs
are more likely to have been close to 2.8 billion dollars. The total death toll was relative-
ly high in Cambodia with a total of ninety military, police and other civilian staff killed
in two years. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping, 73; Doyle, ‘UNTAC – Successes and Failures,’ 86.
107 Sanderson, ‘Intervening for Peace: The Question of Standing Forces for the United Nations’
(Paper delivered at the Governor’s Forum; Government House, Melbourne 23 March 1995)
11. 
notes to chapter five 473
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  17:29  Pagina 473
Chapter 6
1 United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States
Army in Somalia, 1992-1994 (Center of Military History, Washington 2003) 26.
2 Lieutenant Colonel O’Leary reminded his troops that they should kill anyone that fired
on them. If armed Somalis left the Marines alone, the Marines would ‘let them live to
fight another day.’ David A. Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia: With Marine Forces,
Somalia During Operation Restore Hope (undated draft, available at the Marine Corps
Research Center Archives) 2-6. US Marine Corps Captain David Dawson wrote his unpub-
lished monograph as an eyewitness and on the basis of interviews and military docu-
ments after serving as a field historian for the US Marine Force in Somalia from mid-
December until 22 March 1993.
3 Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 3-5; Martin Stanton, Somalia on Five Dollars a Day:
A Soldier’s Story (Novato 2001) 105. In his lucid and at times cynical account of an US
Army battalion in Somalia, Stanton combines personal experiences with a somewhat broad-
er view of the operation between December 1992 and April 1993. 
4 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 53-54.
5 David Laitin, ‘Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention,’ in: Barbara F. Walter
and Jack Snyder, Civil Wars, Insecurity and Interventions (New York 1999).
6 Ali Mahdi influenced a further 8,000 fighters in areas north of Mogadishu. United States
Forces, Somalia After Action Report, 65-66.
7 Walter Clarke, ‘Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia,’ in: Walter Clarke and
Jeffrey Herbst, Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention
(Boulder and Oxford 1997) 5.
8 There are various versions of this proverb circulating. This version is taken from Bob
Breen, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force Somalia (Sydney 1998) 1. 
9 Terrence Lyons and Ahmed Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention and
Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington, DC 1995) 21.
10 Laitin, ‘Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention’, 2; Abdullah A. Mahamoud,
State Collapse and Post-Conflict Developments in Africa: The Case of Somalia, 1960-2001
(unpublished dissertation; University of Amsterdam 2002) 3. 
11 Omar Jess’s SPM-SNA militia, operating in the Lower Juba area in southern Somalia, was
approximately 2,000 strong. Faction affiliations were even more complicated as Jess’s
SPM-SNA and Morgan’s faction were two of three splinter groups that comprised the
SPM. United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report, 66; See also Lynn Thomas and
Steve Spataro, ‘Peacekeeping and Policing in Somalia,’ in: Robert B. Oakley, Michael J.
Dziedzic and Eliot M. Goldberg, Policing the New World Disorder (Washington, DC 1998)
177-178.
12 Terrence Lyons and Ahmed Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and
Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington, DC 1995) 7. Also Durch wrote about
‘Hobbesian anarchy.’ W.J. Durch, ‘Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention
and ‘State-Building’ in Somalia,’ in W.J. Durch (ed.), UN Peacekeeping, American Policy,
and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York 1996) 311.
13 Lee V. Cassanelli, ‘Somali Land Resource Issues in Historical Perspective,’ in: Clarke and
Herbst, Learning From Somalia, 67-76.
14 Khalil Dale in an interview with PBS Frontline for the documentary ‘Ambush in Mogadishu’
(Posted on PBS Online, September 1998).
15 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 2. Also Dawson mentions that the setting reminded US Marines
of the Mad Max movies that were known under the alternative title ‘Road Warrior’ in the
United States.
16 Andrew S. Natsios, ‘Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia,’ 84-85.
17 The most critical account of NGO relief operations in Somalia is given in Michael Maren,
The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity (New York
474 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 474
1997). Although disputed by some NGOs, the then-vice president of World Vision and
later USAID director Andrew Natsios and CARE USA. president Philip Johnston were
quoted saying that as much as up to eighty percent of all relief supplies were diverted or
looted in what euphorically became know as ‘spontaneous distribution.’ See Michael J.
Kelly, Peace Operations: Tackling the Military, Legal and Policy Challenges (Canberra 1997)
7-9. 
18 John T. Fishel, Civil – Military Operations in the New World (Westport 1997) 190.
19 Michael G. MacKinnon, The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy under Clinton: A Fairweath-
er Friend? (London and Portland 2000) 119.
20 Fishel, Civil – Military Operations in the New World, 190.
21 Oakley, ‘The Urban Area during Support Missions,’ 310; John L. Hirsch and Robert B.
Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping
(Washington, DC 1995) 42. 
22 United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 (1992). 
23 Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-23n103. Kelly established this by referring to an interview with
Colonel Lorenz and to Colin L. Powell, My American Journey: An Autobiography (Random
House 1995). 565. See also Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 1-10. Walter Clarke men-
tions the ‘Thanksgiving decision’ in Clarke, ‘Failed Vision,’ 9. 
24 United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report, 61. 
25 Ambassador Oakley’s title was honorific, reflecting his previous service as a United States
ambassador. With no government in Somalia, the American president could not send an
ambassador.
26 Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 50; Fishel, Civil – Military Oper-
ations in the New World, 190.
27 Stanton, Somalia on Five Dollars a Day, 89.
28 Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 2-1; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore
Hope, 54.
29 Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 3-5.
30 David Laitin, ‘Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention,’ n24. Laitin found out
that reliable figures on the numbers of Somalis saved in the initial months are hard to
come by. According to Laitin, a conservative but reliable estimate by Steven Hansch, based
on reasonable statistic evidence, holds between 10,000 and 25,000 lives were saved by
the initial US-led intervention and an estimate 100,000 by the international effort as a
whole. The unsubstantiated figure of 250,000 was often used, while the staunchest advo-
cated of overall success in the US-led phase of the operations, who also fail to provide
any data, argue that half a million people owe their lives to the intervention. Steven 
Hansch et al., Excess Mortality and the Impact of Health Interventions in the Somalia Human-
itarian Emergency (Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group and Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention, 12 August 1994) The figure 250,000 is used by Chester Crocker,
‘Lessons of Somalia,’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 3 (1995) 3; Patman, ‘Beyond the Mogadishu
Line,’ 62; Michael Mandelbaum even said that 500,000 lives were saved, but also he
failed to provide any data. Michael Mandelbaum, ‘Foreign Policy as Social World,’ Foreign
Affairs Vol. 75, No. 1 (1996) 30. 
31 United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report, 25; Fishel, Civil – Military Operations in
the New World, 191.
32 George Bush, Humanitarian Mission to Somalia: Address to the Nation, Washington, DC,
4 December 1992.
33 Jeffrey Record, ‘Exit Strategy Delusions,’ Parameters, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Winter 2001-2002)
21-27.
34 Fishel, Civil – Military Operations in the New World, 191-193. 
35 Ibid., 190. See also: Shawcross, Deliver Us from Evil, 84-85.
36 Colin Powell with Joseph Persico, My American Journey (New York 1995) 576.
notes to chapter six 475
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 475
37 See Chapter 2. Robert M. Cassidy, ‘Prophets or Praetorians? The Uptonian Paradox and
the Powell Corollary,’ Parameters, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Autumn 2003) 141. 
38 Adam B. Siegel, ‘Mission Creep: An Autopsy of a Hopefully Dying Term,’ Low Intensity
Conflict and Law Enforcement, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1999).
39 Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 2-5.
40 The definition for crew-served weapons given in the UNITAF ROE is ‘any weapons sys-
tem that requires more than one individual to operate. Crew-served weapons include but
are not limited to tanks, artillery pieces, anti-aircraft guns, mortars and machine guns.’
They also included technicals. 
41 Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 2-10; Patman, ‘Crossing the Mogadishu Line,’ 63,
73n21. 
42 United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report, 26.
43 One such arms storage sites owned by Aideed and discovered by UNITAF in the early
days of the operation contained an amount of weaponry and ammunition that would have
required 200 five-ton trucks to empty. Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-24.
44 In order to avoid confiscation of their larger arms and stocks some warlords moved large
columns of vehicles and equipment over the Kenyan and Ethiopian border and toward
the southern Galgadud province, outside the reach of the intervention force. Kelly, Peace
Operations, 7-24.
45 This notion emerges from the United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report, which is
more critical of the initial phase of the intervention under UNITAF than most US offi-
cial accounts.
46 Jennifer Parmelee, ‘Waltzing with Warlords,’ Washington Post (25 June 1993); William Clai-
borne and Keith B. Richburg, ‘US Envoy Oakley Arranges Talks Between Two Top Soma-
li Warlords,’ Washington Post (11 December 93) A44.
47 Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 56-64, 70-1, 78. A more critical
account in offered in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (eds.), Learning from Somalia (Boul-
der 1997). Most of the authors contributing to this volume agree that Oakley sided too
closely with the warlords. 
48 Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 3-10; Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 35.
49 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 37. 
50 Stanton, Somalia on Five Dollars a Day, 132. Stanton wrote: ‘About an hour into the trip
we had passed so many crops that I began to feel vaguely silly about bringing a load of
relief rice and lentils to this land of plenty. Sean Naylor wondered aloud about this too.
Kirk Hashank (who was quicker on the draw than I was) quipped, ‘Hell, I don’t know,
Sean, maybe they don’t eat corn.’’
51 Kenneth Allard uses this image in an interview for the PBS Frontline documentary ‘Ambush
in Mogadishu’ (Posted on PBS Online, September 1998). 
52 Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 4-10.
53 Ibid., 4-4, 7, 13.
54 Ibid., 3-33, 7-2.
55 Robert B. Oakley, ‘The Urban Area during Support Missions, Case Study: Mogadishu, The
Strategic Level’ (Presentation for RAND Conference), in: Russ Glenn (ed.), Capital Preser-
vation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the Twenty-First Century (Proceedings of the RAND
Arroyo-TRADOC-MCWL-OSD Urban Operations Conference, March 22-23, 2000) 324. 
56 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 53-54. 
57 Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 7-3, 4. 
58 Oakley, ‘The Urban Area during Support Missions’ (Presentation, 22 March 2000) 325.
59 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 60; according to Dawson, however, ‘[t]he Marines found very
few casualties on the objective.’ Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 7-22.
60 Ibid., 7-24 to 7-31.
61 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 57. Breen refers to a report by the Australian liaison officer
476 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 476
at CENTCOM, Colonel Jock Murray, of a briefing held by General Hoar on 28 December
1992.
62 United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report, 57.
63 Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (National Defense University, Wash-
ington, DC 1995) 50. According to Major Stanton, ‘no technicals’ and ‘no roadblocks’ was
pretty straightforward and enforceable, but ‘no visible weapons’ and ‘no banditry’ were
much harder to enforce. Stanton, Somalia on Five Dollars a Day, 107. 
64 ‘This, combined with our rules of engagement, soon caused a change in attitude of the
Somali political factions. Instead of being fearful of UNITAF forces, they looked for ways
to circumvent and work around them.’ Stanton, Somalia on Five Dollars a Day, 106-107.
65 Oakley, ‘The Urban Area during Support Missions’ (Presentation, 22 March 2000).
66 Kevin M. Kennedy, ‘The Military and Humanitarian Organizations,’ in: Clarke and Herb-
st, Learning from Somalia, 117n16. For these figures Colonel Kennedy refers to UNITAF
briefing for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7 April 1993. Of those 4,621, close to 900 were con-
fiscated by the Australian forces in the Bay province. For the number of 2,250 small arms
and heavy weapons seized by UNITAF in the first ninety days of operations, Patman refers
to Lorenz, ‘Weapons Confiscation Policy During the First Phases of Operation ‘Restore
Hope’,’ Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1994) 414-415.
67 Laura Miller and Charles Moskos, ‘Humanitarians or Warriors? Race, Gender, and Com-
bat Status in Operation Restore Hope,’ Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Summer
1995). This point is also mentioned in the excellent masters thesis by: Major Harold E.
Bullock, Peace by Committee: Command and Control Issues in Multinational Peace Enforce-
ment Operations (Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 1994), 42. 
68 Kennedy, ‘The Military and Humanitarian Operations,’ 109, 113. 
69 United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report, 58.
70 Kennedy, ‘The Military and Humanitarian Operations,’ 109-114. Colonel Kennedy specif-
ically mentions the Australian and Belgian contingents.
71 Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 7-31, 32. Also Bullock mentions the use of tent stakes
by US troops. Bullock, Peace by Committee, 36-37: ‘The sticks worked well since the nor-
mal tool for internal discipline among Somalis is a large, ornate stick wielded freely by
a tribal elder. In situations where a bullet was too much, tent stakes often served well.
Tent stakes were also affixed, pointing outward, to vehicles as make-shift spikes to ward
off attackers in a style reminiscent of the Road Warrior movie vehicles.’
72 Bullock, Peace by Committee, 37. Stanton gives a fascinating account of a riot at a food
warehouse in Wanwaylen. He recalled: ‘I was at the time unfamiliar with the incredible
speed at which a relatively peaceful crowd can become a rock-throwing mob.’ The Botswan-
ian troops, with whose performance most Western units were impressed, earned what
Stanton called ‘a reputation for kick-ass riot control.’ Stanton, Somalia on Five Dollars a
Day, 117-118, 154. 
73 Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military (New York
and London 2003) 202. This account by Priest is based on interview with Wilhelm.
74 Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 7-31, 32; Dana Priest, The Mission, 202. 
75 Mark S. Martins, ‘Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, not Lawyer-
ing,’ Military Law Review, Vol. 143, No.1 (Winter 1994) 64, 129-130. 
76 Martins, ‘Rules of Engagement for Land Forces,’ 17-18, 127-128. 
77 Interview with Khalil Dale for PBS Frontline documentary, ‘Ambush in Mogadishu’ (Post-
ed on PBS Online, September 1998). Somewhat later in the mission, UNOSOM official
Patrick Vercammen had similar experiences with US troops in Mogadishu, which he con-
trasted with the behavior of Australian troops in Baidoa. Patrick Vercammen in interview
with author, Brussels (12 June 2003).
78 Bullock found that the Belgians were overall lauded for ‘doing an excellent job’ in Kismayo,
but were accused of ‘practically ignoring the countryside.’ Bullock, Peace by Committee,
41.
notes to chapter six 477
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 477
79 Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, 6.
80 ‘Somali Human Rights Abuses by the UN Forces,’ African Rights (July 1993). As quoted
in Miller and Moskos, ‘Humanitarians or Warriors,’ n30. 
81 Ibid., 630. 
82 For a raw portrait of Marine Corps culture in the early 1990s see Anthony Swofford, Jar-
head: A Marine’s Chronicle of the Gulf War and Other Battles (New York 2003).
83 Todd W. Lyons, Military Intervention in Identity Group Conflicts (thesis for the Naval Post-
graduate School, Monterey California, 2000) 62n82.
84 Gérard Purnier, ‘The Experience of European Armies in Operation Restore Hope,’ in:
Clarke and Herbst, Learning from Somalia, 139. His account on French posture and intel-
ligence gathering is confirmed in an interview with the author by Patrick Vercammen
(Brussels, 12 June 2003), who as a humanitarian coordinator worked for UNOSOM II
with the Australians, French and Americans in Baidoa through much of 1993. 
85 Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-22.
86 The phrase ‘three block war,’ an influential notion in the US military, was first used in
1995 by General Charles Krulak, the then-commandant of the US Marine Corps. A Con-
cept for Future Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Devel-
opment Command 1997) III–6. 
87 In order to offset some of the antagonism caused by thorough weapons searches by his
Marines in one of the most troublesome areas of Mogadishu, Colonel Newbold initiated
a small-scale medical and dental civic action progam in January, threatening some 300
patients. Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 7-38.
88 Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-23. Based on interview by Kelly with Lorenz. Confirmed by Unit-
ed States Forces, Somalia After Action Report, 255. 
89 After three months of US operations, the force commanders assessed: ‘all areas [were]
stable or relatively stable.’ United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report, 57.
90 George Bush, ‘Humanitarian Mission to Somalia: Address to the Nation.’ 
91 Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-32. 
92 Stanton, Somalia on Five Dollars a Day, 144.
93 Clarke, ‘Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,’ 79.
94 Thomas and Spataro, ‘Peacekeeping and Policing in Somalia,’ 185; Bullock, Peace by Com-
mittee, 35. 
95 Bullock, Peace by Committee, 38; Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 1-27. The compre-
hensive ‘History of the Marines’ wrongly claimed that the troops ‘trained specifically for
combat as an aggressive, mobile, quick strike force’ was ‘forbidden to exchange fire except
when directly attacked.’ Jack Murphy, History of the Marines (World Publishing Group,
North Dighton 2002) 250.
96 Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, 36. 
97 Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 1-27; Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned,
36-37.
98 Bullock, Peace by Committee, 38.
99 The ROEs for Operation Restore Hope were printed in 1994 as an example in US Army
Field Manual 100-23, ‘Peacekeeping Operations.’ On the ROEs in Somalia see also Daw-
son, The US Marines in Somalia, 1-27; Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-32; Bullock, Peace by Com-
mittee, 36.
100 Bullock, Peace by Committee, 39. 
101 Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L. Baggot, A Leap into the Dark: Crisis Action Planning for
Operation Restore Hope (monograph for School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC,
Fort Leavenworth, 1996) 19. This thesis is available at the NDU Library.
102 Bullock, Peace by Committee, 38.
103 Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-32, 7-33. See also Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order, 198.
104 Kelly, Peace Operations, 34. 
478 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 478
105 F.M. Lorenz, ‘Response: The US Perspective of Operation Restore Hope,’ in: Oakley,
Dziedzic and Goldberg, Policing the New World Disorder, 50.
106 Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-39, 40n174. In his book, Kelly reproduced the text from this
memorandum from Lorenz to General Johnston, which is dated 1 December 1992.
107 W. Hays Parks (Special Assistant to the Judge Advocate General of the Army,
Washington, DC) ‘International Humanitarian Law in Multinational Operations: How do
Multinational Forces work within Constraints set by Differing Commitments of Individ-
ual States?,’ Presentation for EAPC Workshop on International Humanitarian Law and
Multinational Forces, London, 20-21 November 2000. 
108 This is the basic argument made in Kelly, Peace Operations, chapters 3 and 4; for an excerpt
of his argument see: Kelly, ‘Legitimacy and the Public Security Function,’ in Robert B.
Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic and Eliot M. Goldberg, Policing the New World Disorder (Wash-
ington, DC 1998).
109 Kelly, ‘Legitimacy and the Public Security Function,’ 410-411.
110 Walter Clarke, ‘Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates,’ in: Clarke and Herbst, Learning
from Somalia, 9; Fishel, Civil – Military Operations in the New World, 193. On initial plans
for more military police support, see Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L. Baggot, A Leap
into the Dark: Crisis Action Planning for Operation Restore Hope (monograph for School of
Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, 1996) 19.
111 Ann Wright served as chief of UNOSOM’s Justice Division from May to August 1993.
See Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-17.
112 Fishel, Civil–Military Operations in the New World, 193-194.
113 Bullock, Peace by Committee, 62; Clarke mentions 7 to 30 CA personnel in theater. Wal-
ter Clarke, ‘Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates,’ in: Clarke and Herbst, Learning from
Somalia, 9.
114 Kennedy, ‘The Military and Humanitarian Operations,’ 102-103.
115 Stanton, Somalia on Five Dollars a Day, 156. 
116 Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 69-71. John Hirsh was Oakley’s
deputy in Somalia. ‘CIA types’ are mentioned by Stanton who based on his account on
first-hand experiences in Bale Dogle and Belet Huen. Stanton, Somalia on Five Dollars a
Day, 100.
117 Ambassador Robert B. Oakley in an interview with the author (Washington, DC, 21 Octo-
ber 2003). 
118 Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 69-71.
119 Interview with Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, 21 October 2003.
120 An Army document dated 24 January 1993 reported that the civil affairs staff was only
prepared as survey teams before deployment, but ended up doing a good job. Bullock,
Peace by Committee, 62. The document used by Bullock was drafted by US Army Lieu-
tenant Moase, ‘Special Operating Forces – Civil Affairs,’ JULLS 12457-88301 (00112), 24
January 1993. 
121 Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 6-8, 30.
122 Dawson was with the Marines at the time and bases his account on situation reports and
interviews with Newbold and Hellmer. He mentioned Omar Elmi as the local leader of
the Aideed faction in Baidoa. Dawson explains how Elmi ‘described the locations of Soma-
lia National Alliance (SNA) forces in the area. The SNA, of course, was a rival faction.’
The field historian does not address the fact that the SNA was in fact Aideed’s faction,
locally called SLA (or SNA-SLA). See Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-2, 8-3, 8-23, 8-25; Breen,
A Little Bit of Hope, 88-89. Elmi’s name does not appear in Kelly’s, Breen’s or any other
account of UNITAF operations in Baidoa.
123 Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 5-10, 11.
124 Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-3.
125 Stanton, Somalia on Five Dollars a Day, 133, 139.
notes to chapter six 479
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 479
126 Among those claiming to be the first to set up local police forces are the US Army bat-
talion in Marka, Oakley in Mogadishu, and the Marines in Baidoa. General Zinni regard-
ed police reconstruction more important than delivering food aid in accomplishing
UNITAF’s mission. See Lyons, Military Intervention in Identity Group Conflicts, 82. 
127 Ganzglass, ‘The Restoration of the Somali Justice System,’ in: Clarke and Herbst, The
Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, 20-21; Thomas and Spataro, ‘Peacekeeping
and Policing in Somalia,’ 178.
128 Interview with Oakley, 21 October 2003.
129 Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-36.
130 Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 87-92.
131 Oakley, ‘The Urban Area during Support Missions’ (Presentation, 22 March 2000) 332-
333.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.; See also Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-35n154, 7-37; Dawson, The US Marines in Soma-
lia, 4-11, 12.
134 Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 88-89.
135 Gérard Prunier, ‘The Experience of European Armies in Operation Restore Hope,’ in:
Clarke and Herbst, Learning from Somalia, 140-141.
136 Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-36, 37; Ganzglass, ‘The Restoration of the Somali Justice Sys-
tem,’ 24.
137 Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-37. Kelly refers to memorandum from Provost Marshal (Spataro)
to UNITAF J-3 (Zinni), ‘Auxiliary Security Force,’ 27 January 1993.
138 Stanton, Somalia on Five Dollars a Day, 156. See also Conrad C. Crane, Landpower and
Crisis: Army Roles and Mission in Smaller-Scale Contingencies During the 1990s (US Army
War College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001) 18.
139 Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-21. As Clarke wrote late 1993, ‘[w]hen there is no central gov-
ernment, the occupying force in a Chapter VII operation can become the de facto gov-
ernment.’ Walter S, Clarke, ‘Testing the World’s Resolve in Somalia,’ Parameters, Vol. 23
(Winter 1993-94) 55. William Shawcross wrote: ‘When a massive US armed force appeared
in a country where there were not institutions, they became in effect the state.’ Shaw-
cross, Deliver Us from Evil, 88.
140 Bullock, Peace by Committee, 42. Based on Bullock’s interview with Clarke. 
141 Ganzglass, ‘The Restoration of the Somali Justice System,’ 20-37. Karin von Hippel writes
that Walter Clarke wrote to her that a mere two Somali prisoners were held in Mogadishu
prison at the time the Marines left the city on 4 May 1993. Von Hippel, Democracy by
Force, 73.
142 Ganzglass, ‘The Restoration of the Somali Justice System,’ 27-28.
Chapter 7
1 Based on a conversation between the author and Alan Ryan, a senior defense analyst at
the Land Warfare Studies Centre (Canberra, September 2001). 
2 Bob Breen, A Little Bit of Hope: Australian Force Somalia (Sydney 1998) 58-59. This chap-
ter dwells heavily on Bob Breen’s outstanding field history, which is based primarily on
research in Australian military archives and interviews with Australian military person-
nel during and after operations in Somalia. The book is out of print and appears to have
received no attention outside Australia. Another important source used to reconstruct Aus-
tralian operations in Somalia are Michael Kelly’s writings. The Australian legal advisor
based various publications on the Australian experience in Somalia. Michael J. Kelly, Peace
Operations: Tackling the Military, Legal and Policy Challenges (Canberra 1997). Kelly later
adapted this book, which was based on his PhD dissertation and published it with Kluw-
480 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 480
er Law International. Michael J. Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace
Operations: The Search for a Legal Framework (The Hague 1999).
3 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 61. Breen’s account is based on an interview with Lieutenant
Colonel David Hurley.
4 For an important journalistic account of the rising influence of the regional military com-
mands on American foreign policy, see Dana Priest’s The Mission. Central Command’s
budget grew from $36.7 million in 1990 to $55.2 million by 2000, when the military
staff at its headquarters in Florida had doubled to some 1,050 people. Priest, The Mission,
71n, 74.
5 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 37.
6 David A. Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia: With Marine Forces, Somalia during Oper-
ation Restore Hope (undated draft, available at the Marine Corps Research Center Archives)
8-18, 19.
7 Ibid., 8-20.
8 Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 71; Human Rights Watch, Soma-
lia Beyond the Warlords: The Need for a Verdict on Human Rights Abuses Report, HRW
Report, Vol. V, Issue No. 2 March 7, 1993. The report, based on the situation in early Jan-
uary 1993 stated how ‘Baidoa was repeatedly touted as the ‘model’ of what is being accom-
plished in the political realm through Operation Restore Hope.’ It seriously questioned
the policy choices made by the Marines in Baidoa. 
9 Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 8-24, 25.
10 Ibid., 4-9.
11 Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-3; Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 88-89. As indicated in the previ-
ous chapter, Dawson mentioned Omar Elmi as the local leader of the Aideed faction in
Baidoa. However, his name does not appear in Kelly’s, Breen’s or any other account of
UNITAF operations in Baidoa.
12 At the time, according to Hurley, no ordinary citizen dared to go out in the streets at
night and only a few would come out in daytime.
13 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 59.
14 Ibid., 73, 192. P. Kieseker, ‘Relationships Between Non-Governmental Organisations and
Multinational Forces in the Field,’ in: Hugh Smith (ed.), Peacekeeping – Challenges for the
Future (ADFA Canberra 1993). Three of the six men attacking the Swiss expatriate were
reportedly his own security guards.
15 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 74, 77.
16 Private letter by Hurley to his family, 12 January 1993, Australian War Memorial Archive
(Hereafter AWM), PR 00294 (Papers of Lt-Col D. Hurley 1 RAR, Hereafter referred to as
AWM, Hurley Papers).
17 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 72-74. 
18 Dawson, The US Marines in Somalia, 4-16, 17. 
19 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 59.
20 Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 71-72. 
21 Private letter by Hurley to his family, 13 January 1993, AWM, Hurley Papers. 
22 Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-3. Kelly´s account was confirmed by UNOSOM officer Patrick
Vercammen in an interview with the author. According to Human Rights Watch nine of
the eleven foreign NGOs active in Baidoa boycotted the meeting between the relief com-
mittee, the NGOs and the UNITAF civilian-military operations officer. See Human Rights
Watch, Somalia Beyond the Warlords: The Need for a Verdict on Human Rights Abuses Report,
HRW Report, Vol. 5, Issue. 2 (7 March 1993).
23 Todd W. Lyons, Military Intervention in Identity Group Conflicts (thesis for the Naval Post-
graduate School, Monterey California, 2000) 66.
24 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 208-9.
25 Private letter by Hurley to his family, 13 January 1993, AWM, Hurley Papers.
notes to chapter seven 481
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 481
26 Hussein Barre Warsame was a 49-year-old former officer from the Barre Army loyal to
Aideed’s USC-SNA. See Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 89. He should not be confused with
General Ahmed Warsame Mohammed Hashi, a Majertain-Darood clan leader who had
fought for Barre in defense of Mogadishu and expelled Aideed’s Hawiye militia from
Bardera in October 1992. American Forces Somalia, After Action Report, 68. 
27 Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-2, 23, 25, Breen, A Little Bit of Hope 88-89. According to Kelly,
Gutaale took his order from one of Aideed’s trusted subordinates, Colonel Arabee, who
visited the region occasionally from Mogadishu to ensure that Aideed was getting his fair
share of the local revenue.
28 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 89. In Dawson’s account the Marines used the services of
local gunmen as guards in charge of airport security. There is a possibility that they were
hiring Gutaale’s men. As soon as the Australians took over, Gutaale offered his ‘services’
for airports security, vowing to kill any infiltrator immediately. His offer was declined.
29 Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-3; Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 88-89.
30 Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-4, 22n84. 
31 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 73, 89.
32 Ibid., 55,68; Lieutenant J.A. McTavish, ‘Rifle Platoon Command Experience – Operation
Solace,’ Combat Arms Journal, Issue 2 (1993) 12.
33 Ibid., A Little Bit of Hope, 78-79.
34 ‘Always keep your cool. Be polite and patient. Do not show anger or lose you temper. You
lose your credibility if you indicate you cannot control your emotions.’ Australian Defence
Force (Army), Soldiers Handbook Operation Solace, Somalia (1993).
35 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 90-91.
36 Graham McBean, ‘Taking Comfort from Solace: Aussie Doctrine Stands the Acid Test,’
Army Magazine, No. 19 (Winter 1994) 14-18. 
37 McBean, ‘Taking Comfort from Solace,’ 15; Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 78, 91-92. Com-
pany commander Major Mick Moon said how by the end of January, ‘many of the lads
very tired now. I can’t see us keeping up this pace for too long.’ 
38 The method was tiring on the soldiers and was combined with regular section/sized and
half-platoon patrols. Although the Australians had received no specific training in the
brick method, troops were happy with the flexibility that the method afforded. McTavish,
‘Rifle Platoon Command Experience,’ 13-14. 
39 McBean, ‘Taking Comfort from Solace.’ 
40 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 96.
41 Ibid., 97-98.
42 Ibid., 67, 106.
43 Ibid., 101.
44 Ibid., 106-107.
45 On 29 December 1992, the Australian defence minister’s spokesman Senator Robert Ray
said: ‘Our general attitude is, if UNOSOM, the group that is to follow Operation Restore
Hope, is to be successful, some attempt must be made to disarm the warring factions.’
Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 48. 
46 McTavish, ‘Rifle Platoon Command Experience,’ 12.
47 Breen concludes that issuing weapons cards was well intended but ineffectual, because
NGO guards had access to vast amounts of arms. Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 341. How-
ever, while there is no denying that there was an abundance of arms, the registration sys-
tem served as a basis on which the Australian could found their weapons policy and exert
their authority within the framework of a set of rules. 
48 The Australians captured and held 900 weapons, ranging from pistols to a 106-mm recoil-
less rifle. The vast majority was of the confiscated arms were assault rifles. David J. Hur-
ley, ‘Operation Solace,’ Australian Defence Force Journal, no. 104 (January and February
1994) 30. Patman gives the unsubstantiated number of 1,000 firearms captured by the
482 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 482
Australians. Patman, ‘Beyond the Mogadishu Line,’ 65. The grand total captured by
UNITAF in April was 4,651 of which 710 were returned to NGO guards. The total amount
captured and held by the end of the operations is therefore likely to have been between
4,000 and 5,000. Kevin M. Kennedy, ‘The Military and Humanitarian Organisations,’
117n16 (Mentioned in previous chapter).
49 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 85-87.
50 Ibid., 341.
51 Michael Kelly, ‘Legal Regimes and Law Enforcement on Peace Operations,’ Hugh Smith
(ed.), The Force of Law: International Law and the Land Commander (Australian Defence
Studies Centre, Canberra 1994) 199. 
52 The Counter Intelligence personnel’s tent, initially in a distant corner near the latrines,
inched ever closer to the staff quarters during the deployment. The CI teams ended up
inside the headquarters building next door to Hurley’s office. Breen, A Little Bit of Hope,
87-88. 
53 Lieutenant Colonel G. Peterson, ‘Human Intelligence and Somalia – A Cost Effective Win-
ner for a Small Army,’ Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 104 (January and February
1994) 36; Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 341. 
54 Peterson, ‘Human Intelligence,’ 37.
55 Ibid., 35.
56 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 85-87, 339,341. The additional Counter Intelligence personnel
consisted of one warrant officer and three non-commissioned officers.
57 McTavish, 14; McBean, ‘Taking Comfort from Solace,’ 14-18; Breen described a large num-
ber of contacts. Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 91, 109, 123, 127. 
58 McBean, ‘Taking Comfort from Solace,’ 16; Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-16. 
59 McBean, ‘Taking Comfort from Solace,’ 16. In April a bandit in a crowded streets held a
gun against a Diggers stomach and pulled the trigger. The gun jammed and the assailant
was wrestled to the ground by the bewildered Digger.
60 Hurley, ‘Operation Solace,’ 29. The appropriateness of many elements of the Services Pro-
tected Evacuation training for deployment in Somalia is also mentioned in Kelly, ‘Legiti-
macy and the Public Security Function,’ 416; Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 20.
61 Sergeant Wayne Douglas, the intelligence specialist, just happened to be leading a US
intelligence officer into town to chat with local political leaders. They stumbled onto this
crime in action. Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 128. 
62 Another borderline case that stretched the Rules of Engagement to their limits was the
‘white light ambush.’ These ambushes were conducted on roads approaching the base.
Soldiers would lay an ambush in pitch dark with night-vision equipment, wait for ban-
dits to approach, flood them with light when just in front of the ambush and demand
they surrender. If a suspect pointed his weapon, the Diggers were allowed to open fire
according to the rules. Sensing the danger of escalation, Hurley stopped such operations
around Baidoa late January. Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 340.
63 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 339.
64 Ibid., 69-70. 
65 Interview with Australian Army Warrant Officer Paul Angus in Somalia 1993. Australia
Army Directorate General of Public Information, ‘Solace: Everyone’s Mother Can Be Proud,’
Documentary on Operation Solace (1993, Available at ADFA Library).
66 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 117.
67 Ibid., 119-122; Lieutenant W.R.A. Bowyer, ‘Somalia Engineer Support,’ Combat Arms Jour-
nal, Issue 2, 1993, 25.
68 David Hurley, ‘An Application of the Law of Armed Conflict: Operation Solace,’ in: Hugh
Smith (ed.), The Force of Law: International Law and the Land Commander (Canberra 1994)
185.
69 ‘Mission command’ as a warfighting command philosophy is primarily attributed to the
notes to chapter seven 483
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 483
German military. Auftragstaktik meant ‘directive control’ and was opposed to Befehlstaktik,
a style of command which essentially meant control by detailed order. Its early develop-
ment was rooted in German tactics at the end of the First World War and further devel-
oped in the Second World War. 
70 United States Military Academy, West Point, Department of History, History of Revolution-
ary Warfare, Volume IV: British Experience: ‘Keeping the Peace’ (West Point – New York 1971)
4-5.
71 Although the particularities of US culture provide no sufficient explanation, the tenden-
cy in public life in the United States to warn for all sorts of eventualities and to prescribe
in meticulous detail what not to do – which seems related to the claims-culture of the
late-twentieth-century American society – appear to hamper ‘mission command’ within
the US military.  
72 Based on conversation with Alan Ryan, LWSC, Canberra, September 2002.
73 Diary entry by Caligary, 2 March 1993 as quoted in Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 126.
74 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 104-105.
75 Ibid., 109. 
76 Peter Kieseker, ‘Relationships Between Non-Governmental Organizations and Multination-
al Forces in the Field,’ in Hugh Smith (ed.), Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future (Can-
berra 1993) 74; Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 129-130.
77 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 108, 125.
78 Ibid., 155-156.
79 Ibid., 159-160; Stanton, Somalia on Five Dollars a Day, 169.
80 McTavish, ‘Rifle Platoon Command Experience,’ 15.
81 Private letter by Hurley to his family, 11 February 1993, AWM, Hurley Papers.
82 Hurley, ‘Operation Solace,’ 30.
83 Private letter by Hurley to his family, 20 March 1993, AWM, Hurley Papers; Breen, A Lit-
tle Bit of Hope, 131.
84 W. Traynor and M.J. Kelly, ‘The Australian Army and its Role in Assisting other Nations
to Build, 1973–1995,’ in: David Horner ed., Armies and Nation Building (1995) 62.
85 Nevertheless, some Australian military personnel did long for more conventional infantry
work. One lieutenant thought his job would be easier if an open war was declared. ‘At
least we would feel free to act as an Army should, rather than as a police force which is
what it feels like at the moment.’ Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 336, 105.
86 Hurley, ‘An Application of the Law of Armed Conflict,’ 185; Michael Kelly, ‘Legal Regimes
and Law Enforcement on Peace Operations,’ 197.
87 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 109.
88 Hurley, ‘Operation Solace,’ 30; Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 142-143.
89 Kelly, ‘Legal Regimes and Law Enforcement on Peace Operations,’ 200. In Bardera, US
Marine Corps Colonel Bedard seized and burned a large shipment of khat late Decem-
ber, only to find out that this was like destroying a shipment of tea to the British. Khat
is a mild narcotic leaf chewed by the locals. The raid caused quite some embarrassment
as the Marine colonel was obliged to compensate the drug-traffickers in dollars. Dawson,
The US Marines in Somalia, chapter 5.
90 McTavish, ‘Rifle Platoon Command Experience,’ 15.
91 In March 1993, the NGO community wrote a letter to commend the Australians for their
actions. Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-11. This letter is also mentioned in Breen, A Little Bit
of Hope. Patrick Vercammen, a Belgian civilian UNOSOM field officer in Baidoa also
regarded them the best peacekeepers he met in all his postings as an NGO worker in
Africa. He contrasted their behavior with the bluntness of US Marines in executing orders.
Patrick Vercammen in interview with author (Brussels, 12 June 2003).
92 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 339.
93 During the previous decades the Australian military had participated in various United
484 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 484
Nations peace operations with support units, but no substantial combat units had been
deployed. For an overview of Australian peacekeeping experiences, see Lieutenant Colonel
N.F. James, ‘A Brief History of Australian Peacekeeping,’ Australian Defence Force Journal,
no. 104 (January and February 1994) 3-18.
94 McBean, ‘Taking Comfort from Solace,’ 16. Also Lieutenant McTavish wrote, ‘[o]peration
Solace was a rewarding experience for me personally and professionally.’ McTavish, ‘Rifle
Platoon Command Experience,’ 15. 
95 Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations
in Malaya and Borneo 1950-1966 (Sydney 1996). 
96 Michael Evans, Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine, 1972-
Present (Land Warfare Studies Centre, Study Paper no. 301; Canberra 1999) 7.
97 Ibid., 9.
98 Lieutenant General John M. Sanderson, Command at the Operational Level (Presentation
to the Australian Command and Staff College, Queenscliff, 26 June 2000); Evans, For-
ward from the Past, 73.
99 Like most of the European armed forces, the Australians were unable to provide expedi-
tionary land forces capable of higher level offensive operations during the Gulf crisis of
1990-1991.
100 Evans, Forward from the Past, 20-22, 36-37.
101 Hurley, ‘An Application of the Laws of Armed Conflict,’ 181.
102 Interview with Australian Army Warrant Officer Paul Angus in Somalia 1993. Australia
Army Directorate General of Public Information, ‘Solace: Everyone’s Mother Can Be Proud,’
Documentary on Operation Solace (1993, Available at ADFA Library).
103 McBean, ‘Taking Comfort from Solace,’ 17.
104 In retrospect, Hurley mentioned counterinsurgency various times in relation to the oper-
ations in Somalia. Hurley, ‘Testimony to Joint Standing Committee Inquiry on Australia’s
Participation in Peacekeeping (JCS Inquiry), Official Hansard Transcript (8 April 1994)
531; Hurley, ‘Operation Solace,’ 30; Hurley, ‘An Application of the Law of Armed Con-
flict,’ 180. In this last article Hurley wrote: ‘The operation was conducted in a similar
manner to counterinsurgency operations: establish a secure base and expand in steps to
establish controlled areas.’ This is the only explicit reference Hurley makes to counterin-
surgency principles as they were codified from the 1960s. Kelly wrote: ‘The appropriate
strategy applied by the Australian commanders was derived from a rich vein of received
wisdom in the Australian Army based on a wealth of experiences in such circumstances.
The circumstances in fact bore a close relationship to counterinsurgency or guerrilla war-
fare. The strategy therefore was to include, as an essential element, effective civil affairs.
Australian experience in the years since World War II brought home the importance of
civil affairs, particularly when operating in environments where the opposing elements
are difficult to distinguish from the community and where a sensitivity to, and the sup-
port of, the community is essential to achieving success. This experience includes con-
flicts in Malaya, Vietnam and Borneo and then an array of peace operations.’ Although
his suggestions of the applicability of such traditions and concepts are correct, he fails to
explain how counterinsurgency and civil affairs were used by the Australians as concepts.
Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-4. See also Kelly, ‘Legitimacy and the Public Security Function,’
420. Also Patman makes a reference to counterinsurgency without explaining if or how
its principles were consciously applied. Robert Patman, ‘Beyond ‘the Mogadishu Line’:
Some Australian Lessons for Managing Intra-State Conflicts’, Small Wars and Insurgen-
cies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring 2001) 62-63.
105 United States Military Academy, Westpoint, Department of History, History of Revolution-
ary Warfare, Volume IV, British Experience: ‘Keeping the Peace’ (West Point – New York
1971) 4-5.
106 Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency (Hong Kong 1990) xi.
notes to chapter seven 485
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 485
107 Hurley, ‘An Application of the Law of Armed Conflict,’ 180. 
108 Larry Cable, ‘Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Peace-
keeping Post Cold War,’ Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Autumn 1993) 229.
109 Hurley, ‘An Application of the Law of Armed Conflict,’ 184. See also Hurley, ‘Operation
Solace,’ 31; Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-6.
110 Also Oakley was convinced that ‘the Australians came much better prepared.’ Robert B.
Oakley in an interview with the author (Washington, DC, 21 October 2003). The presump-
tion of a preconceived Australian plan for such institution building activities found its
way into a number of articles: Robert Patman, ‘Disarming Somalia: The Contrasting For-
tunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers During United Nations Intervention,
1992-1993,’ African Affairs (October 1997); Robert Patman, ‘Beyond ‘the Mogadishu Line’’:
Some Australian Lessons for Managing Intra-State Conflicts’, Small Wars and Insurgen-
cies, Vol. 12, No.1 (Spring 2001). Martin Ganzglass, Letter to the Editor, World View, Vol.
8., No. 2 (Spring 1995) 2. (As quoted in Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-34n111; Ganzglass, ‘The
Restoration of the Somali Justice System,’ 27. 
111 Kelly, Peace Operations, Chapter 7, 8-6.
112 Kelly suggested that restoring the Somali police force was ‘part of efforts to meet the
Hague Regulations,’ that obligated an occupation force to restore law and order. Kelly,
Peace Operations, 8-12.
113 W. Hays Parks (Special Assistant to the Judge Advocate General of the Army,
Washington, DC) ‘International Humanitarian Law in Multinational Operations: How do
Multinational Forces work within Constraints set by Differing Commitments of Individ-
ual States?,’ Presentation at EAPC Workshop on International Humanitarian Law and
Multinational Forces (London, United Kingdom, 20-21 November 2000). 
114 Hurley, ‘Operation Solace,’ 30: ‘As the stability and security levels in the [Humanitarian
Relief Sector] improved the civil-military operations gained greater importance as attempts
were made to re-establish the law and order system of the country.’
115 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 189-190, 432n1; Hurley, ‘An Application of the Law of Armed
Conflict,’ 181.
116 According to Kelly, ‘the genocidal campaign against the Ranhanweyn people of the Bay
region was well on the way to succeeding.’ Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-2.
117 Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-12; Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 206.
118 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 206-207.
119 Zinni in interview in the PBS Frontline documentary ‘Ambush in Mogadishu’ (Posted on
PBS Online, September 1998). Zinni talks of the surprisingly cordial relations he and
Oakley had with Aideed during the initial months of Operation Restore Hope.
120 Former police commander Ahmed Jama argued that in Mogadishu ‘the better people were
silenced by the gun.’ Ganzglass, ‘The Restoration of the Somali Justice System,’ 24. 
121 According to Patman, ‘the Australians embarked upon a process of ‘bottom-up’ political
reconstruction’ by fostering the third, new wing of the SDM. ‘This caused problems with
UN, who stuck to a top-down approach.’ Robert Patman, ‘Disarming Somalia: The Con-
trasting Fortunes of United States and Australian Peacekeepers During United Nations
Intervention, 1992-1993,’ African Affairs (October 1997) 7.
122 Captain Tony Anetts (Administrative Support Officer), Diary Entry 1, March 1993, AWM
Archive, Private Records Collection, PR 00286; idem, 29 March 1993: ‘On 26 March [...]
I went out on a Counter Intelligence task. We accompanied 2x int Sgts as close protec-
tion, to speak to the SDM and SLA. The SDM were very helpful and really appear to want
to turn Somalia around.’
123 Life and Peace Institute, Horn of Africa Program, Local Administrative Structures in Soma-
lia: A Case Study of the Bay Region (Nairobi, June 1995). ‘The Boonka [Baidoa] meeting
was extremely successful and represents a landmark in inter-riverine history. A unifica-
tion was obtained between all the clans participating and a new chairman of SDM was
486 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 486
unanimously elected. The meeting also appointed a committee of clan leaders to be in
charge of the daily affairs of the areas under control.’ Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-6n.
124 Private letter by Hurley to his family, 20 March 1993, AWM, Hurley Papers. 
125 ‘The UN had o direct input into the Group’s activities although the view of the human-
itarian assistance officer were frequently sought.’ Hurley, ‘Operation Solace,’ 29. 
126 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 211.
127 Ibid., 210; Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-5, 6. 
128 ‘The United States, Italy, and France had military police personnel and units. Each of
these nations used its MPs differently in support of ASF. Police officers in the ASF were
most effective when integrated as equal partners into a military commander’s strategy for
providing security.’ Thomas and Spataro, ‘Peacekeeping and Policing in Somalia,’ 198n50. 
129 RACMP Sergeant P.J. Watson (Commander 1st Military Police Company) to Commander
Australian Forces Somalia, Post Operation Report Operation Solace, May 1993.
130 Thomas and Spataro, ‘Peacekeeping and Policing in Somalia,’ 196. Spataro cooperated
with UNOSOM officer Lynn Thomas on police reconstruction in Somalia in 1993.
131 There is general consensus that the United States and the UN are both to blame for the
failure to sufficiently support the re-creation of a national police force. See: Thomas and
Spataro, ‘Peacekeeping and Policing,’ 187.
132 Martin Ganzglass in interview with the author (Washington, DC, 20 October 2003). See
also: Ganzglass, ‘The Restoration of the Somali Penal System,’ 25-29. For the daily cost
of US operations in Somalia, see: George J. Church, ‘Mission Half Accomplished: Hard
Lessons from Mogadishu as Clinton Pursues Military Intervention in Bosnia,’ Time Mag-
azine, 17 May 1993.
133 Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 91; Oakley’s account found its
way into Robert M. Perito, Where’s the Lone Ranger When You Need Him? America’s Search
for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC 2004) 103.
134 Ganzglass, ‘The Restoration of the Somali Penal System,’ 24, 38n19.
135 Martin Ganzglass in interview with the author (Washington, DC, 20 October 2003). See
also Ganzglass, Letter to the Editor, World View, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 1995) 3. Ganzglass
wrote: ‘In all the zones controlled by the Marines and the US Army, there were no organ-
ized programs to work with local councils and rebuild courts and police stations or to
train and equip the police. The US regarded such efforts as ‘mission creep’.
136 ‘I’d say that in five of every six of them, including Mogadishu, the police performed effec-
tively.’ The ASF was established in sixteen different cities and towns. Robert B. Oakley,
‘The Urban Area during Support Missions, Case Study: Mogadishu, The Strategic Level’
(Presentation for RAND Conference), in: Russ Glenn (ed.), Capital Preservation: Preparing
for Urban Operations in the Twenty-First Century (Proceedings of the RAND Arroyo-
TRADOC-MCWL-OSD Urban Operations Conference, March 22-23, 2000) 336. 
137 This comment was attributed by the Refugee Policy Group to Ambassador David Shin,
in charge of Somali affairs in the State Department. Quoted in Ganzglass, ‘The Restora-
tion of the Somali Penal System,’ 39n31. 
138 Thomas and Spataro, ‘Peacekeeping and Policing in Somalia,’ 213-214. Oakley considered
Mogadishu, Baidoa, Huddur, Marka and Belet Weyne the most successful ASF examples.
For the Ambassador’s account see Oakley, ‘The Urban Area during Support Missions,’
335; Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 91.
139 Hurley, ‘Testimony to Joint Standing Committee Inquiry on Australia’s Participation in
Peacekeeping (JCS Inquiry), Official Hansard Transcript (8 April 1994) 535. As cited in
Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-5.
140 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 208-9:
141 Private letter by Hurley to his family, 12 February 1993, AWM, Hurley Papers.
142 Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-11, 12. February is also mentioned as the start for the ASF in
Baidoa in: Private letter by Hurley to his family, AWM, Hurley Papers.
notes to chapter seven 487
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 487
143 All material support was hampered by US legislation that prohibited its military from
supporting foreign police services outside the Western Hemisphere (see previous chap-
ter).
144 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 213; Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-12, 13.
145 Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-15.
146 Eighty policemen were placed in Baidoa, forty in Buurkhaba and twenty each in of the
other six major towns. Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-13.
147 Kelly, ‘Legal Regimes and Law Enforcement on Peace Operations,’ 197; private letter by
Hurley to his family, 24 April 1993, AWM, Hurley Papers. Hurley wrote: ‘The activity
level has slowed down considerably over here. Most locals are getting on with life. The
Battalion had become very much a police force in town, arresting criminals etc. We are
still patrolling in the outer towns.’
148 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 218, 130-131.
149 Ibid., 145.
150 Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-13.
151 In March, Breen writes, ‘[t]here appeared to be little chance of creating an impartial police
force.’ He called the ASF ‘ineffectual’ in this regard. ‘If the SDM factions had been given
their way, the focus of the ASF enforcement duties would have been on tax collection, and
possibly the elimination of political opponents…’ Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 213, 348-9.
152 Vercammen in an interview with the author (Brussels, 12 June 2003). Vercammen, who
was running UNOSOM’s post in Baidoa all by himself, hardly recalled his involvement
in police reconstruction, indicating that this was primarily an Australian military activity.
153 According to Kelly the CID was ‘working independently the time the Australians left.’ 
Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-20, 21. 
154 In Oakley’s account, which has been copied since, there was also substantial progress
toward ‘the beginnings of a court and prison system’ in Mogadishu and other locations.
See Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 91. This view is echoed in
Perito, Where Is the Lone Ranger when You Need Him? 102. Clarke, Ganzglass, Thomas
and Spataro, all of whom were present in Somalia in 1993, saw little evidence thereof.
In correspondence with Karin von Hippel, Clarke told her that only two Somalis were
detained in Mogadishu prison when the last Marines left the city on 4 May 1993. Von
Hippel, Democracy by Force, 73. See also Thomas and Spataro, ‘Peacekeeping and Polic-
ing in Somalia,’ 214. Ganzglass, ‘The Restoration of the Somali Penal System’; Walter
Clarke, ‘The Political Component: The Missing Vital Element in US Intervention Plan-
ning,’ Parameters, Autumn 1996. 
155 F.M. Lorenz, ‘Will the Rule of Law Replace the Law of the Gun?,’ Washington State Bar
News, February 1994, 19. As referred to in Ganzglass, ‘The Restoration of the Somali
Penal System,’ 39n26. Reliability of former legal personnel was problematic, as many
unqualified judges had been appointed on political grounds in the latter years of the Barre
regime.
156 Ganzglass, ‘The Restoration of the Somali Penal System,’ 25; Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-
37, 8-15.
157 Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-15. 
158 Ibid., 8-16. See also Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 212-13.
159 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 218-219.
160 Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-18. For his up-beat account of the functioning of the court sys-
tem Kelly refers to his own observations and a report by Patrick Vercammen to UNO-
SOM dated 21 March 1993.
161 Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-23; Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 136; Hurley wrote in a letter to
his wife just before the news of the release of Warsame broke: ‘We have had some recent
success in capturing bandit leaders and have one more in our sights.’ Private letter by
Hurley to his family, 20 March 1993, AWM, Hurley Papers.
488 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 488
162 RACMP Sergeant P.J. Watson (Commander 1st Military Police Company) to Commander
Australian Forces Somalia, Post Operation Report Operation Solace, May 1993, 26-31; Post
Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-22, 23.
163 When Jess was apprehended by UNITAF in February, a political decision was made not
to prosecute him, even though there was ample evidence of his crimes, such as the mass
killing of elders prior to UNITAF’s arrival. Kelly, Peace Operations, 7-35, 36.
164 Kelly, ‘Legal Regimes and Peace Operations,’ 200; Watson, Post Operation Report Oper-
ation Solace, 33.
165 Thomson’s account in Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 137.
166 Watson, Post Operation Report Operation Solace, 33; Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-28.
167 Watson, Post Operation Report Operation Solace, 34-35; Contrary to Somali law, Gutaale’s
appeals panel sat the day after the trial, instead of giving the defence the required fifteen
days preparation period. Court officials allegedly feared that they could not hold Gutaale
in jail for the prescribed period. United States Department of State, Somali Human Rights
Practices 1993 (1 January 1994). 
168 Stanton, Somalia on Five Dollars a Day, 162. 
169 Colonel Mellor reconfirmed this in: W.J.A. Mellor, ‘Somalia – A Catalyst for Change in
the Command and Control of UN Operations’ in Hugh Smith (ed.), International Peace-
keeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience (Canberra: Australian Defence Force Acad-
emy 1994) 163.
170 Abdullah A. Mahamoud, State Collapse and Post-Conflict Developments in Africa: The Case
of Somalia, 1960-2001 (unpublished dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 2002).
171 Breen, A Little Bit of Hope, 223.
172 American Forces Somalia, After Action Report, 100-103.
173 Kelly, Peace Operations, 8-35, 36.
174 Thomas and Spataro, ‘Peacekeeping and Policing in Somalia,’ 214. Somalis who attend-
ed a 1995 Princeton University conference on the UN intervention in Somalia confirmed
that the Australian approach in the Bay region was very successful when compared to the
efforts in other regions of Somalia.
175 Patrick Vercammen addressed Oakley’s reaction to this remark in interview with the
author; George J. Church, ‘Mission Half Accomplished: Hard Lessons from Mogadishu
as Clinton Pursues Military Intervention in Bosnia,’ Time Magazine, 17 May 1993. Andrew
Purvis was Time’s Africa Bureau chief at the time. 
176 A crucial problem after May was that UNOSOM II’s operational tempo was far lower than
that of the US-led force. UNITAF forces were by and large high-quality troops, while the
quality of the contingents during UNOSOM II went down. This was not simply a mat-
ter of Western or non-Western troops. The UNITAF contingents from Botswana and Zim-
babwe were highly respected. The quality of some national contingents decreased as coun-
tries such as Pakistan replaced their elite units such as the 6th Battalion Punjab Regi-
ment with inferior units. Meanwhile many of the Western troops were under strong
restrictions as to what kinds of activities they could legally engage in. Bullock, Peace by
Committee, 37; United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report, 61-62.
177 UNSCR 814 noted that it was to set up ‘transitional government institutions and consen-
sus on basic principles and steps leading to the establishment of representative demo-
cratic institutions.’
178 Clarke, ‘Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates,’ 9. Clarke argues that all the major Secu-
rity Council Resolutions on Somalia, including the initial draft for UNSRC 814 on nation
building, were written by US officials, mainly in the Pentagon.
179 John T. Fishel, Civil-Military Operations in the New World, 197-198. Fishel argued that unity
of effort was lost not because American forces operated partly under UN command as
has been argued, but because ‘the US military refused to allow the elaborate command
and control structure it had created to work in the way intended.’
notes to chapter seven 489
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 489
180 Walter S. Clarke, ‘Testing the World’s Resolve in Somalia,’ Parameters, Vol. 23 (Winter
1993-94) 55.
181 Oakley, ‘The Urban Area during Support Missions,’ 350.
182 Between 1997 and 1999 there were several periods of intensive fighting in the central
Bay and Bakool regions, where the newly created Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA),
with substantial Ethiopian military support, sought to dislodge Hussein Aideed’s SNA
militias from Baidoa town. Hussein Aideed, ironically a former US Marine, succeeded
his father after his death. Amnesty International Country Report on Somalia, 1998 and
1999; Kieran Murray, ‘Latest fighting in Somalia may set ground for peace,’ Reuters, 7
July 1999; ‘Civil war heating up in Somalia again,’ Associated Press, 7 July 1999.
183 Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, xii. 
184 Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, 31.
185 Clarke, ‘Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention.’; Michael G. MacKinnon,
The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy under Clinton: A Fairweather Friend? (London and
Portland 2000) 119. 
186 For an early expression of this concern, see James H. Baker, ‘Peace Missions Dull the
Army’s Combat Edge,’ Army Times, December 6, 1993, p. 37. By the turn of the century,
other voices were heard claiming the exact opposite. Charles Moskos, ‘Peacekeeping
Improves Combat Readiness,’ Wall Street Journal, 26 April 2001. See also Edith B. Wilkie,
Beth C. DeGrasse and Richard W. Roan, A Force for Peace and Security: US and Allied Com-
mander’s Views of the Military Role in Peace Operations and the Impact on Terrorism of States
in Conflict (Report, Peace Through Law Education Fund 2002).
187 Clarke and Herbst, Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,’ Foreign Affairs,
(March /April 1996) 70.
Chapter 8
1 Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy (Washington, DC
2000); Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York, 1998); David Halberstam, War in a
Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (New York etc. 2002) 358.
2 The estimated figure of between 200,000 and 250,000 fatalities during the war is com-
monly used in the media, but has been disputed and other unofficial UN figures that put
the death toll at half that number. A report by Sarajevo’s Investigation and Documenta-
tion Center, headed by Mirsad Tokaca, scaled down previous generally accepted figures
for war losses in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1992-95 war. ‘We can now say with almost
absolute certainty that the number is going to be more than 100,000 but definitely less
than 150,000,’ Tokaca, an ethnic Muslim, said in an interview with Reuters. Reuters, Alert-
Net, 10 December 2004. (Available online at http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/).
3 The General Framework Agreement, Annex 1A: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the
Peace Settlement.
4 In the winter of 1995-1996 the size of the deployment into Bosnia was 55,000, with an
additional 5,000 support personnel in Croatia. The US contributed some 20,000 US
troops, the British 12,000 Brits and the Dutch 2,100.
5 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1031, paragraph 14 (15 December 1995). 
6 Ivo Daalder in an interview for PBS Frontline Documentary, ‘Give War a Chance: Exam-
ining the Gulf Between What Diplomats Want and the Military is Prepared to Deliver.’
(PBS Online 1999, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/mili-
tary/etc/daalder.html).
7 PBS Frontline interview with Daalder. R. Craig Nation called the exit date a ‘polite fiction,’
which ‘the architects of the project could hardly have taken seriously.’ R. Craig Nation,
War in the Balkans, 1991-2002 (unpublished report, US Army War College, August 2003)
490 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 490
194. (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/warbalkn/warbalkn.pdf); Elizabeth
Cousins and Michael Doyle, ‘Dayton Accord’s Dangerous Duelling Missions,’ The Chris-
tian Science Monitor, Vol. 88, No. 21 (26 December 1995). 
8 Nation, War in the Balkans, 1991-2002, 194. 
9 PBS Frontline interview with Daalder. Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of
America’s Bosnia Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2000).
10 Elizabeth Cousins and Michael Doyle, ‘Dayton Accord’s Dangerous Duelling Missions,’
Christian Science Monitor, Vol. 88, No. 21 (26 December 1995) 23.
11 Richard M. Swain, Neither War Nor Not War: Army Command in Europe During the Time
of Peace Operations: Tasks Confronting US AREUR Commanders, 1994-2000 (NDU SSI May
2003) 7. 
12 The steering board members of the Peace Implementation Council were the United States,
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, Canada, Italy, Japan, the Presidency of
the European Union, the European Commission, and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC), which was represented by Turkey. (See OHR website at
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/).
13 For a critique of the lack of shared strategic vision on reintegrating Bosnia, see ICG Balkans
Report No. 121, Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery (29 November 2001).
14 Leighton W. Smith, ‘NATO’s IFOR in Action: Lessons from the Bosnian Peace Support
Operations,’ Strategic Forum, No. 154 (January 1999). 
15 Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London 1998) 130-131.
16 Pauline Neville-Jones, ‘Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia,’ Survival, vol. 38,
no. 4 (Winter 1996-1997). 
17 Swain, Neither War Nor Not War, 17; Holbrooke, To End a War, 361-2. 
18 Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (Oxford
2001) 55.
19 Robert Gravelle, ‘The Role of SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ Remarks at the 47th
Atlantic Treaty Association General Assembly, 5 October 2001; In retrospect Jouwlan
seemed to agree, promoting an integrated civil-military command structure under NATO.
George Joulwan and Christopher Shoemaker, Civil-Military Cooperation in the Prevention
of Deadly Conflict: Implementing Agreements in Bosnia and Beyond (New York: Carnegie,
1998). 
20 In Holbrooke’s account ‘all the [US] civilians in the meetings’ prior to Dayton expected
the military to ‘lean forward’ as the operation unfolded. Holbrooke, To End a War, 223.
In an interview for the PBS Frontline documentary ‘Give War a Chance’ Holbrooke argued
that Smith ‘interpreted his assignment in a greatly different way than those of us who
had written the Dayton Agreements envisaged. Not just me, but Secretary Christopher
and our entire team.’ Ivo Daalder in his interview for PBS Frontline confirms Holbrooke’s
account.
21 The General Framework Agreement, Annex 1A, VI-5: Agreement on the Military Aspects
of the Peace Settlement. Holbrooke points at Shalikashvilli for suggesting the silver bul-
let clause. Holbrooke, To End a War, 222-223. In Wesley Clark’s account, the silver bul-
let clause was suggested by Madeleine Albright, ambassador to the UN. Clark, Waging
Modern War, 58-59. 
22 Clark, Waging Modern War, 58.
23 Ibid., 59. Clarke cited the paragraph VI-3 from The General Framework Agreement, Annex
1A, as the silver bullet clause: ‘The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR Comman-
der shall have the authority, without interference or permission of any Party, to do all the
Commander judges necessary and proper. […] The violating Party shall be subject to mil-
itary action by the IFOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance with
the Annex.’ Clark wrote: ‘Under our agreement, we were seeking to limit the obligations
of the military – you can’t do everything with military forces – but to give the command-
er unlimited authority to accomplish these limited obligations.’
notes to chapter eight 491
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 491
24 Holbrooke, To End a War, 328.
25 US Army officer in conversation with author. ‘Snuffy Smith’ was an American hillbilly-
type comic-strip figure from the 1940s.
26 After his retirement Jouwlan wrote in 1998: ‘But SFOR – without a more imaginative
approach to civilian-military interaction – will be no more successful in achieving inter-
national objectives by itself in Bosnia than was IFOR.’ George Joulwan and Christopher
Shoemaker, Civil-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict: Implementing
Agreements in Bosnia and Beyond (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Dead-
ly Conflict, 1998) 25. There is a passage in Clark’s book that suggests that also Joulwan
before him tried, but failed to take more direct control of operations in Bosnia in order
to move the operation forward. Clark, Waging Modern War, 86. 
27 Robert Gravelle, coordinator and senior adviser on police matters, ‘The Role of SFOR in
Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ Remarks at the 47th Atlantic Treaty Association General Assem-
bly, 5 October 2001. 
28 Colonel Greg Fontenot (ret.), ‘The Urban Area During Stability Missions, Case Study:
Bosnia Herzegovina, Part 1,’ in: Russel W. Glenn (ed.), Capital Preservation: Preparing for
Urban Operations in the Twenty-First Century (RAND 2000) 203.
29 Holbrooke, To End a War, 338. Holbrooke wrote: ‘It was almost as if they had an implic-
it understanding with the IFOR command: we will not attack you forces if you leave us
alone to pursue an ethnically divided country.’
30 The so-called ‘grey zone’ of operation included maintaining civil law and order, discover-
ing and prevent crimes (serious crimes such as murder and rape, arson, or property relat-
ed crime such as theft and plundering), riot control and large scale civil disturbances,
intervening against armed ‘gangs,’ either criminally or politically motivated but often
mixed, maintaining order and security during an election process, monitoring and assist-
ing in disarming civilians, escorting civilians in violence-prone areas, and protecting
refugees in refugee camps from armed elements. 
31 Of the total figure of 44,750 policemen provided by the UN IPTF advance mission, 29,750
were working in Muslim-controlled areas, 3,000 in Croat areas and 12,000 in the Repub-
lika Srpska. The Muslim-Croat Federation agreed to reduce their forces to 11,500. The
Republika Srpska, however, refused to participate in process. An IFOR study conducted
in 1996 concluded that eighty percent of the Federation police forces had less than six
years of policing experience. The figures from the UN advance mission are mentioned
in Michael J. Dziedzic and Andrew Bair, ‘Bosnia and the International Police Task Force,’
in: Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, Eliot M. Goldberg (eds.), Policing the New World
Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security (National Defense University, The Institute
for National Strategic Studies 1998) 50. These numbers differ substantially from those
provided by Human Rights Watch, which wrote in a report that ‘[w]ith some 20,000 mem-
bers in the Bosnian-Croat Federation, and between 10,000 and 50,000 in Republika Srp-
ska at the time of the IPTF’s deployment in early 1996, the police force needed to be
reduced by at least half.’ Human Rights Watch, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Beyond Restraint,
Politics and the Policing Agenda of the United Nations International Police Task Force, HRW
Publications, Vol. 10, No. 5 (D) June 1998. 
32 US Army Colonel K. Greer, ‘The Urban Area during Stability Missions, Case Study: Bosnia-
Herzegovina,’ in: Russel W. Glenn (ed.), Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Opera-
tions in the Twenty First Century (RAND 2000) 223.
33 The IPTF was established by UN Security Council resolution 1035 (1995) and was desig-
nated as part of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The IPTF was
the one of the three UNMIBH components. Its mandate was to (1) monitor, observe, and
inspect the parties’ law enforcement activities and facilities; (2) advise governmental author-
ities on how to organize effective civilian law enforcement agencies; (3) advise and train
law enforcement personnel; and (4) investigate and report on any human rights abuses
492 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 492
by Bosnia’s police. IPTF’s mandate does not include the power of arrest. The name UN
CIVPOL was a term consciously avoided. 
34 High Commissioner for Human Rights, Field Guide for IPTF and UNTAES CIVPOL (1996).
35 See Holbrooke, To End a War, 251-252.
36 Ibid, 252. Like Holbrooke, specialist in international policing Robert Perito mentions ‘Euro-
pean countries’ insisting on a more restrictive IPTF mandate. See: Andrew F. Tully, ‘Koso-
vo and Bosnia: A Tale of Two Police Forces,’ RFE/RL Balkan Report, Vol. 5, No. 64, 11
September 2001. 
37 The local parties involved in the negotiations were sufficiently distrustful of the other not
to have raised objections to a police force with the authority to arrest persons who were
violating the agreement.
38 Holbrooke, To End a War, 221.
39 Dziedzic and Bair, ‘Bosnia and the International Police Task Force,’ in: Robert B. Oakley,
Michael J. Dziedzic, Eliot M. Goldberg eds., Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Oper-
ations and Public Security (National Defense University, The Institute for National Strate-
gic Studies 1998) 50. 
40 Holbrooke, To End a War, 251, 362.
41 SACEUR Joulwan said in December 1995: ‘IFOR will not act as a police force. That func-
tion will be the responsibility of the civilian side of the peace implementation operation.
IFOR personnel will have the authority to detain any persons who interfere with the IFOR
mission …’ Joulwan in Department of Defense Press Briefing; US Department of Defense,
‘Operation Joint Endeavor Fact Sheet No. 004-B (December 7, 1995).
42 The General Framework Agreement, Annex 1A, VI-3d stated that IFOR, within the lim-
its of its capabilities, shall have right ‘to observe and prevent interference with the move-
ment of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropri-
ately to deliberate violence to life and person.’
43 In Haiti early revisions of the Rules of Engagement did authorize members of the Multi-
national Force to intercede to halt Haitian-on-Haitian violence after the US forces there
received much negative publicity for looking on as someone was beaten to death in the
streets by an angry mob.
44 Stefan Ekecrantz in e-mail correspondence with author, 7 January 2004. 
45 W.B. Kroon and J.B.C. van der Veer, ‘Rules of Engagement: Ervaringen van Nederlandse
Land- en Luchtmachtmilitairen Tijdens UNPROFOR and IFOR,’ Militaire Spectator, Vol.
166, No. 10 (1997) 465.
46 Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO), Rules of Engagement Handbook for Judge
Advocates (1 May 2000) 3-20. In 1999 the US Army 10th Mountain Division included the
following language on their ROE card as part of SFOR: ‘You may use the minimum force
necessary, including deadly force, to stop and detain persons committing, or about to com-
mit, in your presence, serious criminal acts upon other persons (for example murder,
rape, and serious assault).’ 
47 Paul Johnston, ‘Doctrine Is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behavior of Armies,’
Parameters (Autumn 2000) 30-39. As far as war fighting is concerned, Johnston argues
that the way armies have fought is more a function of their culture than of their doc-
trine. 
48 Clark, Waging Modern War, 55.
49 Pauline Neville-Jones wrote that ‘[n]o one wanted IFOR soldiers to get involved in these
[policing tasks].’ Neville-Jones, ‘Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia,’ 52. 
50 General Framework Agreement for Peace, Annex 1A, II-1: ‘Each Party shall ensure that
all personnel and organizations with military capability under its control or within terri-
tory under its control, including armed civilian groups, national guards, army reserves,
military police, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs Special Police (MUP) (hereinafter
‘Forces’) comply with this Annex.’
notes to chapter eight 493
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 493
51 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, 336. Holbrooke’s account is based the eyewitness
account of US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gelbhard and Deputy High Represen-
tative Michael Steiner.
52 Richard K. Sele, ‘Civil-Military Operations in the Post-War Sarajevo Region,’ Low Intensi-
ty Conflict and Law Enforcement Vol. 8, No. 1 (1999), 87-118; Kevin F. McCarrol and Don-
ald R. Zoufal, ‘Transition of the Sarajevo Suburbs,’ Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer 1997)
50-53. McCarroll and Zoufal, both civil affairs officers, explain how essential this CA sup-
port was to making the IPTF operational and supporting the transition as a whole, but
fail to place this tactical success in the larger context of the dramatic developments in the
Sarajevo suburbs in March 1996. 
53 IFOR, but most of all Americans, tended to blame the IPTF. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in
March 1996: ‘It is unrealistic to envisage a civilian police operation continuing its work
without the framework of security provided by the presence of a credible international
military force.’ Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his report to the Security Council, S/1996/210
of 29 March 1996, para. 42-43; For a poignant journalist’s account of the events in Sara-
jevo in March 1996 see Greg Campbell, The Road to Kosovo, 1-23. For the number of
70,000 he refers to a UNHCR Press Briefing, 16 March 1996, Sarajevo. Other sources
mention a total of 100,000 Serbs leaving Sarajevo between from January to March.
54 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, 335-339. 
55 Admiral Smith in interview for PBS News (1 Feb 1996): ‘Unfortunately,’ the Admiral com-
plained, ‘a lot of people read our peace agreement and they interpret my job for me. And
they are very happy to tell whoever might want to listen what my job is.’
56 Ivo Daalder in PBS Frontline interview. 
57 US Army Peacekeeping Institute, SFOR Lessons Learned in Creating a Secure Environment
with Respect for the Rule of Law (Based on a Study of Bosnia, May 2000) 12.
58 Murray and Gordon, IFOR on IFOR, 83
59 Fontenot, ‘The Urban Area During Stability Missions,’ 50.
60 On 30 April 1996, the British divisional headquarters moved from Gornji Vakuf to Banja
Luka to enhance cooperation with the civilian organizations that were established in the
region’s biggest city. Christ Klep and Richard van Gilst, Van Korea tot Kosovo: De Neder-
landse Militaire Bijdrage aan Vredesoperaties (The Hague 2000) 326.
61 Murray and Gordon, IFOR on IFOR, 89. 
62 Ibid, 105.
63 Ibid, 41.  
64 US Army Peacekeeping Institute, SFOR Lessons Learned in Creating a Secure Environment
with Respect for the Rule of Law (Based on a Study of Bosnia, May 2000) 12. Colonel
Fontenot, a US brigade commander in IFOR agreed: ‘Hunkering down in base camps in
not only an ineffective way to advance the cause, but increases the risk to the troops.’
Fontenot, ‘The Urban Area During Stability Missions,’ 213.
65 Christ Klep en Richard van Gils, Van Korea tot Kosovo, 332.
66 US Army Peacekeeping Institute, SFOR Lessons Learned in Creating a Secure Environment
with Respect for the Rule of Law, 37.
67 Richard M. Swain called it naive to say, as some do, ‘civil implementation did not keep
pace with military implementation.’ Compared it to a marathon runner not keeping up
with a sprinter. Swain, Neither War Nor Not War, 50.
68 This argument was put forward by Generals Smith and Joulwan. Smith: ‘Throughout
most of 1997, the High Representative did not use his authority to enforce the parties’
compliance with the civil provisions of the Dayton Agreement. George Joulwan and Christo-
pher Shoemaker, Civil-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict: Implement-
ing Agreements in Bosnia and Beyond (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing
Deadly Conflict, 1998). 
69 PBS Frontline interview with Daalder. 
494 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 494
70 Sophia Clément, ‘The issues raised by Bosnia, and the transatlantic debate,’ Chaillot Paper,
No. 32 (Institute for Security Studies of WEU, May 1998).
71 The prerogatives of High Representative Carlos Westendorp, were increased during the
meeting of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in Sintra in May and Bonn in Decem-
ber 1997. 
72 UNTAES was a civil-military success. It had an integrated UN civil-military command
structure, dynamic leaders of both the civilian and military component, and a strong police
force. UNTAES’ only NATO contributor was Belgium. It had military means and enforce-
ment mandate similar to that of IFOR, but was not as much hampered by the national
restraints NATO countries put upon the use of their contingents in Bosnia. 
73 Dana Priest, The Mission, 50. On Clark’s balancing act between the State Department and
the Pentagon see also Swain, Neither War Nor Not War, 142. 
74 Clark, Waging Modern War, 80.
75 Swain, Neither War Nor Not War, 142. 
76 In 1997, the new British government’s support for the ICTY was in marked contrast that
provided by its predecessor. The new Foreign Minister Robin Cook authorized the Spe-
cial Air Service (SAS) to arrest indicted war criminals in the British sector and British
support for the ICTY included shared telephone intercepts and other intelligence, and
increased Britain’s financial contributions to the ICTY. Sophia Clément, ‘The issues raised
by Bosnia, and the transatlantic debate,’ Chaillot Paper, No. 32 (Institute for Security Stud-
ies of WEU, May 1998). 
77 Clarke, Waging Modern War, 65.
78 For Admiral Smith’s argument against arrests and his vision on the limited mandate, see
his interview for the PBS Frontline documentary, ‘Give War a Chance: Examining the Gulf
Between What Diplomats Want and the Military is Prepared to Deliver.’ (PBS 1999; Avail-
able online at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/guys/smith.html).
79 IFOR AFSOUTH, Transcript of Press Briefing, 12 September 1996 (Available online at
http://www.nato.int/ifor/trans/t960912a.htm).
80 Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor of International War Crimes Tribunal, in an interview
with PBS Frontline for the documentary ‘The World’s Most Wanted Man’ (PBS May 1998,
Available online at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/interviews/-
arbour.html).
81 Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO), The Judge Advocate General’s School
United States Army, Law and Military Operations in the Balkans 1995-1998: Lessons Learned
for Judge Advocates (Charlottesville, 13 November 1998) 124-125. For other accounts of IFOR
and SFOR troops ignoring the known presence of war crimes suspects see Laura Palmer
and Cristina Posa ‘The Best-Laid Plans: Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords in
the Courtroom and on the Ground,’ Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 12 (Spring 1999);
F.M. Lorenz, ‘War Criminals: Testing the Limits of Military Force,’ Joint Forces Quarterly
(Summer 1997) 59-65.
82 Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 482.
83 Calum Macdonald in House of Commons, 18 Jul 1996 The Official Report (Hansard) Col-
umn 1331. (Available online at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk).
84 Swain, Neither War Nor Not War, 50.
85 Palmer and Posa, ‘The Best-Laid Plans: Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords in
the Courtroom and on the Ground,’ 50.
86 On 17 and 18 December 1997, Dutch Army Commandos and Royal Marines specialists
with support from the Dutch battalion performed ‘Operation Iron Glance.’ Human Rights
Watch, ‘Bold Arrest Action in Bosnia Contrasts with Clinton Statement on Karadzic’ (New
York, 18 December 1997, available online at http://www.hrw.org/press97/dec/vitez.htm).
The most elaborate description of the action appeared on the website SpecialOperations.com
(‘Special Operations Forces and Bosnian War Crimes Suspects’ available at http://www.spe-
notes to chapter eight 495
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 495
cialoperations.com/Focus/warcrimes.html). For support from the Dutch SFOR battalion to
this operation, see A. Oostendorp, ‘CIMIC in an SFOR Peace Support Operation in Bosnia,’
M.T.I. Bollen, R.V.A. Janssens, H.F.M. Kirkels, J.L.M. Soeters (eds.), NL-Arms, Netherlands
Annual Review of Military Studies 2002: Civil-Military Cooperation, a Marriage of Reason
(Royal Netherlands Military Academy; Breda 2002) 109.
87 According to The Economist, the Netherlands, together with Britain and the Americans,
were the most active in funding ICTY and the most generous in sharing intelligence. ‘At
Last a Court that War Criminals Must Take Seriously,’ The Economist, 31 January 1998,
43.
88 US Army Peacekeeping Institute, SFOR Lessons Learned in Creating a Secure Environment
with Respect for the Rule of Law (Based on a Study of Bosnia, May 2000) 27.
89 Solana Pledges Tough Stand on War Criminals, RFE/RL Newsline, (22 January 1998) 30. 
90 US officials accused the French of leaking plans for Karadzic’s arrest. R. Jeffrey Smith,
‘Secret Meetings Foiled Karadzic Capture Plan: US Says French Jeopardized Mission,’
Washington Post, 23 April 1998, A1; Laura Rozen, ‘Kosovo culture clash: War criminals in
the former Yugoslavia are getting a free ride from French and American peacekeepers.’
Article published on 21 December 1999 at Salon.com. (http://www.salon.com/news/-
feature/1999/12/21/balkans/?CP=YAH&DN=110).
91 Der Spiegel, 24 September 2001, 42 (for German contributions to arrests of war crimes
suspects see also the German military website http://www.military-page.de/einheit/ksk/-
ksk_01.htm.).
92 ‘SAS Swoop on Serb Butcher,’ Daily Mail, 21 December 1999; Louise Arbour, Chief Pros-
ecutor of International War Crimes Tribunal, in an interview with PBS Frontline for the
documentary ‘The World’s Most Wanted Man’ (PBS Online May 1998).
93 For a critique of ICTY and NATO motives for arrests, see Nation, War in the Balkans,
1991-2002, 203.
94 In 1997, a conference was held on the subject of public security in peace operations at
the Institute for National Strategic Studies (National Defense University). For the proceed-
ings of this conference see: Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, Eliot M. Goldberg eds.,
Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security (National Defense
University, The Institute for National Strategic Studies 1998). For another early publica-
tion on the subject see: Espen Barth Eide, ‘Filling the Public Security Gap in Bosnia.
Reflections on the Possible Relationship between International Police Assistance and a
Post-SFOR Force,’ background paper for the CPN briefing on Post-SFOR Options for the
European Commission and Parliament, Brussels, 28 October 1997.
95 Espen Barth Eide, ‘The Public Security Gap in Modern Peace Operations,’ paper present-
ed at the ACCORD, NUPI, ISS Seminar on the role of civilian police in UN peace oper-
ations, 25-27 February 1998, Durban South Africa. See also: Espen B. Eide, Internation-
al Police Assistance and a Post-SFOR Force.’ 
96 Annika S. Hansen, although not ‘orthodox’ in her analysis of UN CivPol, writes that the
IPTF was ‘venturing dangerously close to executive policing.’ However, this judgment only
concerned executive power as far as policing the police was concerned. Annika S. Hansen,
From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations (IISS Adelphi Paper 343, 2002)
30.
97 Hansen, From Congo to Kosovo, 66
98 Swain, Neither War Nor Not War, 122-123. Only in 1997, were all illegal police checkpoints
cleared. French and US division commanders had initially opposed this new policy on
checkpoints because of ‘risk’ involved. The British were far less concerned.
99 Eide, ‘The Public Security Gap in Modern Peace Operations,’ 25-27. See also Espen B.
Eide, International Police Assistance and a Post-SFOR Force.’ 
100 Swain, Neither War Nor Not War, 50.
101 Robert Gravelle, Coordinator and Senior Adviser on Police Matters, ‘The Role of SFOR
496 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 496
in Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ Remarks at the 47th Atlantic Treaty Association General
Assembly, 5 October 2001.
102 Hansen, From Congo to Kosovo, 71. The International Crisis Group was very critical about
the use and performance of the MSU. ICG, ‘Policing the Police in Bosnia: A Further
Reform Agenda Balkans’ Report No.130 (10 May 2002) 58, f405: ‘The suggestion that
MSUs might be attached to the follow-on mission is akin to taking a bad idea and mak-
ing it worse. Analysts have always lamented the disjunction between the “inner shel” of
security provided by the police and the ‘outer shell’ provided by SFOR. This is the so-
called enforcement gap. Yet contrary to prevailing hopes in NATO circles in late 2000
and early 2001, MSUs have not been able to plug this gap, owing to their restrictive Rules
of Engagement and the reluctance of their contributing countries to see these loosened.
The impotence of the MSUs during the events surrounding the seizure of Hercegovacka
Banka confirmed this.’
103 The proposal for an international gendarmerie was first made early on by General Shal-
ishkashvili and the US military seems have remained more enthusiastic about the third
force option that Europeans. One of the American propagators of the MSU was Susan
Woodward from the Brookings Institution in Sophia Clément, ‘The issues raised by Bosnia,
and the transatlantic debate,’ Chaillot Paper, No. 32 (Institute for Security Studies of WEU,
May 1998). Also Swain was relatively positive. Swain, Neither War Nor Not War, 191-2.
104 Annika S. Hansen, From Congo to Kosovo, 67.
105 US Army Peacekeeping Institute, SFOR Lessons Learned in Creating a Secure Environment
with Respect for the Rule of Law (Report Based on a Study of Bosnia, May 2000) iii, 18. 
106 Ibid, 28n31. 
107 General Clark’s predecessor Joulwan had also tried to gain more direct control of the
operation but failed. Clark, Waging Modern War, 83-85.
108 Ibid. General Clark’s answer to objections over the loss of consent of one of the parties
and fears of troublemakers moving underground was that they were just as much trou-
ble out in the open, so you might as well confront them. 
109 Plavsic faced the hard-line Serb Tri-Presidency Member Momcilo Krajisnik, who had no
legal authority over internal policy in the Republica Sprska. Clark told the US Division
Commander David Grange that the strategic objective for the year was the reelection of
President Plavsic. The key to achieving that was control of the MUP, controlling the hard-
line media and a successful information operations program in the Republica Srpska.
Swain, Neither War Nor Not War, 158n12.
110 Plavsic held a top Bosnian Serb leadership position during the Bosnian war and was close-
ly linked to other Bosnian Serb leaders who have since been indicted for war crimes. In
December 2002, former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified that Plavsic
bore responsibility for crimes committed in Bosnia during the war, but Albright also said
that Plavsic later played an important role in Bosnia’s peace process. ( http://www.rferl.org/-
features/2002/12/17122002192321.asp); see also the ICTY website ‘Indictments and Proceed-
ings.’ (http://www.un.org/icty/cases/indictindex-e.htm).
111 Clark, Waging Modern War, 83-84, 87.
112 Ibid, 87.
113 For the most complete account of this event see Swain, Neither War Nor Not War, 148. 
114 It is likely that the IPTF was not aware of the direct political motives of the United States
and NATO behind the series of raids on police stations. Swain, Neither War Nor Not War,
149.
115 Dziedzic and Bair, ‘Bosnia and the International Police Task Force,’ 50.
116 Col Fontenot described the August 1997 actions by the Bosnian Serbs as ‘rent a mob.’
Fontenot, ‘The Urban Area During Stability Missions,’ 50.
117 For a detailed account of the events of 28 August 1997 from a military perspective see
Fontenot, ‘The Urban Area During Stability Missions.’
notes to chapter eight 497
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 497
118 Clark, Waging Modern War, 100
119 Ibid, 50.
120 International Crisis Group, ‘Dayton: Two Years on: A Review of Progress in Implement-
ing the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia,’ ICG Bosnia Project, Report No. 27 (19 Novem-
ber 1997) 7.
121 For this argument see Sophia Clément (ed.), ‘The issues raised by Bosnia, and the transat-
lantic debate,’ Chaillot Paper, No. 32 (Institute for Security Studies of WEU, May 1998);
Holbrooke, To End a War, 336. Holbrooke called SFOR support to refugee returns ‘whim-
sical.’ It took years of hard work before some belief returned in repatriation schemes by
UNHCR, whimsically supported by NATO.’ According to Human Rights Watch, [o]nly in
2000 a breakthrough occurred in the return of refugees and displaced persons: ‘For the
first time since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords ... refugees and displaced per-
sons returned in relatively large numbers to areas where they would be part of the eth-
nic minority.’ Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000 – Bosnia, 1-2. 
122 Dana Priest, The Mission, 259. 
123 Priest, The Mission, 261-262. Priest wrote that the US Army regarded a substation in Sre-
brenica too a big a drain on manpower, as ‘[i]t would take as many soldiers to guard it
as to staff it. No wonder the Muslim mayor wouldn’t move back. […] This was one of the
thousand small examples that cemented the status quo and prevented real change in
Bosnia.’
124 General George Joulwan in Department of Defense News Briefing, ‘Subject: Role Of IFOR
In Bringing Safety And Security To Bosnia’ (27 March 1996). The US Army deployed 352
CIMIC personnel to Bosnia, compared to approximately 40 French and some 50 from
other nations. Larry Wentz, (ed.), Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience (US Depart-
ment of Defense Command and Control Research Program 1997) 130. 
125 General George Joulwan in Department of Defense News Briefing, ‘Subject: Role Of IFOR
In Bringing Safety And Security To Bosnia’ (27 March 1996); PBS Online Newshour, Joul-
wan in interview with Jim Lehrer (27 March 1996. Available at http://www.pbs.org/new-
shour/bb/bosnia/joulwan_3-27.html).
126 IFOR AFSOUTH Fact Sheet, ‘Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation,’ 20 August 1996.
127 The 1998 draft of NATO AJP-09 made the following distinction. CIMIC activity: ‘A mil-
itary activity intended to support the achievement of a military mission by pursuing an
objective with the responsibility of a civilian authority, international or non-governmental
organization, or civilian activity intended to support the achievement of a civil aim by
assisting in the pursuit of a military objective.’ CIMIC operation: ‘A military operation
the primary intention and effect of which is to support a civilian authority, population,
international or non-governmental organization, the effect of which is to assist in the pur-
suit of a military objective.’ This doctrinal distinction was dropped in 2001.
128 Richard K. Sele, ‘Civil-Military Operations in the Post-War Sarajevo Region,’ Low Intensi-
ty Conflict & Law Enforcement Vol. 8, No. 1 (1999), 87-118.
129 US Army Field Manual (FM) 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations (US Government Printing
Office Washington, DC, January 1993), 1-1.
130 US Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations (1994) 40. 
131 ‘The future success in military operations for the United States, however, rests on a clear
understanding that the purely military does not exist. All operations are civil military in
their basic character.’ However, the notion that political rather than military objectives
dominate, ‘had only been accepted grudgingly, if at all, by the American military.’ John
T. Fishel, Civil Military Operations in the New World, 235.
132 Lieutenant Colonel Wally Z. Walters (US Army), The Doctrinal Challenge of Winning the
Peace Against Rogue States: How Lessons from Post-World War II Germany May Inform Oper-
ations Against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (USAWC Strategic Research Project, Carlisle Bar-
racks, 9 April 2002) 27, 7 Walters analyzed the following doctrine publications: FM 27-
498 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 498
5, FM 41-15 (1954), FM 27-5, FM 41-5 (1958), FM 41-10 (1962, 1969, 1998, 2000) and JP
3-57 (2001). He wrote: ‘By 2000, FM 41-10 evolution dropped all reference to military
government, except for two pages on ‘Civil Administration in Occupied Territories’ that
identify the goal as creating effective civil government that does not threaten future peace
and stability. The pages only provide definitions.’ In the field manuals there was no con-
tent for field use, no techniques, methods or how Civil Affairs units should be employed
to execute this task. The 2001 version of JP-3-57 CMO hardly made any reference to Mil-
itary Government and Civil Administration.
133 The capabilities of US Army civil affairs were described in these words at the Special
Operations website (http://www.specialoperations.com/Army/Civil_Affairs/default.html).
134 Major J.H.J. Ouwerling, Cursus Verslag Civil Affairs Course 99/02 (US Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, 1 February 1999 – 12 March 1999).
135 Wentz, Lessons from IFOR, 131. After 1996, the IFOR CJCIMIC became Combined Joint
Civil-Military Taskforce’, also called CIMIC Taskforce.
136 Ibid., 126n23.
137 Swain, Neither War Nor Not War, 50.
138 Wentz, Lessons from IFOR, 135.
139 Ibid., Executive Summary. This notion of constraints being placed on civil affairs staff
and the lack of understanding of the its role was confirmed during various conversations
between author and US civil affairs personnel during the World Wide Civil Affairs Con-
ference in New York, June 2001. 
140 Wentz, Lessons from FOR, 135.
141 The 320-strong CIMIC staff had changed names to Combined Joint Civil Military Co-
operation Task Force (CJCMTF), or CIMIC Task Force. By 1998 half its staff was Euro-
pean and rising to 75 percent. See: The official SFOR website
(http://www.nato.int/sfor/cimic/introduction/cimic.htm).
142 Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Jacobs, ‘Civil Affairs in Peace Operations,’ Military Review
(July-August 1998) 11-16. 
143 For instance a study from the Dutch Army Section Lessons Learned concluded that ‘CIMIC
has to be flexible and as peace is gradually reestablished, the S5 [CIMIC] Section will
grow in size.’ Royal Netherlands Army, Operational Staff, Section Lesson Learned Publi-
cation, ‘CIMIC’ (2000). This notion of CIMIC was often picked up by the author in pre-
sentations and conversations with military personnel.
144 A proposal for funds directly allocated by NATO funds was cancelled. See Adam B. Sie-
gal, ‘Associating Development Projects with Military Operations: Lessons Learned from
NATO’s First Year in BiH,’ International Peacekeeping, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Autumn 2001) 105. 
145 Ibid, 108.
146 Remarks by Kevin Mannion in the Dutch documentary ‘Circus Sarajevo,’ VPRO DNW:
Rooksignalen uit de Nieuwe Wereld (6 February 2000).
147 A study into civil-military operations in Sarajevo in 1996 nominated support to the IPTF
not only as the most successful, but also most crucial in enhancing peace implementa-
tion. See Richard K. Sele, ‘Civil-Military Operations in the Post-War Sarajevo Region,’ Low
Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement Vol. 8, No. 1 (1999), 87-118. However, direct sup-
port from IFOR combat units to the IPTF during the transition of the Sarajevo suburbs
had been minimal.
148 Colonel William R. Phillips, ‘Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to peace implementation in
Bosnia,’ NATO Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Spring 1998) 22-25.
149 Joint Analysis Team, Bosnia Final Report, Chapter 6, CIMIC Command and Control. Lieu-
tenant. This document is cited in: Colonel Mark Rollo-Walker, SHAPE, Chief CIMIC Sec-
tion End of Tour Report (23 August 1999).
150 NATO Ministerial Guidance 1997 DPC-D (97); NATO Allied Joint Publication 01 (AJP-
01), Chapter 21, CIMIC In Allied Joint Force Operations (October 1998).
notes to chapter eight 499
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 499
151 NATO AD 86-2, CIMIC 2000: Establishment of an ACE CIMIC Capacity (13 January
1999). See also Phillips, ‘Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to peace implementation in
Bosnia,’ NATO Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Spring 1998).
152 NATO AJP-9. From August 2001 AJP-9 defined CIMIC as ‘The coordination and coop-
eration, in support of the mission, between the NATO commander and civil populations
and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organiza-
tions and agencies.’
153 H. Rappard, ‘An Active Dutch CIMIC Policy Is Not A Bridge Too Far,’ in: M.T.I. Bollen,
R.V.A. Janssens, H.F.M. Kirkels, J.L.M. Soeters (eds.), NL-Arms, Netherlands Annual Review
of Military Studies 2002: Civil-Military Cooperation, a Marriage of Reason (Royal Netherlands
Military Academy; Breda 2002) 74-77.
154 Ibid.
155 Conversation with member of the UK Civil Affairs Group at the World Wide Civil Affairs
Conference held in New York in June 2001. The same idea of CIMIC or civil affairs being
perceived and executed as part of the British military’s ongoing operation also surfaces
in James Landon’s contribution on CIMIC to Wentz, Lessons from IFOR, 127.
156 Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (1996). As quoted in:
Robert Gravelle, coordinator and senior adviser on police matters, ‘The Role of SFOR in
Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ Remarks at the 47th Atlantic Treaty Association General Assem-
bly, 5 October 2001.
157 For this argument see Gary Dempsey, ‘Rethinking the Dayton Agreement: Bosnia Three
Years Later,’ Cato Policy Analysis, No. 327 (14 December 1998). Sophia Clément wrote:
‘Those who believe that the military deployment, or at least its American ground compo-
nent, should end – a camp led by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison and former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger – say that the goal of creating an integrated, multiethnic state in
Bosnia is a chimera, and that the sooner the Clinton administration recognizes that Bosnia
has been partitioned, the sooner Americans will be able to leave.’ Sophia Clément, ‘The
Issues Raised by Bosnia, and the Transatlantic Debate,’ Chaillot Paper, No. 32 (Institute
for Security Studies of WEU, May 1998).
Chapter 9
1 During most of 1999, the official geographical names in Kosovo were all still written in
Serbo-Croat. It became common practice after 1999 to write geographic names in both
Albanian and Serbo-Croat, I have chosen to use the Serbo-Croat names as it was com-
mon within the international community and among the NATO military to do so during
the period analyzed here. 
2 R. Abels, M. Pelt and P. Jacobs, Licht Boven Orahovac: 1 (NL) Arty Bn RA KFOR I, Koso-
vo 1999 (Wezep 2000); P.G. F. Hoefsloot, ‘Ervaringen van een Batterijcommandant van
de Gele Rijders: De Periode in Kosovo,’ Carré (5 mei 2000). 
3 For a short history of the Kosovo conflict prior to the NATO intervention see Raymond
Detrez, Kosovo: De Uitgestelde Oorlog (Antwerpen and Baarn 1999). Translated into Alban-
ian by Mirela Shuteriqi and published by Skanderbeg, Tirana 2004. See also: Noel Mal-
colm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York 1998).
4 As quoted in: William Shawcross, Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World
of Endless Conflict (New York etc. 2000) 361.
5 UK Parliament, House of Commons, Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Defence Select
Committee, 20 June 2000 (1086). See also Patrick Wintour, ‘War strategy ridiculed,’ The
Guardian (21 July 2000). Henry Kissinger argued that the Rambouillet text was ‘a provo-
cation, an excuse to start bombing.’ As cited in: Shawcross, Deliver Us From Evil, 364. 
6 Peter J. Boyer, ‘General Clark’s Battles,’ The New Yorker (17 November 2003). 
500 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 500
7 The Independent Kosovo Commission chaired by Nelson Mandela concluded that the war
was illegal for its failure to secure UN approval, but that it was legitimate on the basis
of the gross human right violations. 
8 For a first-hand account of coalition warfare or ‘war by committee’ see: Wesley K. Clarke,
Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York 2002).
9 OSCE, Kosovo/Kosova as Seen as Told: The Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Koso-
vo Verification Mission, October 1998-June 1999 (OSCE Secretariat, Vienna 1999) chap-
ter 14.
10 Mike Jackson, ‘KFOR: The Inside Story,’ RUSI Journal (February 2000) 13. Based on a
presentation given at the Royal United Services Institute on 23 November 1999.
11 Jackson, ‘KFOR: The Inside Story,’ 14. 
12 The massive military effort in support of humanitarian operations in Macedonia and Alba-
nia, at times close to a military takeover, reaffirmed the predominant perception of CIMIC
during peace operations as a predominantly humanitarian issue.
13 For an analysis of the NATO air campaign see Ivo H. Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon,
Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington, DC 2001).
14 Clark, Waging Modern War, 424–425; Dana Priest, ‘Kosovo Land Threat May Have Won
War,’ Washington Post (10 September 1999) A1; Jackson, KFOR: The Inside Story, 14.
15 Dutch NATO Ambassador Niek Biegman quoted in: Tweede Kamer de Staten-Generaal,
Rapport van de Tijdelijke Commissie Besluitvorming Uitzendingen (The Hague 2000) 381. 
16 Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force (‘KFOR’) and the
Governments of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999. 
17 Jackson, KFOR: The Inside Story, 15-16. 
18 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999) paragraph 9. 
19 UNSCR 1244; UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 on the Authority of the Interim Administra-
tion in Kosovo (25 July 1999); Robert Oakley, Public Order in Kosovo: An Early Assessment
(Paper prepared for UNA-USA Roundtable, 18 October 1999).
20 Lecture by Bernard Kouchner on UNMIK (Harvard University, 16 May 2001).
21 Colonel Peter van den Aker confirms that Van Loon was ‘intensively engaged in the oper-
ational decision taking process’ within the brigade. P.J.E.J. van den Aker, ‘Kosovo Force
– 1: Tussen Trauma en Militaire Effectiviteit, Multinationaliteit en Militaire Effectiviteit,’
Militaire Spectator, Vol. 169 (December 2000) 649. 
22 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (First of two interviews; The Hague, 29 January
2003); Lecture by Lieutenant Colonel Anton van Loon, Commander 11th Artillery Battal-
ion RNLA (SHAPE, 6 April 2000).
23 P.J.E.J. van den Aker, ‘Kosovo Force – 1: Tussen Trauma en Militaire Effectiviteit, Multi-
nationaliteit en Militaire Effectiviteit,’ Militaire Spectator, Vol. 169 (December 2000) 649-
650.
24 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 29 January 2003).
25 Abels, Licht Boven Orahovac, 20; P.G.F. Hoefsloot, ‘Ervaringen van een Batterijcomman-
dant van de Gele Rijders: De Periode in Kosovo,’ Carré, 5 May. 
26 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 29 January 2003).
27 Abels, Licht Boven Orahovac, 21.
28 Raymond Detrez, Kosovo: De Uitgestelde Oorlog (Antwerpen and Baarn 1999).
29 Interview Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 29 January 2003).
30 Abels, Licht Boven Orahovac, 50; P.G.F. Hoefsloot, ‘Ervaringen van een Batterijcomman-
dant van de Gele Rijders: De Periode in Kosovo,’ Carré, 5 May 2000.
31 Compared to the area of operations of Australian peacekeepers in Somalia or Dutch
Marines in Cambodia, the municipality was small. While the whole of Kosovo measured
approximately 11,000 square kilometers, the Bay region the Australian battalion group
had to control six years earlier measured 17,000 square kilometers. The city of Baidoa
had a population comparable to that of Orahovac with 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants,
including 20,000 refugees. 
notes to chapter nine 501
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 501
32 Jackson, KFOR: The Inside Story, 15-16.
33 Jackson, ‘KFOR-1 Force Commanders Evaluation Report.’ As quoted in P.J.E.J. van den
Aker, ‘Kosovo Force – 1: Tussen Trauma en Militaire Effectiviteit, Multinationaliteit en
Militaire Effectiviteit,’ Militaire Spectator, Vol. 169 (December 2000) 655.
34 Peter Finn and John Ward Anderson, ‘Rebels Act to Assert Influence in Kosovo,’ 
Washington Post Foreign Service, Tuesday, 15 June 1999, page A1.
35 Centraal Archieven Depot, Ministerie van Defensie (Central Archival Depot, Netherlands
Ministry of Defense), Archive 1 (NL) Contingentscommando KFOR I & II (Hereafter
referred to as CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II), Structurele rapportages, box 1, Contin-
gentscommando Situation Report, 19 June 1999; interview with Colonel Anton van Loon
(second interview, The Hague, 13 February 2003).
36 Centraal Archieven Depot, Ministerie van Defensie (Central Archival Depot, Netherlands
Ministry of Defense), Archive 1 (NL) Artillery Battalion KFOR I (Hereafter referred to as
CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I), Structurele rapportages, box 1, folder 1.5, Situations and
Missions MNB (S), 17 June 1999.
37 Anton van Loon, ‘CIMIC in the Early Phase of the KFOR Mission in Kosovo,’ in: M.T.I.
Bollen, R.V.A. Janssens, H.F.M. Kirkels, J.L.M. Soeters (eds.), Civil-Military Cooperation:
A Marriage of Reason, NL Arms 2002 (Alblasserdam 2002) 119.
38 Abels, Licht Boven Orahovac, 27.
39 Ibid. 
40 The KFOR ROEs said: ‘Disarming armed individuals or groups, which represent an actu-
al threat to the security of Friendly Forces, is authorized.’ CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I,
Correspondentie-archief, doos 7 (Diversen), Map: HQ KFOR, Doc no. 2001. 
41 Remarks by Ivo Daalder in: ‘Newshour with Jim Lehrer: Law & Order,’ 5 July 1999. 
42 Jackson, ‘KFOR: The Inside Story,’ 16.
43 Personal observations by author in Kosovo, September 2002.
44 Interview with Ismet Tara, commander 124th Brigade UÇK in 1999 (Rahovec/Orahovac,
12 September 2002); Interview Colonel Anton van Loon (second interview, The Hague,
13 February 2003).
45 Abels, Licht Boven Orahovac, 94. 
46 Fear of the ‘honeymoon period’ coming to an end in mentioned in: CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn
KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 1, folder 1.4, Intsum MNB(S), no. 118/99, 27-28
July 1999.
47 A trend analysis by KFOR’s Operational Analysis Branch showed a sharp increase in UÇK
non-compliance and mentioned the fear of elements of the UÇK going ‘into the hills.’
Presentation held by Mike Neighbour, head of this branch within ARRC Headquarters
from 1998 to 2002, MORS Workshop Combat Analysis: Deploying Quantitative Support
to the Combat Commander 28-30 January 2003. In an interview with the author, Dutch
Major Roy Abels also mentioned fear within KFOR of guerilla-type activity around this
time. Interview with Major Roy Abels (’t Harde, 3 September 2002). 
48 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie Archief, box 7, folder HQ KFOR, no.
10054, Michael Jackson (COMKFOR) to KFOR brigade commanders (date unknown; esti-
mated late August 1999).
49 Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the UÇK (signed 20 June 1999).
50 Jackson, ‘KFOR: The Inside Story,’ 16.
51 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 5, Intsum 1 (NL) Arty Bn RA,
no. 143/99, 12 November 1999. The intelligence summery said: ‘TMK 123 Bde command-
er seemed cooperative. He said to have met Van Loon and admires the ‘successes’ of
Dutch contingent in Orahovac.’ The remark about Hoxhaj as the ‘local warlord’ was made
by Van Loon in interview with the author (13 February 2003). 
52 Interview with Van Loon (13 February 2003).
53 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 3, Commanders Assessrep 14
502 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 502
September 1999; CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 3, Comman-
ders Assessrep, 15 Sep 1999. The incident was also mentioned in Abels, Licht Boven Ora-
hovac, 89. 
54 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II, Werkarchief, box 3, no.01901, Col. Peter van den Aker
(DCOM MNB-South) to lt.col. Hans Damen (CS-CONTCO), Betreft: Kamervragen, 1 Sep-
tember 1999. 
55 Mike Neighbour, Presentation at MORS Workshop Combat Analysis: Deploying Quanti-
tative Support to the Combat Commander, 16.
56 ICG, Kosovo Report Card 100, 28 August 2000, 6.
57 Jackson, ‘KFOR: The Inside Story,’ 16.
Chapter 10
1 For the proceedings of this conference see Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic and Eliot
M. Goldberg, Policing the New World Disorder (NDU, Washington, DC 1998).
2 Kelly, ‘Legitimacy and the Public Security Function,’ in: Oakley, Dziedzic and Goldberg,
Policing the New World Disorder (NDU, Washington DC 1998). See also Michael Kelly,
Peace Operations: Tackling the Military, Legal and Policy Challenges (Canberra 1997).
3 General Jackson called the situation in Kosovo ‘anarchy or something not far from it.’
Jackson, ‘KFOR: The Inside Story,’ 16. 
4 R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘Marines Kill Another Gunman in Kosovo,’ Washington Post (26 June
1999) A17.
5 R. Abels, M. Pelt and P. Jacobs, Licht Boven Orahovac: 1 (NL) Arty Bn RA KFOR I, Koso-
vo 1999 (Wezep 2000) 43; Greg Campbell, The Road to Kosovo: A Balkan Diary (Boulder
and Oxford 2000) 229-235.
6 Abels, Licht Boven Orahovac, 50.
7 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, folder 3.2, Situation and
Mission van MNB(S)–G-3, 7 July 1999.
8 Ibid., folder 3.2, Situation and Mission van MNB(S)–G-3, 9 July 1999.
9 KFOR Press Update, 29 October 1999 and 11 December 1999; United Nations Press
Briefing, 29 June 1999 (KFOR Press Updates are available online at
http://www.nato.int/kfor/; UNMIK press briefings and releases are available online at
http://www.unmikonline.org).
10 Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Kilch (G-5, MNB South, July 1999-December 1999) lecture at
Allied Forces Northern Europe (Powerpoint presentation; in author’s possession).
11 Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo (2001). For an assessment of
abuses after June 1999 see chapter 17 of this report (This 593-page report is available
online at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/kosovo/).
12 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, folder 4.1, 1 (NL) Arty Bn
RA TF Orahovac, Commanders Assessrep/Daily Sitrep, 30 June 1999 (Hereafter referred
to as Daily Sitrep).
13 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (Second Interview, The Hague, 13 February 2003).
14 Campbell, The Road to Kosovo, 233-234. 
15 While often critical of many aspects of KFOR’s performance, reporters noted how most
NATO units interpreted their role fundamentally different than in Bosnia. See for instance:
R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘Serbian Atrocity Suspect Arrested,’ Washington Post Foreign Service (25
June 1999) A24; Campbell, The Road to Kosovo, 230-235.
16 John Sanderson, ‘The Timor Challenge,’ Sydney Morning Herald 23, 20 September 1999.
17 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Bart Haverman (Breda, 10 April 2003).
18 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘The Role of Military Forces in Managing Public Security Chal-
lenges: As Little as Possible or Filling the Gap?,’ Revised Draft for IPA book edited by
notes to chapter ten 503
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 503
Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Sidhu (17 April 2002) 10.
19 Richard Norton-Taylor and Stuart Miller, ‘Mines stand in the way of allied troops: Peace-
keeping Ground forces prepare for the biggest military operation in Europe since 1945,’
Guardian (5 June 1999).
20 Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Anarchy and Madness,’ New York Review of Books, Vol. XLVII, No.2
(10 February 2000). 
21 Interview with Colonel (retd.) William Phillips (New York, 16 October 2003). 
22 On 20 July 1999, more than a month into the operation, Jackson broke with the peace-
keeping tradition of putting purely military tasks first when he addressed establishing and
maintaining a secure environment ‘including public safety and order’ before separating
the warring parties. CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie-archief, box 7
(Diversen), Map: MNB-S, nr. 7020, COMKFOR Directive, 20 July 1999.
23 Suggested by William Phillips in interview with author (New York, 16 October 2003). 
24 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (First interview, The Hague, 29 January 2003).
25 Clark, Waging Modern War, 371.
26 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn RA KFOR I, Correspondentie Archief, box 7 (Diversen), folder: HQ
KFOR, OPLAN 10413 ‘Joint Guardian’, SACEUR Operations Plan, Annex E – Rules of
Engagement (L13). 
27 The ‘KFOR Rules of Engagement for Use in Kosovo: Soldier’s Card’ does not mention
detention as a possible measure. However, the US Marine Expeditionary Unit’s version
‘MEU Supplemental Kosovo ROE card’ did mention detention and categorized it under
‘other measures.’ These ROE soldier’s cards and various examples of ROE annexes used
by the US military are published in: Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO),
Rules of Engagement Handbook for Judge Advocates (Charlottesville 1 May 2000).
28 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn RA KFOR I, Correspondentie Archief, box 7 (Diversen), folder: HQ
KFOR, Oplan 10413 ‘Joint Guardian’, Annex E – Rules of Engagement; Van Loon wrote
in retrospect that the German approach was ‘oriented on POW treatment.’ A.J.H. van
Loon, ‘Kosovo Force-1: Tussen Trauma en Toekomst (II) Mededeling van het Militair Gezag,’
Militaire Spectator, Vol. 169 (December 2000) 663.
29 The operational directive and Rules of Engagement issues by the Dutch Ministry of Defense
left out arrest, detention and serious crime in relation to the safety of the local popula-
tion. ‘Aimed fire’ was allowed ‘against any person involved in an unlawful act, or about
to commit an act that threatens life or causes serious bodily harm, and if there is no
other way of preventing this from taking place.’ However, this provision was not part of
public security directions, but a summary of rules related to self-defense, the defense of
friendly forces, and persons explicitly under KFOR protection, such as international civil-
ian workers. CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II, Werkarchief, box 1, (Voorlopige) Opera-
tionele Aanwijzing CDS nr. 004/99, Operation Joint Guardian, 11 June 1999; Ibid., Oper-
ationele Aanwijzing CDS nr. 004/99, Operation Joint Guardian, 18 June 1999.
30 Ibid., box 7, ‘Aanwijzing Nr. 8 Voor de behandeling van vermoedelijke daders van mis-
drijven/strafbare feiten, die door de Nederlandse Krijgsmacht in Kosovo in verzekerde
bewaring zijn gesteld resp. dienen te worden genomen’ 23 Juni 1999 (Translation of Ger-
man ‘Weisung 8.’).
31 Interview with Major Roy Abels (‘t Harde, 3 September 2002).
32 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II, Werkarchief, box 1, Kol v.d. Aker MNB(S) aan C-Cont-
co, 23 juni 1999; Ibid., Structurele rapportages, box 1, Contingentscommando Sitrep A,
KFOR (Hereafter referred to as: Sitrep), 22 June 1999. 
33 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie-archief, doos 7 (Diversen), Map: HQ KFOR,
no. 6012, Amendment to Annex R (Oporder 004), Law and Order (25 June 1999). 
34 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Bart Haverman (10 April 2003). Although apprehen-
sion of suspects without catching an offender in the act was not stimulated, a KFOR direc-
tive dated 20 July 1999 reconfirmed the possibility of arresting on the basis of suspicion,
504 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 504
and not merely when caught red handed. CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Corresponden-
tie-archief, doos 7 (Diversen), Map: MNB-S, no. 7020, COMKFOR Directive, 20-7-1999.
35 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II, Werkarchief, box 1, Vraagpunten regelingen Op Joint
Guarantor, 30 June 1999, 1 July 1999. 
36 Interview with General Wesley Clark on PBS Newshour (1 July 1999).
37 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003).
38 Interview with Ismet Tara, commander 124th Brigade UÇK in 1999 (Rahovec/Orahovac,
12 September 2002).
39 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003). For Van Loon’s
argument about his primary motive for extending the Task Force’s policing tasks by his
troops see also: Van Loon, ‘CIMIC in the Early Phase of the KFOR Mission in Kosovo,’
120. 
40 Interview with Agim Hasku (Rahovec/Orahovac, 10 September 2002). 
41 Van Loon, ‘CIMIC in the Early Phase of the KFOR Mission in Kosovo,’ 120. 
42 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, folder 4.1, Daily Sitrep, 29
July 1999; Ibid., folder 4.2, Daily Sitrep, 16 July 1999. 
43 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003).
44 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, folder 4.1, Daily Sitrep, 28
June 1999.
45 Statistics on arrests made by Task Force Orahovac printed in Abels, Licht boven Orahovac,
33. 
46 Van Loon, ‘CIMIC in the Early Phase of the KFOR Mission in Kosovo,’ 120. 
47 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, folder 4.2, Daily Sitrep, 24
July 1999; Ibid., Daily Sitrep, 27 July 1999; Ibid, Daily Sitrep, 26 July 1999.
48 Ibid., Daily Sitrep, 28 July 1999; Confirmed in interview with Colonel Anton van Loon
(The Hague, 13 February 2003).
49 William O’Neill, Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace (Boulder 2002) 75.
50 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, folder 4.2, Daily Sitrep, 26
July 1999.
51 Christ Klep and Richard van Gils, Van Korea tot Kosovo: De Nederlandse Military Deelname
aan Vredesoperaties Sinds 1945 (The Hague 2000) 371.
52 Abels, Licht Boven Orahovac, 93. In this official account, the ‘complaints bureau’ was said
to be openend on 20 June 1999. Other primary sources already mention the bureau to
be open on 16 juni 1999.
53 Ibid., 33. 
54 Interview with Major Roy Abels (‘t Harde, 3 September 2002).
55 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II, Werkarchief, box 1, Memorandum Majoor mr J.C. Groen-
heijde to C-CONTCO, Aanwijzing nr. 8 (aanhouden verdachten), 27 June 1999. 
56 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 1, folder 1.5, MNB(S) Situa-
tions and Missions, 24 June 1999; Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague,
13 February 2003).
57 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II, Werkarchief, box 1, Memorandum Majoor mr J.C. Groen-
heijde to C-Contco, Aanwijzing nr. 8 (aanhouden verdachten), 27 June 1999. 
58 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003).
59 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II, Werkarchief, box 1, Majoor mr J.C. Groenheijde to C-
CONTCO, Aanwijzing nr. 8 (aanhouden verdachten), 27 June 1999. 
60 International Crisis Group, ‘Starting From Scratch in Kosovo,’ ICG Balkans Report No. 83
(13 December 1999) 4.
61 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 29 January 2003).
62 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 1, folder 1.5, MNB(S) Situa-
tion and Missions, 17 June 1999. Within MNB(S) the order given not to allow the UÇK
to occupy police stations and in Pristina British troops evicted the UÇK from a former
police station.
notes to chapter ten 505
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 505
63 Correspondence between author and Astrid van Genderen-Stort, the local UNHCR field
officer in Rahovac/Orahovac in 1999-2000 (Letter received 3 August 2004).
64 Based on conversations with the population of Rahovec/Orahovac held by the author in
September 2002. 
65 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II, Structurele Rapportages, box 1, Sitrep 21 June 1999. 
66 Ibid., Werkarchief, box 5, Lkol Govaarts to Detco KMAR KFOR, 1 July 1999.
67 Ibid., box 1, Vraagpunten regelingen, 30 June 1999. ‘Too mad for words’ was a handwrit-
ten comment in sideline by General Bokhoven. In an interview with the author, Van Loon
confirmed he knew this discussion was going on, but he said that he ‘left this matter to
Bokhoven.’ Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (13 February 2003).
68 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie-archief, no. 7038, Memorandum by Major
Marcel van Weerd (CoS), 31 July 1999.
69 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (13 February 2003).
70 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (13 February 2003); interview with Ismet Tara
(Rahovec/Orahovac, 12 September 2002).
71 Based on conversations between the author and several inhabitants of Orahovac.
72 Marechaussee First Class Jesper Koops quoted in: ‘Marechaussee Blijft Oplettend,’ Defen-
siekrant, 19 August 1999. 
73 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco I&II, Werkarchief, box 9, DCBC Memorandum, Majoor I.H. van der
Pool to Lgen A.P.P.M. van Baal, 16 September 1999. 
74 ‘Gesloopt terug uit Kosovo,’ Algemeen Dagblad, 18 September 1999; ‘Brandbrief van
Marechaussees,’ Het Parool, 18 September 1999. 
75 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie-archief, no. 7038, Memorandum by Major
Marcel van Weerd (CoS), 31 July 1999. 
76 ICG, ‘Policing the Gap: Law and Order in the New Kosovo,’ ICG Balkans Report (6 August
1999) p8.
77 Jakobsen, ‘The Role of Military Forces in Managing Public Security Challenges,’ 10-11.
78 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco I&II, Werkarchief, box 3, no. 01901, Col. Peter van den Aker (DCOM
MNB-South) to lt.col. Hans Damen (CS-Contco), Betreft: Kamervragen, 1 September 1999.
79 Brigadier Jonathan D.A. Bailey (British Army), ‘The Urban Area During Stability Mis-
sions: The British Experience in Kosovo,’ RAND, Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban
Operations in the Twenty-First Century (Preceedings of the RAND Arroyo-MCWL-OSD
Urban Operations Conference, March 22-23, 2000) 256.
80 It can even be argued that a force commander in UN operations had more authority,
since the bulk of the contingents available to him came from developing countries, who
tended to put far less restraints on the use of their troops than Western contributing gov-
ernments. 
81 UNMIK Press Briefing, 20 June 1999.
82 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report: Conflict, Interna-
tional Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford 2000). 
83 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie-archief, doos 7 (Diversen), Map: MNB-S,
no. 7020, COMKFOR Directive, 20 July 1999.
84 Michael R. Gordon, ‘NATO Patrols Edgy Border: This Time Protecting Serbs,’ New York
Times, 25 January 2001.
85 Graham Day and Christopher Freeman, ‘Policekeeping is the Key,’ International Affairs
79, 2 (2003) 304; International Crisis Group, ‘Starting from Scratch in Kosovo: The Hon-
eymoon is Over,’ ICG Balkans Report no. 83 (13 December 1999) 2n2.
86 Alice Hills, ‘The Inherent Limits of Military Forces in Policing Peace Operations,’ Inter-
national Peacekeeping, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Autumn 2001) 79-98. 
87 Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Holshek, ‘The Operational Art of Civil-Military Opera-
tions: Promoting Unity of Effort,’ in: Larry Wentz, Lessons From Kosovo (US Department
of Defence: The Command and Control Research Program 2002) 285.
506 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 506
88 Jackson, ‘KFOR: The Inside Story,’ 17.
89 Based on conversation between author and an American NGO worker who was stationed
in Pristina in the second half of 1999 and interacted often with British KFOR. 
90 RFE/RL radio broadcast by Ron Synovits, Yugoslavia: Lawlessness Persists in Kosovo as Refugees
Return (25 June 1999). 
91 Correspondence between Astrid van Genderen-Stort and the author (letter received 3
August 2004). Conversations between author and Kosovars in September 2003 confirmed
that the Italian and French troops had gained little respect among the Albanian popula-
tion, while the British, Germans and Americans were still held in high regard. 
92 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Bart Haverman (Breda, 10 April 2003).
93 Simon Chesterman, ‘The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations,’ UN Peacekeeping Best
Practices: External Study (21 August 2004) 13.
94 Remarks by Ivo Daalder in: ‘A Newshour with Jim Lehrer: Law & Order,’ 5 July 1999. 
95 Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military (New York
and London 2003) 280.
96 R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘Home Sweet Home in Kosovo: High-Security US Base Will Have All
the Creature Comforts,’ Washington Post Foreign Service (5 October 1999) A11.
97 Captain Alton L. Gwaltney, ‘Law and Order in Kosovo: A Look at Criminal Justice Dur-
ing the First Year of Operation Joint Guardian,’ in: Larry Wentz, Lessons From Kosovo (US
Department of Defense: The Command and Control Research Program 2002).
98 Priest, The Mission, 405. In her analysis of KFOR operations in the US sector, Priest exten-
sively uses the official inquiry following the rape and murder of an Albanian girl by a
US Army sergeant in Vitina in 2000. She also extensively and vividly describes how dur-
ing the winter of 1999-2000, elements of one unit of the 82nd Airborne became increas-
ingly offensive towards the local Albanian population, and took drastic measures in their
effort to investigate and break the criminal elements of the former UÇK. In siding with
the minority Serb population they lost their impartiality and at times their discipline. For
this story Priest refers primarily to: US Army Europe, ‘Unit Climate and State of Disci-
pline Within the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, Task Force Falcon,
Kosovo Force,’ Army Regulation 15-6 Report of Investigation, 18 September 2000.
99 Figures assembled from R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘Serbian Atrocity Suspects Arrested,’ Washing-
ton Post (25 June 1999) A24; ‘Gele Rijders Moeten Mogelijk Kamp Verlaten ‘Komst Russen
slecht voor rust in Orahovac’,’ Reformatorisch Dagblad, 7 July 1999; Holshek, ‘The Oper-
ational Art of Civil-Military Operations,’ 251, n45.
100 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II, Werkarchief, box 3, DCBC Sitrep no. 140/99, 26 July
1999.
101 Ibid., box 4, DCBC Sitrep no. 146/99, 3 August 1999.
102 Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Kilch (G-5, MNB South, July 1999-December 1999), lecture at
Allied Forces Northern Europe (Powerpoint presentation).
103 Gwaltney, ‘Law and Order in Kosovo,’ 259.
104 Reinhardt, KFOR: Streitkrafte fur den Frieden. Tagenbuchauzeichnungen als Deutscher Kom-
mandeur im Kosovo (Frankfurt am Main 2002) 179. Diary entry 8 november 1999.
105 ICG, ‘Starting from Scratch in Kosovo,’ 11.
106 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Bart Haverman (10 April 2003).
107 Donald G. McNeil Jr, ‘G.I.’s in Kosovo Are Judges, Jailers, and Much More,’ New York
Times (22 November 2000); Dana Priest, ‘Waging Peace in Kosovo,’ Washington Post (23
November 1999) A01.
108 Gwaltney, ‘Law and Order in Kosovo,’ 236.
109 Reinhardt, KFOR, 180; CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II, Werkarchief, box 5, Vraagpun-
ten en regelingen Op Joint Guarantor, 13 Juli 1999, CoS SACEUR (Gen Dieter Stock-
mann) to Director International Military Staff, Subject: Kosovo – Transfer of Responsibil-
ities to Civil Agencies (July 1999).
notes to chapter ten 507
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 507
110 Jakobsen, ‘The Role of Military Forces in Managing Public Security Challenges,’ 9. See
also Gwaltney, ‘Law and Order in Kosovo,’ 247, 256.
111 International Crisis Group, ‘Kosovo Report Card,’ ICG Balkans Report No. 100 (28 August
2000) 15.
112 Ibid.
113 Lecture by Bernard Kouchner (Harvard University, 16 May 2001, notes taken by author).
114 The Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum (CPRF), Bridging the ‘Post-Conflict Securi-
ty Gap.’ (October 2003). Notes of Dr. Joseph J. Collins, Robert Perito, and Dr. Joanna
Spear (Document available online at http://www.sfcg.org/Documents/CPRF).
115 Mark Plunkett, ‘The Establishment of the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Peacekeeping,’ in:
Hugh Smith (ed.), International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience (Can-
berra 1994) 71.
116 Espen Barth Edie, ‘The Internal Security Challenge in Kosovo’ (NUPI, Paper prepared for
the UNA-USA/IAI Conference on ‘Kosovo’s Final Status’, Rome 12-14 December 1999) 1.
117 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco I&II, Werkarchief, box 2, Vraagpunten en regelingen Op Joint Guar-
antor, 7 July 1999. 
118 On 12 Aug 1999, Kofi Annan reported to the assembled G-8 ambassadors that close to
600 CIVPOL were in Kosovo and 200 were deployed each week. The International Cri-
sis Group placed the number of those police officers deployment in late 1999 at some-
where between 80-100 per week. ICG, ‘Starting from Scratch in Kosovo,’ 4. NATO esti-
mates in July were also far too optimistic: ‘Deployment of all the civil administration staff
will take 2 months with the civil police element estimated at 10 weeks.’ CAD, 1 (NL) Con-
tco KFOR I&II, Werkarchief, box 5, Vraagpunten en regelingen Op Joint Guarantor, 12
August 1999.
119 ICG, ‘Starting from Scratch in Kosovo,’ 4; Andrew Roche, ‘Law and Order is Kosovo’s
Achilles Heel,’ Reuters (27 December 1999).
120 Reinhardt described the American UNMIK Police, who ‘praised the good cooperation with
KFOR troops,’ as a ‘very robust, experienced cop from New York, who was determined
to arrest and detain the criminals.’ Reinhardt, KFOR, 271.
121 OSCE/UNMIK, Municipal Profile: Orahovac/Rahovec (1 April 2000); CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn
KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, folder 5.2 Daily Sitrep 8 Sep 1999. Taks Force
Orahovac reported that support to UNMIKPOL deployment was a top priority; Ibid., box
3, folder ‘Sectie 2/3,’ UNMIK rapportage Rahovec 52, 10 November 1999. 
122 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II, Werkarchief, box 7, Van Loon to Van den Aker (DCOM
MNB South), 1 September 1999.
123 Carlotta Gall, ‘German General’s Kosovo Peacekeepers Are Fighting Crime,’ New York
Times, 21 December 1999.
124 Gregory Piatt, ‘Law and order duties shifting away from US troops in Kosovo,’ Stars and
Stripes European Edition, November 27, 2000. 
125 United Nations Document. S/2000/538, 6 June 2000, paras. 28 and 31; ICG, ‘Kosovo
Report Card,’ 4. As in Bosnia, NATO also deployed the MSU which, like in Bosnia, the
paramilitary unit had its successes and failures. The Royal Ulster Constabulary in coop-
eration with British troops proved most usefull, showing that a competent military force
in close coop with police was the best solution to bridging the public security gap as long
as there was mutual trust and information sharing. See: Annika S. Hansen, From Congo
to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations (IISS Adelphi Paper 343, 2002) 73.
126 Tim Ripley, ‘KFOR Lightens Up,’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (9 May 2001) 26.
127 Jakobsen, ‘The Role of Military Forces in Managing Public Security Challenges,’ 9.
128 Steve Bennet, the official in charge of recruiting and training polce in Kosovo for the
International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), quoted in
Andrew F. Tully, ‘Kosova and Bosnia: A Tale of Two Police Forces,’ RFE/RL Balkan Report,
Vol. 5, No. 64 (11 September 2001); See also ICG, ‘Kosovo Report Card,’ 4.
508 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 508
129 Personal observations by author in Kosovo (September 2002).
130 Hansen, From Congo to Kosovo, 93. 
131 Ibid.
132 Tully, ‘Kosova and Bosnia: A Tale of Two Police Forces.’
Chapter 11
1 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie Archief, box 3, Dennis McNamara (Deputy
SRSG for Humanitarian Affairs), Subject: ‘Integrated Strategy for Minority Groups in Ora-
hovac,’ 20 September 1999.
2 ‘Russian, Albanians meet to end standoff,’ AP/USA Today, 24 August 1999. 
3 Frank van Vliet, ‘Albanezen in Orahovac Weerstaan Druk Westen,’ De Telegraaf, 28 August
1999.
4 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (second interview, The Hague, 13 February 2003).
5 R. Abels, M. Pelt and P. Jacobs, Licht Boven Orahovac: 1 (NL) Arty Bn RA KFOR I, Koso-
vo 1999 (Wezep 2000) 96.
6 M.P. Peters, ‘Gele Rijders of Russische Para’s? Orahovac en de Blokkade Tegen de Russen,’
Militaire Spectator, Vol. 170, No. 3 (2001) 117. See also the official KFOR evaluation of the
Dutch Ministry of Defence. Ministerie van Defensie, Evaluatie KFOR 1999 (The Hague,
June 2000).
7 According to Agim Hasku, president of the ‘Coordinating Council of the Protests,’ Javier
Solana advised him during a visit to Orahovac in early September to stress the council’s
independence by changing the name of the organization to ‘Organizational Council of
the Protests.’ The Spaniard impressed Hasku as supportive of his cause. The former
mayor even recalled the secretary general telling him ‘you are on the right course, go on
this way,’ when they were alone in a room. It is not quite clear how his lack of knowl-
edge of English allowed him to understand Solana. Interview with Agim Hasku
(Rahovec/Orahovac, 10 September 2002); Interview with Ismet Tara, commander 124th
Brigade UÇK in 1999 (Rahovec/Orahovac, 12 September 2002). 
8 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II, Werkarchief, box 2, Pim Kraan aan MinBZ, DCH/HH
Verkenningsmissie Kosovo, Sitrep nr. 2, 11 July 1999. 
9 Ibid., Vraagpunten en regelingen Op Joint Guarantor, 7 July 1999 (PV NAVO).
10 Jackson’s priorities are mentioned in: CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rap-
portages, box 5, Daily Sitrep, 24 Nov 1999. 
11 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II, Werkarchief, box 7, Permanente Militaire Vertegenwo-
ordiging bij het NAVO Militair Comité aan CDS, Onderwerp: Kort verlag van werkbezoek
van PV en PMV NAVO aan Bosnië en Kosovo, 31 August 1999; Peters that NATO hoped
the whole issue would wither away in time. See: Peters, ‘Gele Rijders of Russische Para’s?,’
128.
12 Karel Bagijn, ‘Russen Blijven Weg uit Orahovac,’ Algemeen Dagblad (10 March 2000);
Peters, ‘Gele Rijders of Russische Para’s?,’ 135.
13 OSCE & UNHCR, ‘Has the War in Kosovo Actually Ended? Update on the Situation of
Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo’ (February-May 2000).
14 A UNHCR spokesperson was the source for this much-quoted figure in the world media.
See: ‘Kosovo Nu Bijna ‘Gezuiverd’,’ Algemeen Dagblad, 25 August 1999.
15 The UNHCR first redressed the figure to 70,000. Later it was confirmed that approxi-
mately 100,000 Serbs remained in Kosovo. ICG, ‘Kosovo Report Card,’ 16; See also: ICG,
‘Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom?,’ ICG Balkans Report No. 78 (November 1999).
16 On 29 August 1999, Reuters reported that Bernard Kouchner had said: ‘The rate of crim-
inality is down – look at where we are and where we were just two months ago.’ KFOR
figures on murder rates from June to November listed 145 Albanian, 135 Serb and 99
notes to chapter eleven 509
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 509
‘other’ murder victims. Serb representatives in Kosovo claimed the figure for Serbs was
around 400, but it was unclear how it gathered its data. For unsubstantiated Serb claims
see ICG, ‘Violence in Kosovo,’ 1n2.
16 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, folder 5.2, Daily Sitrep, 10
September 1999; Ibid., Daily Sitrep, 12 September 1999. This image of selective short-
ages, but a sufficient food supply, is confirmed by Astrid van Genderen-Stort, the local
UNHCR field officer during 1999-2000 in correspondence with author (Letter received
3 August 2004). 
17. CAD, I (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, folder 5.2, Daily Sitrep, 10
September 1999; Ibid., Daily Sitrep, 12 September 1999. This image of selective short-
ages, but a sufficient food supply, is confirmed by Astrid van Genderen-Stort, the local
UNHCR field officer during 1999-2000 in correspondence with author (letter received 3
August 2004).
18 Information provided by Jackson in briefing to North Atlantic Council on 7 July 1999.
CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II, Werkarchief, box 2, Vraagpunten en regelingen Op Joint
Guarantor, 7 July 1999 (PV NAVO).
19 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, folder 4.1 Daily Sitrep, 2
July 1999; See also: Abels, Licht Boven Orahovac, 44, 95. 
20 Correspondence between author and Van Gendereren-Stort (Letter received 3 August 2004);
CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie-archief, box 3, Folder S-2/S-3, Memoran-
dum DSRSG HA Dennis McNamara, 20 September 1999. 
21 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003). 
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Conversation between Dobrila Vitosevic and Ljubisa Velikic and author in Serb quarter
Orahovac (13 September 2002).
25 Official Serbian Government of the Serbian Website, Memorandum of the government
of the FRY on the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, Part 3 (5 November 1999;
http://www.serbia-info.com/news/1999-11/05/15431.html; As of 27 September 2001 the Ser-
bian Government website changed to http://www.serbia.sr.gov.yu) .
26 Hans-Jaap Melissen, ‘Retourtje Kosovo,’ Wereldomroep, 1 October 1999 (Available online
at http://www.rnw.nl/achtergronden/archief/blk/html/kosovo991001.html).
27 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, folder 4.1 Daily Sitrep, 28
June 1999. See also Van Loon quoted in Trouw (13 november 1999). Also Reinhardt spoke
of about the Serbs in Orahovac as living ‘like in a Ghetto’ an referred to this process of
‘Gettoisierung.’ Reinhardt, KFOR, 271-272; For the comparisons to the ‘Warsaw Ghetto’
see: Jarad Israel, ‘The Women of Orahovac Answer the Colonel’ (23 November 1999;
Available online at http://www.emperors-clothes.com/interviews/trouw.htm).
28 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003).
29 Mike Jackson, ‘KFOR: The Inside Story,’ RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, No. 1 (February 2000).
30 Van Genderen’s unenviable position was mentioned in: Chris Brid, ‘No Sanctuary in Town
Ruled by Hate,’ Guardian, 28 October 1999. After four suspects were removed from one
of her convoys and arrested by KFOR, she received death threats from the Serb quarter.
Correspondence between author and Van Gendereren (Letter received 3 August 2004).
31 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, 4.2 Daily Sitrep, 29 July
1999. 
32 Adam Roberts, ‘The So-called ‘Right’ of Humanitarian Intervention.,’ Yearbook of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law (Summer 2001).
33 John Kifner, ‘Mourners: After Scotland Yard Inquiry, a Kosova Village Buries 64: Serbs
Had Killed 7 Children Under 12,’ New York Times (6 July 1999). See also chapter 9 on
Orahovac in 1998 and 1999 in: Human Rights Watch Report, ‘Under Orders: War Crimes
in Kosovo’ (26 October 2001).
510 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 510
34 This explanation was given in all interviews by author with Dutch KFOR personnel and
confirmed in correspondence between the author and Astrid van Gendereren (Letter
received 3 August 2004).
35 Part of letter reproduced in Abels, Licht Boven Orahovac, 23, 29. On June 15 of every year
since 1999, the day they witnessed their first mass grave, Van Loon invites the officers
from his artillery battalion to gather at his family’s farm in the south of the Netherlands.
36 John Kifner, ‘Mourners: After Scotland Yard Inquiry, a Kosova Village Buries 64; Serbs
Had Killed 7 Children Under 12,’ New York Times, 6 July 1999. 
37 Human Rights Watch, ‘Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo’ (Chapter 9).
38 UNSCR 1244 demanded ‘full cooperation by all concerned, including the intenational
security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugolsavia.’
39 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie Archief, box 7, folder: HQ, John T. Ral-
ston (Chief of Investigations ICTY, Office of the Prosecutor) to General Mike Jackson. 
40 Lecture by Colonel Anton van Loon at the Royal Military Academy at which the author
was present.
41 Late June and early July Task Force Orahovac repeatedly reported to the German brigade
commander and via the contingent commander to his own Ministry of Defense that his
intelligence section and MPs were gathering substantial evindence on war crimes, on sus-
pected perpetrators still residing in the area and on the fact that his unit was processing
this information in a substantial intelligence database. The contingent commander also
informed the Ministry of his intention to block them from leaving the province and report-
ed that the Task Force’s ‘efforts are aimed at arresting suspects when possible.’ CAD, 1
(NL) Contco I&II, Structurele Rapportages, box 1, Concto Situation Report no. 99/187, 21
juni 1999; CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, 4.1 Daily Sitrep,
5 July 1999; ‘Omsingeld door Albanezen: Nederlanders Pakken Oorlogsmisdadigers Op,’
Haagse Courant, 2 July 1999.
42 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, folder 4.1 Daily Sitrep, 10
July 1999. Sitrep reported that the 124st Brigade UÇK handed over the MUP-archive to
KFOR. See also: Abels, Licht Boven Orahovac, 33.
43 Interview with Van Loon in: Abe de Vries, ‘De Albanezen halen ook weer het Servisch
Vuil Op,’ Trouw, 11 November 1999. The number of two thousand names in the intelli-
gence database was mentioned by Major Roy Abels in an interview with the author (‘t
Harde, 3 September 2002). 
44 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie Archief, Box 3, Folder: Section 2/3, UNMIK
report Rahovac no. 48 (4 November 1999). 
45 Pleuni Bos, ‘Zonder Gerechtigheid Geen Vrede: Een Persoonlijk Impressie van de Samen-
werking Tussen het ICTY en KFOR,’ Militaire Spectator, Vol. 169 (December 2000) 694;
CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie Archief, box 7, John H. Ralston (Chief of
Investigations ICTY Office of the Prosecutor) to General Jackson (4 October 1999). Ral-
ston said that the ‘additional intelligence and investigative information to augment our
on-site investigations [...] have set a very high standard for other support teams to meet.’
46 The other primary contributing factor to the radicalization of the Albanians was the con-
tinued imprisonment of an estimated 3,000 to 7,000 being held in Serbian prisons. ICG,
‘Violence in Kosovo,’ 4. 
47 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, folder 4.2 Daily Sitrep, 30
July 1999; Ibid., Daily Sitrep, 29 July 1999.
48 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003).
49 Correspondence with Colonel Peter van den Aker, 4 April 2005.
50 German Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping pointed at Kouchner as the initiator of the
arrests in Orahovac in August. ‘KFOR Houdt Servische Verdachten aan,’ NRC Handels-
blad, 21 August 1999. 
notes to chapter eleven 511
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 511
51 This section of the Rules of Engagement for KFOR was directly taken from the SFOR
Rules of Engagement.
52 R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘Serbian Atrocity Suspect Arrested,’ Washington Post Foreign Service
(25 June 1999) A24.
53 Interview with Major Roy Abels (‘t Harde, 3 September 2002).
54 The sudden increase in ICTY forensic teams in the area from two to four was another
indicator that the Albanian population and the UÇK were not alone in their fear that evi-
dence could go lost once the Russians took over. Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon
(The Hague, 13 February 2003).
55 For a description of life in Velika Hoca in March 1999 see Carlotta Gall, ‘In Kosovo’s
Furtive War, a Serb Just Disappears,’ New York Times, 4 March 1999.
56 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie-archief, box 1, Van Loon to Legal Advisor
KFOR (attn Ltc Buellesbach), C-MNB(S), C-Contco (3 November 1999), Subject: Policy
Towards suspected (war) criminals in Orahovac. This source mentions the sixteen per-
sons targeted for arrest in July. Additional sources from July and August 1999 referring
to the sixteen persons in Orahovac and Velika Hoca listed by KFOR headquarters for
arrest are all classified.
57 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003). On the difficul-
ties involved in such actions and the different opions of top NATO generals on military
involvement in arrests see: Edith B. Wilkie, Beth C. DeGrasse and Richard W. Roan, A
Force for Peace and Security: US and Allied Commander’s Views of the Military Role in Peace
Operations and the Impact on Terrorism of States in Conflict (Report, Peace Through Law
Education Fund 2002) 47-52; Rheinhardt, who was eager to arrest suspects, was made
aware of the complexities involved in such arrest operations when he visited Orahovac in
December 1999. See: Reinhardt, KFOR, 271. 
58 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003). 
59 Ibid. Although Van Loon refused to mention in an interview which of NATO’s Special
Forces from what member state performed the arrest, he did mention that it was the
commander of this unit who made the final selection. Other sources indicate that the pri-
mary role in the arrests was played by the German KSK (see following note). 
60 Major Roy Abels mentioned the role played by the KSK in the arrests. Interview with
Major Roy Abels (‘t Harde, 3 September 2002). On 24 September 2001, the German mag-
azine Der Spiegel ran an article on the German KSK and mentioned its role in the arrests
on 20 August in Orahovac in collaboration with Dutch soldiers. 
61 There are some indications of particaption of the Dutch Korps Commando Troepen (KCT)
in the arrests, but no reliable sources that confirm this. In an analysis of the German
KSK, Alexander Richter writes that on 20 August, the KSK ‘together with Dutch Special
Forces’ arrested three war crimes suspects in Kosovo. Alexander Richter, ‘Stichwort: Kom-
mando Spezialkräfte,’ Berlin Information Centre for Transatlantic Security (BITS, 15 Jan-
uary 2002; Available online at http://www.bits.de/public/stichwort/spezialk.htm). Arben Jaha,
an Albanian translator for Task Force Orahovac present at the scene, was convinced that
Dutch Special Forces performed the arrest. This however, would have been explicidly
against orders from the Dutch Ministry of Defense. When confronted with Jaha’s inter-
pretation of events, Van Loon answered: ‘Arben can say whatever he likes.’ Interview with
Arben Jaha (Rahovec/Orahovac 14 September 2002).
62 UNMIK/KFOR Press statement, 23 August 1999.
63 Interview with Ljubisa Velikic (Rahovec/Orahovac, 14 September 2002); Interview with
Arben Jaha (Rahovec/Orahovac, 14 September 2002). 
64 Interview with Ljubisa Velikic (Rahovec/Orahovac, 14 September 2002); Michel Maas,
‘Terugkerende Serviers Zijn Teken van Hoop,’ De Volkskrant, 7 February 2000; Abe de
Vries, ‘Meneer, U hebt hier een proefstation van gemaakt,’ Trouw, 4 December 1999. 
512 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 512
65 Statement by ICTY prosecutor Carla Del Ponte (29 September 1999). Cited in: Human
Rights Watch, Under Orders.
66 UNMIK Press Release, 7 February 2002. 
67 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, 5.1 Daily Sitrep, 22 August
1999; Intelligence Section TF Orahovac, De Informant: Informatieblad voor TF Orahovac
(22 and 24 August 1999). 
68 KFOR headquarters’ instructions on law and order from 25 June 1999 further stated that
‘all persons suspected of involvement in the commission of war crimes should be arrest-
ed.’ See chapter 10.
69 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie-archief, box 1, Van Loon to Legal Advisor
KFOR (attn Ltc Buellesbach), C-MNB(S), C-Contco (NL), 3 November 1999, Subject: Pol-
icy Towards suspected (war) criminals in Orahovac; CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Cor-
respondentie-archief, box 7 (Diversen), Map: Contco KFOR, no. 9048. Commander 1 (NL)
Arty Bn RA to C-Contco, 27 September 1999. 
70 International Crisis Group, ‘Finding the Balance: The Scales of Justice in Kosovo,’ 
Balkans Report No. 134 (12 September 2002) 20; ‘Del Ponte Maakt Vooral Jacht op Grote
Criminelen,’ De Volkskrant, 30 September 1999. How the failure to prosecute war crimes
in Republika Srpska (Bosnia) affected refugee return and the peace process as a whole,
is described in: ICG, ‘War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska,’ Balkans Report No.
103 (2 November 2000).
71 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, Daily Sitrep, 8 September
1999.
72 Ibid., box 3, Daily Sitrep, 25 September 1999; Ibid., Daily Sitrep, 26 September 1999. 
73 Nieuwbericht Ministerie van Defensie, ‘Arrestatie oorlogsmisdadigers’ (24 September
1999): ‘The arrest was performed by UN civilian police officers together with German
Feldjäger and Dutch KFOR troops.’ However, according to the a daily situation report
from the Task Force ‘UNMIKPOL was informed, but did not participate in the arrest.’
The investigations into these cases were conducted by Dutch military police in collabora-
tion with UNMIK police, but thus far UNMIK police had no formal jurisdiction. CAD, 1
(NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 3, Daily Sitrep, 24 September 1999.
74 Vitoshevic was suspected of participating in the mass murders at Brestovac and Velika
Krusa. CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 3, Daily Sitrep, 8 Octo-
ber 1999; Nieuwsbericht Ministerie van Defensie, ‘Verdachte van Oorlogsmisdaden in
Kosovo Aangehouden,’ 7 October 1999. 
75 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 4 Daily Sitrep, 23 October
1999; Ibid., Daily Sitrep, 24 October 1999. This sitrep reported: ‘No extra tension noticed
after yesterday’s arrest of 2 Serbs.’
76 Minister van Defensie, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Minister van Ontwikkelings-
samenwerking, Brief aan de Tweede Kamer, 18 June 1999: ‘Nederland streeft naar een
zo breed mogelijk invulling van mandaat voor KFOR ter ondersteuning van de inspan-
ningen van het ICTY.’ 
77 The Dutch media failed to describe in any length the actions by its troops and did not
raise any questions over the arrests of war crimes suspects. Also no serious questions
were raised in the press or parliament over the implications of Dutch soldiers’ commu-
nity-policing role in Kosovo.
78 The total of 40 arrests until August 2000 is mentioned in: Human Rights Watch, ‘Under
Orders’ (2001); See also UNMIK-KFOR, Press Briefing (4 August 2000); ‘KFOR Pakt Vier
Serviers op na Vondst Massagraf,’ NRC Handelsblad, 29 September 1999. 
79 See for instance: ‘KFOR arrests Serbs at the smallest Albanian sign,’ Politika (6 October
1999); Milan Laketic, ‘KFOR Arrests Serbs on Basis of Anonymous Reports,’ Politica, (12
November 1999; articles available online at http://www.kosovo.com/sk/news/kfn91006.html).
notes to chapter eleven 513
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 513
In these Serb newspapers only German soldiers are mentioned performing the arrest and
no reference is made to Dutch troops. 
80 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie-archief, box 7 (Diversen), Folder: Contco
KFOR, no. 9048. COM 1 (NL) Arty Bn RA to C-Contco, 27 September 1999.
81 Ibid., box 7, folder: DCBC, Ministerie van Defensie, Defensiestaf, Aanwijzing CDS, 
Betreft: Aanhouden verdachten van oorlogsmisdaden in Kosovo, 6 October 1999.
82 Ibid., box 1, Van Loon to Legal Advisor MNB-S (attn Ltc Buellesbach). In this document,
Van Loon anwered questions from KFOR Legal Advisor (email 29 October 1999) passed
to him by the German brigade’s legal advisor concering UNHCR complains that KFOR’s
screening of Serbs leaving Orahovac limited their freedom of movement and that ‘they
could regard it as de facto detention.’ 
83 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie Archief, box 3, 9023, DSRSG for Human-
itarian Affairs Dennis McNamara: ‘Integrated Strategy for Minority Groups in Orahovac’
(20 September 1999). An additional reason given by McNamara for the need to gradual-
ly evacuate instead of moving people on a massive scale at once, was to allow them to
make an informed decision after careful counseling.
84 The UNHCR also raised the question whether the Task Force’s investigations were based
on reliable sources. Van Loon argued that a suspect would only be arrested after serious
investigations, which included at least two matching witness accounts supported by other
physical evidence. He went to great lengths to emphasize that KFOR did not work with
the so-called ‘UÇK-list’ of 64 alleged war criminals, which Belgrade and local Serbs claimed
he was using as a basis for arrest. He had received this list, but only claimed to use it
to know who the UÇK was potentially targetting. CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Corre-
spondentie-archief, box 1, Van Loon to Legal Advisor KFOR (attn Ltc Buellesbach), C-
MNB(S), CONTCO-NL (3 November 1999), Subject: Policy Towards suspected (war) crim-
inals in Orahovac.
85 Ibid., C-MNB(S)/BG Sauer to COMKFOR, KFOR HQ, 3 November 1999; Ibid., Van Loon
to Legal Advisor KFOR (attn Ltc Buellesbach), C-MNB(S), CONTCO-NL, 3 November 1999,
Subject: Policy Towards suspected (war) criminals in Orahovac.
86 Reinhardt quoted in: Edith B. Wilkie, Beth C. DeGrasse and Richard W. Roan, A Force
for Peace and Security: US and Allied Commander’s Views of the Military Role in Peace Oper-
ations and the Impact on Terrorism of States in Conflict (Report, Peace Through Law Edu-
cation Fund 2002) 48. See also: Klaus Reinhardt, KFOR: Streitkräfte für den Frieden: Tage-
buckaufzeichnungen als Deutcher Kommandeur im Kosovo (Frankfurt am Main 2002) 271.
87 Referring to operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, Jackson added: ‘Let’s face it, we’ve been
doing it with the military for some while now.’ Jackson quoted in: Wilkie, Grasse and
Roan, A Force for Peace and Security, 49.
88 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie-archief, doos 1, Preamble between UNMIK
and MNB(S): ‘As of 27.10.1999, 1800 hours UNMIK-Police in addition to KFOR will take
over resp[onsibility] for upholding and maintaining civil law and order in the AOR of
MNB(S) as follows: 1. Police Primacy/Investigative Authority. Includes the control of enforc-
ing criminal codes, conducting investigation, making arrest for criminal offences and com-
munity interface. It is understood that KFOR’s rights in criminal measures are not lim-
ited by this provision. […].’
89 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie-archief, box 1, no. 11143, Contco aan C-11
AFDRA (Fax). Onderwerp: Russische CP en Oorlogsmisdadigers (12 November 1999).
This directive also announced the impending alteration of the Dutch translation of Direc-
tive No. 8.
90 Ibid., no. 11150, C-Contco aan C-11 AFDRA: Onderwerp: oorlogsmisdadigers (13 Novem-
ber 1999); Ibid., doc. 11156, Deputy commander and SNO (NL) Kol P.K. Smit aan 
C-Contco. 
514 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 514
91 These motives were stated several days later in: Ibid., box 7, Ministerie van Defensie
(Defensiestaf), Aanwijzing CDS No. A-19 (18 November 1999).
92 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003).
93 CAD, 1 (NL ) Contco I&II, Werkarchief, box 1, Vraagpunten en regelingen Op Joint Guar-
antor, 21 June 1999 (PV NAVO). Considering the Dutch national obstructions to their
own troops’ proactive role in arrests in Kosovo, it may come as a surprise that the Dutch
representative to NATO was among those propagating a more assertive role. The Dutch
Foreign Minister Jozias van Aartsen and his colleague Defense Minister Frank de Grave
propagated arrests as long as its KFOR headquarters ordered them after official indict-
ments and request by ICTY or, in the case of Kosovo, local UN courts. It would then only
agree if the Dutch chief of the defense staff had reviewed and agreed to proceed – a pol-
icy and procedure similar to that in Bosnia. For this purpose it even kept open the pos-
sibility of using its own Special Forces.
94 KFOR Rules of Engagement (L31). 
95 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie-archief, box 1, no. 11194, DCBC Sitrep,
18 November 1999. (‘Bijstand oppakken personen door UNMIK hoort nu ook bij taken-
pakket KFOR’). 
96 Ibid., box 7, Ministerie van Defensie (Defensiestaf), Aanwijzing CDS No. A-19 (18 Novem-
ber 1999). 
97 Ibid., Maj. Mr J.C. Groenheijde to NL-SNR MNB(S), C-1(NL) Afdra/C-1(NL)Gnhulpbat,
Betreft: Aanhouden verdachten (11 November 1999).
98 ‘KFOR Pakt Servier op,’ NRC Handelsblad, 29 December 1999; Reuters, ‘International
Police Arrest Serb in Kosovo Enclave,’ 28 December 1999.
99 Michel Maas, ‘Terugkerende Serviers Zijn Teken van Hoop,’ De Volkskrant, 7 February
2000; UNMIK-KFOR Press Briefing, 2 February 2000.
100 The number of indictees is that of police statistics reported in the press. See: Human
Rights Watch, ‘Under Orders,’ 2001 
101 Only in February 2003, KFOR arrested the first three former UÇK member that had been
formally indicted by the ICTY for war crimes committed against both Serb and Albanian
civilians. ‘Drie Albanezen naar VN-Tribunaal in Den Haag,’ NRC Handelsblad, 28 Febru-
ary 2003; NRC Handelsblad, 17 July 2003; early 2002 KFOR had arrested three former
UÇK members, but these were charged with crimes committed against ‘collaborating’
Albanians during the 1998-1999 war.
102 ICG,’Finding the Balance: The Scales of Justice in Kosovo,’ 20. See also: OSCE Mission
in Kosovo, ‘Kosovo’s War Crimes Trials: A Review’ (September 2001).
103 On 2 November 2001 the initial conviction of Kolasinac was reversed, but after an appeal
by the prosecutor he was convicted to eight years imprisonment. NRC Handelsblad, 4 Feb-
ruary 2003.
104 OSCE, ‘Kosovo’s War Crimes Trials: A Review’ (September 2001).
Chapter 12
1 Chris Hedges, ‘Kosovo’s Next Masters,’ Foreign Affairs (May/June 1999); See also: Dana
Priest and Bradley Graham, ‘NATO Faces Daunting Task of Governing Kosovo,’ Washing-
ton Post (10 June 1999) A1.
2 Alexandros Yannis, Kosovo Under International Administration: An Unfinished Conflict
(Athens 2001) 71.
3 Alan Ryan, Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force Participa-
tion in the International Force East Timor, Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Paper No.
304 (November 2000).
4 Yannis, Kosovo, 18n11.
notes to chapter twelve 515
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 515
5 Alexandros Yannis, ‘Kosovo Under International Administration,’ Survival, Vol., 43, No. 2
(2001) 36.
6 Dana Priest and Bradley Graham, ‘NATO Faced Daunting Task of Governing Kosovo,’
Washington Post (June 10, 1999) A1.
7 Sergio Vieira de Mello, ‘How Not to Run a Country: Lessons for the UN from Kosovo
and East Timor’ (UNITAR-IPS-JIIA Conference to Assess the Report on UN Peace Oper-
ations, Singapore, February 2001). 
8 The number of thirty UNMIK officials mentioned in a lecture by Bernard Kouchner about
his time as UN special representative of the secretary general (Harvard University, 16 May
2001; notes taken by author). Other figures from: UN Doc. S/2000/538, 6 June 2000,
par. 31; Koenraad van Brabant, ‘Peace-Making Through Protectorate: Six Months in Koso-
vo’ (29 November 1999) 32. 
9 International Crisis Group, ‘Waiting for UNMIK – Local Administration in Kosovo,’ Balkans
Report No. 79 (17 October 1999) 10.
10 KFOR G-5 Branch, ‘KFOR CIMIC Handbook’ (September 1999). The military end state
was defined as the point when UNMIK able to operate without KFOR support.
11 Van Brabant, ‘Peace-Making Through Protectorate,’ 52. 
12 International Crisis Group, ‘Starting from Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over,’
Balkans Report No. 83 (13 December 1999) 11. 
13 UNSCR 1244. Paragraph 10.
14 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Council Resolution
1244 (1999), S/1999/672 (12 June 1999) 10-11. UNMIK’s Office for Judicial Affairs would
be ‘responsible for the organisation and oversight of the judicial system, authenticating
legal documentation and related activities.’
15 ICG, ‘Waiting for UNMIK,’ 4.
16 Publicly, policymaker adhered to the line that the UN would assume all civil administra-
tive authority. ‘[US] Defense officials have ruled out establishing a military government
in Kosovo. Instead, civil authority is to rest initially with an international group of pro-
fessional administrators.’ Bradley Graham and Dana Priest, ‘Troops Are Ready to Enter
Kosovo,’ Washington Post (4 June 1999) A29.
17 As cited in: Richard Norton-Taylor and Stuart Miller, ‘Mines stand in the way of allied
troops: Peacekeeping Ground forces prepare for the biggest military operation in Europe
since 1945, Guardian (5 June 1999); Bradley Graham and Dana Priest, ‘Troops Are Ready
to Enter Kosovo,’ Washington Post (4 June 1999) A29. Ten days prior to entry, the Amer-
ican chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John W. Warner, had
said, ‘[m]ilitary men are going to be challenged to perform tasks unlike any they have
ever faced before.’ 
18 Dana Priest and Bradley Graham, ‘NATO Faces Daunting Task of Governing Kosovo,’
Washington Post (June 10, 1999) A1.
19 US Congress, Hearing of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subject: ‘US Policy
and NATO Military Operations in Kosovo,’ Introduction to question by Chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee Senator John W. Warner, 1 July 1999.
20 Ibid., Statement of William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, 20 July 1999.
21 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 29 January 2003).
22 Ibid. (The Hague, 13 February 2003). 
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.; Interview with Captain (rtd.) Wim Speth, CIMIC officer for Task Force Orahovac in
1999 (‘t Harde, 28 November 2002).
25 Interview with Agim Hasku (Orahovac, 11 September 2002).
26 International Crisis Group, ‘Policing the Gap: Law and Order in the New Kosovo’ Balkans
Report, (6 August 1999) 6.
516 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 516
27 Based on interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003). How-
ever, Qeska would eventually align himself with the PPDK, the political wing of the UÇK
(later PDK). See: OSCE/UNMIK, Municipal Profile: Orahovac/Rahovec (1 April 2000). 
28 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003).
29 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, 4.1 Daily Sitrep, 30 June
1999. The council had conferred with UNMIK chief De Mello, who was in Orahovac that
day for talks with both entities, thus giving the council some legitimacy.
30 ICG, ‘Waiting for UNMIK,’ 2.
31 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, folder 4.2, Daily Sitrep, 16
July 1999.
32 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report: Conflict, Interna-
tional Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford 2000) 104.
33 ICG, ‘Waiting for UNMIK,’ 4.
34 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, folder 4.2 Daily Sitrep, 20
July 1999; Ibid., Daily Sitrep, 22 July 1999. 
35 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003). According to Van
Loon, Queska may even have feared for his life.
36 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, 5.1 Daily Sitrep, 3 August
1999: ‘UNMIK has failed to mention whether they want to continue talks with Mr. Thaqi.’
On another occasion an UNMIK representative told a Dutch diplomat from the Dutch
Embassy in Skopje that the UN would locally not counter self-styled local administrations,
‘but when they monopolize and exclude others, the UN will intervene.’ CAD, Contco
KFOR I&II, Werkarchief, box 2. Pim Kraan, DCH/HH, Sitrep no 1. Verkenningsmissie
in Kosovo (6 July 1999).
37 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, 5.1 Daily Sitrep, 6 August
1999, The commander’s assessment was: ‘Positive developments concerning the start of
a dialogue between Serbs (and Roma) and Albanians. The UÇK mayor has left the town
hall again and is now replaced by previous mayor [Quazim Quesku] who has a large per-
centage of Albanians support and even Serbs.’
38 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003).
39 ICG, ‘Waiting for UNMIK,’ 3.
40 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003).
41 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, 5.1 Daily Sitrep, 7 August
1999.
42 Interview with Qazim Qeska (Orahovac, September 2002). When visiting Orahovac the
author noticed how people were generally avoiding having to answer questions about the
initial struggle for administrative power in the second half of 1999. 
43 Qeska appears to have been co-opted by the PPDK/Provisional Government. In 2000 he
appeared on their PPDK (later PDK) list in the OSCE Municipal Report for Orahovac.
Lacking popular support in Orahovac, Thaqi appears to have fallen from grace. He later
joined the more radical Albanian party LKCK. See: OSCE/UNMIK, Municipal Profile: Ora-
hovac/Rahovec (1 April 2000).
44 ICG, ‘Waiting for UNMIK,’ 11.
45 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, 5.1 Daily Sitrep, 7 August
1999.
46 OSCE/UNMIK, Municipal Profile Suharekë/Suva Reka (April 2000).
47 Ron Synovitz (RFE/RL), ‘Yugoslavia: Lawlessness Persists In Kosovo As Refugees Return’
(Urosevac, 25 June 1999).
48 Petra de Koning, ‘UÇK-bestuur: we zijn geen stamhoofden,’ NRC Handelsblad, 17 Sep-
tember 1999. 
49 OSCE Report, Kosovo/Kosova, As Seen, As Told, Part II: Regional Overviews of the Human
Rights Situation in Kosovo (June to October 1999). 
notes to chapter twelve 517
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 517
50 OSCE/Council of Europe report ‘Filling the Local Power Vacuum in Kosovo, Final Report
from Joint Expert Mission 26 July – 6 August 1999,’ as referred to in: ICG, ‘Waiting for
UNMIK.’
51 Mario Vigl, ‘Von Stunde Null keine Spur mehr,’ Hamburger Abendblatt, 24 June 1999.
52 Ibid. 
53 Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Kilch (G-5, MNB South, July 1999-December 1999) Lecture at
Allied Forces Northern Europe (Powerpoint presentation).
54 OSCE Report, Kosovo/Kosova, As Seen, As Told, Part II Regional Overviews of the Human
Rights Situation in Kosovo, June to October 1999, 113.
55 ICG, ‘Waiting for UNMIK,’ n10.
56 Ibid., 2. In this influential report on the lack of progress by the international administra-
tion in Kosovo the International Crisis Group therefore advised to co-opt the mayors in the
municipalities and leave most of the executive functions to them, while keeping the polit-
ical leadership firmly in UN hands. The report denounced the allegation that the mayors
were simply a bunch of thugs and criticized UNMIK for holding them and the Kosovar
population on a leash, failing to bring in the resources to provide a viable alternative ‘but
always telling them to wait just a little longer.’
57 CAD, Contco I&II, Werkarchief, box 5 DCBC Vraagpunten and regelingen Op Joint Guar-
antor, 13 July 1999 (PV NAVO): CoS SACEUR Gen Dieter Stockmann (GE) to Director
International Military Staff, Subject: Kosovo – Transfer of Responsibilities to Civil Agen-
cies.
58 Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Kilch (G-5, MNB South, July 1999-December 1999) Lecture at
Allied Forces Northern Europe (Powerpoint presentation). In one of its situation reports
the Dutch battalion mentioned the need for similar funds to pay local personnel in the
hospital, the firemen and garbage collectors. There are no indications, however, that these
were ever paid by the Dutch KFOR. CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages,
box 2, 4.1 Daily Sitrep, 30 June 1999.
59 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, 5.2 Daily Sitrep, 4 Septem-
ber 1999. 
60 Ibid., Folder 4.2 Daily Sitrep, 20 July 1999.
61 Ibid., Folder 5.1 Daily Sitrep, 5 August 1999.
62 ICG, ‘Waiting for UNMIK,’ 3. The ICG report stated that ‘UÇK leaders issued public
proclamations deploring crimes carried out in their name, but do not appear to have taken
any action against them.’
63 Ibid. 
64 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague, 13 February 2003).
65 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Structurele rapportages, box 2, 5.1 Daily Sitrep, 14 August
1999.
66 Ibid, box 2, 4.2 Daily Sitrep, 1 August 1999.
67 Interview with Colonel Anton van Loon (The Hague 13 February 2003). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Lecture by General (retd.) Klaus Reinhardt, ‘My Experiences in Kosovo,’ Atlantische Com-
missie (The Hague, 4 October 2001; notes taken by author).
Chapter 13
1 Interview US Army Colonel (retd.) William Phillips (16 October 2003). Confirmed by
Colonel Michael Hess in conversation with author. Hess had prepared various options for
a CIMIC Task Force. SHAPE, CIMIC Planning Considerations for Options in Kosovo
(Powerpoint presentation prepared by US Army Civil Affairs Col. Michael Hess, 1999;
on file with author).
518 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 518
2 Jackson, KFOR: The Inside Story, 18. 
3 Christopher Holshek wrote that even in 2001, ‘CMO is not yet seen as a key operational
determinant, rather than [sic] just another battlefield operating system.’ Lieutenant Colonel
Christopher Holshek, ‘The Operational Art of Civil-Military Operations: Promoting Unity
of Effort,’ in: Larry Wentz, Lessons From Kosovo (US Department of Defence: The Com-
mand and Control Research Program 2002) 288. 
4 Lieutenant Colonel Wally Z. Walters (US Army), The Doctrinal Challenge of Winning the
Peace Against Rogue States: How Lessons from Post-World War II Germany May Inform Oper-
ations Against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, USAWC Strategic Research Project, Carlisle Bar-
racks, PA (9 April 2002) 27. 
5 All first four KFOR commanders cooperated smoothly with Kouchner. Yannis, Kosovo: An
Unfinished Conflict, 22.
6 Interview with US Army Col (retd.) William Phillips, 16 October 2003.
7 Jackson, KFOR: The Inside Story, 18. 
8 Lieutenant Colonel Mark Rollo-Walker, SHAPE, Chief CIMIC Section End of Tour Report
(23 August 1999).
9 UNSCR 1244, par 6.
10 Klaus Reinhardt, KFOR – Streitkräfte für den Frieden: Tagebuckaufzeichnungen als Deutcher
Kommandeur im Kosovo (Frankfurt am Main 2002) 51-52. See also the photo section.
11 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II , Werkarchief, box 2, DCBC Vraagpunten en regelingen
Op Joint Guarantor, 13 Juli 1999: CoS SACEUR Gen Dieter Stockmann (GE) to Director
International Military Staff, Subject ‘Kosovo – Transfer of Responsibilities to Civil Agen-
cies’ (12 July 1999).
12 Interview Lieutenant Colonel Bart Haverman (KFOR legal officer 1999), Breda, 10 April
2003. 
13 Yannis, Kosovo: An Unfinished Conflict, 22.
14 Reinhardt, KFOR, 263; Yannis, Kosovo: An Unfinished Conflict, 21-23.
15 Guy-Michel Chauveau and Gian Giacomo Migone, ‘Cimic and Police: Forging the ‘miss-
ing links’ in crisis management,’ NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Committee Report Sub-
committee on Civilian Security and Cooperation, 23 March 2000; Lieutenant Colonel Mark
Rollo-Walker, SHAPE, Chief CIMIC Section End of Tour Report (23 August 1999).
16 According to US Secretary of Defense Cohen, designated CIMIC forces could only occu-
py themselves with matters such as road construction, the humanitarian crisis, refugee
resettlement.
17 Chauveau and Migone, ‘Cimic and Police: Forging the ‘missing links’ in crisis manage-
ment.’
18 NATO Allied Joined Publication 9 (AJP-9). Officially de redefinition only occurred when
NATO Military CIMIC Policy (MC 411) was approved by the North Atlantic Council in
July 2001.
19 Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Kilch (G-5, MNB South, July 1999-December 1999) MNB(S)
KFOR CIMIC Lecture at Allied Forces Northern Europe (Powerpoint Presentation, on file
with author). 
20 Holshek, ‘The Operational Art of Civil-Military Operations,’ 300.
21 Kilch, KFOR MNB(S) CIMIC Lecture.
22 Ibid.
23 KFOR CIMIC Handbook, G-5 Branch EDN 2 (No date, probably released in September
1999).
24 The early draft of NATO AJP-09 made the following distinction. CIMIC activity: ‘A mil-
itary activity intended to support the achievement of a military mission by persuing an
objective with the responsibility of a civilian authority, international or non-governmental
organization, or civilian acitivity intended to support the achievement of a civil aim by
assiting in the persuit of a military objective.’ CIMIC operation: ‘A military operation the
notes to chapter thirteen 519
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 519
primary intention and effect of which is to support a civilian authority, population, inter-
national or non-governmental organization, the effect of which is to assist in the pursuit
of a military objective.’
25 Only close scrutiny of a detailed matrix of possible civil-support tasks would have made
CIMIC officers within the brigades aware that during the first months of operations in
Kosovo, NATO CIMIC had now come to include the provision of military forces ‘to pre-
serve law and order,’ ‘operate detention facilities to support law and order’ and ‘conduct
some Civil Administrative functions until UNMIK is fully staffed.’ KFOR CIMIC Hand-
book, 1-2-2.
26 Holshek, ‘The Operational Art of Civil-Military Operations,’ 283.
27 KFOR CIMIC Handbook, 5-3-2. 
28 Lieutenant Colonel Jesper Olsen, KFOR HQ CIMIC Lecture (Powerpoint presentation, on
file with author). The French held their CIMIC meetings in the afternoon at four, when
most humanitarian workers were likely to be out in the field doing their job. 
29 From a conversation between author, a US Civil Affairs officer and an American NGO
worker. 
30 Holshek, ‘The Operational Art of Civil-Military Operations,’ 285.
31 Major J.H.J. Ouwerling, Cursus Verslag Civil Affairs Course 99/02. US Army John F.
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), Fort Bragg, 1 Febuary 1999
- 12 March 1999. See also: Anthony D. Sinnot, ‘United States Success in Peace Opera-
tions Requires Civil-Military Cooperation,’ Article in syllabus distributed at the World Wide
Civil Affairs Conference (New York 2001).
32 Holshek, ‘The Operational Art of Civil-Military Operations,’ 304.
33 Interviews with Novib employees Atnufa Tola and Rob van Bentum by S.M. Volters,
‘CIMIC: 1+1=3. Civiel Militaire Samenwerking in Crisisgebieden.’ KIM Scriptie (Den Helder
2000); Correspondence between author and Astrid van Genderen-Stort (Letter received 3
August 2004)
34 Larry Minear, Ted van Baarda and Marc Sommers, NATO and Humanitarian Action in
Kosovo (Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies and the Humanitarian Law
Consultancy Occasional Paper no 38, 2000) 31. Interviews conducted by the authors
between August and September 1999. The ‘standoffish’ posture by the French is men-
tioned by Ivo Daalder as well as in Holshek, ‘The Operational Art of Civil-Military Oper-
ations,’ 286. Ivo Daalder in: ‘A NewsHour With Jim Lehrer: Law & Order,’ 5 July 1999. 
35 Olsen, KFOR HQ CIMIC Lecture; Holshek, ‘The Operational Art of Civil-Military Oper-
ations,’ 305.
36 Kilch, MNB(S) CIMIC Lecture.
37 Minear, Van Baarda and Sommers, NATO and Humanitarian Action in Kosovo, 37.
38 Holshek, ‘The Operational Art of Civil-Military Operations,’ 287.
39 Quoted in: Minear, Van Baarda and Sommers, NATO and Humanitarian Action in Koso-
vo, 28. 
40 The author of the report was quick to emphasize the ‘honourable exception’ provided by
units such as the British, whose frequent foot patrols were reassuring to ‘almost all inhab-
itants of Kosovo’s capital.’ ICG Balkans Report no. 83, Starting from Scratch in Kosovo: The
Honeymoon is Over (13 December 1999) 2n2. See also: W. de Wolf, ‘CIMIC From the Aid
Organisations’ Perspective,’ in: M.T.I. Bollen, R.V.A. Janssens, H.F.M. Kirkels, J.L.M.
Soeters (eds.), Civil-Military Cooperation: A Marriage of Reason (NL Arms 2002, Nether-
lands Review of Military Studies; Alblasserdam 2002) 71; Donna Winslow, ‘Strange Bed-
fellows: NGOs and the Military in Humanitarian Crisis,’ in: Ibid., 53.
41 Donna Winslow, ‘Strange Bedfellows,’ 63n1; Francis Kofi Abiew and Tom Keating, ‘NGOs
and UN Peacekeeping Operations: Strange Bedfellows,’ International Peacekeeping, Vol. 6,
No. 2 (Summer 1999) 89-111.
42 M. Bollen and R. Beeres, ‘On the Conditions for CIMIC during Humanitarian Opera-
520 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 520
tions,’ in: Bollen, Janssens, Kirkels, and Soeters (ed.), Civil-Military Cooperation: A Mar-
riage of Reason, 29. 
43 Minear, Van Baarda and Sommers, NATO and Humanitarian Action in Kosovo.
44 NATO forces became known for delivering on their promises. ‘I have nothing but posi-
tive things to say about NATO,’ observed one NGO country director about his experience
in Macedonia. He said that after NATO built the camps overnight, NATO officials told
NGO workers, in effect: ‘You’re in charge. We’re here to help you. Tell us what to do and
we’ll do it.’ Minear, Van Baarda and Sommers, NATO and Humanitarian Action in Kosovo,
22-23. 
45 KFOR CIMIC Handbook 1-1-1.
46 Charles Moskos, The Media and the Military in Peace and Humanitarian Operation (Chicago
2000).
47 Donna Winslow, ‘Strange Bedfellows,’ 50.
48 Klaus Reinhardt, KFOR – Streitkräfte für den Frieden: Tagebuckaufzeichnungen als Deutcher
Kommandeur im Kosovo (Frankfurt am Main 2002) 52.
49 Minear, Van Baarda and Sommers, NATO and Humanitarian Action in Kosovo, 29.
50 Donna Winslow, ‘Strange Belfellows,’ 61.
51 Kilch, MNB(S) CIMIC presentation. 
52 Lieutenant Colonel Van Loon in lecture on his experiences in Kosovo during CIMIC course
at the Royal Military Academy in Breda (November 2000).
53 CAD, 1 (NL) Contco KFOR I&II , Werkarchief, box 2, Maj Abels to G-3, G-1, G-4 OPS
BLS (Urgent), Uitbreiding OTAS pers en mat; Ibid., box 7, C-Tasfkorce Orahovac to Kol
van Dullemen, Otasverwijzing 11(NL) Adfra; Ibid., box 4, Dir OPS BLS (Kol Van Dulle-
men wnd) aan C-1 (NL) Arty Bn RA, 29 juli. Betreft: Otasverwijzing LSO-groepen.’
54 Since Van Loon had a good understanding with his colleague Colonel Koen Gijsbers, who
was in command of the Dutch engineer battalion, the latter lent him one captain in Octo-
ber to perform additional liaison tasks. He had twenty-five personnel on designated CIMIC
functions within his engineer battalions.
55 Correspondence between author and Astrid van Genderen-Stort (Letter received 4 August
2004).
56 The European Union, which had committed itself to the economic reform of Kosovo, was
not represented in Orahovac and was the slowest of all UNMIK pillars to emerge all over
Kosovo.
57 The battalion lauded the THW for their extremely professional and quick response to
instanly erupting crises. They specialised in technical knowlegde and provided the neces-
sary materials. Van Loon later wondered why the Netherlands did not have ‘such a club.’
He regarded this more useful than creating eleborate CIMIC structures with civilian spe-
cialists in uniform or reservist.
58 Correspondence between author and Astrid van Genderen-Stort (6 June 2003).
59 CAD, 1 (NL) Arty Bn KFOR I, Correspondentie Archief, box 2, Louis Gentile (Head of
Office, UNHCR Djakovica) to Van Loon, 1 November 1999. Letter by Van Genderen-Stort
reproduced in: Abels, Licht boven Orahovac, 48.
60 Yannis, Kosovo: An Unfinished Conflict, 35.
61 Reinhardt, KFOR, 56.
62 Jennifer Leaning during lecture on Kosovo 1999 at Harvard University (June 2001; notes
taken by author); Knut G. Kniste, Administrative Capacity Building in Kosovo, 10.
63 Sergio Vieira de Mello, ‘How Not to Run a Country: Lessonsfor the UN from Kosovo and
East Timor’ (UNITAR-IPS-JIIA Conference to Assess the Report on UN Peace Operations,
Singapore, February 2001).
64 ‘Support Dwindles for Kosovo Rebels,’ Washington Post, 17 October 1999.
65 UNA-USA, Peacekeeping at the Brink: Recommandations for Ugent International Action
on Kosovo (A report of the Project on Finding Solution for Peace in Kosovo, Febuary
2000) 3.
notes to chapter thirteen 521
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  17:32  Pagina 521
66 Yannis, Kosovo: An Unfinished Conflict, 41. 
67 Reinhardt, KFOR, 244-249. 
68 Ibid., 251.
69 Ibid., 263.
70 OSCE/UNMIK, Municipal Profile: Orahovac / Rahovec (1 April 2000).
71 ‘Ein Verfassungsrahmen fur das Kosovo,’ Frankfurther Algemeiner Zeitung (16 May 2001).
While Daan Everts, the Dutch deputy SRSG in charge of the elections, told a local news-
paper that ‘those elections should hand over 70% of self-government,’ according to his
counterpart at civil administration, Tom Könings, the November 2001 elections were just
‘a step towards self-government.’ Cited in: Knut G. Kniste, Administrative Capacity Build-
ing in Kosovo, 10.
72 Lecture by Bernard Kouchner about his time as UN Special Representative of the Secre-
tary General in Kosovo (Harvard University, 16 May 2001; notes taken by author). For
examples of Kouchner’s style of government, including his autonomous decision to intro-
duce the deutsche mark, see: Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite, 64.
73 Olsen, KFOR HQ CIMIC Lecture.
74 Edith B. Wilkie, Beth C. DeGrasse and Richard W. Roan, A Force for Peace and Security:
US and Allied Commander’s Views of the Military Role in Peace Operations and the Impact
on Terrorism of States in Conflict (Report, Peace Through Law Education Fund 2002) 55.
Conclusion
1 William J. Doll and Steven Metz, ‘The Army and Multinational Peace Operations: Prob-
lems and Solutions,’ Report of a Roundtable Sponsored by the SSI, US Army War Col-
lege and the US Army Peacekeeping Institute (29 December 1993).
2 Harry Summers, On Strategy, 21. 
3 A. van Loon, ‘CIMIC in the Early Phases of the KFOR Mission in Kosovo’ in: M.T.I.
Bollen, R.V.A. Janssens, H.F.M. Kirkels, and J.L.M. Soeters (eds.), Civil-Military Coopera-
tion: A Marriage of Reason, NL Arms 2002 (Alblasserdam 2002) 126.
4 NATO CIMIC Policy, MC 411.
5 In NATO Allied Joint Publication 09 CIMIC was defined as ‘[t]he resources and arrange-
ments which support the relationship between NATO commanders and the national author-
ities, civil and military, and civil populations in an area where NATO military forces are
or plan to be employed.’ The emphasis on ‘resources and arrangements’ indicates CIMIC
was approached and seen as a unit or ‘arrangement,’ rather than a technique applied by
soldiers. NATO AJP 09 (1997-2001).
6 Ministerie van Defensie, Kosovo Evaluatie (2001); Koninklijke Landmacht, Handleiding
CIMIC (2002).
7 Kouchner pre-departure press conference (UNMIK; 17 December 2000). 
8 Gwaltney and Weston, ‘Soldiers as Cops, Judges and Jailers: Law Enforcement by the US
Military in Peace Operations,’ US Army Center for Law and Military Operations (Web-
site); CLAMO, Law and Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999-2000.
9 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘The Role of Military Forces in Managing Public Security Chal-
lenges: As Little as Possible or Filling the Gap?,’ Revised Draft for IPA book edited by
Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Sidhu (17 April 2002) 7.
10 Quoted in William Drozdiak, ‘Bush Plan Worries Europeans: Removing US Troops from
Balkans Is Seen as Divisive,’ Washington Post (24 October 2000).
522 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 522
Sources of Illustrations
p. 29 US soldiers as liberators in Italy, 1943: US Army Center for Military
History
P. 39 Looting in Germany in 1945: US Army Center for Military History
p. 43 Numbers US Military Government personnel: Oliver Fredericksen, The
American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953 (Karlsruhe 1953) p.
33.
p. 62 US helicopter in Vietnam: US Army Center for Military History
p. 76 Khmer Rouge soldiers: Source unknown
p. 92 UNTAC pamphlet: Australian Defence Force Academy Library
p. 99 Opening of a school in a Cambodian village: Institute for Maritime His-
tory, Royal Dutch Navy 
p. 108 UNTAC checkpoint Cambodia: Institute for Maritime History, Royal
Dutch Navy 
p. 110 Dutch Marines in crowd and riot control gear: Institute for Maritime
History, Royal Dutch Navy 
p. 127 UN peacekeeper posts instructions: Institute for Maritime History, Royal
Dutch Navy
p. 147 Dutch Marines protecting a polling site: Institute for Maritime Histo-
ry, Royal Dutch Navy
p. 162 Helicopter delivers food aid in Somalia: Australian War Memorial (Photo
by Gary Ramage)
p. 169 UNITAF “Psychological Operations” leaflet: www. psywar.org, Aerial Pro-
paganda Leaflet Database
p. 174 US troops protect food aid: Hollandse Hoogte 
p. 183 US Marine at checkpoint in Mogadishu: Hollandse Hoogte 
p. 202 Australian soldier protects aid distribution: Australian War Memorial
(Photo by T.R. Dex)
p. 208 Australian foot patrol: Australian War Memorial (Photo by George Git-
toes)
p. 220 Australian and Somali ‘bandit’: Australia War Memorial (Photo by
George Gittoes)
p. 231 Somali policemen on patrol: Australian War Memorial (Photo by George
Gittoes)
p. 290 NATO artillery moves into Kosovo: 11 Afdeling Rijdende Artillerie,
Koninklijke Landmacht
523
Soldiers opmaakhf13  15-11-2005  13:38  Pagina 523
p. 303 ‘KLA Dog’: Cartoon by Steve Bell for The Guardian (17 June 1999)
p. 305 Kosovar Albanian insurgents embrace: 11 Afdeling Rijdende Artillerie,
Koninklijke Landmacht
p. 316 Dutch checkpoint in Kosovo: 11 Afdeling Rijdende Artillerie, Koninklijke
Landmacht
p. 325 Dutch soldiers detain Kosovar Albanian teenagers: Hollandse Hoogte
(photo by Martin Roemers)
p. 347 Van Loon talks to Serb villagers: 11 Afdeling Rijdende Artillerie, Konin-
klijke Landmacht
p. 353 Mass grave uncovered in Kosovo: HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
(ARRC)
p. 381 UN flag over Pristina: HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)
p. 394 High level civil-military cooperation: HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
(ARRC)
p. 396 KFOR helicopter: HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)
524 soldiers and civil power
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 524
Index
In this index passim after a number is used for a cluster of references in close but
not consecutive sequence. A continuous discussion over two or more pages is
indicated by a span of page numbers, e.g., “57-59.” An “n” after a number indi-
cates a reference to an endnote.
525
A Bell for Adano, 29-30, 369, 415, 455n
Aartsen, Jozias van, 345, 514
Afghanistan, 167, 429
Aideed, 164-170, 176-179, 193-196, 199, 203, 205-
206, 214, 217, 229-237 passim, 241-242, 476,
479-482, 486, 490
Air-Land Battle concept, 67, 215
Akashi, Yasushi, 82-88, 96, 106, 116, 121, 123,
126, 128-137, 140, 144-146, 152-155, 169
Aker, Peter van den, 309, 320, 356, 501n
Albright, Madeleine, confrontation with Powell,
173; and Bosnia, 251, 264, 293, 497, 522n; and
Kosovo, 377
Algerian war (1954-62), 56, 86, 459n
Ali Mahdi, 164-166, 170, 177-178, 196, 199, 229-
230, 232, 474
Allied Military Government in Occupied Territory
(AMGOT), 30-31 (see also ‘Mediterranean
model’ for civil affairs)
Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC): and Bosnia,
277; CIMIC and, 283; Kosovo, 294-295, 317,
397, 449
Disarmament: Dutch policy within UNTAC, 113-
116, 122-123, 154-155, 419; UNITAF policy, 175,
177-180, 187-188, 193, 210, 240-241; in Bosnia,
277; in Kosovo, 295, 303-311, 324, 334-335, 417
Arrest and detention, under emergency regula-
tions in Malaya, 50, 55; by UNTAC, 104, 132,
154; by UNITAF, 220; by KFOR 319-320, 332,
336, 361-365 passim, 407, 409, 457n, 504n,
519n; by INTERFET, 424.
Atjeh, 47 (see also Netherlands East Indies)
Auftragstaktik (see Mission Command)
ANZAC (Australia New Zealand Army Corps),
208
Australia, 210, 227, 222-3, 315, 480
Australian Army: experience in counterinsur-
gency operations, 59, 60, 64, 222-223, 226-
227; continental defense and, 223-224; praise
of role in Somalia, 221.
Auxiliary Security Force (ASF), 195-196, 231-232,
233-235, 238, 487-488n.  
Barre, Siad, 164-165.
Beek, Relus ter, 77, 97, 109, 462-463n
Beirut, 173, 184, 243, 274
Belgium: liberation in WWII, 26, 32, 35, 36, 41;
contribution to UNTAES, 495n; forces in
Somalia, 170, 182, 183, 194, 202, 239, 477n
Bijsterbosch, Jaap, 78, 118, 119-123 
Bildt, Carl, 249-251, 254, 263, 370, 392
Blair, Tony, 264, 267, 293
Boer War, 48
Bokhoven, Herman, 319-320, 329, 506n
Borneo, 59-60, 64, 222-223, 485
Briggs, Harold, 56-58
Briggs Plan, 57, 226
Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP), 148,
149, 449n
Burma, 49, 51, 56
Bush, George H.W., 69, 79, 168, 172, 177-178,
186-187, 190, 196-197, 199, 248
Bush, George W., 33, 425
Caligari, John, 214, 216
Callwell, Charles, 458n
Cammaert, Patrick, 95, 99, 114-115, 117, 119-120,
124, 132-133, 138-139, 141-145, 149, 391, 418
Canada, 132, 212; and Civil Affairs, 35, 37, 45,
401; Canadian Army in Somalia, 170, 182, 183,
185, 194; in Bosnia, 280-281, 491n; in Kosovo,
364
Carabinieri, 30, 269-270
CENTCOM (Central Command), 169, 172, 178,
185, 188-190, 195, 201, 481n
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 176, 192,
449n, 479n
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 525
526 soldiers and civil power
Chapter VI (of the UN charter), 80, 82, 169
Chapter VII (of the UN charter), 82, 169, 189,
246, 480
Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO CIMIC): during
the Cold War, 67-68, 275-276, 282-283, 391,
398, 426; CIMIC doctrine and definition, 16,
283, 391, 397-398, 422, 453-454n, 500n, 522n;
‘NATO CIMIC 2000’, 283, 500n; CIMIC
Group North, 283-284, 397, 453n; CIMIC
Group South, 283; British view of, 284; CIMIC
Centers, 275, 279, 395, 400-402, 422
Civil-military cooperation (in counterinsurgency
operations), 19, 45, 49-64 passim
Civil Affairs Division (CAD), 27, 31-32, 449n
Civil Military Operations Teams (CMOT), 192,
194, 204-205, 236-237
Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), 191,
275, 401. 
Clark, Wesley K., 250-251, 254, 258, 264-265,
270-271, 273, 293, 294, 317-318, 321, 334, 344,
345, 373, 379, 394
Clarke, Walter S., 197, 199, 480n
Clay, Lucius, 36, 40, 42, 265, 457n
‘Clear and Hold’, 65
Clinton, William J.: and ‘nation building’, 21,
248; and Somalia, 168, 196, 236, 242-243; and
Bosnia, 247-267 passim, 294; and Kosovo, 293,
377; and ‘zero-casualty edict’, 243
Cohen, William S., 264, 273, 294, 344, 374,
516n, 519n
Combined Action Platoons (CAP), 64, 449n,
460n
Constabulary forces: in occupied Germany, 39,
40, 48; (see also MSU, Carabinieri, and Korps
Marechaussee)
Cyprus, 59, 70, 284
Dayton Accord (General Framework for Peace),
6, 245-292 passim; silver bullet clause and,
251, 252, 258, 259, 491n; major weaknesses of,
248-251; ‘GFAP-gap’, 275
Diem Bien Phu, 47
Displaced Persons (DPs), 35, 37-41, 255, 292,
296, 349, 351, 374, 398
Dukers, Herman, 76, 78, 85, 87, 97, 107-109,
112-116, 121, 139, 216, 418, 466n
East Timor, 20, 157, 189, 235, 251, 255, 284, 369-
371, 409-410, 421, 426
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 11, 12, 15, 21, 27, 31, 35,
40, 41, 427
El-Salvador, 13, 68, 80, 250
Emergency regulations (state of emergency), 50,
52, 55, 59, 317, 322
Escalation dominance, 88, 257, 391
Exit strategy, 66, 172-173, 241, 247-248, 285; and
‘quick fix solutions’, 63, 225, 249
Force protection: CIMIC as a tool for, 17-18, 281,
423; excessive US focus on, 184-185, 195, 243,
252, 261, 335, 416; U.S. civil affairs units and,
278-279, 401, British approach to, 351; intelli-
gence and, 118, 333; arrest of war crimes sus-
pects and, 265-267, 363.
France: Vichy France, 11, 27; liberation in WWII,
31-32, 35, 41
French Foreign Legion, 67, 86, 170, 175-176, 186
Genderen Stort, Astrid van, 349, 351, 408, 510n
General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP,
see Dayton Accord)
Gijsbers, Koen, 521n
Grave, Frank de, 357, 361, 421, 514n
Grivas, George, 59
Haiti: and ‘Small wars’, 61; Operation Uphold
Democracy, 18, 20, 189, 247-248, 250, 253,
256-258, 278, 285, 315, 339, 341, 393, 421, 424,
493
Hearts and minds campaign, 54-55, 58, 63, 65;
term introduced by Templer, 57; a platitude
since Vietnam, 55; in Cambodia, 96, 99-103,
153; in Somalia, 180, 185, 226-227; in Bosnia,
280-281; in Kosovo, 332, 402
Hersey, John (see A Bell for Adano)
Ho Chi Minh, 47
Holbrooke, Richard, 247, 250-255 passim, 259,
263, 267, 292-293, 491n, 494n, 498n
Huijssoon, Willem, 87-93 passim, 107, 114-116,
123, 129-130, 136-138, 144-145, 154-155
Hurley, David, 200-239 passim, 391, 419-420
Hussein, Saddam, 69, 78, 172
Intelligence: counterinsurgency and, 48-58
passim, 63, 65, 428; UNTAC, 87, 110, 115, 119,
139, 144, 418; UNITAF, 184, 200, 202, 206,
210-218 passim, 226-229, 235, 239;
IFOR/SFOR, 268, 270, 274; KFOR, 300, 301,
309, 321, 327, 330, 330, 353, 355, 358, 359, 362,
376, 388, 406
ICRC (International Committee of the Red
Cross), 98, 167, 398, 453n
ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia), 265-273 passim, 353-364
passim, 361-362, 364, 407, 421, 495n, 512n,
515n
INTERFET (Intervention Force East Timor, see
East Timor)
IRA (Irish Republican Army), 50, 450n (see also
Northern Ireland)
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 526
index 527
Iraq: 1920-21 revolt, 49; and Operation Desert
Storm (1991), 69, 77, 172-173, 184, 189, 278;
and Operation Provide Comfort (1991), 18, 20,
33, 78, 155, 190-191; and Operation Iraqi Free-
dom (2003 - ), 33, 252, 280
Jackon, Sir Michael (Mike), 16, 267, 263, 294-
295, 300-321 passim, 332-354 passim, 362, 370,
373-374, 379, 384-385, 391-396 passim, 404,
409-410, 413, 417-418, 426
Japan: post-WWII occupation of, 21, 26, 33, 36-
41, 38, 49, 51, 325, 372, 428; and UNTAC, 91,
128, 132, 132, 135-136, 143
Johnston, Robert B., 169-170, 175, 178, 188-189,
194, 197, 202, 208, 227, 229, 237
Joint Chief of Staff Directive No. 1067 (JCS
1067), 33, 41-43
Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS,
Kosovo), 411-412
Joulwan, George, 246, 252, 256, 263, 265, 275,
432, 492-493n
Karadzic, Radovan, 248, 258-259, 265, 266-268,
271-273, 357, 496n.
Kelly, Michael J., 182, 184, 189, 190, 197, 201,
206, 221, 224, 227, 231, 232, 234-240 passim,
311, 439
Kenian Emergency, 459n
Kennedy, John F., 64, 174
Kitson, Frank, 46, 58, 59-60, 70, 459n
Klein, Jacques P., 247, 264, 272
Korff, Fritz von, 298-300, 304, 314, 318, 319, 328,
330, 374, 383
Korps Marechaussee: in the Netherlands East
Indies, 48; in peace operations, 111, 326, 329,
331, 361, 420
Kosovo Police Service (KPS), 341, 450
Kouchner, Bernard, 308, 338, 347, 356, 369, 370,
384, 395, 405, 410-412, 424, 507n, 511n, 515n.
522n
KPC (see TMK)
Kroon, Luuk, 361
Krulak, Charles, 185
Kuwait, 69, 78, 190
Law of Occupation: The Hague Convention
(1907), 26; Fourth Geneva Convention, 455n;
applicability to UNITAF, 189-190, 227
LDK (Lidhja Demokratike te Kosovos, Democratic
League of Kosovo), 377-379, 412
‘Lessons learned’ (or lack thereof): in counterin-
surgency operations, 47-50, 66-67, 223-225,
250-251, 428; in peace operations (general)
256-257, 425, 428; UNTAC, 154-155, 157-158,
473n; UNITAF, 161, 224, 243; IFOR/SFOR,
278, 282; KFOR, 289, 297, 394
Loon, Anton van, 299-301, 307, 309, 315, 318,
322-324, 328-363 passim, 374-380, 387-388,
407-408, 413, 420-421
Lorenz, Frederick, 185, 188-189, 231-232, 234,
236, 237
Low intensity operations, 46, 58, 60, 61, 67
MacArthur, Douglas, 36, 82
Mao Tse-Tung, 47, 59, 226
Marechaussee (See Korps Marechaussee)
Marshall, George C., 11, 12, 26-27
Marshall Plan, 33
Martial law: compared to state of emergency, 50;
as an option for KFOR, 318, 338; and peace
operations, 425
McNamara, Dennis, 128, 132, 133, 349, 361, 514n
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), 98, 141, 204, 221
‘Mediterranean model’ (for civil affairs), 31, 278,
392
Mellor, William, 199, 201, 231
Military Government, 19, 25, 48, 427; and the
definition of civil affairs, 26-27; School of Mili-
tary Government, 27; OMGUS (Office of Mili-
tary Government US), 40; KFOR mission
compared to, 20, 289, 324-325, 391; UNITAF
mission compared to, 238; neglected in mod-
ern civil affairs doctrine, 13, 68, 191, 276
Military governor: Eisenhower as, 35; David Hur-
ley on, 227; Wesley Clark on, 265; Klaus Rein-
hardt on, 389; Van Loon on, 380, 421
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW),
46, 277, 402
Military Technical Agreement (MTA), 295, 353,
375, 293, 299
Milosevic, Slobodan, 246, 248, 272, 289, 291-
294, 346, 352, 354, 356, 364, 371, 373, 378, 412
Minimum force philosophy, 49, 55, 59-61, 65,
109, 123, 256, 458, 493n
Mission Command, 215, 372, 418, 483-484n
‘Mission creep’, 11, 161, 173, 174, 185, 188, 191,
192, 195, 196, 228, 236, 242-243, 254, 257,
260-285 passim, 339, 352, 392, 398
Mitrovica, 334, 345, 348, 366, 382, 385,395, 417
Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG,
UNTAC), 96-97, 116, 120, 136, 138-139, 141,
148
Mladic, Ratko, 256, 267, 268, 271, 357
Mozambique, 13, 80, 250
MUP (Yugoslav Ministry of the Interior Special
Police), 258, 270-271, 291-292, 299-300, 327,
329, 348, 355, 493n, 497n, 511n
Namibia, 13, 79, 80, 84, 104, 126, 250
‘Nation building’, 15, 18, 20, 21, 33, 100-101, 161,
168, 174, 190, 196, 197, 199, 239, 242
Netherlands East Indies, 29, 46-48, 56, 459n 
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 527
528 soldiers and civil power
Newbold, Gregory, 174-178, 193-194, 204-206,
478-479n
North African Campaign (WWII), 11, 25, 27, 31,
57, 427
North Atlantic Council (NAC), 246, 262, 320,
329, 337, 363, 365
Northern Ireland (see also IRA), 60, 67, 116,
208, 261, 284, 315, 317, 332, 333, 393
Oakley, Robert B., 169, 170, 175-178, 180, 192-
203 passim, 227-242 passim, 311, 474n,  476n,
486-488n
Office of the High Representative (OHR, Bosnia),
249-251, 262-264, 272-277 passim, 494-495n
OSCE (Organization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe): in Bosnia, 249, 262, 275,
282; in Kosovo,  292, 294, 296, 300, 324,
326, 340, 341, 350, 361, 371, 376, 380-383, 385,
395, 406, 408, 411
Palestine, 49, 50, 51, 52, 284, 428
Peace enforcement, 21, 70, 79, 88, 157, 243, 246,
257, 250, 269, 401
Plunkett, Mark, 105, 131, 132, 338
Pol Pot, 81, 84, 126, 143, 473n
‘Police actions’ (see Netherlands East Indies)
PU (Policia Ushtarake, UÇK Military Police), 322-
323, 382, 450
Powell Doctrine (see Weinberger-Powell Doctrine) 
Powell, Colin, 66, 69, 168, 172-173, 199, 236
Psychological operations, 169-170, 217
Public safety officers, 35, 326
Rambouillet Agreement, 292-295, 316, 377, 500n
Rice, Condoleeza, 425
Rose, Sir Michael, 243, 267
Rugova, Ibrahim, 292, 377, 378, 380, 410-412
Rules of Engagement (ROE): in Cambodia, 113,
122; in Somalia, 182-183, 186-188, 209, 213,
215, 219; in Haiti, 493n; in Bosnia, 246, 256,
270; in Kosovo, 305, 318, 318, 337, 356, 363,
364
Rwanda, 15, 155-156, 243, 245, 417
Sanderson, John M., 20, 76, 83, 84-106 passim,
114-157 passim, 315, 416, 464n, 467n, 469n,
473
Sauer, Wolfgang, 362, 383, 402
‘Search and destroy’, 63, 65, 214
Security sector reform, 424
Shalikashvili, John, 251-252, 265, 403, 491n
Shelton, Henry H., 425
Sihanouk, Norodom, 80-82, 116, 129, 131, 149
Small Wars Manual (US Marine Corps), 61-63,
459
Smith, Leighton W., 15, 27, 246, 249, 251-252,
258-266 passim
Solana, Javier, 264, 268, 273, 321, 345, 364, 394,
404, 509n
Soviet Union, 12, 39, 41, 45, 64, 68, 80, 81, 143,
164, 167, 173, 194, 223, 276
Special Forces, 268, 301, 364; U.S. Army Special
Forces (Green Berets), 63-64, 257; British
(Special Air Service), 59, 64, 202, 211, 265,
268, 357, 451n, 495n; Dutch Army and Marine
Corps, 257, 267, 459, 512, 515; German (Kom-
mando Spezial Kräfte), 268, 357, 512
Speth, Willem, 330, 401, 406, 407
Srebrenica, 114, 124, 246, 248, 250, 262, 267,
268, 274, 320, 345, 498n
Stanhope, Dick, 204, 228-237 passim
‘Strategic corporal’, 183
Summers, Harry, 66, 460
Templer, Gerald, 32, 57-59, 226, 399, 428
Thaci, Hashim, 304, 306, 377-379, 384, 411
Thompson, Robert, 54-59, 224-226
‘Three Block War’ (see Charles Krulak)
TMK (Kosovo Protection Corps), 306, 308-310,
341, 358
Truman, Harry S., 33, 40, 41
Tudjman, Franco, 246, 248
United Nations Operation in Congo (UNOC), 70,
451, 461
United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNO-
SOM I, 1992), 167, 170
United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNO-
SOM II, 1993-1995), 172, 178, 196, 201, 230-
242, 267
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR),
97, 246, 250, 255-257, 267, 271, 300
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
(UNRRA), 41
United Nations Transitional Authority Eastern
Slavonia (UNTAES), 20, 254, 264, 339, 421,
493n, 495n
US Marine Corps, 61, 63, 119, 139, 169, 182, 191,
337
Vercammen, Patrick, 230, 236, 237, 477n, 481n,
484n, 488n
Warner, John W., 373, 374, 516
Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, 66, 173, 243, 249,
252, 285, 417
Westerndorp, Carlos, 264, 273-274, 495n
Westmoreland, William C., 63-64
Wilhelm, Charles, 178, 181, 203
Yom Kippur War (1973), 66
Zinni, Anthony, 178, 191, 195-196, 201, 229, 232,
425, 480n, 486n
Soldiers opmaakhf13  14-11-2005  15:56  Pagina 528
